Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Michael Allen]

Once again I'm perplexed by the humor you find and enjoy in contemplating the plain fact that most humans frequently find the same things to be humorous (even across cultural and language barriers) while you yourself see the collective as a "plurality of unmentionables." Can you uncover the reasons why you see humans as a "plurality of unmentionables (i.e. sentients who ...)"? Maybe you can clarify your thinking by completing the phrase "sentients who . . . ." Is this a Tower of Babel kind of thing you're trying to get at?

The plurality of unmentionables comes from my own experience of laughing at something extremely funny...the reason I throw the word "unmentionables" (plurality is important here) is that my sensation of laughing comes at the very tail end where language cannot express the full meanng. Laughter as an experience always arrives on the scene where language breaks down; this is born out further by the fact that "once someone tries to explain the joke....laughter dies."

Yes, I think laughter is the key to unlocking our percieved "mysteries" of consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

"Access consciousness" or p consciousness? If you buy Block's distinction.

“Instead of directly addressing the Hard problem, a possibly more productive direction might be to consider putative functions of consciousness, namely, cognitive functions that require consciousness in the sense of being awake and able to report stimulus contents with confidence. Here, we consider consciousness both in terms of the state of consciousness (e.g. wakefulness) and the contents of consciousness (e.g. awareness of specific sensory stimuli).”
They seem to be focusing on what function the contents of consciousness seem to be correlated with rather than trying to establish a direct causal relationship between p consciousness and physical processes.

I think this is wise bc as we’ve discussed re recent articles, the concept of neural correlates of consciousness does not imply a causal relationship.

 

[Constance]

(1) all human consciousnesses are 'deluded' into thinking that their personal consciousness is radically different from and isolated from the consciousnesses of others, leading to general denial of, or failure to achieve, precisely the intersubjectivity that most of us do experience in our social lives?
Or
(2) do you mean to say that consciousness "can only be 'experienced in a field of separated beings" who all appear to be solipcists?

Yes means either (1) or (2) is correct or both...

I did not intend to state either of your propositions (1) or (2). Your proposition (1) makes no sense to me as a phenomenologist for several reasons: a) why would all human consciousnesses be 'deluded' in the terms you state since b) most of us do experience and learn from what you yourself recognize as "the intersubjectivity that most of us do experience in our social lives"?

Nor could I have meant to say (2) because, as phenomenological philosophy reveals, consciousness arises precisely in the prereflective recognition of the existence of other beings who resemble oneself in their activities and behavioral interactions in a shared environment and in their evident awareness and affectivity in response to be-ing/existing alongside and in inescapable relation to wordly things and others.

I am leaning on (1)...and intersubjectivity is often overlooked (precisely)

Not overlooked in and by phenomenology in its 100 years of development. And currently no longer overlooked in psychology and psychoanalysis as the paper I link below explains. (I have additional papers on this subject that I can link for anyone interested in reading them, written by additional psychologists and also by phenomenological philosophers and scholars.)

(2) is a very interesting non-intuitive solution to the problem...but I only say this because I have a fetish for the ironic.

Irony is possible only in a context/situation well understood by those who express or appreciate irony. The question is how well do we comprehend the nature of consciousness and understand its origins. Irony is premature at this point.

 

[Constance]

The plurality of unmentionables comes from my own experience of laughing at something extremely funny...the reason I throw the word "unmentionables" (plurality is important here) is that my sensation of laughing comes at the very tail end where language cannot express the full meanng. Laughter as an experience always arrives on the scene where language breaks down; this is born out further by the fact that "once someone tries to explain the joke....laughter dies."

Yes, I think laughter is the key to unlocking our percieved "mysteries" of consciousness.

I do not think that consciousness is a 'mystery'. I also think that laughter is premature since the field of interdisciplinary consciousness studies over the past 30 years has made significant progress at least in recognizing the multitude of questions concerning consciousness that need to be answered. I can agree that language both enables communication and falls short of achieving the fullness of what we mean to ask and in time express. Notably both analytical philosophy of mind and the 'hard' sciences were misled by following 'the linguistic turn' in the 20th century, assuming that available and reductive terms/words/concepts were sufficient for the tasks of theorizing about mind and life.

It was this 'linguistic turn' that led Derrida to believe and argue beginning in mid-century that all language deconstructs itself and becomes unreliable as a description of lived reality. He could conclude at one point that the world can be reduced to 'texts' vexed by persistent 'slippage of the text' and thus producing a vacuum of communication and meaning. The phenomenological response, even before Derrida, was the recognition of the need to enter into the hermeneutic circle of interpretation with its dialectical approaches to arriving by stages at mutual comprehension of intended meaning. In fairness to Derrida, he did begin by calling attention to the multitude of perspectives -- individual and gendered; colonialist and colonized -- that must be taken into account in our writing of history if we are to fully understand our history.

 

[Michael Allen]

Not understanding what you mean by 'singularity' of consciousness. Would you clarify? Do you mean to claim that all human consciousnesses are 'deluded' into thinking that their personal consciousness is radically different from and isolated from the consciousnesses of others, leading to general denial of, or failure to achieve, precisely the intersubjectivity that most of us do experience in our social lives? Or do you mean to say that consciousness "can only be 'experienced in a field of separated beings" who all appear to be solipsists?

"Singularity" as opposed to something like the opposite of what really must be the background of the same...something like intersubjectivity despite the chronological advent of the term in our vocabulary must take place before any "Singularity" emerges as a kind of necessary finality ...that's probably the big joke I am laughing about. I cannot say much more because I lack the ability to articulate.

 

[Constance]

We don't what? If you mean that we don't all function about the same because we're all made about the same, perhaps you're equating "functioning" with "behavior". These are two completely different contexts. What I'm talking about is that assuming we're dealing with normal healthy humans, all will have organs, tissues, bones, brains, etc. that are made in the same way, out of the same stuff, and perform their jobs ( function ) in the same way. There is mountains of scientific evidence to support this, making it pointless to argue otherwise. Therefore we should expect that if consciousness is a trait of one human, it's probably a trait of all humans. How anyone would prove this, I don't know. Nevertheless I contend that it is a reasonable assumption.

I think the underscored statement is generally valid, but that the nature and lived experience of consciousness is subject to significant differences for a number of reasons including neurological differences and early experiences that inhibit the openness and intersubjectivity (mutuality) that many/most of us enjoy. In this respect, for many afflicted individuals, issues arise in both 'functioning' and 'behavior'. Here is a link to a paper I meant to add in an earlier response today because it reveals the physiological and emotional grounds of differences in the abilities of many humans to interact with others fully and meaningfully. You will see what I mean if you read the paper.

Schizophrenic autism: clinical phenomenology and pathogenetic implications

 

[Michael Allen]

Your proposition (1) makes no sense to me as a phenomenologist for several reasons: a) why would all human consciousnesses be 'deluded' in the terms you state since b) most of us do experience and learn from what you yourself recognize as "the intersubjectivity that most of us do experience in our social lives"?

Nor could I have meant to say (2) because, as phenomenological philosophy reveals, consciousness arises precisely in the prereflective recognition of the existence of other beings who resemble oneself in their activities and behavioral interactions in a shared environment and in their evident awareness and affectivity in response to be-ing/existing alongside and in inescapable relation to wordly things and others.

Not overlooked in and by phenomenology in its 100 years of development. And currently no longer overlooked in psychology and psychoanalysis as the paper I link below explains. (I have additional papers on this subject that I can link for anyone interested in reading them, written by additional psychologists and also by phenomenological philosophers and scholars.)
.....

hmmm...are you aware that I broke your OR into (1) and (2)...I tried not to paraphrase.

"[1]Do you mean to claim that all human consciousnesses are 'deluded' into thinking that their personal consciousness is radically different from and isolated from the consciousnesses of others, leading to general denial of, or failure to achieve, precisely the intersubjectivity that most of us do experience in our social lives? Or [2] do you mean to say that consciousness "can only be 'experienced in a field of separated beings" who all appear to be solipsists?"

But I think you've answered my questions -- you included the term personal with reference to consciousness...it is funny that perhaps the fundamental nature of consciousness would make any phenomenologist laugh themselves silly and consider such unexpected comedy as insignificant.

I think we are probably talking cross-purposes here. You have a much deeper understanding of the serious efforts and literature on the topic and I will cede to your points and understanding. You have linked a great deal of literature which I have neglected and it is not fair that I should ignore it and simultaneously bark the first thoughts that arrive in my brain under the influence of a few glasses of wine

 

[Constance]

"Singularity" as opposed to something like the opposite of what really must be the background of the same...something like intersubjectivity despite the chronological advent of the term in our vocabulary must take place before any "Singularity" emerges as a kind of necessary finality ...that's probably the big joke I am laughing about. I cannot say much more because I lack the ability to articulate.

I think that you likely can articulate what you are getting at in more specific terms and urge you to try again. Perhaps you can account for how and why what you think of as 'Singularity' in/of consciousness occurs in our species and others? What is the evidence for such a change in native capacities we recognize in the evolution of species and most fully in ourselves? Also, why is this 'Singularity' [dissociation? or solipsism?] a "a kind of necessary finality" ?

 

[Michael Allen]

"we should expect that if consciousness is a trait of one human, it's probably a trait of all humans "

Without consciousness there is no theory of mind....but on the other hand without theory of mind (intersubjectivity) there can be no consciousness

 

[Constance]

hmmm...are you aware that I broke your OR into (1) and (2)...I tried not to paraphrase.

"[1]Do you mean to claim that all human consciousnesses are 'deluded' into thinking that their personal consciousness is radically different from and isolated from the consciousnesses of others, leading to general denial of, or failure to achieve, precisely the intersubjectivity that most of us do experience in our social lives? Or [2] do you mean to say that consciousness "can only be 'experienced in a field of separated beings" who all appear to be solipsists?"

Yes I was aware of that; thus I responded to both of your alternative propositions, neither of which I can entertain.

But I think you've answered my questions -- you included the term personal with reference to consciousness...it is funny that perhaps the fundamental nature of consciousness would make any phenomenologist laugh themselves silly and consider such unexpected comedy as insignificant.

I'm not laughing. Perhaps I'm too serious.

I think we are probably talking cross-purposes here. You have a much deeper understanding of the serious efforts and literature on the topic and I will cede to your points and understanding. You have linked a great deal of literature which I have neglected and it is not fair that I should ignore it and simultaneously bark the first thoughts that arrive in my brain under the influence of a few glasses of wine

Don't worry about it. We're all here to make progress in understanding what consciousness is and what consciousness and mind require us to attend to -- and care about, care for -- in the world we share with all living others. I think I'll now also have a glass of wine, Pinot Grigio to be precise. Cheers and Happy New Year to All.

Also, here is the link I meant to provide an hour ago in a post to you, since linked in a post to Randle:

Schizophrenic autism: clinical phenomenology and pathogenetic implications

 

[Constance]

"we should expect that if consciousness is a trait of one human, it's probably a trait of all humans "

Without consciousness there is no theory of mind....but on the other hand without theory of mind (intersubjectivity) there can be no consciousness

Agreed, except that we are prereflectively/pre-thetically conscious long before we enter into reflection and reflexivity. It's taken us until the last century in philosophy to work hard at understanding both 'mind' and the phenomenal consciousness that enables it to develop.

 

[Michael Allen]

Agreed, except that we are prereflectively/pre-thetically conscious long before we enter into reflection and reflexivity. It's taken us until the last century in philosophy to work hard at understanding both 'mind' and the phenomenal consciousness that enables it to develop.

Can we say the same about the componenents of pre-intersubjectivity (which of course include "the" prereflective)?

A quick note: the term pre-intersubjectivity will fall on our subjectively deaf ears...laughter ensues

 

[Michael Allen]

I think that you likely can articulate what you are getting at in more specific terms and urge you to try again. Perhaps you can account for how and why what you think of as 'Singularity' in/of consciousness occurs in our species and others? What is the evidence for such a change in native capacities we recognize in the evolution of species and most fully in ourselves? Also, why is this 'Singularity' [dissociation? or solipsism?] a "a kind of necessary finality" ?

The "Singularity" is such that is experienced between the very pin-point arriving at a particular human like yourself...the experience "seems" at first to arrive without another being... Example: newborns and their pure selfishness till they pick up on the vast word of others like themselves... So let's ask what happens without such a "pin-point" beginning? Contrast a bee...pin-point single-minded existence that cares nothing except doing that which allows it to persist in a vast pheremone "world" of which it has no understanding. Singularity of purpose residing in a matrix of inter-being capital P "Purpose" ... where do you get one without the other?

 

[Constance]

Can we say the same about the componenents of pre-intersubjectivity (which of course include "the" prereflective)?

What 'components' do you have in mind?

A quick note: the term pre-intersubjectivity will fall on our subjectively deaf ears...laughter ensues

I catch your drift. It takes attentive observation of species -- including our own -- through the long processes of evolution to begin to grok the states of prereflective awareness and proto-consciousness. We ourselves pass through these stages in infanthood and early childhood, and we can understand these stages through empathetic observation of our children. If the recognition of others in prereflective consciousness enables babies to achieve a 'theory of mind' by the age of two [established fact], we need to understand how that comes about, how it happens. It happens out of bodily consciousness and experiences of loving and comforting touch, the functioning of all the senses by which the very young come to know the character of their caregivers pre-thetically and to respond to them according to the quality of the care they give and the bonds they inspire and inscribe with particular others.

The term 'pre-intersubjectivity' as well as the term 'pre-subjectivity' are without meaning for us since we cannot go back to experiencing those inchoate states we once shared with the newborn of every species. But I don't see why recognizing this should make us laugh. Rather it should make us wonder at the gradual emergence of consciousness and mind and lead us to pursue the nature of subjectivity itself.

Here's an event in an aquarium that I just read about (follow the link). It makes me ask 'what did this octopus know/understand' and 'how did he know it'?

Octopus Escapes Aquarium Through 160-Foot Drainpipe Into the Sea

 

[Constance]

The "Singularity" is such that is experienced between the very pin-point arriving at a particular human like yourself...the experience "seems" at first to arrive without another being... Example: newborns and their pure selfishness till they pick up on the vast word of others like themselves... So let's ask what happens without such a "pin-point" beginning? Contrast a bee...pin-point single-minded existence that cares nothing except doing that which allows it to persist in a vast pheremone "world" of which it has no understanding. Singularity of purpose residing in a matrix of inter-being capital P "Purpose" ... where do you get one without the other?

We don't know what kinds of consciousness insects, birds, fish, mammals have. Bees certainly possess a kind of group consciousness and communicate with one another (notably in messages 'danced' by their 'scouts' returning back to the hive to signal a newly discovered hive location to migrate to). The bees follow the scout. Purposes evolve as needs evolve, as need requires. How many 'purposes' have each of us developed and applied throughout our lifetimes to the changing mileau in which we live our lives?

I question your statement above, which I've underscored:

"Example: newborns and their pure selfishness till they pick up on the vast wor[l]d of others like themselves... "

In my experience, infants and very young children do not just vaguely "'pick up' on the vast world of others like themselves." They achieve self-awareness and other-awarenes in conjunction with the care and nurturing they receive in babyhood, and by two years old -- in my daughter's case in her first year -- they understand and enact the gestures that have conveyed care and comfort-giving by their parents. I understood this when one day in Annie's first year the woman managing home-care of four babies of working women I knew was ill and I had to find another experienced caregiver. This lovely woman (call her Susan) told me when I picked Annie up at the end of the working day that she had at first walked Annie slowly around her house, snuggling Annie against her chest, cooing to her and patting her on her back, and that to Susan's surprise Annie was patting Susan on her own back. The 'knowing' that precedes language and categorical thinking is understanding that arises mutely in prereflective consciousness through interpersonal experience.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

More from the paper. Strong parallels with HCT:

“What is the functional benefit of having the ability to generate counterfactual representations? Dennett’s formulation of stages of evolution of minds (Dennett 1996) illustrates the benefit of counterfactuals in evolution and intelligence. Dennett proposed useful distinctions among different stages of the evolution of creatures. These include the following four types of creatures.

The first stage of creatures is called Darwinian. Darwinian creatures are the most primitive form of creatures. The organisms at this stage do not learn from experiences but have a fixed set of behaviors determined by their genetic composition. They adapt to the environment only as a species through natural selection and mutation to their genes. Thus, learning occurs at a population level but not as individual agents.

The second stage is called Skinnerian. Skinnerian creatures—named after the psychologist Skinner—learn from their own experience through associative learning. If a particular action led to a reward (e.g. food), then that action is reinforced, whereas an action that led to an aversive result will be avoided. Skinnerian creatures can adapt to the environment during the lifetime of individual organisms through trial and error. However, there is a limitation in that they can only learn from their own experiences. They would have to learn danger from surviving dangerous situations.

Then, there comes the third stage of creatures—Popperian creatures named after the philosopher Popper. They have internal simulation of the environment and select an action based on predictions about simulated consequences of repertoires of future action sequences. This ability allows Popperian creatures to learn from their simulated, counterfactual experience, and to select reasonable actions even in a new environment when their internal model approximates it reasonably well. Moreover, the ability to form counterfactual representations of sensory consequences contingent upon their future action is the core function of intention. ...

Finally, the fourth stage is called Gregorian. Gregorian creatures can learn from their cultural environment through words and language. This requires the ability to run a simulation of the environment using information they learned through books and the Internet. In Popperian creatures, internal models had to be built upon their own experiences. Gregorian creatures on the other hand can improve their internal models through communication with other agents, which endows them with an additional leverage of intelligence. Here, the ability to internally represent counterfactual states is a prerequisite.”

 

[Soupie]

I think Bach’s statement that physical systems are not conscious but rather simulations are is fascinating. It forces out of our natural naive realist perspectives.

From the paper:

“Our current hypothesis predicts that the presence of consciousness should be measured by the presence of internal generative models of the environment and the self.“

And the self.

I think that is critical here. There is not a causal relationship between physical mechanisms and phenomenal consciousness. We will not discover an external, physical mechanism that causes phenomenal consciousness.

What distinguishes a phenomenally conscious physical state from a non-phenomenally consciousness state will have an intrinsic determinate.

I think that intrinsic determinate is a representation of [a] self.

I know this has been discussed at length. Some have argued that there are phenomenally conscious states sans a feeling of self. I’m not convinced.

One of the things the above paper has pointed out is the “buffer-like” nature of neural processes associated with p consciousness.
It’s conceivable that people enter non-self states, that are later experienced through memory, once a representation of self is back on line.

So what I’m saying is perhaps tautological (if I’m using that term correctly): in order for an agent to experience consciousness, an agent must be capable of generating an internal simulation of a conscious self.

 

[Michael Allen]

...
In my experience, infants and very young children do not just vaguely "'pick up' on the vast world of others like themselves." They achieve self-awareness and other-awarenes in conjunction with the care and nurturing they receive in babyhood, and by two years old

It's the "in conjunction" with the "care and nurturing" obtained in their development. Agreed because I think this is contained in my "others like themselves."

I didn't clearly indicate the importance of the "others like themselves" in my original statement, so it makes sense that it would be overlooked.

The more interesting point is of course the underlying substratum implied by the hive example with the vast sea of chemistry of which each "bee" unit partakes--a closer, yet very esoteric to the normal human intuition, approximation of a model we are searching for in ourselves.

 

[Randall]

I think the underscored statement is generally valid, but that the nature and lived experience of consciousness is subject to significant differences for a number of reasons including neurological differences and early experiences that inhibit the openness and intersubjectivity (mutuality) that many/most of us enjoy. In this respect, for many afflicted individuals, issues arise in both 'functioning' and 'behavior'. Here is a link to a paper I meant to add in an earlier response today because it reveals the physiological and emotional grounds of differences in the abilities of many humans to interact with others fully and meaningfully. You will see what I mean if you read the paper.

Schizophrenic autism: clinical phenomenology and pathogenetic implications

Schizophrenic autism is not a "normal healthy" situation, so although it's interesting as a tangent, it's not relevant to the point. But even in these cases, the functioning at the base level remains the same, e.g. the neurons in schizophrenics and normal people are both bio-electrical relays that if observed on an individual scale would likely be almost indistinguishable from one another in terms of function. However, how the persons they are part of behave, is a whole other matter. I will check out the paper and respond separately to that when I have more time.

 

[Michael Allen]

We don't know what kinds of consciousness insects, birds, fish, mammals have. Bees certainly possess a kind of group consciousness and communicate with one another (notably in messages 'danced' by their 'scouts' returning back to the hive to signal a newly discovered hive location to migrate to). The bees follow the scout. Purposes evolve as needs evolve, as need requires. How many 'purposes' have each of us developed and applied throughout our lifetimes to the changing mileau in which we live our lives?

But we do know the interplay of structures beneath these examples...what we call "know" is probably useless as it pertains only to our own current notions of what it really means to have the experience of knowing. Communication between units that comprise a full self-ascertaining "unit" or does communication lie somewhere at the bedrock of pre-reflection? We attribute our own "purposes" to our own notion of "unit," but what about the colony of cells constructed by the mechanisms that already evolved with our DNA millions of years before we even constructed our own notion of "communication?"