Randall, this post of yours is fortuitous in foregrounding the major misunderstanding of phenomenology, as both method and ontological insight, and also of the unresolved 'mind-body problem' by people who have not actually read the key texts in this school of modern philosophy. In drafting a response to your post I did a google search for a particular statement by MP which led me to the Wikipedia article on MP, the first several paragraphs of which should be helpful to you and others regarding what phenonomenology and phenomenological philosophy actually reveal about the nature of consciousness, mind, and being. After posting these first three introductory paragraphs and several paragraphs from the section on "Thought and Consciousness" I'll probably add a post highlighting the meaning, the significance, of what these paragraphs deftly express, if necessary. These are only a few key extracts from a well-written and serviceable introduction to the core ideas developed in phenomenology, which might inspire you and others here to read the source texts I've been referring to here for the last three years. To begin with, one should absorb the entirety of the Wikipedia page on MP.
"Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty[15] (French:
[mɔʁis mɛʁlo pɔ̃ti]; 14 March 1908 – 3 May 1961) was a French
phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by
Edmund Husserl and
Martin Heidegger. The constitution of meaning in human experience was his main interest and he wrote on perception, art, and politics. He was on the editorial board of
Les Temps modernes, the leftist magazine established by
Jean-Paul Sartre in 1945.
At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role perception plays in understanding the world as well as engaging with the world. Like the other major phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty expressed his philosophical insights in writings on art, literature, linguistics, and politics. He was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the twentieth century to engage extensively with the sciences and especially with
descriptive psychology. It is through this engagement that his writings became influential in the project of naturalizing phenomenology, in which phenomenologists use the results of
psychology and
cognitive science.
Merleau-Ponty emphasized the body as the primary site of knowing the world, a corrective to the long philosophical tradition of placing consciousness as the source of knowledge, and maintained that the body and that which it perceived could not be disentangled from each other. The articulation of the primacy of embodiment led him away from phenomenology towards what he was to call “indirect ontology” or the ontology of “the flesh of the world” (
la chair du monde), seen in his final and incomplete work,
The Visible and Invisible, and his last published essay, “Eye and Mind”."
and from the beginning paragraphs of the section headed 'Thought' and subheaded 'Consciousness':
"Thought[edit]
Consciousness[edit]
In his
Phenomenology of Perception (first published in
French in 1945), Merleau-Ponty developed the concept of the body-subject (
le corps propre) as an alternative to the
Cartesian "ego cogito." This distinction is especially important in that Merleau-Ponty perceives the essences of the world existentially.
Consciousness, the world, and the human body as a
perceiving thing are intricately intertwined and mutually "engaged." The
phenomenal thing is not the unchanging object of the natural sciences, but a correlate of our body and its sensory-motor functions. Taking up and "communing with" (Merleau-Ponty's phrase) the sensible qualities it encounters, the body as incarnated
subjectivity intentionally elaborates things within an ever-present world frame, through use of its pre-conscious, pre-predicative understanding of the world's makeup. The elaboration, however, is "inexhaustible" (the hallmark of any perception according to Merleau-Ponty). Things are that upon which our body has a "grip" (
prise), while the grip itself is a function of our connaturality with the world's things. The world and the sense of self are emergent phenomena in an ongoing "becoming."
The essential partiality of our view of things, their being given only in a certain
perspective and at a certain moment in time does not diminish their reality, but on the contrary establishes it, as there is no other way for things to be copresent with us and with other things than through such "
Abschattungen" (sketches, faint outlines, adumbrations). The thing transcends our view, but is manifest precisely by presenting itself to a range of possible views. The object of perception is immanently tied to its background—to the nexus of meaningful relations among objects within the world. Because the object is inextricably within the world of meaningful relations, each object reflects the other (much in the style of
Leibniz's monads). Through involvement in the world –
being-in-the-world – the perceiver tacitly experiences all the perspectives upon that object coming from all the surrounding things of its environment, as well as the potential perspectives that that object has upon the beings around it.
Each object is a "mirror of all others." Our perception of the object through all perspectives is not that of a propositional, or clearly delineated, perception; rather, it is an ambiguous perception founded upon the body's primordial involvement and understanding of the world and of the meanings that constitute the landscape's perceptual
gestalt. Only after we have been integrated within the environment so as to perceive objects as such can we turn our attention toward particular objects within the landscape so as to define them more clearly. This attention, however, does not operate by clarifying what is already seen, but by constructing a new
Gestalt oriented toward a particular object. Because our bodily involvement with things is always provisional and indeterminate, we encounter meaningful things in a unified though ever open-ended world."
Maurice Merleau-Ponty - Wikipedia
Additionally helpful for reaching an understanding of the meaning of the terms 'phenomenon' and 'phenomenal' as worked out in the progress of phenomenology during the 20th century is the paper by Taylor Carman entitled "The Principle of Phenomenology" that I linked a page or two ago and link again here:
https://www.academia.edu/7205497/The_Principle_of_Phenomenology?
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