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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

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Sorry Constance. I suppose I’m just frustrated. Of course I don’t want you to stop asking questions. I have actually appreciated your conversation with MA over the past few weeks.

Thanks. Let's just forget about this little kerfuffle. I'm frustrated too, as is obvious in my persistence in pressing the importance of phenomenology for a full appreciation of the nature and structure of human consciousness and its influence on what we think and do within the existential conditions of our lived world.

We know you value phenomenology. If there is anything we may have learned from this years-long discussion, it’s that the pathway to solving the mbp is still wide open.

As I've said before, I think the mbp as foregrounded in analytical philosophy is overcome in phenomenological philosophy with contributing insights from biology, psychology, and affective neuroscience. I evidently haven't succeeded in making that case here despite many efforts. Nevertheless I understand the attractions of the theories you want to pursue and will stand by and read more about them.

Re asking questions: I’ve been discussing and presenting material on the intrinsic nature argument since we discussed Hoffman and Strawson a real materialism probably a year or two ago. Never have we mentioned Penrose, etc. I guess it just confuses me how you could think that’s what I’ve been saying. ??‍♂️

I do see the 'intrinsic nature argument' you've been presenting with the succession of theorists you've brought forward, and I recognize the power of its attraction. I'm reading the paper linked in the OUP material you cited yesterday and will follow your lead as discussions ensue here. Re Penrose and Hameroff, I mentioned them because their contributions to the recognition of quantum processes in the brain seemed to me to support your pursuit of quantum field explanations of consciousness. Perhaps they do? Anyway, I will do more listening for awhile. :)


ETA: here is the link to that paper at OUP:
Information generation as a functional basis of consciousness
 
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There are times when I think you overcomplicate things. The concept of function need not be so esoteric. For example the function of one gear may be nothing more than to turn another gear. This is entirely comprehensible. There is no "false sense of being" associated with it on any practical level. If we want to invoke Zeno, that's another matter. But that level of understanding isn't required to make complete sense of the situation. If you're trying to relay a different message, then perhaps an example would be helpful.

The concept of function is rather trivial within our manifold of experience...the problem occurs when you apply this concept to explain the manifold that brought the concept into being. What I am trying to say is that our "concepts" are weak tools because the very thing we are trying to disassemble and comprehend has already mindlessly assumed the tools and their effects.

Edit:

Yes it would see that I am overcomplicating "things." The problem is that we are trying to analyze the analyzer which has already taken upon itself to ascertain reality in such a way as to improve our survivability. That which extends beyond the necessary bound of survivability seems strange to us...but may be an evolutionary byproduct. Something that is "entirely comprehensible" by our embedded engine of being-in-the-world may actually utterly fail to explain it's own origins. In other words, the questions we verbalize may mislead us from any final or complete understanding of the very engine that "feels" it's own existence through reflection on its own "questioning" or "feeling/groping about" What we think is "entirely comprehensible" (a gear turning another) is a figment that is already taken for granted in our questioning of the foundation of being. The cause-effect models already assume something invisible or transparent to allow consciousness to feel the dynamics of being which it cannot fully understand.

The easiest way to illustrate this point is to imagine an infintely capable consciousness that knows everything. If such a sentience exists (it doesn't) then there would be no basis for any ability to feel ... spoiler alert: an omniscient consciousness is dead...unfeeling, unchanging, physical....all the things that consciousness itself (as a living embedded being) abhors. So it makes perfect sense that consciousness fail to provide a theory that satisfies it's own questioning.
 
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In my view, phenomenal consciousness is the experience of phenomena, while the physical composition of phenomenal consciousness would seem to be a field of some type.
Is this phenomenal consciousness field (PCF) visible with the naked eye?
 
The concept of function is rather trivial within our manifold of experience...the problem occurs when you apply this concept to explain the manifold that brought the concept into being. What I am trying to say is that our "concepts" are weak tools because the very thing we are trying to disassemble and comprehend has already mindlessly assumed the tools and their effects.

So we are essentially only marionettes whose movements and projects in and for ourselves and others and more broadly for the well-being of our environing world are not our own but are unconsciously manipulated and determined by a 'manifold', of which we have no real knowledge? Recalls Chalmers's description of zombies in his setting out of the hard problem.

Edit: Yes it would see[m] that I am overcomplicating "things." The problem is that we are trying to analyze the analyzer which has already taken upon itself to ascertain reality in such a way as to improve our survivability. That which extends beyond the necessary bound of survivability seems strange to us...but may be an evolutionary byproduct.

So in your view our only identifiable instinct concerns our 'surviving' in this life? We and other animals are in fact motivated by a plenum of identifiable instincts which you seem to prefer to ignore. Consult J.J. Gibson, Jaak Panksepp, and associated others.

Something that is "entirely comprehensible" by our embedded engine of being-in-the-world may actually utterly fail to explain it's own origins. In other words, the questions we verbalize may mislead us from any final or complete understanding of the very engine that "feels" it's own existence through reflection on its own "questioning" or "feeling/groping about"

This is confusing for me. It seems that you are arguing that this unknown and unknowable 'manifold' (the engine of Being in the cosmos, thus of our sense of being-in-the/a-world) is magically embedded in all forms of life/expressions of consciousness and renders us automatons whose 'consciousness' is capable only of presenting questions which we cannot begin to answer. Thus we have no need of philosophy or the sciences, or of our own capacities for reflection on what we experience. Have I got that right?

What we think is "entirely comprehensible" (a gear turning another) is a figment that is already taken for granted in our questioning of the foundation of being. The cause-effect models already assume something invisible or transparent to allow consciousness to feel the dynamics of being which it cannot fully understand.

So our descriptions of how things, forces, processes work in nature, which have increased in depth and complexity in our time, are pointless? The questions we ask are futile since the answers are only to be found in the 'manifold'/the cosmic engine of being' and we are unable to comprehend the nature of this engine. Thus seeking to understand our own nature, to use our individual and collective capacities for reasoning based in our empirical experiences of things and others, are idle and meaningless efforts. My goodness, what shall we do with our time instead?

The easiest way to illustrate this point is to imagine an infintely capable consciousness that knows everything. If such a sentience exists (it doesn't) then there would be no basis for any ability to feel ... spoiler alert: an omniscient consciousness is dead...unfeeling, unchanging, physical....all the things that consciousness itself (as a living embedded being) abhors. So it makes perfect sense that consciousness fail to provide a theory that satisfies it's own questioning.

I don't think that most of us "abhor" the idea of an 'infinite consciousness' as perhaps being "unfeeling, unchanging, physical." We have no information about the nature of any 'infinite consciousness' that might exist, just as we have no idea about the nature of the hidden 'manifold'/'engine of being' you speculate about. You are engaged in thought experiments. Nothing wrong with that, but I think you should recognize the limitations of thought experiments.
 
Is this phenomenal consciousness field (PCF) visible with the naked eye?
I don't unify the concept of sensory phenomena with the that of a field theory for consciousness. Therefore a phenomenal consciousness field (PCF) would be a new term here. But assuming that we equate sensory phenomena with qualia, then experiencing qualia visually is literally the same as seeing the consciousness field. We are however not thinking of it in that context, just like when we go to the movies, we are literally seeing a movie screen, but the screen itself is removed from our experience of the movie.
 
... If this link doesn't work, search for ...
The trick seems to be to delete everything after ".pdf" ( without the quotes ).
Link: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/15a5/d073ba4c54d5348fb8ec9e0c3293edc5f2b5.pdf

Apart from McGinn's use of "apprehend" when the word "comprehend" would be a better choice, my opinion of the paper's subject matter Can We Solve the Mind—Body Problem? remains the same as has been previously stated. It is a false "problem". Therefore the whole exercise of attempting to answer it is a fool's errand. There are bodies and there are minds. Both coexist when the conditions are right.

Therefore to understand consciousness to the same degree as we understand anything else, all that needs to be established are all the particulars of the conditions directly correlated with the presence of consciousness. Armed with that knowledge, we would then have every reason to believe that in situations where those conditions exist, consciousness exists as well.

As proof of this assertion, I once again point out the reproductive cycle of human beings. There are literally billions of examples proving the above hypothesis beyond any reasonable doubt. The alternative is to invoke some sort of magical thinking where credence is given to the idea that some divinity or another keeps tabs on births and deaths and dispenses consciousness like sacramental bread. That approach solves nothing.
 
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I don't unify the concept of sensory phenomena with the that of a field theory for consciousness. Therefore a phenomenal consciousness field (PCF) would be a new term here. But assuming that we equate sensory phenomena with qualia, then experiencing qualia visually is literally the same as seeing the consciousness field. We are however not thinking of it in that context, just like when we go to the movies, we are literally seeing a movie screen, but the screen itself is removed from our experience of the movie.
So we can see a PCF?
 
So we can see a PCF?
That depends on whether or not any visual phenomena exist, and whether or not you would choose to consider such phenomena a part of your field of consciousness. When you imagine a red Ferrari are you seeing a thing made of metal, fiberglass, and rubber? Or are you experiencing a visual representation in your field of consciousness? You pick.
 
The concept of function is rather trivial within our manifold of experience...the problem occurs when you apply this concept to explain the manifold that brought the concept into being. What I am trying to say is that our "concepts" are weak tools because the very thing we are trying to disassemble and comprehend has already mindlessly assumed the tools and their effects.

Edit:

Yes it would see that I am overcomplicating "things." The problem is that we are trying to analyze the analyzer which has already taken upon itself to ascertain reality in such a way as to improve our survivability. That which extends beyond the necessary bound of survivability seems strange to us...but may be an evolutionary byproduct. Something that is "entirely comprehensible" by our embedded engine of being-in-the-world may actually utterly fail to explain it's own origins. In other words, the questions we verbalize may mislead us from any final or complete understanding of the very engine that "feels" it's own existence through reflection on its own "questioning" or "feeling/groping about" What we think is "entirely comprehensible" (a gear turning another) is a figment that is already taken for granted in our questioning of the foundation of being. The cause-effect models already assume something invisible or transparent to allow consciousness to feel the dynamics of being which it cannot fully understand.

The easiest way to illustrate this point is to imagine an infintely capable consciousness that knows everything. If such a sentience exists (it doesn't) then there would be no basis for any ability to feel ... spoiler alert: an omniscient consciousness is dead...unfeeling, unchanging, physical....all the things that consciousness itself (as a living embedded being) abhors. So it makes perfect sense that consciousness fail to provide a theory that satisfies it's own questioning.
Thanks for that clarification. This part is especially relevant: "... the questions we verbalize may mislead us from any final or complete understanding ..."

I would say that while our self awareness allows us to consciously analyze ourselves, much remains abstract. For example, we may fall ill and make a self-diagnosis that we are sick, but we have no direct experience of our immune system battling some virus. We just feel a rise in temperature and other symptoms. Science helps us extrapolate what is really going on, but we have no direct awareness of the cause.

In the past that blindness has misled us about the cause of disease. We may have asked, What demon is responsible? However the trend appears to be one where by learning how to ask the right questions, over time we are getting closer to the right answers. This is one of the reasons I constantly reject the MBP as a valid question. Instead we need to ask: What criteria are required to get the same situation?
 
The trick seems to be to delete everything after ".pdf" ( without the quotes ).
Link: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/15a5/d073ba4c54d5348fb8ec9e0c3293edc5f2b5.pdf

Apart from McGinn's use of "apprehend" when the word "comprehend" would be a better choice, my opinion of the paper's subject matter Can We Solve the Mind—Body Problem? remains the same as has been previously stated. It is a false "problem". Therefore the whole exercise of attempting to answer it is a fool's errand. There are bodies and there are minds. Both coexist when the conditions are right.

Therefore to understand consciousness to the same degree as we understand anything else, all that needs to be established are all the particulars of the conditions directly correlated with the presence of consciousness. Armed with that knowledge, we would then have every reason to believe that in situations where those conditions exist, consciousness exists as well.

As proof of this assertion, I once again point out the reproductive cycle of human beings. There are literally billions of examples proving the above hypothesis beyond any reasonable doubt. The alternative is to invoke some sort of magical thinking where credence is given to the idea that some divinity or another keeps tabs on births and deaths and dispenses consciousness like sacramental bread. That approach solves nothing.


"Apart from McGinn's use of "apprehend" when the word "comprehend" would be a better choice"

?
 

I don't think the information provided at that link is helpful. 'Comprehend' implies mastery/full comprehension of a subject matter, object, or idea, whereas 'apprehend' suggests a state short of full comprehension but which is on the way to understanding/grasping the subject matter, object, or idea.

Among standard English dictionaries in use in the U.S., Merriam-Webster is the most reliable. Here is a link to M-W's breakdown of definitions for the verb 'to apprehend':

apprehend
verb
ap·pre·hend | \ ˌa-pri-ˈhend \

apprehended; apprehending; apprehends

Definition of apprehend

transitive verb
1: ARREST, SEIZE apprehend a thief

2a: to become aware of : PERCEIVE /She immediately apprehended the problem.
b: to anticipate especially with anxiety, dread, or fear

3: to grasp with the understanding : recognize the meaning of

intransitive verb
: UNDERSTAND, GRASP

I've highlighted in red the two definitions that are clearly close to McGinn's intended usage and meaning.

Definition of APPREHEND


ETA: While we're applying to our dictionaries for needed definitions I'd like to note the following Wiki source for a thorough definition of the word 'apperception', important in both analytical and phenomenological philosophy of mind.
Apperception - Wikipedia
 
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If this link doesn't work, search for:

Semantic Scholar › pdfs › ...PDF
Can We Solve the Mind—Body Problem? - Semantic Scholar

This is McGinn's seminal paper on cognitive closure. It tracks with some of @Michael Allen ideas...name a thing and have power over it.

I especially like/appreciate the following extract from McGinn's concluding paragraph:

". . . the limits of our minds are just not the limits of reality. It is deplorably anthropocentric to insist that reality be constrained by what the human mind can conceive. We need to cultivate a vision of reality (a metaphysics) that makes it truly independent of our given cognitive powers, a conception that includes these powers as a proper part. It is just that, in the case of the mind-body problem, the bit of reality that systematically eludes our cognitive grasp is an aspect of our own nature. Indeed, it is an aspect that makes it possible for us to have minds at all and to think about how they are related to our bodies. This particular transcendent tract of reality happens to lie within our own heads. A deep fact about our own nature as a form of embodied consciousness is thus necessarily hidden from us. Yet there is nothing inherently eerie or bizarre about this embodiment. We are much more straightforward than we seem. Our weirdness lies in the eye of the beholder."

This link worked for me: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/15...Vaw1yyzxaYxDLQAXCELGI4e5z&cshid=1580083270035
 
That depends on whether or not any visual phenomena exist, and whether or not you would choose to consider such phenomena a part of your field of consciousness. When you imagine a red Ferrari are you seeing a thing made of metal, fiberglass, and rubber? Or are you experiencing a visual representation in your field of consciousness? You pick.
Usi, keep in mind that I’m making a genuine effort to understand your approach. You say you’ve narrowed down for yourself the most logical description of the nature of the mind and brain. Please share.

let me ask a related but slightly different question: can people see the PCF of another person with their own eyes?
 
This is one of the reasons I constantly reject the MBP as a valid question. Instead we need to ask: What criteria are required to get the same situation?
The mbp not a valid question? Are you thinking of the HP?

The mbp is simply the question of how the mind and body, ie phenomenological and physical things are related. I’m not sure how that question is invalid?

The HP is a more nuanced question and I can see how one might reject its premise.
 
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