Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

[Constance]

I think @Michael Allen would take a stronger position and say a knowing/perceptual system can’t explain it’s ability to know/perceive using its “language” of knowing/perceiving.

I still haven't read the paper but will do so tomorrow. Since I haven't read it at this point it might not make sense for me to ask any questions now, but I would like to ask what the referent of 'its' is in the construction "can’t explain it’s ability to know/perceive using its “language” of knowing/perceiving." Does 'its' refer to a proposed "language of knowing/perceiving" formed and existing in neural nets that trade in 'representations' of the environing world not originating in the presentational experiences of conscious beings? The Clark paper sounds like a challenge and I look forward to reading it now. I didn't do so today because I had to take a brain-cleansing break by immersing myself in Brazilian music for eight hours. I haven't taken an extended music break since the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis and the political catastrophes going on in this country every day. I'll link one of the performances that most blew the cobwebs out of my neural nets:

 

[Randall]

I had to take a brain-cleansing break by immersing myself in Brazilian music for eight hours ... I'll link one of the performances that most blew the cobwebs out of my neural nets:

Totally cool. The first time I heard anything Brazilian was ...

Sergio Mendez and Brazil 66

 

[Constance]

In other words, the mbp is a natural consequence of our representational relation to reality.

I'm not sure this consequence is what we could call 'natural', i.e., arising in nature beyond our capacities to penetrate it. I think it's actually time we should get beyond thinking that there is a 'mind-body problem' [the 'hard' problem] by analyzing the ways in which we have historically arrived at and held on to the idea that our lived reality -- the immense and complex variety of what we experience and express of and about this reality -- can be understood in terms of 'representations', whether entertained by us as a priori concepts in philosophy and science or, in our time, passed off to neuroscience and information theory for explanations we are unable to touch, reveal, and articulate. This is why phenomenological philosophy developed in the 20th century -- to overcome the presuppositions of categorical thinking and its inherent dualism in order to awaken our species to the existential openness of our consciousness and thinking. So as not to close the book on what we think we know about what we experience and its interrelation with the world as and how we experience it. .

 

[Constance]

Totally cool. The first time I heard anything Brazilian was ...

Sergio Mendez and Brazil 66

Love it. Love all Brazilian jazz and have gone to it for restoration of my aural and neural nets since I was in college. Brazil 66 took the liberating joy and satisfactions of Samba to the world around the same time that Antonio Carlos Jobim and Joao Gilberto developed its offspring the Bossa Nova. Since then Brazilian music has continued to develop, the best of it always adhering to the rhythm and chord structures laid down by these known and unknown geniuses. Maybe we should start a thread of links to this redemptive music to help our fellow music fans here survive the acute stresses of our particular time?

 

[Randall]

Maybe we should start a thread of links to this redemptive music to help our fellow music fans here survive the acute stresses of our particular time?

The Music thread seems to have mysteriously vanished. There is a What Are You Listening To thread for anything including lectures, not just music. There's also a bunch of other threads for music. Another one dedicated to de-stressing can't hurt, but be prepared for the fact that some people de-stress to Death Metal. So it could get messy. Maybe it's best to just post your musical interludes here. They're always enjoyable ( to me anyway ).

 

[Constance]

The Music thread seems to have mysteriously vanished. There is a What Are You Listening To thread for anything including lectures, not just music. There's also a bunch of other threads for music. Another one dedicated to de-stressing can't hurt, but be prepared for the fact that some people de-stress to Death Metal. So it could get messy. Maybe it's best to just post your musical interludes here. They're always enjoyable ( to me anyway ).

I'd like to do that as long as no one else minds. I think philosophy is well mixed with music. Maybe better as well-balanced with music, maintaining what the Brazilians call 'balancar' (with a hook on the bottom of the 'c'), a balance between 'saudade' and 'felicidade' (sadness or melancholy and happiness). Here is Djavan, another wonder for many years now with a following as great as Seu Jorge's.

 

[Constance]

A few moments backstage between Djavan and Seu Jorge, who wants to learn Djavan's "Maca." Followed by a clip of Djavan singing it. And now I'll stop and get back to philosophy.

 

[Constance]

Maca ~~

 

[Constance]

I would refine that a little more to say: The MBP arises when holding the position that minds are a representation of some embodied reality.

Yes. I think this says it well.

 

[Randall]

I'd like to do that as long as no one else minds. I think philosophy is well mixed with music. Maybe better as well-balanced with music, maintaining what the Brazilians call 'balancar' (with a hook on the bottom of the 'c'), a balance between 'saudade' and 'felicidade' (sadness or melancholy and happiness).

We could start a "Music For Philosophers" thread. Which seems to be the most open idea. Again though, a lot of such music falls outside what you or even myself might prefer to listen to. What if a particular song expresses deeper philosophical concepts than the music we like? Do we allow it or do we accept it but not give it a like? What parameters would be fair in moderating such a thread?

 

[Constance]

Let's think about it. It could open minefields of reaction. I can stand anything but Mahler and German polkas, and some of the operas the Met broadcasts on Saturdays these days (not a single musical element to be heard). I'd personally be happiest if we kept it to jazz, which has an international range. We could call it Jazz for Philosophers and think of it as a respite from philosophy. .

Meanwhile I have something for a humor break:

Mars Officially Bans All Flights From Earth, Says It Will Review Policy In 5,000 Years

 

[Soupie]

"For example, any perceptual/knowing system modeling itself will have a mbp. The map will never match the territory.

I think @Michael Allen would take a stronger position and say a knowing/perceptual system can’t explain it’s ability to know/perceive using its “language” of knowing/perceiving.

One shouldn’t expect to find in the world the contents of the map by which they know the world."

-------


I think this gives up too much...and what do we get? Why do we need a map in the first place? The map is just there for the consciousness that is the map ... so that the only thing the mind can do is read the map.

Phenomenal experience seems to come later, is constructed and is full of puzzles and if it's not a-causal, then we have no conceivable mechanism for experience to act on the physical...(and is it also biologically expensive?) ...now, do we want to add all of these to the map and take them off of our "to be explained" list?

The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate

On the representational account, the representations are implemented via physiological processes. There is no problem of mental causation.

When we peer into the physical world, we find no consciousness. Consciousness only exists for us inside our model of the world. Each of us is ( in ) a subjective model of the world, an umwelt.

The mbp arises when we mistake our world, our umwelt, for the larger reality we are modeling.

The “only” question for me is whether someone akin to panpsychism is still required. Bach and others seem convinced that purely material/biological systems/organisms can implement qualitative models ( akin to pharaoh’s approach ). There are certain qualitative feels I can imagine emerging from purely physical processes if I squint my eyes, but then others that I can’t imagine emerging from purely physical processes.

So even though the consciousness-as-self-regulatory-model makes a lot of sense to me, I’m not convinced it can emerge/evolve from purely material systems. Im still intrigued by the intrinsic nature argument.

I think it may be a moot point though. Whether human consciousness derives from matter with a non-phenomenal intrinsic nature or from matter with a phenomenal intrinsic nature, what seems to be important are the physiological processes which we can ultimately observe and measure.

Having said that, I still believe however that whatever sets consciousness neural processes apart from non-conscious neural processes won’t be observable/measurable. It will be something subjective; internal to the system. It will have something to do with the role that particular neural process plays in implementing the organisms world model.

From an objective, public perspective, a non-conscious neural process and a conscious neural process will look the same.

 

[Soupie]

I think it's actually time we should get beyond thinking that there is a 'mind-body problem' [the 'hard' problem] by analyzing the ways in which we have historically arrived at and held on to the idea that our lived reality -- the immense and complex variety of what we experience and express of and about this reality -- can be understood in terms of 'representations' ...

I’ve asked more than once in this discussion—and I’ll ask again—is there any other way to understand how our “lived” reality relates to objective reality?

I understand we may not like the terms representation, model, simulation, umwelt, interface, etc.

What other term or better yet, concepts, do we have?

 

[smcder]

The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate

On the representational account, the representations are implemented via physiological processes. There is no problem of mental causation.

When we peer into the physical world, we find no consciousness. Consciousness only exists for us inside our model of the world. Each of us is ( in ) a subjective model of the world, an umwelt.

The mbp arises when we mistake our world, our umwelt, for the larger reality we are modeling.

The “only” question for me is whether someone akin to panpsychism is still required. Bach and others seem convinced that purely material/biological systems/organisms can implement qualitative models ( akin to pharaoh’s approach ). There are certain qualitative feels I can imagine emerging from purely physical processes if I squint my eyes, but then others that I can’t imagine emerging from purely physical processes.

So even though the consciousness-as-self-regulatory-model makes a lot of sense to me, I’m not convinced it can emerge/evolve from purely material systems. Im still intrigued by the intrinsic nature argument.

I think it may be a moot point though. Whether human consciousness derives from matter with a non-phenomenal intrinsic nature or from matter with a phenomenal intrinsic nature, what seems to be important are the physiological processes which we can ultimately observe and measure.

Having said that, I still believe however that whatever sets consciousness neural processes apart from non-conscious neural processes won’t be observable/measurable. It will be something subjective; internal to the system. It will have something to do with the role that particular neural process plays in implementing the organisms world model.

From an objective, public perspective, a non-conscious neural process and a conscious neural process will look the same.

I pulled my post down, it still needs editing.

"The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate."

Right...there's a paper I posted in part 12 that takes a similar approach.

 

[smcder]

The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate

On the representational account, the representations are implemented via physiological processes. There is no problem of mental causation.

When we peer into the physical world, we find no consciousness. Consciousness only exists for us inside our model of the world. Each of us is ( in ) a subjective model of the world, an umwelt.

The mbp arises when we mistake our world, our umwelt, for the larger reality we are modeling.

The “only” question for me is whether someone akin to panpsychism is still required. Bach and others seem convinced that purely material/biological systems/organisms can implement qualitative models ( akin to pharaoh’s approach ). There are certain qualitative feels I can imagine emerging from purely physical processes if I squint my eyes, but then others that I can’t imagine emerging from purely physical processes.

So even though the consciousness-as-self-regulatory-model makes a lot of sense to me, I’m not convinced it can emerge/evolve from purely material systems. Im still intrigued by the intrinsic nature argument.

I think it may be a moot point though. Whether human consciousness derives from matter with a non-phenomenal intrinsic nature or from matter with a phenomenal intrinsic nature, what seems to be important are the physiological processes which we can ultimately observe and measure.

Having said that, I still believe however that whatever sets consciousness neural processes apart from non-conscious neural processes won’t be observable/measurable. It will be something subjective; internal to the system. It will have something to do with the role that particular neural process plays in implementing the organisms world model.

From an objective, public perspective, a non-conscious neural process and a conscious neural process will look the same.

There is some of what I wanted to say about Clark's paper here:

Not Objectifiable

A bold draft paper from Tom Clark tackles the explanatory gap between experience and the world as described by physics. He says it’s all about the representational relation. Clark’s approach is sen…

www.consciousentities.com

 

[Constance]

In other words, the mbp is a natural consequence of our representational relation to reality..

I seem to have lost the thread of your conversation with Steve (who has posted that he has withdrawn one of his posts to revise it). Looking for that post or traces of it I tracked back to this post of yours and realize that I'm not sure what you're saying in the underscored phrase. Is it that our relationship to reality is to be understood as based only in/constituted only by our mental 'representations' of all that we encounter in the environing world rather than by direct experiences and interactions with that which we encounter? And if so, are you postulating that 'reality' can refer only to objective aspects of the reality we live in? In short, are you defining 'reality' as entirely 'objective'?

ETA: I also take it that these next two statements of yours later in the thread are meant to express Clark's hypothesis:

The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate.

On the representational account, the representations are implemented via physiological processes. There is no problem of mental causation.

So there is no such thing as consciousness or mind evolved and developed through lived experiences on earth? If that's what Clark and you are holding, are we (and all the other animals on earth) effectively automatons or robots in your view?

 

[Randall]

Does nobody care to consider the Neuro-Filtering Hypothesis ( NFH ) I proposed a few days ago? It's the first quasi-new thing to come along for me since I came to the conclusion that materials alone might make the difference between experiencing consciousness or not experiencing consciousness. I haven't even seen it proposed anywhere else. I'd really like to know if anyone else has run across something identical to it anyplace else.

 

[smcder]

aww

The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate

On the representational account, the representations are implemented via physiological processes. There is no problem of mental causation.

When we peer into the physical world, we find no consciousness. Consciousness only exists for us inside our model of the world. Each of us is ( in ) a subjective model of the world, an umwelt.

The mbp arises when we mistake our world, our umwelt, for the larger reality we are modeling.

The “only” question for me is whether someone akin to panpsychism is still required. Bach and others seem convinced that purely material/biological systems/organisms can implement qualitative models ( akin to pharaoh’s approach ). There are certain qualitative feels I can imagine emerging from purely physical processes if I squint my eyes, but then others that I can’t imagine emerging from purely physical processes.

So even though the consciousness-as-self-regulatory-model makes a lot of sense to me, I’m not convinced it can emerge/evolve from purely material systems. Im still intrigued by the intrinsic nature argument.

I think it may be a moot point though. Whether human consciousness derives from matter with a non-phenomenal intrinsic nature or from matter with a phenomenal intrinsic nature, what seems to be important are the physiological processes which we can ultimately observe and measure.

Having said that, I still believe however that whatever sets consciousness neural processes apart from non-conscious neural processes won’t be observable/measurable. It will be something subjective; internal to the system. It will have something to do with the role that particular neural process plays in implementing the organisms world model.

From an objective, public perspective, a non-conscious neural process and a conscious neural process will look the same.

I refer the gentle reader to the comments section here:

Not Objectifiable

A bold draft paper from Tom Clark tackles the explanatory gap between experience and the world as described by physics. He says it’s all about the representational relation. Clark’s approach is sen…

www.consciousentities.com

 

[smcder]

Does nobody care to consider the Neuro-Filtering Hypothesis ( NFH ) I proposed a few days ago? It's the first quasi-new thing to come along for me since I came to the conclusion that materials alone might make the difference between experiencing consciousness or not experiencing consciousness. I haven't even seen it proposed anywhere else. I'd really like to know if anyone else has run across something identical to it anyplace else.

When you did various Google searches to see if they might turn up something similar, tell us what you found so we don't duplicate that.

 

[smcder]

From the comments section, there's doesn't appear to be a response from Clark to it.

"I just don’t see how or where the idea comes fron that conscious experience has anything to do with representation. This is more indirection fallacy.

What conscious experience gets generated, gets generated. There is no way we can know if it ‘looks like’ anything – or indeed if there is any meaningful way we can describe what conscious experience is as ‘appearance’, when there is no objective sense of “appearance” outside of the scope of conscious experience in the first place.

There is also a huge amount of implicit assumption taking place in these theories. Just because something is outside of the scope of physics doesn’t mean it’s not real. It doesn’t even mean it’s not “physical”, in the generic sense. It just means that physics can’t deal with it – as could be expected for any human art.

Experience is as real as a spaceship and is no less real for having no account on physics. If having an account in physics is the hallmark for “reality” then we really are in trouble, as physics is a highly limited syntax-only discipline with an extremely narrow scope. As far as mental experiences go, it’s utterly useless. Then again – same with biology, where physics is also totally useless.

JBD"