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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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Soupie
Paranormal Adept
That's an absolutely fascinating research project. Especially this: "The most amazing thing is that it’s not like seeing light. It’s almost a feeling, at the threshold of imagination,” says Alipasha Vaziri, a physicist at the Rockefeller University in New York City, who led the work and tried out the experience himself."
In any case, that's not the sense in which I meant it was limited; I mean this method of "access" is limited in how much access it really gives us to the thing as it is. How much access to the thing as it is do we really have when a whole host of changes to our nervous system are involved in the perceptual event? We could use the access to the single photon as an example.
"But, in part because the retina processes its information to reduce ‘noise’ from false alarms, researchers hadn’t been able to confirm whether the firing of one rod cell would trigger a signal that would be transmitted all the way to the brain. Nor was it clear whether people would be able to consciously sense such a signal if it did reach the brain."
While it's amazing that a single photon can trigger some type of perceptual-feeling in humans, how much of the photon as it is are we really getting access to?
Actually yes, based on some of the hypotheses and positions you seem to have supported in the past.
I don't; would you remind me? Thanks.
ETA: Never mind; you reminded me in a subsequent post.
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?? Ask a painter? Or a visitor to an art gallery? Or me as I revel in particular colors (their hues and densities) more than others?
… Downloadable from the PhilPapers.org website at your link. Thanks.
?? Does the frog not register -- in addition to the sense of the change in, say, the temperature of the water it is in -- an additional sense of how the change in temperature makes the frog 'feel'? Perhaps good if the water's been very cold; not so good if the water reaches boiling point.
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Interesting extract from the above article:
"The most amazing thing is that it’s not like seeing light. It’s almost a feeling, at the threshold of imagination,” says Alipasha Vaziri, a physicist at the Rockefeller University in New York City, who led the work and tried out the experience himself."
A personal experience: getting out of bed to go pee in the middle of the night, w/o turning any lights on, I have frequently sensed but not possibly 'seen' {??} lights flashing, forming pathways, inside my head. But if I did not in some way 'see' these manifestations of bright and discrete light, how did I know about them?
smcder
Paranormal Adept
My point is that we can see a single quanta of light and yet we don't expect to "see" a proton...so I don't think DR is making the claim that we can perceive things literally "as they really are" (do you mean "as they really are" ="intrinsically"?) even extrinsic reality isn't fully perceptible due to physical limits.
From wiki:
"Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the accepted view of perception in natural science that states that we do not and cannot perceive the external world as it really is but know only our ideas and interpretations of the way the world is"
In relation to indirect realism, then, we make the most of what is meant by "as it really is" and I think it's intelligible.
Finally, one can always say "yes but is that how things really, REALLY are?"
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Springer has made available online the following paper (published last year by the journal Phenomenology and Cognitive Science) which lays the groundwork for Higgin's paper in the journal's current issue, linked above.
Joe Higgins, "Biosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self"
"Abstract. In a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: "the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self^ (Kyselo 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a reconception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.
Keywords: Selfhood. Cognitive science. Embodiment. Ensocialment. Body-social problem. Enactivism.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2.pdf
ETA: This is the third paper on this subject by Higgins linked in this thread. The other two are linked in posts 705 and 706.
Joe Higgins, "Biosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self"
"Abstract. In a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: "the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self^ (Kyselo 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a reconception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.
Keywords: Selfhood. Cognitive science. Embodiment. Ensocialment. Body-social problem. Enactivism.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2.pdf
ETA: This is the third paper on this subject by Higgins linked in this thread. The other two are linked in posts 705 and 706.
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This paper should also be helpful to us in sorting out the usefulness of the term 'information':
Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
Quantum theory is not only about information
Laura Felline
Department of Philosophy, University of Rome III
"Abstract. In his recent book Bananaworld. Quantum mechanics for primates, Jeff Bub revives and provides a mature version of his influential information-theoretic interpretation of Quantum Theory (QT). In this paper, I test Bub’s conjecture that QT should be interpreted as a theory about information, by examining whether his information-theoretic interpretation has the resources to explain (or explain away) quantum conundrums. The discussion of Bub’s theses will also serve to investigate, more in general, whether other approaches succeed in defending the claim that QT is about quantum information. First of all, I argue that Bub’s interpretation of QT as a principle theory fails to fully explain quantum non-locality. Secondly, I argue that a constructive interpretation, where the quantum state is interpreted ontically as information, also fails at providing a full explanation of quantum correlations. Finally, while epistemic interpretations might succeed in this respect, I argue that such a success comes at the price of rejecting some in between the most basic scientific standards of physical theories."
philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14777/1/QT%20not%20only%20about%20information%20v3.pdf
Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
Quantum theory is not only about information
Laura Felline
Department of Philosophy, University of Rome III
"Abstract. In his recent book Bananaworld. Quantum mechanics for primates, Jeff Bub revives and provides a mature version of his influential information-theoretic interpretation of Quantum Theory (QT). In this paper, I test Bub’s conjecture that QT should be interpreted as a theory about information, by examining whether his information-theoretic interpretation has the resources to explain (or explain away) quantum conundrums. The discussion of Bub’s theses will also serve to investigate, more in general, whether other approaches succeed in defending the claim that QT is about quantum information. First of all, I argue that Bub’s interpretation of QT as a principle theory fails to fully explain quantum non-locality. Secondly, I argue that a constructive interpretation, where the quantum state is interpreted ontically as information, also fails at providing a full explanation of quantum correlations. Finally, while epistemic interpretations might succeed in this respect, I argue that such a success comes at the price of rejecting some in between the most basic scientific standards of physical theories."
philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14777/1/QT%20not%20only%20about%20information%20v3.pdf
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Based on this video, i am a DR.
The distinction between causal indirectness and cognitive indirectness was helpful. Do you think this approach is valid?
I say the process of perception is causally indirect but cognitively direct.
My guess, after watching this video (and reading and interacting with others) is that there is a whole lot of confusion about DR and IR.
Edit: however there were other parts of his argument that I think were incoherent. The part about hallucinations and then the part about color being objective but two organisms seeing an object 2 different colors, and that being just fine with dr.
And he didn't seem to address dreaming.
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
Based on this video, i am a DR.
The distinction between causal indirectness and cognitive indirectness was helpful. Do you think this approach is valid?
I say the process of perception is causally indirect but cognitively direct.
My guess, after watching this video (and reading and interacting with others) is that there is a whole lot of confusion about DR and IR.
Edit: however there were other parts of his argument that I think were incoherent. The part about hallucinations and then the part about color being objective but two organisms seeing an object 2 different colors, and that being just fine with dr.
And he didn't seem to address dreaming.
"Edit: however there were other parts of his argument that I think were incoherent. The part about hallucinations and then the part about color being objective but two organisms seeing an object 2 different colors, and that being just fine with dr."
Interesting, I thought the arguments on color were good. I'll have to review the other material you mention.
Basically I think he argues color is objectively "out there" as a particular object under the same conditions produces the same color in the same organism, whether "green" or "blue" - it's not in the observer's head.
In fact I think we could come to talk very precisely with the alien about color. Let's say he and Mrs. Gnorkk! have moved in across the street and one day he wants some lawn care advice. You've spent many a happy hour with the Gnorks! and you find, based on his report of the grass being a concerning cobalt blue - that he needs a particular nitrogen blend that you just happen to have a little extra of ... and which works like a charm! Far fetched?
Again direct vs indirect turns on whether you perceive the world or perceive sense datum...
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The "as it is" part shouldn't be ignored but shouldn't trip us up.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
And I wonder if this turning is a matter of semantics. And I don't say that dismissively; I say that sincerely.
I think it hinges on how one defines "perceiving." In my way of thinking, perceiving is a kind of experiencing. Likewise, hallucinating is a kind of experiencing. And dreaming is another kind of experiencing.
What is the difference between these three kinds of experiencing? In all three of these kinds of experience, we seem to be a subject perceiving a vibrant world.
I think this is important bc in the video, during the discussion of hallucination, Kane says we could say instead of "perceiving" sense data we perceive brain states. He says this is just as bad for the DR as perceiving sense data. So it's no good.
So instead he says that hallucination is when we misperceive the world.
To me this is all a silly, semantic mess.
See below:
He says color is objectively out there... but then says two diff organisms, human and alien, could see the same object as different colors, green and blue.
This is incoherent. If the object was objectively colored, say, X, and we perceive reality directly and pretty much as it is, how is it okay for us to see this X colored object as green and the alien to see it as red, or us to see it as red and the alien as green.
If two organisms see the same objectively colored object differently, then the difference must be in the organism. Then it follows that saying we perceive the world pmaii, is meaningless. We don't perceive pmaii, we see it in a uniquely human way. And that's ok.
The point I'm trying to make is, based on Kane's video, teller difference between DR and IR is so minuscule as to be meaningless.
If sense data is essentially the same as brain states, and brain states are causally necessary and indirect, it's a matter of semantics to "say" we perceive brain states or we perceive the world.
We don't perceive brain states; we perceive the world via brain states.
Imo that's what the difference between IR and DR realism boils down to; a semantic quibble over the meaning of perceive. To perceive brain states or to perceive via brain states.
Both IR and DR say there is a real, external world, we perceive it subjectively, brain states are involved, two different organisms will perceive reality differently. (And both approaches are comfortable saying we perceive reality pmaii. And in my opinion, that's a very dubious claim.)
smcder
Paranormal Adept
smcder
Paranormal Adept
"He says color is objectively out there... but then says two diff organisms, human and alien, could see the same object as different colors, green and blue."
He said what is out there is a surface reflecting x Nm wavelengths. The alien sees it as blue and we see it as green. Who cares? We can talk lawn care for hours with a simple caveat because we see the grass pretty much as it is.
"This is incoherent. If the object was objectively colored, say, X, and we perceive reality directly and pretty much as it is, how is it okay for us to see this X colored object as green and the alien to see it as red, or us to see it as red and the alien as green."
The object has a surface reflectance of x Nm and the way we see x Nm is as green or blue. How should we see a surface reflectance in order to see it "as it is"?
In terms of the difference in dr and ir...did you hear the one about the speckled hen?
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
All of that last paragraph needs to be examined, but nothing more urgently than:
"And both approaches are comfortable saying we perceive reality pmaii. And in my opinion, that's a very dubious claim."
1. We need to see exactly what claim "they" are making (see for example Sankey's paper I posted above) or rather what range of claims as I suspect what "as it is" means is not a matter of creed.
2. We need to understand what you mean by "as it is" - you've admitted above it's "not completely different" -and there's enough room between the vaguenesses of PMAII and "not completely different" to claim overlap.
My own take is that because tables are made up of quarks doesn't mean there aren't really tables, there really are! And I see them as they are - as tables. Etc etc.
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
It's a good paper, I may look for others by him.
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