Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[smcder]

Carruthers' 'logic' leads him to some pretty odd (many might say unacceptable) conclusions. Nothing unusual about that I suppose.
Does anyone live near Tuscon? I've been offered to give a presentation there in April (The Science of Consciousness Conference 2020)... on my paper. It'd be worth going if some of you lot are nearby.

Here's a link to the conference:

THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS | TSC 2020 CONSCIOUSNESS REBOOT

THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS | TSC 2020

www.eventbrite.com

Tucson is about 1300 miles, (2100 kilometers) away. I hesitate to commit because of my health status but I'm not involved in a study at this point and I'd be willing to evaluate a trip, say about a month before and let you know if it seems possible at that time. I'd love to see you present! Have you been to the states before?

 

[Soupie]

The individuals with the “information generation hypothesis” of consciousness (counterfactuals) have another brief article:

Does Consciousness Have a Function?

Perhaps, the most fascinating question about consciousness is the Hard Problem. It’s the problem of explaining why and how subjective experiences arise from complex electrochemical interactions happening in the brain. It is Hard because the working of the brain should be fully described in term...

blog.oup.com

It’s a good article fwiw but I post it here for the comments. Is there any other branch of science (maybe QM) that produces such varied interpretations?

 

[Constance]

Here's a link to the conference:

THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS | TSC 2020 CONSCIOUSNESS REBOOT

THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS | TSC 2020

www.eventbrite.com

Tucson is about 1300 miles, (2100 kilometers) away. I hesitate to commit because of my health status but I'm not involved in a study at this point and I'd be willing to evaluate a trip, say about a month before and let you know if it seems possible at that time. I'd love to see you present! Have you been to the states before?

I too would love to attend this conference and to meet both of you in person, but I doubt that I will get there. Would need to find pet sitters and to fly, which I never enjoy. Best of luck and congratulations to you @Pharoah. These Tucson conferences, going on for about 30 years now, have been essential for the development of Consciousness Studies. To be invited to read a paper there is very significant. You are obviously not the average bear.

 

[Soupie]

Btw no, I don’t believe consciousness has a “function.” Function is a concept from the objective, 3rd person perspective, not the personal, 1st person perspective.

 

[Constance]

Link to the conference program:

Center for Consciousness Studies . Tucson . Arizona

 

[Constance]

Btw no, I don’t believe consciousness has a “function.” Function is a concept from the objective, 3rd person perspective, not the personal, 1st person perspective.

If there is a first-person, tacitly self-referential, perspective -- ongoing perspective, stream of consciousness -- experienced by consciousness what do you think its function would be? That is, why would it develop in the evolution of life? For what purpose(s)?

 

[Constance]

@Constance I know you asked me several questions above—which I feel like I’ve already answered numerous times—and I will attempt to answer them again shortly.

However I’d like to ask how you distinguish between consciousness and mind.

As I see it, consciousness, which begins to operate in prereflective states and develops in reflective capacities, grounds the development of 'mind' construed as cognition --- thinking, conceptualizing, and reasoning about both the nature of the world and of itself.

in short, I would say that models of world and self *are* mind instantiated in (phenomenal) consciousness.

How do you define 'phenomenal consciousness' in humans and other animals?

 

[Constance]

@Soupie wrote, re Carruthers' theory, first quoting him:

“In fact, however, there are no special properties. There are no qualia. The temptation to think otherwise derives from the special way in which we can think introspectively about our own perceptual states, deploying concepts such as this (feel of my experience of red). The “problem” of consciousness merely arises out of the contrast between first- and third-person modes of thinking about our own states. For it is one-and-the-same state, with one-and-the-same set of physical and functional properties, that can be thought of now as a perception of red and now as this feel. The latter is just a different way of thinking of the very same state as the former.

Given that there is no extra property that enters the world with phenomenal consciousness, it follows that the question of consciousness in non-human animals is of no scientific importance.”

And here is Peter Carruthers who denies the reality of phenomenal consciousness. The phenomenal quality of red is not real, he says, it’s merely how one thinks of the perception of red from the 1st person.

Does that make sense to anyone here?

Not to me. It seems incoherent to me. Why does PC think that a person would '"think" of his/her perception of red' if "the phenomenal quality of red is not real" {therefore cannot be perceived}?

 

[Soupie]

How do you define 'phenomenal consciousness' in humans and other animals?

Phenomenal consciousness is the qualitative aspect of consciousness: the way emotions, perceptions, sensations, and thoughts feel. All aspects of “being conscious” include phenomenal consciousness.

I think of ‘mind’ as the content and ‘phenomenal consciousness’ as the substrate.

 

[Constance]

{in response to my question in post #919 "can you describe how you experience your own consciousness?"}

I swear I’m not trying to be difficult, but what exactly are you asking? How does one experience their own consciousness? Are you asking one to describe what they find when they introspect?

When introspect I discover emotions such as sad, mad, hurt, worried; I discover perceptions such as green, salty, hot, etc; and I discover thoughts, questions, worries, etc. As well as other “feels” which I haven’t words for.

[This reminds me of the * I left hanging way above. Without perceptions there would be nothingness... with the exception of non-perceptual mental phenomena such as thoughts and emotions.]

How else might one experience their own consciousness? Did you have something else in mind?

I then asked a second question in post #919: "I also wonder whether anyone here would be willing, if it were a possible option, to give up their own consciousness? To let it disappear down the drain of his or her own experienced being, or in short to cut off its capacity for experience and reflections on experience?"

@Soupie replied:

I doubt it. Why ask such a question? ?

I ask these questions because answering them makes it much more difficult to claim, for example, that 'there is no such thing as consciousness', or that 'consciousness is not the personal possession and means by which individuals of our and countless other species are enabled to navigate their local worlds', or that 'consciousness is a quantum field in and to which we do not participate but instead merely receive and enact 'models' of our being and the world's being'.

 

[Constance]

I guess @Constance I feel like we are WAY past questions like these. I feel like many of us are hungry to explore the mbp and whatnot. But you seem to still be bewildered by the ideas and notions we are tentatively exploring.
Maybe that’s just my perception. I’m not trying to attack you but you act like if we step outside of the phenomenological approach we are all consciousness deniers who think p consciousness is a computer program. We are way past all that methinks.

I'm not trying to attack you either, only to encourage you to find out exactly what the phenomenological and neurobiological analyses of consciousness reveal before you dismiss them from the interdisciplinary project of Consciousness Studies, which we have been responding to for a long time now but without collectively engaging sufficiently in all major approaches (of which phenomenology is one). But I will step aside for awhile (except perhaps to link a paper here and there without comment) so that you can more freely pursue the conversations you wish to develop. No hard feelings. Just hard problems.

 

[Soupie]

I then asked a second question in post #919: "I also wonder whether anyone here would be willing, if it were a possible option, to give up their own consciousness? To let it disappear down the drain of his or her own experienced being, or in short to cut off its capacity for experience and reflections on experience?"

@Soupie replied:



I ask these questions because answering them makes it much more difficult to claim, for example, that 'there is no such thing as consciousness', or that 'consciousness is not the personal possession and means by which individuals of our and countless other species are enabled to navigate their local worlds', or that 'consciousness is a quantum field in and to which we do not participate but instead merely receive and enact 'models' of our being and the world's being'.

Who in this thread is making these claims? No one.
@Constance please stop bogging us down with endless explaining and re-explaining and answering of questions that have already been answered ad nauseam.

 

[Constance]

Who in this thread is making these claims? No one.
@Constance please stop bogging us down with endless explaining and re-explaining and answering of questions that have already been answered ad nauseam.

Perhaps you don't see the implications and effects of the hypotheses and theories you've pressed here for several years, including those of Dennett, Hoffman, Josha Bach, and recently Metzinger.

I already said in my last post that I'll step aside, clear the space for you. Isn't that enough? You want me to resign?

ps: really? 'ad nauseum'? (that bites.)

 

[Randall]

I’m not interested in doing the logic study USI but I will attempt to understand your approach to phenomenal consciousness. Let me ask you some questions. Please correct any inaccuracies in my questions:
You believe that phenomenal consciousness is a field emitted by a certain part of the brain. Can you describe this phenomenal consciousness field?

Rather than belief, I prefer to think of the subject in terms of what seems to me to be the most reasonable way to look at the various issues given the information and ideas we've been exposed to thus far. For the question of "phenomenal consciousness", I'd say that if what you mean is along the lines of what Nagel's describes as mental states marked by what it's like to undergo experiences , I would first say that we can do away with the "what it's like" part, and simply consider consciousness as synonymous with experiencing.

Exactly what we're experiencing would seem to fall into categories and sub-categories. Hypothetically the simplest form of experience would only consist of the experience of being, though I cannot imagine what that must be like. Perhaps certain monks in Tibet might know. I'm not sure.

The inference of the word "phenomenal" implies that experiencing includes some sort of phenomena. So if I'm interpreting your question correctly, you're asking if I would equate the experience of phenomena with a field emitted by the brain. If that is an accurate interpretation of your question, I would have to say "No", because the two concepts are in completely in different contexts.

It is analogous to differentiating between a home ( uncountable noun ) and a house ( countable noun ). We can look at the material structure of a house all day long and have no idea what it means for it to be a home to those inside ( if that makes any sense ). In short, the field is part of the structure, not the experience. However the experience is also dependent on the structure.

Once again I could use the EM analogy there ( if it's not already clear enough ). When you switch the light on in a room, the light is not the lightbulb. Yet the light is dependent on a functioning lightbulb. The overwhelming evidence indicates that this is the way the situation is with consciousness and the brain. We may never know exactly why or how the particles ( if there is such a thing ) in a lightbulb have been imparted with their properties. We just know they are, and that we can reproduce the situation.

So at some point we have to be prepared to accept that we can only dig so deep. Life as a human is one where the house is built molecule by molecule, and at some point the light switches on. We know that if we build more houses the same way, more lights will switch on. This gives us a framework to work in. Over time we may be able to come up with some new architecture, but before we can be sure the lights will go on, we need to establish exactly what situation(s) makes them go on in the first place. I believe that part can be done. I currently think the other part is beyond knowing.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie wrote, re Carruthers' theory, first quoting him:



Not to me. It seems incoherent to me. Why does PC think that a person would '"think" of his/her perception of red' if "the phenomenal quality of red is not real" {therefore cannot be perceived}?

I think I am right in saying that I have read a passage from PC expressing the view that animals and the mentally handicapped do not have phen cs... I haven’t read anymore of his work since tbh. One must be prepared to ditch theories if they come to problematic conclusions imo.

I’ve decided to decline the conference as my parents are needing constant care atm... there’s justno way round it really.
Incidentally, we should consider presenting online to each other: our own conference. I often think that everyone has v interesting positions and knowledge base that would make for a v entertaining formal picture. The preparation process is also a good way of clarifying one’s ideas.

 

[Soupie]

Perhaps you don't see the implications and effects of the hypotheses and theories you've pressed here for several years, including those of Dennett, Hoffman, Josha Bach, and recently Metzinger.

I already said in my last post that I'll step aside, clear the space for you. Isn't that enough? You want me to resign?

ps: really? 'ad nauseum'? (that bites.)

Sorry Constance. I suppose I’m just frustrated. Of course I don’t want you to stop asking questions. I have actually appreciated your conversation with MA over the past few weeks.

We know you value phenomenology. If there is anything we may have learned from this years-long discussion, it’s that the pathway to solving the mbp is still wide open.

Re asking questions: I’ve been discussing and presenting material on the intrinsic nature argument since we discussed Hoffman and Strawson a real materialism probably a year or two ago. Never have we mentioned Penrose, etc. I guess it just confuses me how you could think that’s what I’ve been saying. ??‍

 

[Soupie]

So if I'm interpreting your question correctly, you're asking if I would equate the experience of phenomena with a field emitted by the brain. If that is an accurate interpretation of your question, I would have to say "No", because the two concepts are in completely in different contexts.

So you don’t think phenomenal consciousness is a field emitted by the brain?

 

[Michael Allen]

If there is a first-person, tacitly self-referential, perspective -- ongoing perspective, stream of consciousness -- experienced by consciousness what do you think its function would be? That is, why would it develop in the evolution of life? For what purpose(s)?

Let me step in an say that the entire concept of function depends on a framework which cannot be fully comprehended in such a concept..."functional" as a black box converting inputs to outputs must rely on the ability to view the function within a larger framework of being-in-the-world. We must return to the primitives that allow "us" to configure parts of our own embedded nature to comprehend a "function." In other words, a functional description is a fictional narrative placed transparently into a world which we consider is the source of our ability to feel ownership. These problems reside so close to our boundary of unthinkability but are like sirens calling us into a false sense of Being.

 

[Randall]

So you don’t think phenomenal consciousness is a field emitted by the brain?

In my view, phenomenal consciousness is the experience of phenomena, while the physical composition of phenomenal consciousness would seem to be a field of some type. To say less or simply answer in the affirmative or negative would introduce confusion about the issue. This is because the third person singular "is" denotes something more fundamental in terms of meaning. We've been through this before with the stack of bricks analogy. While a stack of bricks is what a building may be composed of, a stack of bricks is not a building. This differentiation may seem trivial, but the lack of it with respect to consciousness also seems to be at the root of a lot of confusion.

 

[Randall]

Let me step in an say that the entire concept of function depends on a framework which cannot be fully comprehended in such a concept..."functional" as a black box converting inputs to outputs must rely on the ability to view the function within a larger framework of being-in-the-world. We must return to the primitives that allow "us" to configure parts of our own embedded nature to comprehend a "function." In other words, a functional description is a fictional narrative placed transparently into a world which we consider is the source of our ability to feel ownership. These problems reside so close to our boundary of unthinkability but are like sirens calling us into a false sense of Being.

There are times when I think you overcomplicate things. The concept of function need not be so esoteric. For example the function of one gear may be nothing more than to turn another gear. This is entirely comprehensible. There is no "false sense of being" associated with it on any practical level. If we want to invoke Zeno, that's another matter. But that level of understanding isn't required to make complete sense of the situation. If you're trying to relay a different message, then perhaps an example would be helpful.