Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Pharoah]

I know!

And I'm asking would a mind "able to think of the brain and consciousness in ways that utterly prescind from the perceptual and the introspective" have a mbp problem?

Can you rearrange the words in this sentence so that it is clearer? Is it: would a mind have a mbp if it was cut off from the perceptual and introspective?
If so, I’d say no ... but that doesn’t mean it would have no mind (or body) and therefore that it would actually have no problem. merely that it would not realise it had a problem perceptually or introspectively.

 

[Constance]

Can you rearrange the words in this sentence so that it is clearer? Is it: would a mind have a mbp if it was cut off from the perceptual and introspective?
If so, I’d say no ... but that doesn’t mean it would have no mind (or body) and therefore that it would actually have no problem. merely that it would not realise it had a problem perceptually or introspectively.

Here is the full paper linked in @Soupie's introduction to the theory he is developing, from Oxford OUP:

Information generation as a functional basis of consciousness

 

[Constance]

This paragraph from the above-linked paper makes a great deal of sense:

"Reflexive versus non-reflexive behavior as a marker of consciousness
In clinical settings, the ability to execute non-reflexive behavior is taken as a sign of the presence of consciousness when distinguishing disorders of consciousness (Piccinini and Craver 2011): the minimally conscious state (MCS) in which the patient is awake and retains awareness of the self and environment, and the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (Laureys et al. 2010) in which the patient is awake but lacks awareness of the self and environment. According to a modern guideline, MCS is characterized by the presence of cognitively mediated behavior, which is differentiated from reflexive behavior (Giacino et al. 2002). That is, in disorders of consciousness, the presence of consciousness depends on intentional, deliberate behavior as opposed to automated, reflexive behavior triggered solely by the properties of the current sensory input. While identification of non-reflexive behavior is difficult if we were to rely only on behavioral characteristics displayed by a patient, this clinical definition appeals to our intuition that consciousness is needed in non-reflexive behavior."

This seem to be borne out in cases of amnesia.

 

[Soupie]

I read McGinn above to say that something in the brain is responsible for consciousness and that there is a causal nexus ... he later says "Brain states cause conscious states" ... but you write: "So he’s correct in saying that nothing in the brain can cause the mind/consciousness" ... what am I missing?

That was in reference to his statement that we can’t imagine spatial properties giving rise to consciousness. I agree with that. Or as I said, it’s hard to see how that could be the case. Of course they always could, who knows. Nature is weird.

 

[Soupie]

"I assume that all quantum fields have a qualitative character. Or that the 12 fields can ultimately be reduced to one field."

So, Panpsychism, correct?

I’m going to be difficult and say no. Rather I’m of the view that what we currently identify as quantum fields have a qualitative character.

 

[smcder]

That was in reference to his statement that we can’t imagine spatial properties giving rise to consciousness. I agree with that. Or as I said, it’s hard to see how that could be the case. Of course they always could, who knows. Nature is weird.

Do you mean this statement?

"The senses are responsive to certain kinds of properties-those that are essentially bound up with space but these properties are of the wrong sort (the wrong category) to constitute P."

 

[Soupie]

Here is the full paper linked in @Soupie's introduction to the theory he is developing, from Oxford OUP:

Information generation as a functional basis of consciousness

I’m not developing a theory. I’m making the intrinsic nature argument for the mbp. However I’m doing in a way.

As we’ve been discussing, the mbp is centered in the “notion” that there is a structural mismatch between consciousness and matter.

I’m (clumsily) making two arguments:

1) the apparent structural mismatch is a byproduct of self-perception (which is related to notes problems of self-reference)

2) any perceptual system, when perceiving itself, will likewise have a mbp

(The paper you link above is only distantly related to the intrinsic nature argument.)

 

[smcder]

Can you rearrange the words in this sentence so that it is clearer? Is it: would a mind have a mbp if it was cut off from the perceptual and introspective?
If so, I’d say no ... but that doesn’t mean it would have no mind (or body) and therefore that it would actually have no problem. merely that it would not realise it had a problem perceptually or introspectively.

McGinn says we can never grasp P in the sentence below:

"Let us then say that there exists some property P, instantiated by the brain, in virtue of which the brain is the basis of consciousness."

He argues that why we can't has to do with how we apprehend the mind body problem: using the two faculties of perception and introspection. He thinks further that our concept formation comes from these faculties and that no mind that uses these two faculties will get to grips with P. He's not sure but maybe there is some kind of mind that could but it would be a mind that does not form concepts from introspection or perception - more strongly that concept formation in such a mind is entirely cut off from introspection and perception.

He thinks it seems we deal with mathematics in such a way (Platonism I think?) as an indication that such minds might be possible but he seems cautious about this.

All that said, I think at the time I was trying to figure out if @Soupie thought there might be any kind of mind that could solve McGinn's problem.

 

[smcder]

I’m going to be difficult and say no. Rather I’m of the view that what we currently identify as quantum fields have a qualitative character.

But for you the qualitative is a primary aspect, the qualitative is there from the get go, correct? So no hard problem for you! Correct?

 

[smcder]

I’m not developing a theory. I’m making the intrinsic nature argument for the mbp. However I’m doing in a way.

As we’ve been discussing, the mbp is centered in the “notion” that there is a structural mismatch between consciousness and matter.

I’m (clumsily) making two arguments:

1) the apparent structural mismatch is a byproduct of self-perception (which is related to notes problems of self-reference)

2) any perceptual system, when perceiving itself, will likewise have a mbp

(The paper you link above is only distantly related to the intrinsic nature argument.)

@Pharoah - my question above was in response to something like this post by @Soupie

McGinn argues that our senses are geared to represent a spatial world:

"The senses are responsive to certain kinds of properties-those that are essentially bound up with space but these properties are of the wrong sort (the wrong category) to constitute P."

Further he says that our minds form concepts from this faculty of perception and thus we are not able to conceive and form theories about the property by which the brain subserves the mind.

Finally, I'm not sure that is the same "structural mismatch" that @Soupie is referring to here.

 

[Soupie]

Finally, I'm not sure that is the same "structural mismatch" that @Soupie is referring to here.

It’s not. McGinn argument for cognitive closure is not based on the structural mismatch. He argues that there is a structural mismatch. He then goes on to argue that we can’t explain how the brain causes consciousness do to cognitive closure. His argument for cognitive closure is not linked I don’t think to the structural mismatch.

 

[Soupie]

Further he says that our minds form concepts from this faculty of perception and thus we are not able to conceive and form theories about the property by which the brain subserves the mind.

I’m not sure about that.

 

[Soupie]

Further he says that our minds form concepts from this faculty of perception and thus we are not able to conceive and form theories about the property by which the brain subserves the mind.

This would actually be closer to what I’m arguing, except for the causation.

I’m arguing that perception of the rain is holding us back from what the brain really is in actuality.

But I’m saying this limitation is blinding us from seeing the brain mind identity. Not that this limitation is bringing us from brain causing the mind.

 

[Soupie]

I take McGinn to be accepting as actual the perception of the brain as wholly and only composed of spatial properties.

 

[smcder]

I take McGinn to be accepting as actual the perception of the brain as wholly and only composed of spatial properties.

Can you quote McGinn to clarify and support this? The tricky phrase for me is "accept as actual the perception"

 

[smcder]

I take McGinn to be accepting as actual the perception of the brain as wholly and only composed of spatial properties.

He says we know the mind body problem through perception (we know the object the brain this way and that our perceptions are basically spatial) and introspection (how we know the "mind" or our experience) - he argues the perplexity we feel in the face of the mbp comes from this and also comes from his claim that our concept formation is related to these faculties.

But when he talks about the property P needed to explain the relationship between the mind and the brain, he says:

"I take it this claim will not seem terribly controversial. After all, we do not generally expect that every property referred to in our theories should be a potential object of human perception: consider quantum theory and cosmology. Unrestricted perceptual openness is a dogma of empiricism if ever there was one. And there is no compelling reason to suppose that the property needed to explain the mind-brain relation should be in principle perceptible; it might be essentially 'theoretical', an object of thought not sensory experience."

 

[smcder]

Yes. But there are a few other hurdles that I didn’t address above. However I think they can be overcome.

If we argue there is no structural mismatch between minds and quantum fields, it goes both ways. There is nothing about quantum fields that seems to be a mismatch with consciousness. We can sense the continuous, field-like nature of consciousness.

But are there properties of the mind that don’t seem to match quantum fields? I say no. But saying no means accepting something that most cannot.

The mind has a qualitative nature. To deny a structural mismatch between minds and quantum fields is to accept that quantum fields have a qualitative nature.

The something it is like to be Soupie and quantum fields structurally match?

 

[Soupie]

"I take it this claim will not seem terribly controversial. After all, we do not generally expect that every property referred to in our theories should be a potential object of human perception: consider quantum theory and cosmology. Unrestricted perceptual openness is a dogma of empiricism if ever there was one. And there is no compelling reason to suppose that the property needed to explain the mind-brain relation should be in principle perceptible; it might be essentially 'theoretical', an object of thought not sensory experience."

Ok. I’m with you.

I think my argument and McGinn’s argument can be presented in such a way that the parallel each other more than not.

He obviously starts with a different premise than I (the HP) and also arrives at a different conclusion.

Re the structural mismatch

I need to read an in-depth description of it. I would love to continue a dialogue with you about it.

One problem I face is crystallizing my own view. I say that quantum fields have a qualitative nature. But what are quantum fields?

We don’t know them perceptually. We know them mathematically. Are quantum fields spatial in actuality? I think a physicist would say yes.

Put that to the aside for a moment.

It was helpful for me to conceptualize the mbp as spatial and qualitative.

What Comes first the chicken or the egg?

Part of me is saying: when a qualitative perceptual system perceives itself, it will represent its self as spatial.

Is the spatial actual or simply how the senses represent the qualitative?

I haven’t answered this question for myself yet. Because the actual brain is noumena, perhaps we can say whether the actual brain is actually spatial.

 

[Soupie]

McGinn says the qualitative or a property giving rise to the qualitative may be in the brain, we just can’t sense/perceive.

I’m saying that the qualitative just is the brain, but our senses represent it AS spatial.

 

[Constance]

That was in reference to his statement that we can’t imagine spatial properties giving rise to consciousness. I agree with that. Or as I said, it’s hard to see how that could be the case. Of course they always could, who knows. Nature is weird.

In phenomenology (sorry to bring it up, but this will be short), the discovery and development of awareness, protoconscious, and consciousness depend on both perception and tacit self-awareness of the animal's being-in-the/a-world. The visible depth of the environing world (understood tacitly whenever an animal or human moves out beyond its familiar niche, expanding the horizons of its known 'world') grounds what MP calls "the perceptual faith" -- i.e., the understanding that one exists within the outer being of a place whose visible horizons change and expand as he or she moves. Tacit self-reference experienced in encounters with things and gestalts in this expanding 'world' establishes the sense of one's own spatial and temporal situation, thus open-ended perspectives, in a perceived environment. Gradually the understanding of the nature of one's inescapable relation to this sensed 'world' is refined through experience and then reflection, which gives way in time to science and ontological thinking.

He says we know the mind body problem through perception (we know the object the brain this way and that our perceptions are basically spatial) and introspection (how we know the "mind" or our experience) - he argues the perplexity we feel in the face of the mbp comes from this and also comes from his claim that our concept formation is related to these faculties.

I don't think we 'know'/become aware of the brain contained within our skulls until much later in our development, closer to our own historical time. Now we study the brain itself, sitting on our lab table, recognize it as an organ integrated with the body (an interdependence of organs and processes), and indeed wonder if and how this five-pound mass of tissue can account for the wealth and complexity of our lived experiences in the world, which have brought us to the scientific study/interrogation of the brain. I don't think it's possible to account for the capacities and facilitations of this organ in the absence of a phenomenological investigation of lived experience and consciousness itself. In other words, to 'prescind' that which has been learned about consciousness in the history of our species to date and look only at the dead brain on our lab table for explanations of what we are and where we are is imo short-sighted. I shall subside now.

But when he talks about the property P needed to explain the relationship between the mind and the brain, he says:
"I take it this claim will not seem terribly controversial. After all, we do not generally expect that every property referred to in our theories should be a potential object of human perception: consider quantum theory and cosmology. Unrestricted perceptual openness is a dogma of empiricism if ever there was one. And there is no compelling reason to suppose that the property needed to explain the mind-brain relation should be in principle perceptible; it might be essentially 'theoretical', an object of thought not sensory experience."

Bas van Fraassen, an accomplished philosopher of science and of mind and long a student of consciousness, proposes for science a practice of 'Constructive Empiricism' in the midst of our theory-building. Below is a link to his book publications, which includes a further link to his papers.

Bas van Fraassen: Publications