Try the works of Merleau-Ponty if you seek an 'eloquent discourse' of that nature.
Point taken. I'll have to look back to that post and try to re-phrase what I meant to say.
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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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Try the works of Merleau-Ponty if you seek an 'eloquent discourse' of that nature.
Point taken. I'll have to look back to that post and try to re-phrase what I meant to say.
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
I'm not going to try to guess from reading someone else's papers what you might say yourself. So we'll just skip those questions.
If you cannot import the bookmarks from Edge into Chrome, then just visit them one at a time in Edge, copy the URL, and paste it into Chrome. Over time, you will rebuild a list of the ones you use most.
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
From an abstract regarding Husserl's Hyle ....
"In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of character that we do not create but can only discover. This determinate, non-representational stratum of perceptual consciousness also serves as a bridge between consciousness and the world beyond it. I articulate and defend this conception of perceptual consciousness. I locate the view in the space of contemporary positions on phenomenal character and argue for its superiority. I close by briefly arguing that the Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism (this involves disarming the Grain Problem). "
(source: Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness)
...different levels here perhaps where what is termed "algedonic" isn't in the same category as the other hyle. "Immanent" isn't a very good term either, because the very phenomena examined must be a merging of something that seems to the same observer as fully originating within ... (i.e. the "subject") and yet cannot <<exist>> without some kind of merging with that which is definitely NOT <<immanent>>)
What is this "phenomenological reduction" --> someone please explain. What other than the truism at the end (i.e. the the "Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism) helps us understand what the devil we are talking about in all of these posts?
The grain problem itself could be characterized by the silly "what of the little things that provided the chorus of activity that allowed you to ...." -- it is nothing more than an apparition of consciousness created by the very mechanism that is trying to understand what underlies its ability to ______. This problem was never really armed unless we ourselves gave away the weapons and the ammunition. So there is no real need to disarm the "grain problem" unless we wish to disarm ourselves.
"In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of character that we do not create but can only discover. This determinate, non-representational stratum of perceptual consciousness also serves as a bridge between consciousness and the world beyond it. I articulate and defend this conception of perceptual consciousness. I locate the view in the space of contemporary positions on phenomenal character and argue for its superiority. I close by briefly arguing that the Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism (this involves disarming the Grain Problem). "
(source: Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness)
...different levels here perhaps where what is termed "algedonic" isn't in the same category as the other hyle. "Immanent" isn't a very good term either, because the very phenomena examined must be a merging of something that seems to the same observer as fully originating within ... (i.e. the "subject") and yet cannot <<exist>> without some kind of merging with that which is definitely NOT <<immanent>>)
What is this "phenomenological reduction" --> someone please explain. What other than the truism at the end (i.e. the the "Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism) helps us understand what the devil we are talking about in all of these posts?
The grain problem itself could be characterized by the silly "what of the little things that provided the chorus of activity that allowed you to ...." -- it is nothing more than an apparition of consciousness created by the very mechanism that is trying to understand what underlies its ability to ______. This problem was never really armed unless we ourselves gave away the weapons and the ammunition. So there is no real need to disarm the "grain problem" unless we wish to disarm ourselves.
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Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
"Physicalist reductionism I take to be the view that the physical story about what is going on in the brain and the world with which it interacts is in some sense the whole story. "
[source: http://consc.net/event/reef/lockwoodgrain.pdf]
Interesting lad...states that physicalist reduction as a physical story. The obvious stumbling block here resides in the terms *view and *story...and if you are Sherlock Holmes, even the word *physical has some really major baggage. The problem with such a formulation is that any story provided by the very mechanisms that have such capabilities are themselves part of the world in need of explanation.
Suddenly I feel like a broken record...
[source: http://consc.net/event/reef/lockwoodgrain.pdf]
Interesting lad...states that physicalist reduction as a physical story. The obvious stumbling block here resides in the terms *view and *story...and if you are Sherlock Holmes, even the word *physical has some really major baggage. The problem with such a formulation is that any story provided by the very mechanisms that have such capabilities are themselves part of the world in need of explanation.
Suddenly I feel like a broken record...
Everyone struggles with Being and Time. This collection of later essays, grouped for publication by Heidegger himself, is more accessible and far more rewarding. Not necessarily easier in all its parts, but clearer and coherent in its meaning. It took me three readings to finally comprehend it, and I still remember the evening I did, a personal illumination late at night in a room with a Christmas tree, several decades ago.
www.amazon.com/Poetry-Language-Thought-Publisher-Perennial/dp/B004U6T5R4/ref=sr_1_2?crid=2WFK46HFY8NFS&keywords=heidegger+poetry+language+thought&qid=1576289723&s=books&sprefix=Heidegger%2C+Poetry%2C%2Cstripbooks%2C349&sr=1-2
I've linked to the Albert Hofstadter translation at amazon. His introduction to the volume is excellent. For a detailed overview of the subjects developed in this collection, read the second review on the amazon page.
For some reason or madness in Chrome, my post to Randle has been copied into this post, so I'll go ahead and provide him with the Gallagher links here:
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Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
Microsoft Edge? You mean the successor of the famous Internet Exploder (TM)? Nice to know that you have switched
...now I am very curious as to what Edge allows that suddenly is filtered by Chrome's anti-bad-link-blocker.This sounds familiar. We've been here before, three years ago and several times after. As I've said on those occasions, if I could rephrase in sufficient detail what is conveyed in these papers I cite by phenomenological philosophers and scholars it would take a great deal of time -- and why should I make that effort since you can read these works in their authors' words, or at least I assume you can.
Thank you but no thanks. I'd rather go back to Microsoft Edge where everything works much better for me.
Microsoft Edge? You mean the successor of the famous Internet Exploder (TM)? Nice to know that you have switched
Edge maintains a number of pages open for me, whereas Chrome does not. I think the problem is that my Microsoft technician downloaded Chrome last week to solve a problem in a document I was editing and also left Microsoft Edge operational. Too much trouble to go back and forth between browsers. In other words, it's not that the links I was reserving tonight were bad; the document I was to edit a few days ago was vexed/kerfuffled in some way or ways. So much so that the document could not be downloaded from google mail.
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
Yes, I have Office but only use it for Word, which I couldn't live without. Off-topic is always okay here.
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
Hyletic data is the prey of the very being that searches the searching of the prey of consciousness...
Survives? The only being that can bring about "reduction" is the very being under examination doing the reduction....
Immanent and yet not? The truism follows...."are not among the transcendent objects"...you place asterisks next to *among, *object and then are forced into the "transcendent" checkmate. This entire concept is a truism circuit formed within the very source under examination. Thus the only answer lies in the very arbitrary division of reality that brought about the question and it's alibi answer.... Throw "immanence" and "trancendence" out the door if you wish to pursue any real understanding of consciousness.
"One [undefined] thus attempts to study hyletic [the very means of its own unthinkable process that leads to reflection to itself] ...
NO wonder there is a "phenomenological residuum" when such terms excercise themselves in the very theatre which lies at the background and is purely non-thinking...even non-thinkable
Let's do a "deep dive" into this residue:
Something that is analyzed (broken down and fully comprehended by the engine of conciousness) fully survives within the being that reconstitutes being within itself through its own .... which is to say that it remains an "atom" or "indivisible" component which is by definition the limit of the same's ability to provide a full "limit" on being.
[Aside: consciousness is an engine of being that can only exist by it's endurance or "life of change" within something that it cannot fully comprehend...a fully perfect consciousness engine with full understanding (i.e. omniscience) is actually an impossibility. A consciousness can only reflect on it's own ability to be by the very nature of not fully understanding. A complete (or perfect) consciousness is actually completely unconscious (in the worst possible way). ]
So what is this "residue?"
It is actually the very fiction which a dasein provides to itself in order to rest assured that it understands a foundation of impossibility.
Time to go back to the basics.
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"Physicalist reductionism I take to be the view that the physical story about what is going on in the brain and the world with which it interacts is in some sense the whole story. "
[source: http://consc.net/event/reef/lockwoodgrain.pdf]
Interesting lad...states that physicalist reduction as a physical story. The obvious stumbling block here resides in the terms *view and *story...and if you are Sherlock Holmes, even the word *physical has some really major baggage. The problem with such a formulation is that any story provided by the very mechanisms that have such capabilities are themselves part of the world in need of explanation.
Suddenly I feel like a broken record...
This will require time to work through. Tomorrow.
"Physicalist reductionism I take to be the view that the physical story about what is going on in the brain and the world with which it interacts is in some sense the whole story. "
[source: http://consc.net/event/reef/lockwoodgrain.pdf]
Interesting lad...states that physicalist reduction as a physical story. The obvious stumbling block here resides in the terms *view and *story...and if you are Sherlock Holmes, even the word *physical has some really major baggage. The problem with such a formulation is that any story provided by the very mechanisms that have such capabilities are themselves part of the world in need of explanation.
Suddenly I feel like a broken record...
I've opened the link you provided to the paper on the grain problem. Too late to read it tonight but I'm wondering about the words "not secure" in the URL. Is this a risk to my computer? Thanks.
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
It just means that the connection is not encrypted...only have to worry if you are passing confidental information to them (which in this case you are not)
Thanks. Coming back now to contemplate your posts of last night and to read the 'grain problem' paper. In the meantime I've received another paper that addresses hyletic experience and time-consciousness in Husserl -- "Affectivity and Time: Towards a Phenomenology of Embodied Time-Consciousness" by Marek Pokropski at
https://www.academia.edu/14487073/A...auto_download=true&email_work_card=view-paper
Here is an extract:
". . . Perception as an activity directed towards an object presupposes a subjectivity given to itself passively (preceding conscious intentional activity) in an affective and non-intentional manner. Thus, the lived body, which for Husserl, as we have seen, is constituted in virtue of tactile sensations in the broad sense (including pain and warmth) and in kinaesthesis, manifests itself not as an object but as a dynamic field of feelings, as the affective background which makes possible perceptual manifestation of an object. However, the duality in the structure of bodily experience does not imply a dualistic ontology. It only reveals two basic aspects or modes of presentation: first, a non-intentional mode of bodily self-givenness, and second, the intentional presentation of an object. Therefore, the former, that is the lived body, can be described as a pre-reflective, non-intentional, non-thematic bodily self-awareness (Zahavi, 1998, 1999)."
That consciousness and mind have their inchoate beginnings in -- are engendered in -- the prereflective but affected body is crucial for the phenomenological struggle to overcome dualism and what has been called the mind/body problem. This insight also undermines the reductiveness of standard neuroscience and accounts for Panksepp's development with other biologists of the new field of Affective Neuroscience. I think it also overcomes efforts to imagine that we exist within a computational 'matrix' rather than in an actual physical world that we emerge from and interact with for better or worse -- unfortunately in our time for worse, as Heidegger came to recognize and describe in his later works.
Husserl was, of course, essential and foundational for the development of phenomenological philosophy and many of his insights continue to be debated in this school of philosophy and increasingly in analytical philosophy. It's a vast task to attempt to learn all that he discovered and to work through the details of his writing regarding hyletic experience, internal time consciousness, and other topics. We do need to understand the phenomenological reduction in the context of the series of reductions he proposed, and this paper/book chapter should provide the understanding we need:
"Husserl’s Reductions and the Role They Play in His Phenomenology," DAGFINN FØLLESDAL, published in A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall Copyright © 2006 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
http://timothyquigley.net/cont/husserl-reductions_follesdal.pdf
Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
My comments are within your quote...[<me]...to be clear...read through the quoted material!
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Simply quoting someone else's online paper is something a bot like Siri or Google can do. There is a major difference between that and a real conversation. Surely you can appreciate that?
So call me a bot and shoot me, Randle.
Past experience, mine and that of others here, has been that attempted conversations with you on these complex subjects have ended with your spending time challenging/rejecting my/our terminology and/or linking us to your 'critical thinking' website, which turns out to be very limited in critical thinking. What I prefer is the seminar model in which everyone involved reads the same text before discussing it.
That's quite a lot to respond to, especially since I've not yet been able to understand most of what you write. I will keep trying. In the meantime, I came across another paper by Williford today which I think you might perhaps find congenial to your way of thinking. Here's a link to it at researchgate:
(PDF) Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance
I first linked to it through a search that provided the paper but did not provide a URL I can copy. It came into my computer as a file for my own use, specifying the following:
Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main]
Cheers.
@Michael Allen, read through your responses to what I posted earlier today and can respond at least to this part:
I wrote: "Husserl was, of course, essential and foundational for the development of phenomenological philosophy and many of his insights continue to be debated in this school of philosophy and increasingly in analytical philosophy. It's a vast task to attempt to learn all that he discovered and to work through the details of his writing regarding hyletic experience, internal time consciousness, and other topics. We do need to understand the phenomenological reduction in the context of the series of reductions he proposed, and this paper/book chapter should provide the understanding we need: . . ."
You wrote: "[nope...read the words carefully and extract meaning that resonates with the mechanism under examination...there is no debate unless you have a dasien that wishes to embrace the myths (Santa) that help remove the need for questioning.
which leads to my first rule:
Axiom of the Mind: Never trust a thought pattern that ends the desire to question ..."
My response in turn: Do you actually think phenomenological philosophy has sought and found "myths that help remove the need for questioning?" If so, why does this field of inquiry continue to re-examine in expanding detail the last century of major texts constituting this inquiry?
You add: "[questions are always the source of consciousness and mind...if you find the answer to the mega question...you will cease to be a mind]"
So I gather that philosophy of mind itself is what troubles you? If not, please clarify.
I wrote: "Husserl was, of course, essential and foundational for the development of phenomenological philosophy and many of his insights continue to be debated in this school of philosophy and increasingly in analytical philosophy. It's a vast task to attempt to learn all that he discovered and to work through the details of his writing regarding hyletic experience, internal time consciousness, and other topics. We do need to understand the phenomenological reduction in the context of the series of reductions he proposed, and this paper/book chapter should provide the understanding we need: . . ."
You wrote: "[nope...read the words carefully and extract meaning that resonates with the mechanism under examination...there is no debate unless you have a dasien that wishes to embrace the myths (Santa) that help remove the need for questioning.
which leads to my first rule:
Axiom of the Mind: Never trust a thought pattern that ends the desire to question ..."
My response in turn: Do you actually think phenomenological philosophy has sought and found "myths that help remove the need for questioning?" If so, why does this field of inquiry continue to re-examine in expanding detail the last century of major texts constituting this inquiry?
You add: "[questions are always the source of consciousness and mind...if you find the answer to the mega question...you will cease to be a mind]"
So I gather that philosophy of mind itself is what troubles you? If not, please clarify.
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