Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

And as to we are our experiences - i don't get it, I've never been green in all my life! I think that phrase has caught your fancy and it means something to you ... But I get the sense no one else can make heads or tails of it.

"Green" has nothing to do with it. It's merely an example. One can use any mental thought or feeling. Any mental structure.

I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally.

People seem to divide the self into one or three parts.

• The self reduces to (1) the brain. There is no mental-self.

• The (1) mental-self is all there is. Physical reality does not exist.

• There is (1) a physical body-self, and there is (2) a non-physical mental-self. This non-physical mental-self experiences (3) thoughts, feelings, etc.

I reject these views.

My view is that there is (1) a physical body-self consisting of the world-organism interaction, and (2) the integrated information/mental-self which results from this world-organism interaction.

 

[Pharoah]

Thanks Pharoah. I've just caught up with this post and will read what you've written after I catch up with the current rapid-fire expansion of the thread.

Yep.. good luck

smcder: executive summary... But Constance wanted me to expand what I had written about regarding the Mary Argument (whatever that was?)
Here is your ten point summary.

1. Basically, Jackson is wrong that the Mary Argument demonstrates that physicalism is false:
2. What Mary gains from studying about phenomenal experience is conceptual knowledge.
3. Conceptual knowledge does not invoke the phenomenon of experience, this is true.
4. Nevertheless, phenomenal experience is a form of knowledge about the environment (it is non-conceptual in its construction).
5. This knowledge is an innate physiological knowledge which is acquired over generations because it is beneficial to survival.
6. This physiological knowledge is qualitative because some experiences are good and others are bad - evolved physiological mechanisms reflect these qualitative subtleties because they are relevant to survival.
7. The mechanisms of physiological knowledge - both biochemical and cognitive - are varied and complex.
8. Ultimately, the mechanisms can be understood and replicated artificially (although it is not necessary to do so in order to refute Jackson's claim).
9. The theory behind innately acquired qualitatively relevant mechanism and mechanisms that enable realtime assimilative adaptation, is enough to indicate that phenomenal experience is a product of physical mechanism.
10. Nevertheless, this conceptual knowledge about mechanism - however complete and sophisticated - cannot invoke phenomenal experience of itself, because the construct of conceptual knowledge transcends that of physiological knowledge.

 

[Constance]

First of all, I'm not even going to attempt to wade through the terminological train wreck that is the discussion of intrinsic vs extrinsic/relational properties. Ultimately these are labels/concepts that might not have a direct correlation to reality.

For instance, is mass an intrinsic or extrinsic/relational property? So, I can't say whether information is an intrinsic property of the primary substance. Based on this philosophical definition from Wikipedia, it might be:

If a physical substance exists, then it's state of existence (information) will exist as well.

The intrinsic/extrinsic issue does not seem to be very helpful, or at least sufficiently developed to be helpful. Isn't information both intrinsic and extrinsic to systems that interact in the evolution of the universe. Even at the quantum level, a particle carries intrinsic information that interacts extrinsically with other particles bearing their own intrinsic information that is extrinsically expressed. What happens seems to consist in interaction/exchange of information and entanglement of information enabling increasing complexity in informationally connected systems. The 'state of a physical substance' does not seem to be a permanent state in a cosmos in which interaction and increasing complexity are ongoing . There appears to be no 'primal sustance' but a primal state or condition of interaction and integration repeated endlessly in the evolution of the universe/cosmos.

I'm thinking of something like a traffic light: if the light is in the physical state of being green, then it will also have the informational property of being green; if the light is in the physical state of being red, then it will also have the informational property of being red.

So, information may be the intrinsic property of the primal substance, while it's physical properties may be extrinsic. Perhaps the primal substance is information (although I haven't worked that out conceptually, but I believe some mathematicians and physicists have argued this).

But the information would be proto-phenomenal. Information isn't just phenomenal as is. It would need to be combined (or integrated) in specific ways to realize phenomenal experience/mind.

For some reason you seem not to want to think of the protophenomal and the phenomenal as existing along a spectrum of experience. And that seems to be because you want to understand everything that happens, everything that evolves, as already fully accounted for at an abstract distance from experience, whether at the quantum level or the classical level. At the latter level, the one where we experience our environment, you therefore want to keep the 'conceptual' level of consciousness separate from the 'phenomenal' level of consciousness -- two streams thought to flow side by side rather than as flowing together in conscious experience and reflection upon it, which is indeed the confluence of subject and object in lived experience, the ongoing evolution and integration of consciousness and mind with world, the single bearer-being of the recognition of the question of 'being' -- the question of what being is, which we, so far on earth, have apparently become the sole species capable of asking, and gradually thinking through.

How do material organisms integrate immaterial information (the proto-phenomenal) in such a way that phenomenal consciousness is realized? No one knows.

The 'material' seems to be your stumbling block. Perhaps information is phenomenal {a creature of subject-object interactions, all the way up and down} rather than something 'immaterial' instantiated in the 'material'. Phenomenal consciousness begins in protophenomenal consciousness, and neither can be said to be 'material' as I see it. The spirit {mind} seems to arise from the body of the world, as Mr. Homburg thought.

 

[smcder]

Yep.. good luck

smcder: executive summary... But Constance wanted me to expand what I had written about regarding the Mary Argument (whatever that was?)
Here is your ten point summary.

1. Basically, Jackson is wrong that the Mary Argument demonstrates that physicalism is false:
2. What Mary gains from studying about phenomenal experience is conceptual knowledge.
3. Conceptual knowledge does not invoke the phenomenon of experience, this is true.
4. Nevertheless, phenomenal experience is a form of knowledge about the environment (it is non-conceptual in its construction).
5. This knowledge is an innate physiological knowledge which is acquired over generations because it is beneficial to survival.
6. This physiological knowledge is qualitative because some experiences are good and others are bad - evolved physiological mechanisms reflect these qualitative subtleties because they are relevant to survival.
7. The mechanisms of physiological knowledge - both biochemical and cognitive - are varied and complex.
8. Ultimately, the mechanisms can be understood and replicated artificially (although it is not necessary to do so in order to refute Jackson's claim).
9. The theory behind innately acquired qualitatively relevant mechanism and mechanisms that enable realtime assimilative adaptation, is enough to indicate that phenomenal experience is a product of physical mechanism.
10. Nevertheless, this conceptual knowledge about mechanism - however complete and sophisticated - cannot invoke phenomenal experience of itself, because the construct of conceptual knowledge transcends that of physiological knowledge.

I'll have to read your whole article

... SEP has an exhaustive article on the knowledge problem here:

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

that we read in part one of this thread ... good reference, history, formulations of the argument and objections ... The article concludes:

"6. Concluding Remark
The appropriate evaluation of the knowledge argument remains controversial. The acceptability of its second premise P2 (Mary lacks factual knowledge before release) and of the inferences from P1 (Mary has complete physical knowledge before release) to C1 (Mary knows all the physical facts) and from P2 to C2 (Mary does not know some facts before release) depend on quite technical and controversial issues about (a) the appropriate theory of property concepts and their relation to the properties they express and (b) the appropriate theory of belief content. It is therefore safe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge argument will not come to an end in the near future. "

Thank goodness! ;-)

 

[Soupie]

The 'state of a physical substance' does not seem to be a permanent state in a cosmos in which interaction and increasing complexity are ongoing .

Agreed.

There appears to be no 'primal sustance' but a primal state or condition of interaction and integration repeated endlessly in the evolution of the universe/cosmos.

I like this idea but as I said above, I have a hard time conceptualizing it. But yes, from this interaction seems to arise what we have labeled the physical and mental aspects of nature. My belief that these aspects ultimately arise from the same substance (process) is why I consider myself a monist.

For some reason you seem not to want to think of the protophenomal and the phenomenal as existing along a spectrum of experience.

Hm, I don't follow you here.

Consider our discussion of the nature of the consciousness/mind of a human, a dolphin, a worm, and a bowling bowl.

If I were to arrange these objects (processes) on a continuum, it would go like this:

Proto phenomenal - bowling ball

Phenomenal - worm, dolphin/human

That is, I don't think bowling balls have phenomenal experiences, whereas worms, dolphins, and humans do.

However, I would argue the dolphins and humans likely have an equal richness of phenomenal experiences, whereas a worm's would not be as rich.

And that seems to be because you want to understand everything that happens, everything that evolves, as already fully accounted for at an abstract distance from experience, whether at the quantum level or the classical level. At the latter level, the one where we experience our environment, you therefore want to keep the 'conceptual' level of consciousness separate from the 'phenomenal' level of consciousness -- two streams thought to flow side by side rather than as flowing together in conscious experience and reflection upon it...

Hm, I don't follow you here either.

I think the capacity to mentally conceptualize the world is something different from the capacity to phenomenally experience the world. (Note that what we are mentally conceptualizing is actually our phenomenal mental experiences.)

Thus, a bowling ball does not have the capacity to generate phenomenal experiences nor mental concepts. A worm does have the capacity to generate phenomenal experiences, but whether is can form mental concepts is dubious. If they can, they will quite basic. Finally, humans and dolphins can both phenomenally experience and mentally conceptualize. While these mental process are distinct, they also overlap seamlessly (most of the time).

which is indeed the confluence of subject and object in lived experience, the ongoing evolution and integration of consciousness and mind with world, the single bearer-being of the recognition of the question of 'being' -- the question of what being is, which we, so far on earth, have apparently become the sole species capable of asking, and gradually thinking through.

I can't make heads or tails of this.

The 'material' seems to be your stumbling block. Perhaps information is phenomenal {a creature of subject-object interactions, all the way up and down} rather than something 'immaterial' instantiated in the 'material'. Phenomenal consciousness begins in protophenomenal consciousness, and neither can be said to be 'material' as I see it. The spirit {mind} seems to arise from the body of the world, as Mr. Homburg thought.

I'm not suggesting either phenomenal consciousness or information are material. They are both non-material (or immaterial). However, I am suggesting both are directly and intimately linked with the material/physical processes. Indeed, what I am suggesting is that proto-phenomenal and phenomenal consciousness are information. That is, not isomorphic, but ontologically the same. Mental = Information

 

[smcder]

I'm reposting some of the "classic" links from part one of this thread - these are basic to the discussion of consciousness and the paranormal.

This blog post links to Dean Radin's evidence page - 100 plus peer reviewed publications on psi, mostly after the year 2000 and including critique by skeptics, most notably the exchanges between statistician Jessica Utts:

JESSICA UTTS' HOME PAGE

And skeptic Ray Hyman (also compiled here: Links to Papers on Parapsychology

here is a direct link to Radin's evidence page:

http://deanradin.com/evidence/evidence.htm

Radin:

"Critics are fond of saying that there is no scientific evidence for psi. They wave their fist in the air and shout, "Show me the evidence!" Then they turn red and have a coughing fit. In less dramatic cases a student might be genuinely curious and open-minded, but unsure where to begin to find reliable evidence about psi. Google knows all and sees all, but it doesn't know how to interpret or evaluate what it knows (at least not yet).

In the past, my response to the "show me" challenge has been to give the titles of a few books to read, point to the bibliographies in those books, and advise the person to do their homework. I still think that this is the best approach for a beginner tackling a complex topic. But given the growing expectation that information on virtually any topic ought to be available online within 60 seconds, traditional methods of scholarship are disappearing fast. "

 

[smcder]

http://deanradin.com/evidence/Nahm2011.pdf

This is a review of cases of "terminal lucidity" - restoration of clarity to patients with severe neuro-physiological disorders at the point of death.

This phenomena is also well known as an aspect of dying within Buddhism.

Here is an NIH review:

Terminal lucidity: a review and a case - PubMed Mobile

Abstract


The unexpected return of mental clarity and memory shortly before death in patients suffering from severe psychiatric and neurologic disorders, which we have called "terminal lucidity", has been reported in the medical literature over the past 250 years, but has received little attention. We review a range of terminal lucidity cases in order to encourage investigation of the mechanisms involved and possible insights into both the neuroscience of memory and cognition at the end of life and treatment of terminal illness. These examples include case reports of patients suffering from brain abscesses, tumors, strokes, meningitis, dementia or Alzheimer's disease, schizophrenia, and affective disorders. Several of these accounts suggest that during terminal lucidity, memory and cognitive abilities may function by neurologic processes different from those of the normal brain. We expect that significant contributions to better understanding the processes involved in memory and cognition processing might be gained through in-depth studies of terminal lucidity. Studying terminal lucidity might also facilitate the development of novel therapies. In addition, increased awareness of unusual end-of-life experiences could help physicians, caregivers, and bereaved family members be prepared for encountering such experiences, and help those individuals cope with them.

 

[smcder]

Yep.. good luck

smcder: executive summary... But Constance wanted me to expand what I had written about regarding the Mary Argument (whatever that was?)
Here is your ten point summary.

1. Basically, Jackson is wrong that the Mary Argument demonstrates that physicalism is false:
2. What Mary gains from studying about phenomenal experience is conceptual knowledge.
3. Conceptual knowledge does not invoke the phenomenon of experience, this is true.
4. Nevertheless, phenomenal experience is a form of knowledge about the environment (it is non-conceptual in its construction).
5. This knowledge is an innate physiological knowledge which is acquired over generations because it is beneficial to survival.
6. This physiological knowledge is qualitative because some experiences are good and others are bad - evolved physiological mechanisms reflect these qualitative subtleties because they are relevant to survival.
7. The mechanisms of physiological knowledge - both biochemical and cognitive - are varied and complex.
8. Ultimately, the mechanisms can be understood and replicated artificially (although it is not necessary to do so in order to refute Jackson's claim).
9. The theory behind innately acquired qualitatively relevant mechanism and mechanisms that enable realtime assimilative adaptation, is enough to indicate that phenomenal experience is a product of physical mechanism.
10. Nevertheless, this conceptual knowledge about mechanism - however complete and sophisticated - cannot invoke phenomenal experience of itself, because the construct of conceptual knowledge transcends that of physiological knowledge.

Can you locate your argument among the objections here?

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

4.3?

4.6 offers the view that genuine information is gained ...

4.2 linguistic vs metaphysical physicalism is especially interesting ...

 

[Soupie]

And that seems to be because you want to understand everything that happens, everything that evolves, as already fully accounted for at an abstract distance from experience, whether at the quantum level or the classical level.

Ok, I think I have a sense here of what you're saying/asking. However, I'm not confident I can clarify what I do mean, haha, since I've tried many times.

It may not be that you misunderstand me, you may just disagree with me.

I don't think everything that happens is fully accounted for at an abstract distance from experience.

For instance, if a tree falls down in a forest, and there is no organism around to hear it crash to the ground, there will exist nowhere the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground.

For the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground to exist, two things will be needed: 1) a tree crashing to the ground, and 2) an organism with the capacity to translate the information received from the crashing tree into phenomenal experience.

Thus, if a tree crashed to the ground in front of a bowling ball, there would be no phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground. That is, though the necessary information would be available in the world, there would be no organism capable of receiving this information and translating it to phenomenal experience.

On the other hand, if a tree crashed to the ground in front of a tit mouse, there would be the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground. That is, the mouse-organism would have received this information from the environment and translated it into the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground.

 

[smcder]

http://deanradin.com/evidence/Nahm2011.pdf

This is a review of cases of "terminal lucidity" - restoration of clarity to patients with severe neuro-physiological disorders at the point of death.

This phenomena is also well known as an aspect of dying within Buddhism.

Here is an NIH review:

Terminal lucidity: a review and a case - PubMed Mobile

Abstract


The unexpected return of mental clarity and memory shortly before death in patients suffering from severe psychiatric and neurologic disorders, which we have called "terminal lucidity", has been reported in the medical literature over the past 250 years, but has received little attention. We review a range of terminal lucidity cases in order to encourage investigation of the mechanisms involved and possible insights into both the neuroscience of memory and cognition at the end of life and treatment of terminal illness. These examples include case reports of patients suffering from brain abscesses, tumors, strokes, meningitis, dementia or Alzheimer's disease, schizophrenia, and affective disorders. Several of these accounts suggest that during terminal lucidity, memory and cognitive abilities may function by neurologic processes different from those of the normal brain. We expect that significant contributions to better understanding the processes involved in memory and cognition processing might be gained through in-depth studies of terminal lucidity. Studying terminal lucidity might also facilitate the development of novel therapies. In addition, increased awareness of unusual end-of-life experiences could help physicians, caregivers, and bereaved family members be prepared for encountering such experiences, and help those individuals cope with them.

The "just so" challenge is a naturalistic explanation of why the brain would "pull itself together" (that's a technical term) at the last minute when it's been damaged for an extended period?

If alternate paths are available why don't they come into play earlier?

Cognition appears to be biologically expensive - which argues for and against redundancy ... But this seems more than a question of simple redundancy and it's across many types of disorder.

Nagel's argument:

"the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory."

Isn't immediately helpful but it does allow us to look at the problem from the other side - consciousness as causal - in terms if CRpP the combination problem, this would be phenomenal structure correcting physical structure - if there is evidence of physiological (would this occur rapidly or at the same rate as normal physiological change/repair ?)

 

[smcder]

Ok, I think I have a sense here of what you're saying/asking. However, I'm not confident I can clarify what I do mean, haha, since I've tried many times.

It may not be that you misunderstand me, you may just disagree with me.

I don't think everything that happens is fully accounted for at an abstract distance from experience.

For instance, if a tree falls down in a forest, and there is no organism around to hear it crash to the ground, there will exist nowhere the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground.

For the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground to exist, two things will be needed: 1) a tree crashing to the ground, and 2) an organism with the capacity to translate the information received from the crashing tree into phenomenal experience.

Thus, if a tree crashed to the ground in front of a bowling ball, there would be no phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground. That is, though the necessary information would be available in the world, there would be no organism capable of receiving this information and translating it to phenomenal experience.

On the other hand, if a tree crashed to the ground in front of a tit mouse, there would be the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground. That is, the mouse-organism would have received this information from the environment and translated it into the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground.

And what does the tree think of all this?

They always forget the trees ...




Michael Marder, “Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life” (Columbia UP, 2013)

 

[Soupie]

Isn't immediately helpful but it does allow us to look at the problem from the other side - consciousness as causal - in terms if CRpP the combination problem, this would be phenomenal structure correcting physical structure - if there is evidence of physiological (would this occur rapidly or at the same rate as normal physiological change/repair ?)

The Placebo Effect: What Is It?

 

[Soupie]

And what does the tree think of all this?

They always forget the trees ...




Michael Marder, “Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life” (Columbia UP, 2013)

The tree in my example was made of plastic, haha!

 

[smcder]

The Placebo Effect: What Is It?

Terminal lucidity in patients with chro - PubMed Mobile

Abstract
In this article, we present the results of a literature survey on case reports of the unexpected return of mental clarity and memory shortly before death, which we have called "terminal lucidity." We focus specifically on terminal lucidity in mental disorders, of which we have found 81 case references. Of these, we were able to retrieve 49 case reports, most of which had been recorded before 1849. Thereafter, comparatively few reports of terminal lucidity have been published. Some more recent publications referred to terminal lucidity in patients suffering from schizophrenia and dementia. We draw parallels and distinctions between terminal lucidity and remissions attributable to febrile illness in neurosyphilis. We recommend in-depth studies on the psychopathology and neuropathology involved in terminal lucidity, since they might enable the development of both improved therapies and a better understanding of unresolved aspects of cognition and memory processing.

 

[smcder]

"Green" has nothing to do with it. It's merely an example. One can use any mental thought or feeling. Any mental structure.

I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally.

People seem to divide the self into one or three parts.

• The self reduces to (1) the brain. There is no mental-self.

• The (1) mental-self is all there is. Physical reality does not exist.

• There is (1) a physical body-self, and there is (2) a non-physical mental-self. This non-physical mental-self experiences (3) thoughts, feelings, etc.

I reject these views.

My view is that there is (1) a physical body-self consisting of the world-organism interaction, and (2) the integrated information/mental-self which results from this world-organism interaction.

"Green" has nothing to do with it. It's merely an example. One can use any mental thought or feeling. Any mental structure."

Yes, I know.

"part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally."

Could you show me where I have pre-supposed that the mind/subject exists non-locally? I would like to clarify any such post that I have made.

And then could you explain what you mean when you say I am the green, the love, the pain? I may not have read that post - plus it will be good to have it in part 2 of this thread. You could do a FAQ and then link back to it when these questions come up.

 

[smcder]

Sorry. Information Philosophy.

You don't like applying the descriptor immaterial to information as it related to physical material. Which descriptor would you prefer?

It's more than my personal preference - it's clarity ... I don't read every post on this thread and sometimes I sleep in between what I do read ... And there may be other occasional readers or passers by, so if you're purveying a particular POV you might make posts as stand alone as possible - if you write:

"I agree that we are much more than experiences. I say we have a body-self (material) and a mental-self (immaterial). Both of these selves are complex however a la the conceptual and phenomenal aspects of the mental-self."

Then I think "oh Soupie is a dualist!" And I quit reading your stuff! ;-)
...

Dualism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

"Dualism in Metaphysics is the belief that there are two kinds of reality: material (physical) and immaterial (spiritual). In Philosophy of Mind, Dualism is the position that mind and body are in some categorical way separate from each other, and that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical in nature."

Monism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

Neutral Monism:
This dual-aspect theory maintains that existence consists of one kind of primal substance (hence monism), which in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical aspects or attributes. Thus, there is some other, neutral substance (variously labelled as Substance, Nature or God), and that both matter and mind are properties of this other unknown substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza and also by Bertrand Russell for a time.

Reflexive Monism:
This is a dual-aspect theory (in the tradition of Spinoza) which argues that the one basic stuff of which the universe is composed has the potential to manifest both physically and as conscious experience (such as human beings) which can then have a view of both the rest of the universe and themselves (hence "reflexive"). It is a contemporary take on a concept which has been present in human thought for millennia, such as in later Vedic writings like the "Upanishads" and some beliefs from ancient Egypt.

... So ... We re- write the above as:

"I agree that we are much more than experiences. While there is only one primal substance, it has two aspects - so we have a body-self (physical aspect) and a mental-self (phenomenal aspect).

Or, for reflexive monism:

"I agree that we are much more than experiences. While I believe there is only one basic stuff of which the universe is comprised, it has the potential to manifest as a body-self (physical) and a reflexive mental-self that is a conscious experience that is capable of having a view of both the rest of the universe and of itself.

 

[smcder]

Sorry. Information Philosophy.

You don't like applying the descriptor immaterial to information as it related to physical material. Which descriptor would you prefer?

Here are the other questions in my original post:

"What is meant by ontologically fundamental? Do you mean mind or mental just is, right? Phenomenal experience is an ultimately irreducible aspect of an ultimately physical or neutral stuff.

I can see information is gojng to be the next difficulty - so I want to avoid any further verbal disputes over monism ... And I think we have THAT down warts and all ... and you still identify as a CRpP? Is that correct?

Finally is it your position that nothing is ultimately paranormal, it just hasn't received a normal explanation ... Yet? Can we call that "pre-normalism"?"

 

[smcder]

"Green" has nothing to do with it. It's merely an example. One can use any mental thought or feeling. Any mental structure.

I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally.

People seem to divide the self into one or three parts.

• The self reduces to (1) the brain. There is no mental-self.

• The (1) mental-self is all there is. Physical reality does not exist.

• There is (1) a physical body-self, and there is (2) a non-physical mental-self. This non-physical mental-self experiences (3) thoughts, feelings, etc.

I reject these views.

My view is that there is (1) a physical body-self consisting of the world-organism interaction, and (2) the integrated information/mental-self which results from this world-organism interaction.

"I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally."

If you do have something new, you may want to protect it and seek publication or establish a blog.

 

[smcder]

"Green" has nothing to do with it. It's merely an example. One can use any mental thought or feeling. Any mental structure.

I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally.

People seem to divide the self into one or three parts.

• The self reduces to (1) the brain. There is no mental-self.

• The (1) mental-self is all there is. Physical reality does not exist.

• There is (1) a physical body-self, and there is (2) a non-physical mental-self. This non-physical mental-self experiences (3) thoughts, feelings, etc.

I reject these views.

My view is that there is (1) a physical body-self consisting of the world-organism interaction, and (2) the integrated information/mental-self which results from this world-organism interaction.

How's about "pan experientialism" a la Whitehead and Hartshorne??

 

[Constance]

Ok, I think I have a sense here of what you're saying/asking. However, I'm not confident I can clarify what I do mean, haha, since I've tried many times.

It may not be that you misunderstand me, you may just disagree with me.

I think I understand what you're trying to argue, and, yes, I do disagree with it.

I don't think everything that happens is fully accounted for at an abstract distance from experience.

For instance, if a tree falls down in a forest, and there is no organism around to hear it crash to the ground, there will exist nowhere the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground.

For the phenomenal experience of the sound of a tree crashing to the ground to exist, two things will be needed: 1) a tree crashing to the ground, and 2) an organism with the capacity to translate the information received from the crashing tree into phenomenal experience.

This is close to the point where I disagree with your theory. What is it that enables an organism to respond to the sound of a tree crashing? It seems to me that it is that organism's ability to hear that enables it to hear the sound of a tree crashing. The organism must also hear other sounds, a myriad of them, generated in its ecological niche. The organism has grown up in a mileau that is sensible -- in which things and other creatures are visible, audible, palpable, tastable, smellable. The organism is experientially present to -- senses its presence in -- this mileau. No doubt its senses have been enabled through millenia during which 'information' exchange became the habit of nature, during which life emerged and living organisms became present to and within local reality. What that interaction and entanglement of information has led to in life, in living beings, is lived reality, which is experiential, temporal, and open-ended and thereby exceeds the integration of information that has produced its existential potentiality.

Embodied experience and the evolution of consciousness go beyond the information that has made them possible. Understanding how information exchange and integration have produced us as well as the world we live in is an interesting question. But it cannot explain to us our adventures on the planet. It does not contain the answers to the existential questions we ask ourselves: what is life? what is mind? why do we care? how should we live? It does not even contain an answer to the question 'why do we seek understanding of the world and of ourselves'. 'Information' does not ask this question. We do.

Maybe the above helps in understanding my disagreement that 'integrated information' can explain everything. Maybe not. I actually doubt that it can without your having become acquainted with the school of phenomenological philosophy.