Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Soupie]

Ie does the qualitative have an actual spacial property or do the senses just represent the qualitative as having/being a spatial property?

We know the senses represent the brain as being spatial, but is it really spatial?

 

[Soupie]

Ie does the qualitative have an actual spacial property or do the senses just represent the qualitative as having/being a spatial property?

We know the senses represent the brain as being spatial, but is it really spatial?

If I understand correctly, this is a topic and/or question that Kant tackled. Whether space was actual (noumena) or part of the phenomenal.

I think a case can be made a la MA and other bits that we can’t say there is a structural mismatch between the brain and mind bc we can’t get a clear look at the structure of the mind and brain.

 

[Soupie]

In other words, to 'prescind' that which has been learned about consciousness in the history of our species to date and look only at the dead brain on our lab table for explanations of what we are and where we are is imo short-sighted. I shall subside now.

You don’t have to subside.

But what I will say is that the question we are asking is much narrower than that: we are asking how the qualitative and the spatial are related.

Now it may be that this is a red herring. Or that we can’t answer that question with out incorporating the lived experience/personal level concepts you mention.

Or perhaps more likely that we can’t get beyond the personal level despite our efforts.

 

[Constance]

Here is a link to the SEP article on Constructive Empiricism for anyone interested in pursuing it:

Constructive Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Constance]

You don’t have to subside.

But what I will say is that the question we are asking is much narrower than that: we are asking how the qualitative and the spatial are related.

Now it may be that this is a red herring. Or that we can’t answer that question with out incorporating the lived experience/personal level concepts you mention.

Or perhaps more likely that we can’t get beyond the personal level despite our efforts.

Or perhaps simply that we can't achieve a point of view from everywhere or everywhen. ??

 

[Soupie]

McGinn says the qualitative or a property giving rise to the qualitative may be in the brain, we just can’t sense/perceive.

I’m saying that the qualitative just is the brain, but our senses represent it AS spatial.

Actually McGinn is (not maybe, is) saying there is a property in the brain that gives rise to the qualitative. We can’t perceive this property and therefore it’s beyond our ken to conceive of it.

I’m saying the qualitative IS the brain. And we CAN perceive it. We perceive it AS a spatial brain.

 

[Soupie]

The something it is like to be Soupie and quantum fields structurally match?

Insofar as I am composed of quantum fields and there is something it is like to be me, yes.

But also, I don’t think there is anything about the nature of quantum fields that precludes them from having a qualitative nature other than human intuition.

 

[Soupie]

http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf

”The structural mismatch argument
This argument is inspired by the structural mismatch problem discussed earlier: macrophenomenal structure (of consciousness) seems quite different from macrophysical structure (of the brain, say) where constitutive Russellian panpsychism would seem to require that the structures be the same. It is also closely related to the grain problem, which is used (for example by Maxwell and Stoljar) to raise a version of the structural mismatch problem

We can understand microphysical structure and macrophysical structure as the quasi-mathematical structure of microphysical and macrophysical entities as characterized by physics. Macrophenom- enal structure is the structure we find within our phenomenology. In both cases, structure includes both internal structure (the internal geometrical structure of a complex physical entity, the internal structure of a visual field) as well as what we might external structure: the structure of spaces within which properties are embedded (the scalar structure of mass, the three-dimensional struc- ture of color space).

The structural mismatch argument can be put in the form of an apparently inconsistent tetrad:

(1) Microphenomenal structure is isomorphic to microphysical structure
(2) Microphenomenal structure constitutes macrophenomenal structure.
(3) Microphysical structure constitutes macrophysical structure.
(4) Macrophenomenal structure is not isomorphic to macrophysical structure“

Yes, I’m going to dispute (4). I don’t have the intellectual power nor the knowledge to effectively do so, however haha.

I think there’s reason to believe (4) is false. I’m not sure in principle that we could ever arrive at a 1:1 isomorphic match between spatial and qualitative due to the self-reference issues and issues MA has raised. But I think we might some day achieve a close enough match between mind and brain that we will see they share an identity—and the apparent duality is due to self-reference (looking in the mirror) not an actual duality.

 

[Soupie]

Isomorphism (Gestalt psychology) - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The term isomorphism literally means sameness (iso) of form (morphism). In Gestalt psychology, Isomorphism is the idea that perception and the underlying physiological representation are similar because of related Gestalt qualities. Isomorphism refers to a correspondence between a stimulus array and the brain state created by that stimulus, and is based on the idea that the objective brain processes underlying and correlated with particular phenomenological experiences functionally have the same form and structure as those subjective experiences.[1]

...

A commonly used example of isomorphism is the phi phenomenon, in which a row of lights flashing in sequence creates the illusion of motion. It is argued that the brain state created by this stimulus matches the brain state created by a patch of light moving from one location to another. The stimulus is perceived as motion because the subjective percept of spatial structure is correlated with electric fields in the brain whose spatial pattern mirrors the spatial structure in the perceived world.[4][5]

 

[stonehart]

I assert that my consciousness exists using “I think therefore I am” as an axiom.

I assert that the physical universe is all that exists because:

a) there is no evidence supporting the existence of a non-physical universe;
b) there are no explanations requiring the existence of a non-physical universe;
c) if a non-physical universe did exist, there is no mechanism for it to interact with the physical universe, so functionally it is equivalent to not existing;

Therefore my consciousness exists and is part of the physical universe.

Prove me wrong.

Very good point of view, I would assert that you can only ever be that which you have touched seen, socialized etc etc anything outside of that is a total unknowable and becomes pure hypothesis and conjecture.

What we see or should I say perceive as consciousness is a by product of interaction and development within this physical existence, as such to assert that there is anything else beyond it is pure supposition, I mean how could it be anything else but?

You can only ever truly know that which you can see, smell, taste, interact with etc etc that is the sum total of the human experience, physical stimulus like pain and pleasure are feed backs from our physical world, emotions are socialized into us as we grow from birth... all of this is a result of being immersed in a physical world and it is that which we call consciousness arises from... literally a by product of a physical existence and no more.

 

[Randall]

Very good point of view, I would assert that you can only ever be that which you have touched seen, socialized etc etc anything outside of that is a total unknowable and becomes pure hypothesis and conjecture.

What we see or should I say perceive as consciousness is a by product of interaction and development within this physical existence, as such to assert that there is anything else beyond it is pure supposition, I mean how could it be anything else but?

You can only ever truly know that which you can see, smell, taste, interact with etc etc that is the sum total of the human experience, physical stimulus like pain and pleasure are feed backs from our physical world, emotions are socialized into us as we grow from birth... all of this is a result of being immersed in a physical world and it is that which we call consciousness arises from... literally a by product of a physical existence and no more.

If we start where you say "I would assert that you can only ever be that ...", and assume that the "you" in that sentence is meant as a reference to you as a person, then it might be beneficial to quickly recap the concept of personhood. A pretty good case can be made that not only are you everything you mentioned, but every other part not mentioned. In fact the much underestimated part that does no experiencing ( that we're aware of ), is responsible for a sizeable portion of our identity, as well as our personality.

 

[Soupie]

https://www.dartmouth.edu/~peter/pdf/15.pdf

“The problem in modern neuroscience is a paradigmatic one that can be traced to its central concept of neural pro- cessing. According to the Neuron Doctrine, neurons behave as quasi-independent processors separated by relatively slow chemical synapses, with strictly segregated input and output functions through the dendrites and axon, respec- tively. It is hard to imagine how such an assembly of inde- pendent processors could account for the holistic emergent properties of perception identified by Gestalt theory. In fact, the reason these Gestalt aspects of perception have been largely ignored in recent decades is exactly because they are so difficult to express in terms of the Neuron Doc- trine paradigm. More recent proposals that implicate syn- chronous oscillations as the neurophysiological basis of con- scious experience (Crick 1994; Crick & Koch 1990; Eckhorn et al. 1988; Llinas et al. 1994; Singer 1999; Singer & Gray 1995) seem to suggest some kind of holistic global process that appears to be more consistent with Gestalt principles, although it is hard to see how this paradigm, at least as cur- rently conceived, can account for the solid three-dimen- sional nature of subjective experience. The persistent dis- parity between the neurophysiological and phenomenal levels of description suggests that either the subjective ex- perience of visual consciousness is somehow illusory, or the state of our understanding of neural representation is far more embryonic than is generally recognized.”

@Constance it occurs to me that this is one of the reasons that the reject computationalism. It’s hard to see how neural computations could be isomorphic to our phenomenology.

I’m sympathetic to this concern as well.

However as I understand the concept of isomorphism there can be formal isomorphism sans functional isomorphism. That is there can isomorphisms between the literal forms of two things and/or there can be isomorphisms between the functioning of two things.

A very very crude example:

Imagine a form A B C. But the function of this form is an interaction between A and C.

Imagine another form X Y Z. It’s form is not isomorphic to A B C. However the function of X Y Z is X interacting with Z. In this way there is a functional isomorphism between A-C and X-Z.

So while we are searching perhaps for formal isomorphisms between the brain and mind, it may be that a functional isomorphism is what we should be seeking instead.

Furthermore the more I think about this, the more I feel that human perception and conception is too limited to apprehend the true nature of what-is. That is, any efforts to capture a truly objective perspective on what-is will fail.

The question is whether we can see things objectively enough to find an isomorphism, as large grained as it may be. A fine grained isomorphism is likely beyond us.

We will never get a purely objective grip on what-is due to the inherently subjective nature of perception and conception.

 

[Soupie]

Regarding representation and isomorphisms.

As has been mentioned, tree rings can be regarded as a representation of the age of a tree.

There is a (functional?) isomorphisms between the number of tree rings and the number of years the tree has been alive.

Most people understand this when it comes to neural representations of environmental stimuli. There is a functional (?) isomorphisms between the environmental stimuli (em waves) and the neural signals the induce in the nervous system.

However, we find this type of isomorphism unacceptable, then, going from the brain to the mind.

It’s fine if the environment and brain are functional isomorphic, but the brain and the mind NEED to be formally isomorphic.

The problem with this thinking however is a failure to realize that what we perceive as the brain (squishy grey) is itself a representation. It’s not the actual brain.

The actual brain is objective. Our perception of the actual brain is subjective.

We constantly make the mistake of thinking our subjective brain is the objective brain.

What this means is that the brain and mind SHOULD not have a 1:1 formal isomorphism but may be akin to the years/tree rings relationship.

Now, an additional level of complexity is layered onto the brain-mind relationship because in this case the brain isn’t representing an environmental stimuli but rather the brain is representing ITSELF.

 

[Soupie]

So we ask: why doesn’t the subjective brain structural match our mind?

Why don’t tree rings structurally match the passage of time?

The object of representation and the representation need not structurally match. There need only be a functional isomorphism.

This applies to the MBP as well.

 

[stonehart]

If we start where you say "I would assert that you can only ever be that ...", and assume that the "you" in that sentence is meant as a reference to you as a person, then it might be beneficial to quickly recap the concept of personhood. A pretty good case can be made that not only are you everything you mentioned, but every other part not mentioned. In fact the much underestimated part that does no experiencing ( that we're aware of ), is responsible for a sizeable portion of our identity, as well as our personality.

I think Wittgenstein would either have his face in his palms or loving this thread Randall :-P .... words are a game know the rules play the game lol

Just to throw some metaphoric gasoline on the fire of this thread you should all read this, what it is is a little essay on the mind brain theory and looks into the ideas of the mind and consciousness either being separate or that the emergence of consciousness is that of the computational mind and the problems that arise in philosophy with this.

FIVE PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND | Edge.org

www.edge.org

 

[Randall]

I think Wittgenstein would either have his face in his palms or loving this thread Randall :-P .... words are a game know the rules play the game lol

Just to throw some metaphoric gasoline on the fire of this thread you should all read this, what it is is a little essay on the mind brain theory and looks into the ideas of the mind and consciousness either being separate or that the emergence of consciousness is that of the computational mind and the problems that arise in philosophy with this.

FIVE PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND | Edge.org

www.edge.org

The article is a very good summary of the key concepts we have been on about here. I do however wonder about the validity of "acausal consequences" as a concept. In this situation the word "consequences" appears for all intent and purpose to be synonymous with the word "effects". This being the case, the phrase "acausal consequences" is a claim that there can be an effect without any cause. This flies in the face of all reasonable logic: Causality (physics) - Wikipedia

 

[stonehart]

The article is a very good summary of the key concepts we have been on about here. I do however wonder about the validity of "acausal consequences" as a concept. In this situation the word "consequences" appears for all intent and purpose to be synonymous with the word "effects". This being the case, the phrase "acausal consequences" is a claim that there can be an effect without any cause. This flies in the face of all reasonable logic: Causality (physics) - Wikipedia

No arguments from me on that point, I have some issues as well with the wording of the essay and while good points a raised I am not in agreement with the conclusion, he takes the point that the mind is not a machine (computational mind) where I tend toward that conclusion that the mind is a machine. Reason I posted this is the subject of this thread is in many respects a very real topic of debate in philosophy.

 

[Randall]

No arguments from me on that point, I have some issues as well with the wording of the essay and while good points a raised I am not in agreement with the conclusion, he takes the point that the mind is not a machine (computational mind) where I tend toward that conclusion that the mind is a machine. Reason I posted this is the subject of this thread is in many respects a very real topic of debate in philosophy.

I couldn't agree more. Maybe we can touch on this today on the ATP show. Anyone else on the thead who wants to join in would be welcome too.

 

[stonehart]

I found this quite interesting:

"A perspective by Chomsky lays down the gauntlet with regard to today’s competing schools of AI development and directions:

Chomsky derided researchers in machine learning who use purely statistical methods to produce behavior that mimics something in the world, but who don’t try to understand the meaning of that behavior. Chomsky compared such researchers to scientists who might study the dance made by a bee returning to the hive, and who could produce a statistically based simulation of such a dance without attempting to understand why the bee behaved that way. “That’s a notion of [scientific] success that’s very novel. I don’t know of anything like it in the history of science,” said Chomsky.

Of course, Chomsky is tacitly assuming that “meaning” and truly understanding natural language is something much more than just statistics. But is it really? That certainly seems like common sense. On the other hand, if we look closely at the brain, all we see are networks of neurons firing in statistical patterns. The meaning somehow emerges from the statistics."

Our Conceit of Consciousness

MIT recently held a symposium called “Brains, Minds, and Machines,” which took stock of the current state of cognitive science and machine learning, as well as debating directions for the next gene…

learninglayer.wordpress.com

 

[Soupie]

Re the structural mismatch

”If the properties of mind are not determined by the properties of the physical brain, what is it that determines the properties of the mind?

For example, phenomenal color experience has been shown to be reducible to the three dimensions of hue, intensity, and saturation. Physical light is not restricted to these three dimensions; the spectrum of a typical sample of colored light contains a separate and distinct magnitude for every spectral frequency of the light, an essentially infinite-dimensional space that is immeasurably greater in information content than the three dimensions of phenomenal color experience.

In answer to Koffka’s (1935) classical question “Why do things look as they do?”, the answer is clearly not “Because they are what they are.” That answer is clearly false in the case of color perception, as well as in the cases of visual illusions, dreams, and hallucinations.

We now know that the dimensionality of color experience relates directly to the physiology of color vision; it relates to the fact that there are three different cone types in the human retina and it relates to the opponent color process representation in the visual cortex.

The dimensions of color experience therefore are not totally disconnected from the properties of the physical brain, as suggested by Davidson (1970), but in fact phenomenal color experience tells us something very specific about the properties of the representation of color in the physical brain.

And the same argument holds for spatial vision, for there are a number of prominent distortions of phenomenal space which clearly indicate that phenomenal space is ontologically distinct from the physical space known to science, as will be discussed in section 6.3.”