Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Soupie]

Does that get you all the way to panpsychism? The ipsundrum is an organized state of matter:

"I’ve constructed a story about how sentition evolved to be a quasi-magical attractor state hidden in the
brain, and suggested a plausible evolutionary trajectory by which this could have happened"

which is not saying all matter is phenomenous

I would non snarkily say that is semantics. Once we introduce a term such as proto phenomenal we are acknowledging the reality of the hp and offering a “soft” solution.

to go from non-phenomenal is hard

to go from protophenomenal to phenomenal is soft

 

[smcder]

"Note that in neither of the cases just discussed is the intentional object of the representation a material thing that the subject is wrong
to believe in because no such thing actually exists in the physical world, as for example with the Impossible Triangle or Santa Claus.
Rather, the intentional object is a subjective feeling that the subject is right to believe in because just such is the reality of his evaluation of
events. For the subject the joke really is funny, the sensation really is phenomenally painful. True, there is nothing at the level of physical
reality, within or without the brain, that satisfies the property of being phenomenally painful, or for that matter of being funny. But there is
something at the level of psychological reality within the mind. Indeed, on this vexed question of illusionism versus realism about
consciousness, I would say that on this account I lean towards realism."

And that, for him, ends the discussion of what consciousness is made of.

 

[Soupie]

I don't think Dennett would say nature is protophenomenal, I think he doubts phenomenality.

He says it’s an illusion.

but whether one can get away with calling phenomenality an illusion is questionable.

I say again it’s semantics.

like Humphrey and Bach, Dennett would say phenomenality is a property of representations.

this would make non representational matter proto representational or proto phenomenal

 

[smcder]

I would non snarkily say that is semantics. Once we introduce a term such as proto phenomenal we are acknowledging the reality of the hp and offering a “soft” solution.

to go from non-phenomenal is hard

to go from protophenomenal to phenomenal is soft

Only if we apply proto-phenomenal to all of matter. Here, it is just applied to the ipsundrum.

Likewise the ipsundrum does not have phenomenal properties in its own right. The most we might say is that it’s proto-phenomenal (or
‘phenomenous’, as I put it in an earlier paper — Humphrey, 2008). The phenomenality emerges only when this brain activity is read by
an inner observer with a sense of consciousness who gets the sensation. But again this doesn’t mean the phenomenality is an illusion."

 

[Soupie]

They are conflating

Only if we apply proto-phenomenal to all of matter. Here, it is just applied to the ipsundrum.

Likewise the ipsundrum does not have phenomenal properties in its own right. The most we might say is that it’s proto-phenomenal (or
‘phenomenous’, as I put it in an earlier paper — Humphrey, 2008). The phenomenality emerges only when this brain activity is read by
an inner observer with a sense of consciousness who gets the sensation. But again this doesn’t mean the phenomenality is an illusion."

so does that mean non ipsundrum matter is proto-proto-phenomenal?

 

[smcder]

They are conflating

so does that mean non ipsundrum matter is proto-proto-phenomenal?

The semantic difference is in "in". Both materialists and panpsychists would point to a pile of matter and say there is mind in there and both would mean something different.

 

[Soupie]

Humphrey, Dennett, and Bach would say that phenomenality is a property of representations. Which is something living organisms do to model themselves and the world.

Ergo matter is proto-representational and living matter is representational.

if we accept the argument that phenomenality is a property of representations, then it follows that matter is proto-phenomenal and living matter is phenomenal in so far as it is representational. (One could then make a case that this view is akin to panpsychism.)

if you deny that phenomenality can simply be a property of representational functions, then you’re back to strong emergence of phenomenality.

 

[smcder]

Humphrey, Dennett, and Bach would say that phenomenality is a property of representations. Which is something living organisms do to model themselves and the world.

Ergo matter is proto-representational and living matter is representational.

if we accept the argument that phenomenality is a property of representations, then it follows that matter is proto-phenomenal and living matter is phenomenal in so far as it is representational. (One could then make a case that this view is akin to panpsychism.)

if you deny that phenomenality can simply be a property of representational functions, then you’re back to strong emergence of phenomenality.

"Likewise the ipsundrum does not have phenomenal properties in its own right. The most we might say is that it’s proto-phenomenal (or
‘phenomenous’, as I put it in an earlier paper — Humphrey, 2008). The phenomenality *****emerges***** only when this brain activity is read by
an inner observer with a sense of consciousness who gets the sensation. But again this doesn’t mean the phenomenality is an illusion."

Emphasis mine. ;-)

 

[Soupie]

The semantic difference is in "in". Both materialists and panpsychists would point to a pile of matter and say there is mind in there and both would mean something different.

Not necessarily. Both would argue that a mind emerges from the organization of matter.

a panpsychist would say phenomenality was already there. A materialist would say phenomenality emerges along with the mind.

but if a materialist says proto-phenomenal... than the difference between the views becomes trivial

 

[Soupie]

"Likewise the ipsundrum does not have phenomenal properties in its own right. The most we might say is that it’s proto-phenomenal (or
‘phenomenous’, as I put it in an earlier paper — Humphrey, 2008). The phenomenality *****emerges***** only when this brain activity is read by
an inner observer with a sense of consciousness who gets the sensation. But again this doesn’t mean the phenomenality is an illusion."

Emphasis mine. ;-)

I think that is quite right. That’s the view I hold as a panpsychist.

nature is fundamentally phenomenal. But it takes the *emergence* of minds for us to notice.

a materialist such as Humphrey can say nature is proto phenomenal but full phenomenality *emerges* in the form of representations.

 

[smcder]

The semantic difference is in "in". Both materialists and panpsychists would point to a pile of matter and say there is mind in there and both would mean something different.

So the materialist would say "not yet ... not yet

Not necessarily. Both would argue that a mind emerges from the organization of matter.

a panpsychist would say phenomenality was already there. A materialist would say phenomenality emerges along with the mind.

but if a materialist says proto-phenomenal... than the difference between the views becomes trivial

Yes, phenomenality.

Are you only looking at that case of "proto-phenomenal"? (above) Because there he is using it like ... for example, we could say a record is proto-musical and the music emerges when the record is spun under the needle ... without saying all vinyl is protomusical much less all of matter.

 

[smcder]

I think that is quite right. That’s the view I hold as a panpsychist.

nature is fundamentally phenomenal. But it takes the *emergence* of minds for us to notice.

a materialist such as Humphrey can say nature is proto phenomenal but full phenomenality *emerges* in the form of representations.

He is not saying nature is proto phenomenal, he is saying the ipsundrum is proto phenomenal

 

[smcder]

I think that is quite right. That’s the view I hold as a panpsychist.

nature is fundamentally phenomenal. But it takes the *emergence* of minds for us to notice.

a materialist such as Humphrey can say nature is proto phenomenal but full phenomenality *emerges* in the form of representations.

Nature then would be proto-everything. Also, I'm not sure what is the difference between proto-phenomenal and phenomenal...I'll glance back at Chalmers.

Here it is:

"It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only panpsychism. It also supports a certain sort of panprotopsychism: roughly, the view that fundamental entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. Later in the article, I will examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and examine problems that arise for both. "

 

[smcder]

Also,

"Likewise the ipsundrum does not have phenomenal properties in its own right. The most we might say is that it’s proto-phenomenal (or
‘phenomenous’, as I put it in an earlier paper — Humphrey, 2008). The phenomenality emerges only when this brain activity is read by
an inner observer with a sense of consciousness who gets the sensation. But again this doesn’t mean the phenomenality is an illusion."

So I don't think the phenomenality ever belongs to the ispundrum, rather phenomenality emerges when the biological substrate (ipsundrum) is read by this inner observer...so with the record analogy, the record is proto phenomenal in the sense that along with the needle and the movement it precedes the music but the record itself does not thus become itself musical.

 

[Soupie]

So the materialist would say "not yet ... not yet


Yes, phenomenality.

Are you only looking at that case of "proto-phenomenal"? (above) Because there he is using it like ... for example, we could say a record is proto-musical and the music emerges when the record is spun under the needle ... without saying all vinyl is protomusical much less all of matter.

Yes. He is deflating phenomenality to representation. At the same time he is careful to say phenomenality is not an illusion. Bc he knows that’s how some (like Dennett and Bach) would construe it.

perhaps the point here is that by “softening” the hard problem, he opens himself up to concerns.

my point is that once one introduces a term such as “proto phenomenal” we not far away from panpsychism.

Dennett “avoids” this by saying his phenomenality is an illusion. We don’t let him get away with that though.

 

[smcder]

Yes. He is deflating phenomenality to representation. At the same time he is careful to say phenomenality is not an illusion. Bc he knows that’s how some (like Dennett and Bach) would construe it.

perhaps the point here is that by “softening” the hard problem, he opens himself up to concerns.

my point is that once one introduces a term such as “proto phenomenal” we not far away from panpsychism.

Dennett “avoids” this by saying his phenomenality is an illusion. We don’t let him get away with that though.

"my point is that once one introduces a term such as “proto phenomenal” we not far away from panpsychism."

I don't think so - see my post immediately above.

 

[Soupie]

Phenomenality is either an illusion or nature is protophenomenal. Or the mbp is still a complete mystery.

 

[Soupie]

"my point is that once one introduces a term such as “proto phenomenal” we not far away from panpsychism."

I don't think so - see my post immediately above.

I’m not letting him off the hook for claiming the ipsundrun is proto phenomenal.

This is like saying nature is not phenomenal. Brains are proto phenomenal. And representations are phenomenal.

how do we get from non phenomenal to protophenomenal?

 

[smcder]

Phenomenality is either an illusion or nature is protophenomenal. Or the mbp is still a complete mystery.

Humphrey seems to me to be saying phenomenality is not proto phenomenal and is real ... and in strong terms too:

"An illusion? No, I wouldn’t say that either. It’s true that the ipsundrum, as such, does not have phenomenal properties, and what you read into it does have them. But this doesn’t mean you are misreading the ipsundrum. If I may borrow terms from semiotics (without buying into the whole works), the
ipsundrum is a signifier; what it’s like is the signified; they exist on different conceptual levels and the connection between them is
unmotivated. The fact that what it’s like for you at the level of feeling has properties not present — indeed not even conceivable — for the ipsundrum at the level of brain activity does not in any way imply that the feeling misrepresents what’s really the case."

 

[Soupie]

Humphrey seems to me to be saying phenomenality is not proto phenomenal and is real ... and in strong terms too:

"An illusion? No, I wouldn’t say that either. It’s true that the ipsundrum, as such, does not have phenomenal properties, and what you read into it does have them. But this doesn’t mean you are misreading the ipsundrum. If I may borrow terms from semiotics (without buying into the whole works), the
ipsundrum is a signifier; what it’s like is the signified; they exist on different conceptual levels and the connection between them is
unmotivated. The fact that what it’s like for you at the level of feeling has properties not present — indeed not even conceivable — for the ipsundrum at the level of brain activity does not in any way imply that the feeling misrepresents what’s really the case."

This is akin to Bach’s statement that organisms aren’t conscious, simulations are conscious.

Humphrey is saying the ipsundrum isn’t conscious, the representations it manifests are conscious.

Dennett would say the same. Brains manifest representations that have phenomenal qualities.

Whereas Humphrey says these phenomenal qualities are real (albeit non physical) Dennett and Bach would say they are illusory.