Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[smcder]

"This" meaning my description or the definition of RR that i posted?

Your view. But check that against what I just posted.

 

[smcder]

The Wikipedia I just posted and this

The only sense in which, on my view, we would say perception is internal would be in the sense that perception is a process in which a change within the organism co-varys with a change in the environment. But again, the organism is not percieving the change in its nervous system; rather, the change in its nervous system just is the perception.

 

[smcder]

And this:

my view, the frog is feeling the change in the pond (the real world) because the change in its nervous system just is the qualitative feeling of heat.

It sounds like your view is direct realism

 

[smcder]

"On my view we perceive reality in a way that is adaptive for us. That's it."

"As far as the claim that we perceive reality "pretty much as it is" which is often found with definitions of direct/naive realism—this is where my view would depart from direct realism. I don't see how anyone could support this view."

"Meaning, I don't think we see reality pretty much as it is extrinsically nor do we see it pretty much as it is intrinsically!"

"I'm not suggesting that perception of reality and reality are completely different."

 

[smcder]

The last statement above (which does seem at odds with the others and that's confusing) I think puts you within "quibble range" of DR in terms of seeing reality PMAII. I'm ok right now with this being DR.

 

[Soupie]

I dont think my view is squarely in the DR camp, bc I would not say we perceive reality as it is or even pmaii. However, I'm not in the RR camp because I dont believe percpetion is a replica of reality either.

But the direct realist does not deny that the sunset is radiation; the experience perception has a hierarchical structure,[14] and the radiation is part of what amounts to the direct experience perception.

We have to maintain a distinction between experience and a perceptual experience.

So if i understand the above correctly, i would agree that the frog directly perceives the temperature of the water in the pond. We could say the perception process/event involves the water temperature changing and the frog's nervous system changing.

However, and this will likely send this good discussion spinning off chaotically into the void, and organism's nervous sytem can and sometimes does change in the absense of changes in the environment.

When the water changes and the nervous system changes, and hotness is experienced, we call that perception.

When just the nervous sytem changes and hotness is experienced, we might call that a hallucination.

"On my view we perceive reality in a way that is adaptive for us. That's it."

"As far as the claim that we perceive reality "pretty much as it is" which is often found with definitions of direct/naive realism—this is where my view would depart from direct realism. I don't see how anyone could support this view."

"Meaning, I don't think we see reality pretty much as it is extrinsically nor do we see it pretty much as it is intrinsically!"

"I'm not suggesting that perception of reality and reality are completely different."

PMAII <---------> Completely Different

I don't think this is the right way to think about the nature of perception. I think this is where a lot of the confusion comes in. (I know my view is controversial.)

The mainstream view is that phenomenal perception is something that weakly or strongly emerges from the brain, but is then epiphenomenal.

On my monist view, perception is the process of two separate things co-varying in a way in which allows one of those things (the organism) to behave in an adaptive way.

The question isnt to what extent the changes to the organism's nervous system 'appear' like the the environment.

By drawing on objective and subjective evidence (keeping in mind not a true duality) we can gather that objective environmental change X corresponds to nervous system change X1 and nervous system chnage X1 corresponds to subjective experience Y.

So what we are asking here is how veridical is subjective experience Y to environmental change X.

The answer is, as best I can tell, that X is to Y roughly as X is to X1.

 

[smcder]

I dont think my view is squarely in the DR camp, bc I would not say we perceive reality as it is or even pmaii. However, I'm not in the RR camp because I dont believe percpetion is a replica of reality either.


We have to maintain a distinction between experience and a perceptual experience.

So if i understand the above correctly, i would agree that the frog directly perceives the temperature of the water in the pond. We could say the perception process/event involves the water temperature changing and the frog's nervous system changing.

However, and this will likely send this good discussion spinning off chaotically into the void, and organism's nervous sytem can and sometimes does change in the absense of changes in the environment.

When the water changes and the nervous system changes, and hotness is experienced, we call that perception.

When just the nervous sytem changes and hotness is experienced, we might call that a hallucination.


PMAII <---------> Completely Different

I don't think this is the right way to think about the nature of perception. I think this is where a lot of the confusion comes in. (I know my view is controversial.)

The mainstream view is that phenomenal perception is something that weakly or strongly emerges from the brain, but is then epiphenomenal.

On my monist view, perception is the process of two separate things co-varying in a way in which allows one of those things (the organism) to behave in an adaptive way.

The question isnt to what extent the changes to the organism's nervous system 'appear' like the the environment.

By drawing on objective and subjective evidence (keeping in mind not a true duality) we can gather that objective environmental change X corresponds to nervous system change X1 and nervous system chnage X1 corresponds to subjective experience Y.

So what we are asking here is how veridical is subjective experience Y to environmental change X.

The answer is, as best I can tell, that X is to Y roughly as X is to X1.

Have a listen to the Kane B video. I'm listening to it again but if I remember he talks about hallucinations and I'll have to listen for what he says re PMAII but In think you may well be square ly in DR.

 

[smcder]

I dont think my view is squarely in the DR camp, bc I would not say we perceive reality as it is or even pmaii. However, I'm not in the RR camp because I dont believe percpetion is a replica of reality either.


We have to maintain a distinction between experience and a perceptual experience.

So if i understand the above correctly, i would agree that the frog directly perceives the temperature of the water in the pond. We could say the perception process/event involves the water temperature changing and the frog's nervous system changing.

However, and this will likely send this good discussion spinning off chaotically into the void, and organism's nervous sytem can and sometimes does change in the absense of changes in the environment.

When the water changes and the nervous system changes, and hotness is experienced, we call that perception.

When just the nervous sytem changes and hotness is experienced, we might call that a hallucination.


PMAII <---------> Completely Different

I don't think this is the right way to think about the nature of perception. I think this is where a lot of the confusion comes in. (I know my view is controversial.)

The mainstream view is that phenomenal perception is something that weakly or strongly emerges from the brain, but is then epiphenomenal.

On my monist view, perception is the process of two separate things co-varying in a way in which allows one of those things (the organism) to behave in an adaptive way.

The question isnt to what extent the changes to the organism's nervous system 'appear' like the the environment.

By drawing on objective and subjective evidence (keeping in mind not a true duality) we can gather that objective environmental change X corresponds to nervous system change X1 and nervous system chnage X1 corresponds to subjective experience Y.

So what we are asking here is how veridical is subjective experience Y to environmental change X.

The answer is, as best I can tell, that X is to Y roughly as X is to X1.

"On my monist view, perception is the process of two separatethings co-varying in a way in which allows one of those things (the organism) to behave in an adaptive way.

The question isnt to what extent the changes to the organism's nervous system'appear' like the the environment."

This is discussed too. And he talks about the problems you raise with color.

 

[smcder]

You mention that you're view is controversial and not squarely in this or that camp....but that's how it is with views of individuals: you don't have to sign off line by line to be in the camp - I don't think the confusion lies in your view being unique or mind boggling, I think it's mostly about terminology and communication.

BUT...we'll see ;-)

 

[smcder]

Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence - Philsci-Archive

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/304/1/Sci_Rsm_Elaboration_&_Defence.rtf

 

[smcder]

The thermal vision example you give above to me is evidence that we do see the world "as it is".

Do you see the argument for this?

 

[Soupie]

The thermal vision example you give above to me is evidence that we do see the world "as it is".

Do you see the argument for this?

We need to hash out what "as it is" means exactly.

If by "as it is" we mean perception informs us of states if the world, sure.

If by "as it is" we means the world "appears" in the absence of humans as it does in human perception, then no (on my view).

 

[smcder]

We need to hash out what "as it is" means exactly.

If by "as it is" we mean perception informs us of states if the world, sure.

If by "as it is" we means the world "appears" in the absence of humans as it does in human perception, then no (on my view).

"by "as it is" we means the world "appears" in the absence of humans as it does in human perception, then no (on my view)."

Is that controversial? Is it a required definition of "as it is" for DR?

 

[smcder]

Beautiful.

Did this (Russel .pdf) answer your concerns re: color?

 

[smcder]

by "as it is" do we mean the world as it is in the absence of any possible perceiver and/or sum total of perceptions by any possible perceivers (APP)?

 

[Soupie]

"by "as it is" we means the world "appears" in the absence of humans as it does in human perception, then no (on my view)."

Is that controversial? Is it a required definition of "as it is" for DR?

In many definitions of DR it is stated that we perceive the world "pretty much as it is."

I'm trying to understand what that means for a DRealist.

Does that mean that a flower as it is in human perception is pretty much the same as it is?

I say the answer is a resounding no.

 

[Soupie]

by "as it is" do we mean the world as it is in the absence of any possible perceiver and/or sum total of perceptions by any possible perceivers (APP)?

I interpret it to mean the former.

 

[smcder]

I interpret it to mean the former.

There's only 1 choice there ... So "yes"?

 

[smcder]

I interpret it to mean the former.

I'll ask it this way.

A thing as it is has aspects (properties) inaccessible to any possible observer...or?

If so...does that mean it has qualities that can have no impact on any possible observer in any perceptible way? If so, the next question is ....

 

[Soupie]

A thing as it is has aspects (properties) inaccessible to any possible observer...or?

I would say probably not. But, the way in which organisms like us "access" these properties is limited. If a thing as it is has property X and we "access" this property via change X1 in our nervous system, this way of accessing the properties of things as they are will only take us so far.