Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

As I read you here, there seems to be a considerable change in either your ideas or in the way in which you're expressing them. ...

In other words, you seem to be recognizing now that consciousness cannot be thought as separate from mind. Is that impression accurate?

No, there hasn't been a change. I think the confusion stems from my earlier interest in IIT. You had noted that IIT doesn't account for all forms/aspects of consciousness, only phenomenal consciousness.

My response has always been 1) I'm not sure if IIT and/or Tonini addresses non-phenomenal forms of consciousness or not as I still have yet to read IIT in any depth, and 2) if IIT doesn't address non-phenomenal forms of consciousness, that doesn't necessarily mean Tonini (or I) denies the existence or importance of non-phenomenal forms of consciousness.

Above you use the terms "consciousness" and "mind." It's frustrating that I can't be exactly sure what you mean by those terms.

I'll just say that I think humans possess phenomenal consciousness (feeling), conceptual consciousness (thinking), and self-aware consciousness (meta-feeling/thinking); and that these "layers" of consciousness interact seamlessly to create the human mind.

But I still don't understand what you mean by "phenomenal consciousness" {please define}, nor why you resist the idea that mind develops in the recognition of its own standing at a distance from that which is 'other', producing the increasingly aware self revealed in and by consciousness), which is already incipient in experience.

I make a distinction between phenomenal experience and phenomenal consciousness. (And I wouldn't worry about it too much because I'm probably completely wrong about it.)

To clarify, I think some organisms can produce phenomenal experiences (integrated information) with no corresponding (conceptual) sense of self. For example, a, say, fruit fly may integrate information in such a way that phenomenal pain is produced. However, attached to this pain will be no reflective sense on the part of the fruit fly that it is an organism experiencing pain. There will simply be pain.

It is only later in the evolution of organism/mind that the capacity for conceptual thinking allows organisms to conceptualize phenomenal experiences thus bringing these experiences into consciousness — phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the capacity for conceptual consciousness and phenomenal consciousness allow the organism/mind to conceptualize itself, giving rise to a sense of self.

I apologize in advance for the confusion the above will create, haha.

As far as what role "awareness of the other" plays in the establishment of a conceptual sense of self, I'm not sure.

At the biological, physiological level, there must be a non-conceptual awareness by organism of the boundaries of its own physical body. However, I do not think a conceptual, conscious sense of self accompanies this physiological awareness in the absence the capacity for conceptual consciousness. However, this biological, physiological awareness certainly informs the sense of self in organisms possessing the capacity for conceptual consciousness.

 

[Constance]

Edgar Mitchell,
A DYADIC MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Extract:

". . . When we consider the way the human organism receives information, science has limited
itself to considering information from the five normal senses, all of which find their basis
in electromagnetic theory. However the human body not only receives but perceives
information from external sources and also has an elaborate internal .feeling sense.
which manages information internally. .Feeling. is by definition a subjective experience.
This internal feeling sense and the associated information management system is a key
element in the dyadic model.

The feeling sense monitors the internal well being of the system, provides access to
intuition, provides response to sublimated memories, provides stimuli for the emotions
and provides a response to non-local information. All of the functions, however, may be

described simply in terms of information management. Although non-local effects have
been observed and studied for over a century by parapsychologists, in the absence of a
compelling theory the results have been ignored or disparaged and certainly
misrepresented by mainstream science. Non-locality in quantum physics now provides a
physical basis for these effects. A large number of investigators for several decades have
demonstrated that brain waves can be synchronized and information transferred between
individuals across Faraday cage barriers. The results do not obey the inverse square rule
of electromagnetic propagation, nor are they time dependant, suggesting the phenomenon
is a macro-scale version of quantum non-locality, but with more degrees of freedom that
simple particles undergoing a double split experiment
.
Split brain theory, mapping the functional capabilities of the brain, plus anthropological
studies suggest that the linguistic and reasoning capabilities, resident in the left
hemisphere and frontal lobe, are later capabilities to have evolved. The functions of the
right hemisphere and the limbic region are pre-linguistic are responsible for pattern
recognition, intuition, emotional response and more holistic functions. The dyadic theory
suggests that the molecules of the body and brain are also in dynamic exchange of energy
with the zero point field (as is all matter) and also resonate non-locally with each other
and the remainder of the universe. The brain/body inner .feeling. sense provide
perception of this information. Likely the zero point field is the mechanism for this
resonance. The non-local resonance of energy and matter throughout the universe is
suggested as nature's most fundamental information management scheme. Dyadic theory
predicts that patterns of resonance become more complex as the complexity of the
molecular structure increases; that the modes of resonance parallel the degrees of
freedom of molecular structure. Perception possesses additional degrees of freedom in
more complex matter. Observed first at the level of subatomic particles, but by extension
to all matter, non-locality provides an information basis for all subjective experience. In
retrospect it seems exceedingly strange that if both energy and information have been
present from the beginnings of the universe, and that matter seems to have self organized
from energy, that information would not also be utilized in the organizational process.
But information is the basis of knowing. and .knowing. implies the attribute that Homo
sapiens experience as .consciousness. or .mind.. Thus mind in some elemental sense is
ubiquitously present in the universe.

I argue that the most fundamental aspects of consciousness with which we are concerned
are actually .perception. (or awareness) and .intentionality. (or volition). Thus it is these
fundamental attributes that are likely the primordial antecedent to the evolved
consciousness that Homo sapiens experiences. The .mentality. that we experience is the
evolving component of consciousness that requires a more complex brain and nervous
system.

Likely all matter in nature, but certainly all living matter perceives information within
some nuance of the word .perceive.. In other words, fundamentally nature has provided
a subjective experience. But in the same sense that we cannot directly observe
wave/particles in action at the subatomic level and must devise intricate experiments to
detect behaviors at that level of existence; neither can we observe subjective experience
except our own personal subjectivity. Therefore we must use other means to deduce its
existences in entities other than humans. In the dyadic model perception and
intentionality are dyadically coupled, that is to say they occur together. If one can
discover the intentional behaviors in nature, then awareness will be present also. The
rationale behind this coupling is: a) we experience both perception and intentionality at
our level of organization, b) complexity theory points out the repeating patterns in nature
at different scale sizes and at different levels of molecular complexity, c) awareness
without an ability to respond, and intentionality without feedback of the results, would
both be useless attributes, d) awareness and intentionality create a learning feedback loop
which we do observe in nature. Thus it is both reasonably and experimentally verifiable
that perception and intentionality are coupled. One can observe with present day
instrumentation behaviors in simple forms of nature that are neither random nor
deterministic. Such behaviors are of necessity intentional, such as the search for food,
mating opportunities, predator avoidance, etc. These behaviors are indicative of a
volitional presence, and thereby are internal subjective experience.

It is necessary to be very specific about the meaning of .awareness. as proposed by the
dyadic model. Homo sapiens experiences self-reflective awareness, meaning the ability to
reflect upon the information content of our thoughts. The primates are perhaps on the
edge of experiencing self reflection but certainly have a full measure of self-awareness.
By self awareness I mean the ability to distinguish self from other, to experience an
I/thou dualism. It is likely that self-awareness can be found in many, of not most, animals
having multiple sensors and a brain. Below self-awareness is undifferentiated awareness
which means the ability to perceive information and to react to that information but
without a self concept. If the development of an individual traces the evolution of a
species, then we may say that any fetus certainly has undifferentiated awareness. Selfawareness does not develop in the human child until several months after birth. How far down the evolutionary chain one can detect undifferentiated awareness is a valid area for research. The dyadic model suggests that undifferentiated awareness, or simple
perception, is a more fundamental attribute of matter than life itself, and the crucial point
is the distinction between reception and perception of information. If non random, non
deterministic behavior can be observed within the degrees of freedom permitted matter
by the conservation rules, perception can be inferred at that level of organization.

Norbert Weiner of M.I.T. provided a numerical definition of information as the negative
of entropy, circa 1942. James Shannon of Bell laboratories provided the seminal paper
developing information theory six years later. A tacit assumption of information theory is
that the meaning of information is carried in the signal. It can be easily shown that this
assumption can pertain on[ly] to .intended. information, but is in general false. The meaning of information is assigned by the percipient. Even if the originator of information
intended a meaning for the signal, there is no assurance that that any percipient sill
recognize the intended meaning. Information is just a pattern of energy that requires
perception to utilize and an information base (experience) from which to assign meaning.
Meaning. is internally created information which connects the perceived information to
the information base residing in memory. To assign meaning is a fundamental function of
.mentality., the evolutionary component of consciousness. At very simple levels of
living matter, behaviors such as the search for food, mating opportunities, predator
avoidance, etc. require that information from the environment be perceived and given
meaning. And since information does not carry within the signal, but is just a pattern of
energy to be interpreted, assigning a meaning is an evolved, learned behavior. Learning is
precisely the activity of giving meaning to information and retaining the meaning for
future use. Non-local resonance allows experience to be shared.


If nature's primordial information management process is non-locality, it would seem
that evolution rather quickly availed itself of other information produced by the
environment as the environment became more complex. Acoustic, tactile, olfactory,
visual and taste senses undoubtedly evolved rather early in the planetary environment
once mobile organisms existed. Multi-sensory information requires an information
management process within the organism. The dyadic theory suggests that information in the environment caused .mentality. to begin its own organizing process. Thus the
antecedents to human consciousness find their roots in the primitive processing of
environmental information, but the most primitive of the processes is centered around
non-locality.


Prior to the evolution of Homo sapiens, which means prior to brains developing selfreflective awareness, before linguistic capabilities, before reasoning and other high level mental functions, animals were solving problems, creating tools and otherwise being
quite intelligent. This activity should be characterized as subconscious or unconscious
activity (as compared to anthropic type self-reflective conscious awareness). Wolf packs
likely discovered by accident that splitting forces and encircling prey was an effective
hunting strategy. But the successful experience connected with other information in the
brain, and .meaning. was established and remembered. It is likely the same for beavers
learning to construct dams of stick and mud, and bees learning to communicate through
the waggle dance. Nature's creatures likely learned through trial and error, thus nature
itself must be said to learn through trial and error. We say that animals obey .instinct.,
but how did they acquire the instinct? . Most likely by learning it through trial and error in
the process of evolutionary development. Non-local resonance undoubtedly played a
significant role in communication of .instinctual. behaviors. Non-local resonance as used
in the dyadic model is similar to the morphic resonance as proposed by Sheldrake.

Perhaps the most compelling reason to interpret natural learning processes in this manner is the fractal evidence from chaos theory; nature repeats patterns at different scale sizes. Recursive evaluation of simpler nonlinear equations has been discovered to simulate exotic forms in nature, at different scale sizes. This suggests, not that nature knows mathematics, but that nature uses multiple feedback loops of energy and molecules to produce form. Together these phenomena are highly suggestive of learning behaviors and non-local resonance.

The dyadic model suggests that the anthropic consciousness experienced by humans must
be viewed in an evolutionary sense as having emerged from antecedent conditions that
can be traced back to origins before the Big Bang in the sea of zero point energy. The
elemental components of perception and intentionality seem to be irreducible attributes,
and must be considered .hidden. or at least unobserved attributes of elemental matter. If
intentionality exists at all, it must be fundamental. Intentionality cannot arise from a
deterministic nature. Physicists have only looked for and verified nonlocality for basic
correlations of polarization, momentum, etc. . the most basic wave/particle measures.
But given that evidence, reason suggests that a most fundamental behavior of matter
resides in the property of nonlocality and that nonlocality operates at all levels of
complex matter. We do no more injustice to reason to say that particles .instinctively.
maintain correlation than to say that photons .know. that they are undergoing a double
split experiment. It is language and our knowing that is incomplete, not the properties of
matter.


In the dyadic model, wave/particle are coupled, perception/intentionality are coupled,
xistence/knowing, internal/external, subject/object, life/death, success/failure, and so
forth. They are coupled because in our universe, at least, they always seem to be found
together when we attempt to describe process. . . ."

http://quantrek.org/Technical Literature/Mitchell_A_Dyatic_Model_Of_Consciousness.pdf

 

[Soupie]

[T]he idea you would need to agree to is that everything cannot possibly be explained by a current or a future physics. Are you taking that step?

Can you expand on this a little bit (or a lot). What you perceive as trickiness is quite possibly just ignorance.

Here's my thinking regarding labels such as physical, spiritual, mental, etc. Could they be a case of the blind mice and the elephant; we feel the trunk and think reality is one thing, the tail and reality another thing, the ears another thing, etc.

In my (perhaps simplistic) way of thinking, reality (what-is) is one kind of thing. Perhaps reality can and should be differentiated into physical, spiritual, and mental stuff. However, since all this stuff apparently interacts and composes one thing (reality) then ultimately, it can be said to be one stuff.

Now, can what we call physical stuff account for what we know of reality? Can, for instance, free will exist in a physical paradigm? (I think, but I'm not certain (see above) that the problem is that physical reality is considered to be deterministic.)

So two questions:

1) Do we know, for certain, that humans have free will?
2) Do we know, for certain, that physical reality is deterministic?

I think the answer to both questions is no, we don't know. So, besides the labeling issue — physical vs spiritual vs mental — there is the fact that we can't answer these philosophical questions because we simply don't know enough about reality. (Will we ever?)

Again, it's very, very likely that there is some fundamental, philosophical problem that I am completely ignorant of. Feel free to spell it out for me if you care to, haha. I might need the "for dummies" version though.

 

[Soupie]

...I haven't seen anything in your position to prevent us from reducing information to the arrangement of "stuff"...

Okay, this may be another place where my ignorance of basic philosophical problems shows.

If you recall, I posted about conceiving of the mind like the concept of three (3).

We can represent the concept (3) in, probably, an infinite number of ways: The English written three, the English spoken three, the number three, the Roman numeral three, etc. Furthermore, it can be written with pen, pencil, paint, clouds in the sky, etc. It can even be represented in the human brain via, perhaps, a pattern of neuronal spikes.

However, the concept of three (3) cannot be reduced to any of these mediums which temporally embody it. The concept three is immaterial. However, for it to be realized (exist?) it must be embodied.

So, yes, bits of information can be reduced to the arrangements of stuff, but the concepts that the bits of information embody cannot be reduced. (This is why perhaps Toninis IIT is so interesting because he is saying phenomenal qualia are not physical stuff, but they are embodied by physical stuff. Deeply fascinating.)

So neither the phenomenal nor the conceptual can be reduced to the informational bits (arrangement of physical stuff) by which they are embodied, but neither would be realized (exist) without physical stuff.

 

[smcder]

Can you expand on this a little bit (or a lot). What you perceive as trickiness is quite possibly just ignorance.

Here's my thinking regarding labels such as physical, spiritual, mental, etc. Could they be a case of the blind mice and the elephant; we feel the trunk and think reality is one thing, the tail and reality another thing, the ears another thing, etc.

In my (perhaps simplistic) way of thinking, reality (what-is) is one kind of thing. Perhaps reality can and should be differentiated into physical, spiritual, and mental stuff. However, since all this stuff apparently interacts and composes one thing (reality) then ultimately, it can be said to be one stuff.

Now, can what we call physical stuff account for what we know of reality? Can, for instance, free will exist in a physical paradigm? (I think, but I'm not certain (see above) that the problem is that physical reality is considered to be deterministic.)

So two questions:

1) Do we know, for certain, that humans have free will?
2) Do we know, for certain, that physical reality is deterministic?

I think the answer to both questions is no, we don't know. So, besides the labeling issue — physical vs spiritual vs mental — there is the fact that we can't answer these philosophical questions because we simply don't know enough about reality. (Will we ever?)

Again, it's very, very likely that there is some fundamental, philosophical problem that I am completely ignorant of. Feel free to spell it out for me if you care to, haha. I might need the "for dummies" version though.

Not at all - In my rhetorical (or rant-torical style ;-) I think I often use "you" for something like "one" or "we" or when I want to say "it" is tricky rather than "you" are tricky ... this works face to face but when I re read a post after a day or two it doesn't come off the way I intended ... so let me look at my original post and see ... also I'm going off an aggregated sense of your position as I take it to be in average rather than any given time because I know it's work in progress.

 

[Pharoah]

Incidentally Constance, the article I think you posted entitled "The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory" by Vandekerckhove, Bulnes and Panksepp, is in some parts a ringing endorsement of HCT in my view.

I was wondering if contributors to this discussion might give me some feedback on two things:
firstly, the infographic that I have created about HCT
secondly the post I have written to accompany it.
When you click on the link to see the post, you will find that it is password protected.
The password is: paracast
This is the post address: Infographic – Why does consciousness exist? Hierarchical Construct Theory (HCT) | Philosophy of Consciousness
This is the infographic:

 

[Constance]

Incidentally Constance, the article I think you posted entitled "The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory" by Vandekerckhove, Bulnes and Panksepp, is in some parts a ringing endorsement of HCT in my view.

Could be. Why don't you send Panksepp a copy of your chart and paper and see what he has to say?

I was wondering if contributors to this discussion might give me some feedback on two things:
firstly, the infographic that I have created about HCT
secondly the post I have written to accompany it.

This is the infographic:

I like your chart very much. I was a little surprised to see a Springer Spaniel cropping up in the Cambrian, but he provides local color and is a strong attractor. I went off to wikipedia's evolution of life timeline to see what the two unidentifiables were in the Eoarchean and I'm guessing the bright green rectangular representation in the lower right is a graptolite of the type whose fossil remains appear in the first photo here:
Graptolithinia - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
There's a drawing farther down that wiki page showing the wondrous variety of shapes taken by this species of life, first doubted to have been a living 'animal'. All this is fascinating and a lot more interesting than concepts. I've also reflected on the brief distinguishing characterizations you provide of the first three 'constructs' you identify and think it would be good to add more descriptive information concerning those three. I haven't read the supporting paper yet and suggest that if you don't already do so there you should provide a definition of the way in which you use the term 'representation' throughout the chart. I also noted that in the characterizations you provide for the animals of the Cambrian period you refer to them as 'mental constructs'. That kind of thing needs some explication and justification imo. I for one can't think of dogs, especially Springer Spaniels, as 'mental constructs'.

 

[Pharoah]

Could be. Why don't you send Panksepp a copy of your chart and paper and see what he has to say?



I like your chart very much. I was a little surprised to see a Springer Spaniel cropping up in the Cambrian, but he provides local color and is a strong attractor. I went off to wikipedia's evolution of life timeline to see what the two unidentifiables were in the Eoarchean and I'm guessing the bright green rectangular representation in the lower right is a graptolite of the type whose fossil remains appear in the first photo here:
Graptolithinia - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
There's a drawing farther down that wiki page showing the wondrous variety of shapes taken by this species of life, first doubted to have been a living 'animal'. All this is fascinating and a lot more interesting than concepts. I've also reflected on the brief distinguishing characterizations you provide of the first three 'constructs' you identify and think it would be good to add more descriptive information concerning those three. I haven't read the supporting paper yet and suggest that if you don't already do so there you should provide a definition of the way in which you use the term 'representation' throughout the chart. I also noted that in the characterizations you provide for the animals of the Cambrian period you refer to them as 'mental constructs'. That kind of thing needs some explication and justification imo. I for one can't think of dogs, especially Springer Spaniels, as 'mental constructs'.

Constance, that is really helpful feedback so thanks.
I will add a section in the blog post specifically about representation, intentionality and info to try to clarify. These terms are very tricky to define.
Will redo 'animals = mental constructs' issue as best I can in the space available.
My son designed the infog... hence the springer spaniel.

 

[Constance]

Constance, that is really helpful feedback so thanks.
I will add a section in the blog post specifically about representation, intentionality and info to try to clarify. These terms are very tricky to define.
Will redo 'animals = mental constructs' issue as best I can in the space available.
My son designed the infog... hence the springer spaniel.

Glad to be helpful. Your son is very talented; he deserves to have a Springer Spaniel.

 

[Constance]

No one has commented yet on Edgar Mitchell's 'dyadic model' of consciousness, and it's understandable since I presented too much information in the massive quotation I posted a few posts up. I also did not have time to even out the margins, leaving the distractions of partial lines and inconsistent spaces throughout and thus making the text more difficult to read. I think Mitchell addresses many of the problems we've come up against in this thread with considerable insight, so I want to provide shorter extracts from the text I quoted above [with added paragraph breaks and foregrounding of key issues] to enable us to grok what he is saying. (But I do recommend reading the whole of that paper, which is much longer than the large chunk I quoted.) So to begin:

"In the dyadic model perception and intentionality are dyadically coupled, that is to say they occur together. If one can discover the intentional behaviors in nature, then awareness will be present also.

The rationale behind this coupling is:

a) we experience both perception and intentionality at
our level of organization,

b) complexity theory points out the repeating patterns in nature
at different scale sizes and at different levels of molecular complexity,

c) awareness without an ability to respond, and intentionality without feedback of the results, would both be useless attributes,

d) awareness and intentionality create a learning feedback loop
which we do observe in nature.

Thus it is both reasonably and experimentally verifiable that perception and intentionality are coupled. One can observe with present day instrumentation behaviors in simple forms of nature that are neither random nor deterministic. Such behaviors are of necessity intentional, such as the search for food, mating opportunities, predator avoidance, etc. These behaviors are indicative of a volitional presence, and thereby are internal subjective experience.

It is necessary to be very specific about the meaning of .awareness. as proposed by the dyadic model. Homo sapiens experiences self-reflective awareness, meaning the ability to reflect upon the information content of our thoughts. The primates are perhaps on the edge of experiencing self reflection but certainly have a full measure of self-awareness.

By self awareness I mean the ability to distinguish self from other, to experience an I/thou dualism. It is likely that self-awareness can be found in many, if not most, animals having multiple sensors and a brain.

Below self-awareness is undifferentiated awareness which means the ability to perceive information and to react to that information but [without?] concept. If the development of an individual traces the evolution of a species, then we may say that any fetus certainly has undifferentiated awareness. Self-awareness does not develop in the human child until several months after birth. How far down the evolutionary chain one can detect undifferentiated awareness is a valid area for research. The dyadic model suggests that undifferentiated awareness, or simple perception, is a more fundamental attribute of matter than life itself, and that the crucial point is the distinction between reception and perception of information. If nonrandom, nondeterministic behavior can be observed within the degrees of freedom permitted matter by the conservation rules, perception can be inferred at that level of organization.[/quote]

The three key insights I read in the above paragraphs are expressed in these sentences:

"One can observe with present day instrumentation behaviors in simple forms of nature that are neither random nor deterministic. Such behaviors are of necessity intentional . . . . These behaviors are indicative of a volitional presence, and thereby are internal subjective experience."

"The dyadic model suggests that undifferentiated awareness, or simple perception, is a more fundamental attribute of matter than life itself, and [that] the crucial point is the distinction between reception and perception of information."


It has long seemed me that understanding what 'information' is requires understanding of qm and quantum field theory, about neither of which is there majority support for different interpretations. About six years ago I read a fascinating paper by the quantum gravity theorist Carlo Rovelli that broached questions about the nature of information exchange between and among physical fields. The philosopher of science Bas van Fraassen has taken up these questions in a paper entitled "Rovelli's World" which I think can help us to understand what the exchange of information among physical systems is, or might be -- or might represent. Here are a few extracts from von Fraassen's paper and then the link:

"Noting the emphasis Rovelli puts on information, it is also important to place Rovelli’s approach with respect to the information-theory approach. This is a very lively new development. While there were beginnings and precedents, this has recently taken a quite radical turn, and Rovelli’s work can be seen as involved in that turn. Let’s look at the beginnings first and then at the radical agenda in such recent work as that of Christopher Fuchs, Jeffrey Bub and their collaborators."


"Wheeler is here contrasting Everett’s conception with the older ‘external observation’ conception, that he describes as follows:

'''The "external observation" formulation of quantum mechanics has the great merit that it is dualistic. It associates a state function with the system under study —as for example a particle — but not with the ultimate observing equipment. The system under study can be enlarged to include the original object as a subsystem and also a piece of observing equipment — such as a Geiger counter — as another subsystem. At the same time the number of variables in the state function has to be enlarged accordingly. However, the ultimate observing equipment still lies outside the system that is treated by a wave equation. (1957, ibid.)'

Rovelli clearly places himself in the older ‘external observation’ formulation, opposite to the new one that Wheeler lauds. But there is one very important difference that places Rovelli somewhat nearer Everett’s. Rovelli takes seriously the idea that any and every system can play the role of ‘ultimate observing equipment’:

'By using the word “observer” I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in any other manner special, system. I use the word “observer” in the sense in which it is conventionally used in Galilean relativity when we say that an object has a velocity “with respect to a certain observer”. The observer can be any physical object having a definite state of motion. For instance, I say that my hand moves at a velocity v with respect to the lamp on my table. Velocity is a relational notion (in Galilean as well as in special relativistic physics), and thus it is always (explicitly or implicitly) referred to something; it is traditional to denote
this something as the observer, but it is important in the following discussion to keep in mind that the observer can be a table lamp. (end sect. I).'"


"Rovelli, who can give these examples, is telling us only something about the general form that these observers’ descriptions (their information) can take, given that certain measurement interactions have taken place. The resolution of this sensed tension is this: Rovelli does not give any specific such description of the world -- he describes the form that any description which assigns states must take. Rovelli describes not the world, but the general form of information that one system can have about another – namely as the assignment of states relative to a given system on the basis of information available to that system:

 there is no implication of possible specific information about what there is which is independent of any point of view, but

 there can be knowledge of the form that any such information, relative to a particular vantage point, must take.

So we have here a transcendental point of view. Rovelli offers us this knowledge of the general form, the conditions of possibility. We must take very seriously the fact that as he sees it, quantum mechanics is not a theory about physical states, but about (‘about’?) information. The principles he sees at the basis of quantum mechanics are principles constraining the general form that such information can take, not to be assimilated to
classical evolution-of-physical-state laws."


". . . states are just generalized probability functions – more accurately, expectation value functions -- defined on this algebra of observables. So far that is similar to the approach in more “realistically” understood foundational treatments. The difference comes in what is added now so as to single out quantum theories. What is added is constraints on information transfer, with the states thought of as information depositories. From the premise that those constraints are satisfied, the basic principles of quantum theory are deduced. As reflection on this result, Bub then argued in his “Why the Quantum?” that 'A quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of non-classical waves or particles.(2004, p. 42)'"

Rovelli's World by von Fraassen at
https://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/Rovelli_sWorld-FIN.pdf

 

[Constance]

Another extract from Mitchell:

“The point being argued here is that the internal feeling sense and the intuitive function is a basic mechanism in nature’s scheme of information management, that is to say –“knowing”. It evolved long before the left hemispheres and frontal lobes that seem to be responsible for language, reasoning and other high level mental functions upon which humankind has placed emphasis in the historic period. Thus examination of the more primitive brain functions in the human organism is most likely to yield clues as to the historic role of consciousness and mentality in the evolving pre-anthropic world."


Quoting @Pharoah in his paper "Intentionality and non-mental representation – An analysis of Ten Problems of Consciousness"

"William Lycan‘s (2008) introductory statement on intentionality for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins as follows:

• 
  Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, properties and states of affairs” Representational Theories of Consciousness, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

It is generally the assumption that the defining attribution of intentionality is its relation to mental phenomena.

Michael Tye’s position on intentionality is consistent with this assumption. In ‘Ten Problems of Consciousness – A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind’, he states,

• 
  The position I defend is an intentionalist one: phenomenally conscious states are essentially representational states of a certain sort. p.66

But Tye qualifies his stance as ‘unorthodox’, distinguishing it from that of Colin McGinn (1982 – The Character of Mind), John Searle (1983 – Intentionality), and Ned Block (1995 – On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness)

• 
  All states that are phenomenally conscious – all feelings and experiences – have intentional content. p.93

• 
  The overall conclusion I draw is that feeling and experiences generally have intentional content. Philosophical orthodoxy on this topic is just plain wrong. p.131

So with Michael Tye, I am in good company in holding the view that philosophical orthodoxy is wrong on intentionality, but I intend to show through brief and compelling analysis that Michael Tye’s stance is not nearly radical enough. The view that intentionality is exclusive to mental phenomena (c.f. Brentano, 1874/1973 – Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint) creates an interpretative chasm between the mental and everything else. And so it has been orthodoxy to assume without critical reflection, that representation must relate exclusively to us – via ‘mind’, by whatever interpretative means proponents elect to define it – in opposition or in contrast, to our material origins. In contrast, my position promotes the thesis that there are transitional emergent steps interspersed with evolutionary stages that link the material to the mental i.e., a series of representational transitions that realise types of expressions of intentionality that, clearly, are not generally recognised as such."

. . . "I believe I have demonstrated, that in contrast to a tree’s physiology to which I have just briefly alluded, a conceptual-type representation is entirely observer-dependent. Inevitably, the unavoidable question arises; what gives an innately acquired physiology its observer-independent intentionality to represent anything?

The fact is, one can apply conceptual correlative interpretations to any observed or imagined scenario. To speak of these concepts however, as representing something observed or imagined is ignoring the possibility that those observations or imaginings may have representation in and of themselves through the mechanisms of their own non-conceptual construct-type."

. . . "
What conclusion does Michael Tye draw concerning the nature of representation?

• 
  How should we think of natural representations of this sort? Well, different numbers of rings are correlated with different ages…. What really matters, it appears, is correlation, or more accurately, causal covariation, under optimal conditions. p.100 – p.101

• 
  The key idea, then, is that representation is a matter of causal covariation or correlation… under optimal conditions. p.101

In speaking exclusively of conceptual interpretative representation, Michael Tye is ignoring the intrinsic representation of the object under observation. He is ignoring the ‘nature’ in “natural representations”.

Critically the point is lost in passing; that some non-mental constructs are representational in and of themselves.

When it comes to intentionality, there is every reason to question the rationale of philosophical orthodoxy. Thus, we can redraft Michael Lycan’s opening Stanford Encyclopedia entry “Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, properties and states of affairs”, by removing the word “mind” and replacing it with a concise alternative that does not require interpretative boundaries to be drawn: ‘Intentionality is the power for the intrinsic properties of all construct-types to be about, to represent, or to stand for, states of affairs.’ Apart from its intuitive coherence, this redrafted version has the benefit over the old, of denying the need for an explanatory leap between non-mental and emergent (or magical) mental phenomena. Instead, what it requires, is a need for an overarching explanation of the relationship – the evolving relationship – between different types or levels of representational constructs.

To conclude part 1, there are different types of representation. Alternatively, one might say there are different types of form that demonstrate different types of self-purpose, or intrinsic purpose, through the nature of their construct i.e., perhaps, intentionality has deeper roots than first assumed.

Earlier, I said that I would reveal other issues with Michael Tye’s stance on representation and intentionality: . . . [continues to "Part 2 – The dangers of extrapolating from conceptual-type representation"].

Intentionality & Non-Mental Representation | Tye | Philosophy of Consciousness

 

[Pharoah]

No one has commented yet on Edgar Mitchell's 'dyadic model' of consciousness, and it's understandable since I presented too much information in the massive quotation I posted a few posts up. I also did not have time to even out the margins, leaving the distractions of partial lines and inconsistent spaces throughout and thus making the text more difficult to read. I think Mitchell addresses many of the problems we've come up against in this thread with considerable insight, so I want to provide shorter extracts from the text I quoted above [with added paragraph breaks and foregrounding of key issues] to enable us to grok what he is saying. (But I do recommend reading the whole of that paper, which is much longer than the large chunk I quoted.) So to begin:

"In the dyadic model perception and intentionality are dyadically coupled, that is to say they occur together. If one can discover the intentional behaviors in nature, then awareness will be present also.

The rationale behind this coupling is:

a) we experience both perception and intentionality at
our level of organization,

b) complexity theory points out the repeating patterns in nature
at different scale sizes and at different levels of molecular complexity,

c) awareness without an ability to respond, and intentionality without feedback of the results, would both be useless attributes,

d) awareness and intentionality create a learning feedback loop
which we do observe in nature.

Thus it is both reasonably and experimentally verifiable that perception and intentionality are coupled. One can observe with present day instrumentation behaviors in simple forms of nature that are neither random nor deterministic. Such behaviors are of necessity intentional, such as the search for food, mating opportunities, predator avoidance, etc. These behaviors are indicative of a volitional presence, and thereby are internal subjective experience.

It is necessary to be very specific about the meaning of .awareness. as proposed by the dyadic model. Homo sapiens experiences self-reflective awareness, meaning the ability to reflect upon the information content of our thoughts. The primates are perhaps on the edge of experiencing self reflection but certainly have a full measure of self-awareness.

By self awareness I mean the ability to distinguish self from other, to experience an I/thou dualism. It is likely that self-awareness can be found in many, if not most, animals having multiple sensors and a brain.

Below self-awareness is undifferentiated awareness which means the ability to perceive information and to react to that information but [without?] concept. If the development of an individual traces the evolution of a species, then we may say that any fetus certainly has undifferentiated awareness. Self-awareness does not develop in the human child until several months after birth. How far down the evolutionary chain one can detect undifferentiated awareness is a valid area for research. The dyadic model suggests that undifferentiated awareness, or simple perception, is a more fundamental attribute of matter than life itself, and that the crucial point is the distinction between reception and perception of information. If nonrandom, nondeterministic behavior can be observed within the degrees of freedom permitted matter by the conservation rules, perception can be inferred at that level of organization.

This is an exciting development for me.
In the 90s I spent a good deal of effort trying to relate QM to HCT but found my intellect not remotely up to the task. So I will read up on the work of these individuals. I think these ideas are consistent with HCT.

 

[Pharoah]

on "relational quantum dynamics" Sep says:

The central tenet of relational quantum mechanics is that there is no meaning in saying that a certain quantum event has happened or that a variable of the system S has taken the value q: rather, there is meaning in saying that the event q has happened or the variable has taken the value q for O, or with respect to O. The apparent contradiction between the two statements that a variable has or hasn't a value is resolved by indexing the statements with the different systems with which the system in question interacts. If I observe an electron at a certain position, I cannot conclude that the electron is there: I can only conclude that the electron as seen by me is there. Quantum events only happen in interactions between systems, and the fact that a quantum event has happened is only true with respect to the systems involved in the interaction. The unique account of the state of the world of the classical theory is thus fractured into a multiplicity of accounts, one for each possible “observing” physical system. In the words of Rovelli (1996): “Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical systems relative to other systems, and this is a complete description of the world”.

This is exactly what HCT says. This is how one state becomes informed by interaction with another.

 

[Pharoah]

This from the same entry in section 6. in sep v important:

More radically, Rovelli and Smerlak (2006) argue that these correlations do not entail any form of “non-locality”, when viewed in the context of this interpretation, essentially because there is a quantum event relative to an observer that happens at a spacelike separation from this observer. The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics, completeness and locality.

 

[smcder]

Can you expand on this a little bit (or a lot). What you perceive as trickiness is quite possibly just ignorance.

Here's my thinking regarding labels such as physical, spiritual, mental, etc. Could they be a case of the blind mice and the elephant; we feel the trunk and think reality is one thing, the tail and reality another thing, the ears another thing, etc.

In my (perhaps simplistic) way of thinking, reality (what-is) is one kind of thing. Perhaps reality can and should be differentiated into physical, spiritual, and mental stuff. However, since all this stuff apparently interacts and composes one thing (reality) then ultimately, it can be said to be one stuff.

Now, can what we call physical stuff account for what we know of reality? Can, for instance, free will exist in a physical paradigm? (I think, but I'm not certain (see above) that the problem is that physical reality is considered to be deterministic.)

So two questions:

1) Do we know, for certain, that humans have free will?
2) Do we know, for certain, that physical reality is deterministic?

I think the answer to both questions is no, we don't know. So, besides the labeling issue — physical vs spiritual vs mental — there is the fact that we can't answer these philosophical questions because we simply don't know enough about reality. (Will we ever?)

Again, it's very, very likely that there is some fundamental, philosophical problem that I am completely ignorant of. Feel free to spell it out for me if you care to, haha. I might need the "for dummies" version though.

There actually are a number of "For Dummies" titles in philosophy ... not sure about Heidegger, because of course, Heidegger ain't for Dummies!

There is another series "A Very Short Introduction to - " that has a huge number of titles ... I'll try to find a link.

 

[smcder]

Very Short Introductions
-

General Series
-

Series
-

Academic, Professional, & General


- Oxford University Press

 

[smcder]

A little lighter, but challenging on free will.

Raymond Merrill Smullyan (born May 25, 1919)[1] is an American mathematician, concert pianist,logician,Taoist philosopher, and magician.

Is God a Taoist?

"Smullyan has written several books about Taoist philosophy, which he believes neatly solves most or all traditional philosophical problems as well as integrating mathematics, logic, andphilosophy into a cohesive whole."

 

[Constance]

This from the same entry in section 6. in sep v important:

More radically, Rovelli and Smerlak (2006) argue that these correlations do not entail any form of “non-locality”, when viewed in the context of this interpretation, essentially because there is a quantum event relative to an observer that happens at a spacelike separation from this observer. The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics, completeness and locality.

Others disagree, of course. Here's one critique of RQM I came across (am still trying to track down the website):

"Rovelli’s relational EPR.

Reply to GeorgeWeis@aol.com

Dear George,

Many thanks for sending Rovelli’s paper “Relational EPR”.

You ask me for comments upon it.

My overall impression is that it is moving in the opposite of the right
direction. It is kind of a continuation of the “search for certainty”
enterprise initiated by Descartes, in that makes it into an effort to say the
least one can confidentially assert rather than the most that one can usefully propose, as a way of understanding the scientifically accepted data.

By proposing a rationally coherent model/theory with more specific detail one achieves a more specific conception of nature and of our place within it.

The issue of non-locality is an example.

The detailed information that confirms the predictions of QM in the EPR
type experiments (involving two-spacelike-separated-regions-R&L) is available only in the later region C where the two experimenters get together and compare notes. The proof of nonlocality given on the penultimate (textual) page of Mindful Universe shows that if the relationships entailed by QM between the outcomes experienced in R under different choices made in R by the experimenter in R are independent of the choices made in L by the experimenter in L about which of the two alternative experiments he will perform in L, then the outcomes of experiments performed in L, as reported in C, cannot be independent of which experiment was chosen in R. That is, the outcomes in R and L, reported in C, cannot both conform to the predictions of QM and be independent of the choices made by the experimenters in the other region. Because the facts/realities in C are facts about reports of events occurring in R and L, they are physical realities within RQM. But one cannot require, without logical contradiction, both, (1), the validity of the predictions of QM and also, (2), the reported outcomes in R and in L to be independent of the choices made by the experimenters in the space-like-separated regions L and R, respectively.

This breakdown of the notion of “locality” is an interesting property that is logically entailed by the predictions of QM about reports reaching C. Insofar as Rovelli’s relational approach obscures this feature of QM, that approach is, in my opinion, deficient because it hides a potentially important connectivity (wholeness) feature of nature. Ultimately we want to know what the scientifically secure data entails about us and our place in nature.

It is not clear that Rovelli’s RQM does in fact allow one completely to evade the inference of the existence of the wholeness feature of QM. One must, of course, in considering the predictions of QM in EPR type experiments, go to the region C where all the relevant fact are available, and consider the reports that occur jointly there pertaining to observations reportedly occurring in R and L. But then the theoretical assumptions that the reported outcomes in R and L both (1) conform to the predictions of QM and (2) are independent of the choices made by the faraway experimenter, turn out to be logically compatible!

The description of “relational quantum mechanics” (RQM) given in terms of a failure of “Einstein Realism”, which is that:

“there exists a physical reality independent of substantiation and perception.”

In footnote 1 Rovelli notes that this statement does not do justice to
Einstein’s position.

Rovelli begins to define RQM by saying that “In RQM physical reality is taken to be formed by individual quantum events (facts2)…”
where footnote 2 recites Wittgenstein’s dictum “The world is the totality
of facts, not of things”.

But his characterization of what is “real” applies to all “orthodox” versions of quantum mechanics: all orthodox versions of QM feature reduction/collapse events which specify the actual facts. In all orthodox versions of QM the facts/realities are NOT “independent of substantiation and perception.”

So the issue, regarding RQM, as far as I am concerned, is not with “Einstein Realism”. It is with how the term “real” is best used within an interpretation of quantum theory that accepts the idea that reality is somehow created out of acts of “substantiation and perception”. Orthodox (von Neumann-Heisenberg) QM (insofar as it attempts to provide an ontology) accepts the idea that the “actual” comes into being in association with events that have both physically and psychologically described aspects. The issue raised by RQM is to what extent is it useful to regard these actualizations as transpersonal, rather than merely personal. To what extent is it beneficial to reject altogether the idea of a transpersonal “truth/reality/actuality”, and reduce truth to a something that is relative to the observer.

Given that we accept orthodox quantum mechanics we reject this “Einstein Realism”. Einstein Realism is not the issue. The issue is whether it is beneficial to subscribe to the RQM view that “the reality of the property of any given system S is only relative to a physical system A that interacts with S and is affected by these properties”. In terms of the density matrix formulation the issue is whether one should say that the “reality” of a system S is specified only relative to some observing system A, and hence by a density matrix Rho(S|A) instead of by von Neumann’s Rho(S)=Partial trace of the density matrix of the universe over all variables other than those of S.

The von Neumann definition gives a powerful unity to the whole system that is technically useful. It does entail a nonlocality property: the density matrix undergoes “quantum jumps” RhoàP Rho P , and such a jump, associated with a projection operator P that act locally, say in someone’s brain. But the new state can then be extended over all space-time via the Schroedinger equation. The action of P eliminates the strands of potentialities that are incompatible with P, and this alters the effective past—the past that determines potentialities for the future---and this produces some completely understandable effects in the faraway region. The whole is completely understandably tied together into a whole quantum universe. I see no technical or logical advantage in suppressing the use of this powerful theoretical conception of nature, and of our dynamical role within it. The relational/relative conception of truth certainly has devastating moral implications, which must be accepted if it is truly the implication of the scientifically secure data. But the rejection of transpersonal truth is in no way foisted upon us by a rational analysis of the scientific data.

Rovelli defines “locality” as the principle that two spatially separated objects cannot have instantaneous mutual influence. This is quite obscure, in a world that is the totality of facts, not things! ---in a world consisting of events!

The meaning of “locality” normally used in the analysis of EPR-Bohm-Bell-Hardy type experiments is the non-dependence of outcomes (of events) in one space-time region upon choices of experiments performed in a space-time region that is space-like separated from the first.

This idea of locality is central not only to the Bell-type theorems but to the
EPR arguments itself. It is the basis of the EPR argument at its final crucial step: “This makes the reality of P and Q depend upon the process of measurement carried out on the first system, which does not disturb the second in any way.”

The Rovelli analysis does not, it seems to me, really get to the core of the nonlocality issue, which is the failure in QM of the notion that the free choice made by the experimenter in one region should not affect the outcome that appears in the other region, which is spacelike separated from the first.

Rovelli does emphasize the fact that one must go to the region C in order to have in hand the facts that that the pertinent predictions of QM refer to. But it seems to me that once the two observers have met and compared notes, both have the reports about what choices were made and what outcome appeared (earlier) in the space-like separated regions R and L. They can confirm that the relevant predictions of QM are satisfied, and can carry out logical analyses and determine that logical contradictions occur if one assumes that the choices made in the two regions can be treated as locally inputted free variables, and that the registered and reported outcomes in each region are independent of the faraway free choice. It does not appear to me that orthodox (von Neumann) quantum mechanics “requires the existence of a hypothetical super-being that can simultaneously measure the state of A and B.” (Rovelli, p. 4 of ArXive copy) On the other hand, it is true that one can form a rationally coherent conception of an evolving universe with well defined transpersonal facts at each stage of the evolutionary process.

Any claimed virtue of RQM, such as the dissolving of the need for effective faster-than-light transfer of information---which, however, can be rationally achieve via reductions that change potentialities globally in the orthodox way---is, I believe, overshadowed by the difficulty of explaining---strictly within an RQM framework that allows no FTL transfer of the information inputted by the “localized free choices” by experimenters in R and L---the apparent logical contradictions found by rational quantum physicists located in region C. I regard that difficulty as evidence for the existence of an interpersonal (non-relational, non-relative) truth/reality. Also, I do not see in what I have read about RQM the all-important process-1 choices that logically precede the stochastic process-3 events. How do Rovelli’s “systems” make these choices, which appear to be un-caused by any of the known quantum laws? The notion that these choices are “free” and “localized” is the basis of all EPR-type arguments.

In the RQM formulation the observers must themselves be quantum systems.
Thus they themselves, in making the difficult decision as to whether to do experiment 1 or experiment 2 can be presumed to be, before choosing, in a quantum mixture of states corresponding to the two possibilities. The core problem in quantum theory is the relationship between mind and matter, and this naturally goes over to the issue of the connection between the contents of our streams of conscious experiences and the processes going on in our brains. This is where the issue of the origin of the process-1-related conscious choice comes to a head. What chooses which of the process-1 physical probing actions will occur, when the observing system is in a mixed state? This is the core question in the interpretation of QM, but RQM seems not to address it. If RQM accepts the usual quantum idea that this is a localized free choice, then the rational quantum physicists situated in region C are faced with a logical quandary that seems irresolvable within a restricted RQM ontology that forbids faster-than-light and backward-in-time transfers of the information inputted in R and L by the experimenters’ free choices.

Within the more orthodox quantum ontology that permits interpersonal
(objective) truth/reality, one can consider the stage of the objective process where the regions associated with the events that have already (in process time) filled up the portion of space-time up to the space-like surface σ.

The process-1 events [ρàPρP + P’ρP’] leave all “Traces” unaltered.

Consequently, the process-1 events can occur simultaneously at an infinite collection of disjoint parts of σ: there is no interference between them. Then the process-3 reduction can occur simultaneously (in process time) at all of these locations, or at any subset of them, in accordance with the statistical constraints of QM. In this “objective” model the “present” is a space-like surface, rather than a constant time surface, as it is in the non-relativistic version. But truth/reality can be objective without any violation of the empirical conditions demanded by the theory of relativity."

 

[Constance]

Here is a summation of other objections:

Absent Relations: A Critical Look at Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics | wiplash

 

[Pharoah]

I haven't yet read your last entry Constance and will do presently, but I was eager to forward the following link to you et al:
http://www.mdpi.com/2076-3425/2/2/147/pdf
Panksepp emailed me the link. It has got me excited for one simple reason - It is so similar to my views; to the extent that I feel as I might have written some of it. The difference however, is that all the ideas come from empirical research. Panksepp tells me he has been searching for 40 years for the theoretical framework, so we might have some usefull insights to pass on to one another.