Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Pharoah]

"He says color is objectively out there... but then says two diff organisms, human and alien, could see the same object as different colors, green and blue."

He said what is out there is a surface reflecting x Nm wavelengths. The alien sees it as blue and we see it as green. Who cares? We can talk lawn care for hours with a simple caveat because we see the grass pretty much as it is.

"This is incoherent. If the object was objectively colored, say, X, and we perceive reality directly and pretty much as it is, how is it okay for us to see this X colored object as green and the alien to see it as red, or us to see it as red and the alien as green."

The object has a surface reflectance of x Nm and the way we see x Nm is as green or blue. How should we see a surface reflectance in order to see it "as it is"?

In terms of the difference in dr and ir...did you hear the one about the speckled hen?

In terms of the difference in dr and ir...did you hear the one about the speckled hen?
Why did the speckled hen cross the road?... that one?... Because it didn't want to be accused of crossing indirectly

 

[smcder]

The problem of the speckled hen - Wikipedia

"A. J. Ayer suggested that if we are unable to enumerate speckles accurately, then it is incorrect to suggest that the "sense-data" provides a definite number of speckles despite the fact that the hen does have a definite number of them, clearly outlined."

As an argument against indirect perception. If we perceive via sense-datum, we should know how many speckles, instead we have to look and count.

 

[Pharoah]

The problem of the speckled hen - Wikipedia

"A. J. Ayer suggested that if we are unable to enumerate speckles accurately, then it is incorrect to suggest that the "sense-data" provides a definite number of speckles despite the fact that the hen does have a definite number of them, clearly outlined."

As an argument against indirect perception. If we perceive via sense-datum, we should know how many speckles, instead we have to look and count.

Therefore we do not perceive via sense-datum? Isn’t sense-datum passé?

 

[Soupie]

The object has a surface reflectance of x Nm and the way we see x Nm is as green or blue. How should we see a surface reflectance in order to see it "as it is"?

There are two problems with DR claims about perception and color.

DR (1) color is "out there" and objective, and (2) we see what's out there pmaii.

DR then claim (1) one organism can see object X as color green and diff organism can see object as color blue.

Ergo color is not "out there" rather its internal to the organism. Surface reflectance is out there, not color.

(2) if two organisms can see object X as radically different as blue and green, then saying we see object X pmaii is so vague as to be meaningless.

But note, it's still correct for a DR to say we perceive reality directly. We don't perceive sense datum or brain states. Rather we perceive what's out there via brain states.

All of that last paragraph needs to be examined, but nothing more urgently than:

"And both approaches are comfortable saying we perceive reality pmaii. And in my opinion, that's a very dubious claim."

1. We need to see exactly what claim "they" are making (see for example Sankey's paper I posted above) or rather what range of claims as I suspect what "as it is" means is not a matter of creed.

It's irrelevant. IR claim we perceive sense data and DR admit causal indirectness. In both cases, seeing reality pmaii is so vague that it's meaningless to assert this.

Neither approach denies that there is an objective surface out there (hence realism). But both approaches describe a perception that is ultimately subjective and uniquely human, and therefore limited. True, it might be the best we can get! but it's still limited in the access it provides to reality as it is.

2. We need to understand what you mean by "as it is" - you've admitted above it's "not completely different" -and there's enough room between the vaguenesses of PMAII and "not completely different" to claim overlap.

My own take is that because tables are made up of quarks doesn't mean there aren't really tables, there really are! And I see them as they are - as tables. Etc etc.

I've said the claim that we perceive reality pmaii, is a category error (for lack of better term).

Perception is a process of one thing (an organism NS) changing in response to the changes of another thing (the environment).

Asking if the changes to the organism are pretty much like the changes to the environment is not helpful. We can ask how sensitive or fine grain the changes in the organism are and how many changes in the environment it is sensitive to, but these changes need not (and I argue cannot) allow us to perceive reality as it is in any meaningful sense. (This claim is too strong. I need to be more clear here.)

The example of two organisms perceive the same thing as blue and green is all I need to confirm my point.

We could say perceiving surface texture X as green or blue is close enough to say we are perceiving it pmaii, but that's stretching the phrase "pretty much" too thin imo.

 

[smcder]

Therefore we do not perceive via sense-datum? Isn’t sense-datum passé?

This was in response to @Soupie:

"The point I'm trying to make is, based on Kane's video, teller difference between DR and IR is so minuscule as to be mmeaningless."

 

[smcder]

There are two problems with DR claims about perception and color.

DR (1) color is "out there" and objective, and (2) we see what's out there pmaii.

DR then claim (1) one organism can see object X as color green and diff organism can see object as color blue.

Ergo color is not "out there" rather its internal to the organism. Surface reflectance is out there, not color.

(2) if two organisms can see object X as radically different as blue and green, then saying we see object X pmaii is so vague as to be meaningless.

But note, it's still correct for a DR to say we perceive reality directly. We don't perceive sense datum or brain states. Rather we perceive what's out there via brain states.


It's irrelevant. IR claim we perceive sense data and DR admit causal indirectness. In both cases, seeing reality pmaii is so vague that it's meaningless to assert this.

Neither approach denies that there is an objective surface out there (hence realism). But both approaches describe a perception that is ultimately subjective and uniquely human, and therefore limited. True, it might be the best we can get! but it's still limited in the access it provides to reality as it is.


I've said the claim that we perceive reality pmaii, is a category error (for lack of better term).

Perception is a process of one thing (an organism NS) changing in response to the changes of another thing (the environment).

Asking if the changes to the organism are pretty much like the changes to the environment is not helpful. We can ask how sensitive or fine grain the changes in the organism are and how many changes in the environment it is sensitive to, but these changes need not (and I argue cannot) allow us to perceive reality as it is in any meaningful sense. (This claim is too strong. I need to be more clear here.)

The example of two organisms perceive the same thing as blue and green is all I need to confirm my point.

We could say perceiving surface texture X as green or blue is close enough to say we are perceiving it pmaii, but that's stretching the phrase "pretty much" too thin imo.

"Ergo color is not "out there" rather its internal to the organism. Surface reflectance is out there, not color."

Kane n says we see surface reflectance as color.

As far as green or blue what difference does it make "objectively"? The important quality is surface reflectance. You miss the point of the alien lawn care story.

 

[Soupie]

We can ask how sensitive or fine grain the changes in the organism are and how many changes in the environment it is sensitive to, but these changes need not (and I argue cannot) allow us to perceive reality as it is in any meaningful sense. (This claim is too strong. I need to be more clear here.)

Claiming that we perceive reality pmaii is, I believe, to claim that the human perception of a humming bird drinking from a flower is pretty much as it is.

I reject that.

To be clear, I do not think the human perception of a humming bird drinking from a flower is pretty much as this event is.

(1) There will be many physical aspects of this event that our nervous sytem is not sensitive to,

(2) The changes to the human nervous system in response to the event as it is will be unique; different nervous systems will change in different ways; it follows that different organisms will therefore perceive this event as it is in equally different ways, and therefore not as it is, and

(3) the way in which our nervous system organizes the stimuli from this event as it is will also differ from the way in which other and/or different organisms' NS organize the stimuli from thenevent. Perhaps ordering events in slightly different temporal relationships, perhaps attenuating or enhancing various stimuli, perhaps tracking various stimuli via different sensory modalities, and on and on.

Thus, we can say that we perceive some elements of reality out there in various ways that are useful for humans to act within reality.

"Ergo color is not "out there" rather its internal to the organism. Surface reflectance is out there, not color."

Kane n says we see surface reflectance as color.

So color is not out there. Surface reflectance is out there. How is this meaningfully different than the IR approach?

The DR says we see out there "as color" the IR says we see "color" as something out there.

Its semantics.

As far as green or blue what difference does it make "objectively"? The important quality is surface reflectance. You miss the point of the alien lawn care story.

The argument is not about whether we can communicate effectively intersubjecticely.

Its about whether out there is pretty much blue or green. Its not.

 

[smcder]

Claiming that we perceive reality pmaii is, I believe, to claim that the human perception of a humming bird drinking from a flower is pretty much as it is.

I reject that.

To be clear, I do not think the human perception of a humming bird drinking from a flower is pretty much as this event is.

(1) There will be many physical aspects of this event that our nervous sytem is not sensitive to,

(2) The changes to the human nervous system in response to the event as it is will be unique; different nervous systems will change in different ways; it follows that different organisms will therefore perceive this event as it is in equally different ways, and therefore not as it is, and

(3) they way in which our nervous system organizes the stimuli from this event as it is will also differ from the way in which other and/or different organisms' NS organize the stimuli from thenevent. Perhaps ordering events in slightly different temporal relationships, perhaps attenuating or enhancing various stimuli, perhaps tracking various stimuli via different sensory modalities, and on and on.

Thus, we can say that we perceive some elements of reality in ways that are useful for humans to act on and within reality.


So color is not out there. Surface reflectance is out there. How is this meaningfully different than the IR approach?

The DR says we see out there "as color" the IR says we see "color."

Its semantics.


The argument is not about whether we can communicate effectively intersubjecticely.

Its about whether out there is pretty much blue or green. Its not.

Ok

 

[Soupie]

Ok

Alternatively, if the claim that we see reality pretty much as it is means that the forms and changes in our perceptions more or less reflect actual, concrete changes out there, then yes, I accept that.

But if this is the meaning of pmaii that DRs hold, how is this meaningfully different than IRs?

 

[Pharoah]

http://www.sfu.ca/~kathleea/docs/SensorySystems.pdf

 

[Soupie]

http://www.sfu.ca/~kathleea/docs/SensorySystems.pdf

The opening three paragraphs certainly have my attention!

(That is supposed to be a happy surprise, not an uncomfortable surprise.)

 

[smcder]

UPyCYFWhat Sensory Signals are About," Analysis, July 1998. Please click here for the paper

 

[Pharoah]

UPyCYFWhat Sensory Signals are About," Analysis, July 1998. Please click here for the paper

That's a nice response. But I think it is flawed. I would say in response to Elder that you need to compare the thermoreceptor argument from Atkins, not with the totality of the visual field, but with individual or small clusters of rod or cone cells. The mapping of spatial and temporal values is what the brain is doing with numerous vision cells. With thermoreceptors, that cognitive mapping is just not happening on remotely the same scale. So they are not directly comparable. What the brain makes of what is perceived, is what the brain usefully can make of what thermoreceptors or vision cells send its way. And in both cases, the brain can be prompted to draw the wrong conclusions about what is out there in the world.

 

[smcder]

Crawford L. Elder, Real Natures and Familiar Objects - PhilPapers

A compliment to the Sankey paper posted above.

 

[smcder]

"I am interested in virtually all issues in the philosophy of mind as well as the metaphysical and epistemic problems they engender—from the nature of mental representation and intentionality, to colour perception, embedded cognition, cognitive development, the emotions, consciousness and the self. What unifies all of these investigations is a neuro-philosophical approach. I begin any project with the problem as traditionally conceived by philosophy; then I look at what recent neuroscience has unearthed on the topic. The task is then to use the empirical literature to re-conceive of the traditional philosophical problem while at the same time using the philosophical insights to drive forward the experiments in neuroscience. I regard my work as essentially interdisciplinary (although in practice I tend to spend more time reading neuroscience simply because of the sheer volume and complexity of the recent scientific literature)."

Dr. Kathleen Akins - Department of Philosophy - Simon Fraser University

"Neurophilosophy" is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of philosophy and the neurosciences. In neurophilosophy, we attempt to understand how various traditional, long-standing problems about the nature of the mind and the world can be resolved (or at least nudged towards resolution) by current findings within the neurosciences. My work incorporated current research within neurophysiology, neuropsychology, neurethology and psychophysics in order to understand the nature of perception, cognition, consciousness, the emotions and mental representation in general."

Dr. Kathleen Akins | Home

I like the interdisciplinary approach but it's clear:

although in practice I tend to spend more time reading neuroscience simply because of the sheer volume and complexity of the recent scientific literature).

that if we are epistemically dependent on "recent scientific literature" in toto then we are already lost. This is why I am interested in epistemic justification that does not depend on this knowledge which is simply unavailable anyway. Notice too that Akins takes an optimistic stance in her own researches. In part, we see the world as it is if we choose to see ourselves as seeing the world as it is - because we are part of and participate in the world being the way that it is. It may be that to see the world correctly, as it is, means taking the stance that we see the world as it is.

 

[smcder]

Claiming that we perceive reality pmaii is, I believe, to claim that the human perception of a humming bird drinking from a flower is pretty much as it is.

I reject that.

To be clear, I do not think the human perception of a humming bird drinking from a flower is pretty much as this event is.

(1) There will be many physical aspects of this event that our nervous sytem is not sensitive to,

(2) The changes to the human nervous system in response to the event as it is will be unique; different nervous systems will change in different ways; it follows that different organisms will therefore perceive this event as it is in equally different ways, and therefore not as it is, and

(3) the way in which our nervous system organizes the stimuli from this event as it is will also differ from the way in which other and/or different organisms' NS organize the stimuli from thenevent. Perhaps ordering events in slightly different temporal relationships, perhaps attenuating or enhancing various stimuli, perhaps tracking various stimuli via different sensory modalities, and on and on.

Thus, we can say that we perceive some elements of reality out there in various ways that are useful for humans to act within reality.


So color is not out there. Surface reflectance is out there. How is this meaningfully different than the IR approach?

The DR says we see out there "as color" the IR says we see "color" as something out there.

Its semantics.


The argument is not about whether we can communicate effectively intersubjecticely.

Its about whether out there is pretty much blue or green. Its not.

I think you are still missing the point. We can communicate effectively because it doesn't matter if it's blue or green - we can communicate effectively because we are not seeing blue or green we are seeing the surface reflectance "out there" thus Mr. Gnork! can tell me about the exact hue of his blue grass and I can prescribe the correct nitrogen ratios for a brilliant, emerald green lawn.

 

[smcder]

This was in response to @Soupie:

"The point I'm trying to make is, based on Kane's video, teller difference between DR and IR is so minuscule as to be mmeaningless."

I didn't get from the video that the difference in DR and IR is so miniscule as to be meaningless, I should wonder at the volume of literature generated thus! (or maybe I shouldn't), but the difference in DR and IR is the presence or absence of perceptual intermediaries and that, I suspect, is a significant difference.

 

[smcder]

There are two problems with DR claims about perception and color.

DR (1) color is "out there" and objective, and (2) we see what's out there pmaii.

DR then claim (1) one organism can see object X as color green and diff organism can see object as color blue.

Ergo color is not "out there" rather its internal to the organism. Surface reflectance is out there, not color.

(2) if two organisms can see object X as radically different as blue and green, then saying we see object X pmaii is so vague as to be meaningless.

But note, it's still correct for a DR to say we perceive reality directly. We don't perceive sense datum or brain states. Rather we perceive what's out there via brain states.


It's irrelevant. IR claim we perceive sense data and DR admit causal indirectness. In both cases, seeing reality pmaii is so vague that it's meaningless to assert this.

Neither approach denies that there is an objective surface out there (hence realism). But both approaches describe a perception that is ultimately subjective and uniquely human, and therefore limited. True, it might be the best we can get! but it's still limited in the access it provides to reality as it is.


I've said the claim that we perceive reality pmaii, is a category error (for lack of better term).

Perception is a process of one thing (an organism NS) changing in response to the changes of another thing (the environment).

Asking if the changes to the organism are pretty much like the changes to the environment is not helpful. We can ask how sensitive or fine grain the changes in the organism are and how many changes in the environment it is sensitive to, but these changes need not (and I argue cannot) allow us to perceive reality as it is in any meaningful sense. (This claim is too strong. I need to be more clear here.)

The example of two organisms perceive the same thing as blue and green is all I need to confirm my point.

We could say perceiving surface texture X as green or blue is close enough to say we are perceiving it pmaii, but that's stretching the phrase "pretty much" too thin imo.

Asking if the changes to the organism are pretty much like the changes to the environment is not helpful. We can ask how sensitive or fine grain the changes in the organism are and how many changes in the environment it is sensitive to, but these changes need not (and I argue cannot) allow us to perceive reality as it is in any meaningful sense. (This claim is too strong. I need to be more clear here.)

Yes please! (to being more clear here) - what are the differences in the world as it is and the way that we see it? - for starters.

We are fortunate that in not perceiving reality as it is in any meaningful sense we are able to conclude that we are not perceiving reality as it is in any meaningful sense. What wonderfully clever apes we are to see beyond the veil (those of us who can, that is.)

 

[smcder]

Oops! I forget the ;-) Apply a ";-)" to the posts above as necessary.

 

[Soupie]

I think you are still missing the point. We can communicate effectively because it doesn't matter if it's blue or green - we can communicate effectively because we are not seeing blue or green we are seeing the surface reflectance "out there" thus Mr. Gnork! can tell me about the exact hue of his blue grass and I can prescribe the correct nitrogen ratios for a brilliant, emerald green lawn.

Ok.