Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[smcder]

I don't think information is an abstract term at all. However, the hypothesis that (integrated) information constitutes the mind is currently unproven.

I do think direct communication between brains/minds is feasible. However, via what mechanism this would occur I don't know. What I don't think is possible is for one mind to be someone else's mind, even momentarily.

I don't think anyone is claiming one mind could be another ... ? You originally wrote:

"I'm anticipating some confusion, so here's more:

Why can't I feel Smcder's feelings?

Answer: Because brains don't feel feelings, they make them!

Once my brain generates the feeling of anger, this feeling does not need to be "felt" by my brain nor some mental, Soupie homunculus. Once my brain generates anger, that's it. That's my anger. That anger is me, my mental me. I am anger.

This anger can't therefore float over to smcder so his brain can "feel" it, if my brain doesn't feel it, his certainly won't either. Furthermore, this anger won't float over to smcder so some mental, smcder homunculus can "feel" my feeling.

My feeling is. It stands alone."

So there you wrote:

"This anger can't therefore float over to smcder so his brain can "feel" it, if my brain doesn't feel it, his certainly won't either."

But now you write:

"I do think direct communication between brains/minds is feasible."

You were right about the confusion! Please sharpen my saw!! ;-)

Also, where do your feelings originate? In meditation we focus on the breath and wait ... Not long! ... For feelings to arise ... Then we watch them, dropping the "story line" - which means we don't engage in telling ourselves stories about why we have these feelings ... And we see that they pass and we return to the breath.

I have noticed that not all of my feelings have stories ... Sometimes they just arise ... When I am in certain places with certain kinds of people. (Often in churches for example) or around certain people I get feelings that seem quite alien to me. I talked to my mother who is incredibly empathic (she was a therapist and a Chaplin) and she experiences the same thing. As a result she lives am isolated life, as do I.

Prosaic explanations proliferate. (PEP)

 

[Soupie]

What kind of 'mechanism' do you think is necessary to account for nonlocal communication? I've thought that the unified and interconnected quantum substrate of our being as well as of the universe's being (understood holographically) might be demonstrated one day to account for it. Many psi researchers are working in that direction. But there seems to be something more [which feels like something 'wished for'] expressed in your use of the term 'mechanism' than the potentiality of innumerable paths of connection and interaction between local and nonlocal realities. 'Mechanism' implies a closed and deterministic system, whereas phenomenology and cognitive science as explored by Varela and Thompson et al think in terms of open systems and freedom (and thus will and agency). You might look at all that Steve has been writing about here differently if you were to pursue the sources and theories developed by Varela and Thompson. Just a suggestion.



We're still trying to define 'mind' as well as 'consciousness'. I haven't yet read all of the last day's posts so I don't know who has suggested 'whole mind transference'.

In order for two brains/minds to directly communicate, there will need to be a transfer of information. That's what communication is, the transfer of information.

In order for information to transferred, there will need to be a mechanism a la sent, sound, vision, etc. by what mechanism would two brains directly exchange information?

 

[Soupie]

I've already replied a day or two ago that we are much more than 'experiences', but the path to understanding why seems to be one you reject.

I agree that we are much more than experiences. I say we have a body-self (material) and a mental-self (immaterial). Both of these selves are complex however a la the conceptual and phenomenal aspects of the mental-self.

 

[smcder]

I think phenomenologists are needlessly verbose. I seem to find the writing style of most (all?) phenomenologists - including @Constance - incredibly difficult to digest.

Here is how I say the above: We are experiences.

That's because they are keeping all the good information from you!! ;-)

 

[smcder]

I agree that we are much more than experiences. I say we have a body-self (material) and a mental-self (immaterial). Both of these selves are complex however a la the conceptual and phenomenal aspects of the mental-self.

No, thats dualism ... This is monism:

Russellian Monism - Bibliography - PhilPapers

"This view is 'monist' in that both the physical properties described by science and phenomenal properties are ultimately grounded in a single class of property - the intrinsic properties of physical entities."

 

[Soupie]

I don't think anyone is claiming one mind could be another ... ? You originally wrote:

"I'm anticipating some confusion, so here's more:

Why can't I feel Smcder's feelings?

Answer: Because brains don't feel feelings, they make them!

Once my brain generates the feeling of anger, this feeling does not need to be "felt" by my brain nor some mental, Soupie homunculus. Once my brain generates anger, that's it. That's my anger. That anger is me, my mental me. I am anger.

This anger can't therefore float over to smcder so his brain can "feel" it, if my brain doesn't feel it, his certainly won't either. Furthermore, this anger won't float over to smcder so some mental, smcder homunculus can "feel" my feeling.

My feeling is. It stands alone."

So there you wrote:

"This anger can't therefore float over to smcder so his brain can "feel" it, if my brain doesn't feel it, his certainly won't either."

But now you write:

"I do think direct communication between brains/minds is feasible."

You were right about the confusion! Please sharpen my saw!! ;-)

as I understood it, the original question was "how do you account for people who feel the feelings of others."

My response was we can't feel another person's feeling; however, since I believe feelings are information, it's possible that one brain can directly communicate (share information) with another brain, thus allowing the second brain to generate isomorphic information, and thus an isomorphic feeling.

 

[smcder]

In order for two brains/minds to directly communicate, there will need to be a transfer of information. That's what communication is, the transfer of information.

In order for information to transferred, there will need to be a mechanism a la sent, sound, vision, etc. by what mechanism would two brains directly exchange information?

That's a bit Newtonian of you! Constance answered your question:

@Comstance wrote

"I've thought that the unified and interconnected quantum substrate of our being as well as of the universe's being (understood holographically) might be demonstrated one day to account for it. Many psi researchers are working in that direction."

You might look at Michael Persingers work.

 

[Soupie]

No, thats dualism ... This is monism:

Russellian Monism - Bibliography - PhilPapers

"This view is 'monist' in that both the physical properties described by science and phenomenal properties are ultimately grounded in a single class of property - the intrinsic properties of physical entities."

No, it's property dualism, substance monism.

 

[smcder]

No, it's property dualism, substance monism.

Right, so how do you say the mental-self is immaterial?

"This view is 'monist' in that BOTH the physical properties described by science and phenomenal properties are ultimately grounded in a single class of property - the intrinsic properties of physical entities."

 

[Soupie]

That's a bit Newtonian of you! Constance answered your question:

@Comstance wrote

"I've thought that the unified and interconnected quantum substrate of our being as well as of the universe's being (understood holographically) might be demonstrated one day to account for it. Many psi researchers are working in that direction."

You might look at Michael Persingers work.

I wasn't asking a question, I was answering. Constance didn't know what I meant by mechanism. Yes, she provided a potential mechanism.

 

[Soupie]

Right, so how do you say mental-self is immaterial?

Information is a property of physical material.

 

[smcder]

Information is a property of physical material.

Reference?

So the immaterial is a property of the material ... Seems needlessly verbose to me! ;-)

Sorry ... Couldn't help myself!

 

[Soupie]

Reference?

So the immaterial is a property of the material ... Seems needlessly verbose to me! ;-)

Sorry ... Couldn't help myself!

The Information Philosopher - dedicated to the new information philosophy

Ex nihilo, nihil fit, said the ancients, Nothing comes from nothing. But information is no (material) thing. Information is physical, but it is not material. Information is a property of material. We can create something (immaterial) from nothing!

 

[Constance]

Hello again,
I have written a reply for Constance regarding the Mary Argument. As it is 2,900 words, I thought it too long to post here so have posted it at Jackson Mary Argument | HCT | Philosophy of Consciousness Hope that is ok.

Thanks Pharoah. I've just caught up with this post and will read what you've written after I catch up with the current rapid-fire expansion of the thread.

 

[smcder]

This reminds me ... Venn's birthday was yesterday or day before ... on the Google site ... his kids were probably like

"No dad, not another of your stupid diagrams!"

But yes, I've seen this diagram, read Chalmers papers etc ... But I can't find anything about the immaterial ... It's not even in the stupid diagram!

 

[smcder]

Hello again,
I have written a reply for Constance regarding the Mary Argument. As it is 2,900 words, I thought it too long to post here so have posted it at Jackson Mary Argument | HCT | Philosophy of Consciousness Hope that is ok.

Also,
soupie asked
"To clarify, can you provide some micro and macro examples of both emergent phenomena and emergent properties? Struggling to think of any emergent macro properties."
I will be preparing a decent reply to this over the next week or so. I am going away again but will try to respond to any queries in the meantime. I am sorry in advance if I don't respond but the internet will be rubbish where I am going.

Could you do an executive summary for the thread? That might also entice lookers on to go to the full version.

 

[Soupie]

This reminds me ... Venn's birthday was yesterday or day before ... on the Google site ... his kids were probably like

"No dad, not another of your stupid diagrams!"

But yes, I've seen this diagram, read Chalmers papers etc ... But I can't find anything about the immaterial ... It's not even in the stupid diagram!

The Information Philosopher - dedicated to the new information philosophy

Ex nihilo, nihil fit, said the ancients, Nothing comes from nothing. But information is no (material) thing. Information is physical, but it is not material. Information is a property of material. We can create something (immaterial) from nothing!

Mental = Information = Immaterial

 

[smcder]

Just one more question ...

Russellian Monism - Bibliography - PhilPapers

This applies to all Russellian monisms, including CRpP:

"Russellian monism consists of the following two claims: i) that science describes physical entities structurally but does not capture their intrinsic nature, and ii) that the intrinsic nature of physical entities is integral to the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. This view is 'monist' in that both the physical properties described by science and phenomenal properties are ultimately grounded in a single class of property - the intrinsic properties of physical entities."

Everything is

"... ultimately grounded in a single class of property - the intrinsic properties of physical entities."

That's the point of monism ... So, be patient with me, but where is the immaterial in a monistic philosophy in which everything is ultimately grounded in one kind of entity?

Is information a phenomenal property? If so it's a property ultimately of physical entities ...

Isn't that the whole basis of the combination problem?

 

[smcder]

Mental = Information = Immaterial

This reintroduces the causation problem ... The very problem monism is supposed to eliminate (instead it has the combination problem - a thorn by any other name)

Dualism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

 

[smcder]

Monism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

Materialistic Monism (also see the sections on Materialism and Physicalism):
This doctrine holds that there is but one reality, matter, whether it be an agglomerate of atoms, a primitive, world-forming substance, or the so-called cosmic nebula out of which the world evolved. It holds that only the physical is real, and that the mental can be reduced to the physical. Members of this camp include Thomas Hobbes and Bertrand Russell, and it has been the dominant doctrine in the 20th Century.