At this point whether we agree that the mbp should be called a problem or not is a matter of semantics.
Semantics is not trivial in the quest for understanding.
we both agree that we currently do not have a theory that begins to explain how the mind and body are related.
Sure we have a theory that begins to explain how the mind and body are related. However that explanation can only be superficial, e.g. How we relate minds and bodies to each other is by correlating the phenomena of consciousness with the presence of bodies, in particular, human bodies with functioning brains.
at best we can say human consciousness seems to be related to the body, especially the brain, and especially neurons. but we are nowhere near having a scientific explanation of why, say, the taste of chocolate is correlated with certain neural states and not, say, the taste of vanilla.
Those sorts of questions aren't valid scientific questions.
Feynman tried to explain this to people, and I have made a similar attempt here:
Superficial Questions Get Us Nowhere. This is not simply semantics.
You seem content to say “let’s stop calling it a problem and just accept that certain feelings/sensations are correlated with certain neural states even though we have no idea how or why.”
That's superficially correct. Understanding the reason is much less superficial.
I say it is a problem, you say it’s not. Let’s move on.
Okay. But that analogy is a really good one ( for something anyway ).
I also quibble with your suggestion that consciousness, somehow being caused by physical processes in the brain, is fundamental. If that’s the case, it would be a case of strong emergence on my understanding.
I'm not saying that the brain is necessarily the cause of consciousness. I am saying that there is no reason not to conclude that consciousness will always correlate to certain brains. Whether the brain itself is causal depends on how we interpret that term. For example, as an analogy, and please try to remember that no analogy is perfect, a water condenser doesn't cause or create water out of nothing, and it doesn't in and of itself even change much while working, but the result is that water comes out of it.
Now suppose we had never encountered water before. Water emerging from a water condenser might seem to be like some mysterious ectoplasm that is strongly emergent. But when we know the actual situation, we can tell that the idea of emergentism in this analogy doesn't really fit. I'm not saying consciousness exists in some ethereal state that brains are able to condense into awareness, but it might be something analogous to that, instead of something emergent.
if something were to be fundamental, it would have no priors that we know of.
Sort of. Maybe a little more complex than that, but good enough.
Human organism and brains would be required for consciousness, which in your account mysteriously (strongly) emerges from them.
My account would be as much a maybe as a maybe not. I like the idea of strong emergence, but I've been drifting in the direction that it's similar to panpsychism, in that it doesn't really explain anything.
save me your bricks and house analogy. Again, let’s move on.
Okay.
my position is as follows: there are multiple lines of evidence converging on the idea that the classical reality we perceive is not base reality. There are conversations in physics atm about the reality of space, time, causality, etc. The science of perception is converging on the idea that, to some degree, we don’t see reality in itself but in a limited, subjective way that has been adaptive for our species.
couple the above with the fact that we have no beginnings of a theory ( or idea ) of how consciousness might emerge from neural processes.
I don’t dispute the fact that states of human consciousness seem to correlate with states of the human brain and body. What i do dispute is the intuition that the human brain and neurons cause consciousness.
That seems to fit the picture to the extent that in the end we don't know what the fundamental causes are of anything. We can always reduce superficial explanations to the point where we have no complete explanation for the forces or phenomena involved, and simply have to accept them as a given.
I think we are beginning to understand that space, time, and causality are not fundamental.
I'm not so sure about that claim. I think it depends on context. Space and time can both be broken down into smaller conceptual elements, but as they exist in the world, there is no way to explain how or why they should exist any more than anything else. Causality requires preexisting conditions such as space, time, and matter, so there's a strong case for it being something emergent.
That means things like brains and neurons are not fundamental either.
I don't think I know of anyone who claims brains and neurons are fundamental in the same way as space, time, electromagnetism, or gravitation.
this, I believe, is why we can’t move beyond mere correlation when it comes to the nature of the relationship between mind and matter. I think mind and matter share a deeper relationship than can be revealed via classical physics, chemistry, or biology.
I have a feeling you are probably right. The sciences all accept that certain forces and phenomena are a given and then try to find ways to describe the relationships between them. The "deeper relationship" ( how these forces and phenomena are imparted on the world ) is something that is presently beyond the ability of science to answer. I'm not sure it can ever be answered.
I think an understanding of the relationship between what we know as the mind and the body will come, if ever, when we have models of reality at a deeper level then we do currently.
I empathize with your thirst for the big answers. Maybe I'm just getting old and resigning myself to what it seems we
can learn rather than what seems impossible ( at least to me ). I strongly suspect that we may never
understand the relationship between consciousness and other phenomena, but we will gain an increasingly higher resolution
description of it, and from that we will invent practical applications.
