S
smcder
Guest
I'm not certain I completely understand the arguments being presented above, but they seem to be suggesting that phenomenal experience (consciousness) is a fundamental aspect of reality, occurring with even the most basic organisms (and indeed, perhaps with even non-organisms...), and it is essentially representational (at least the Mitchell essay argues that).
I agree with all of this. And I would be curious to hear Chalmer's take on this. I've never liked his Hard Problem as I think it creates a false duality between information and qualia. That is, I think (integrated) information and qualia are one and the same, and to cast them as distinct - as Chalmer's does with the HP - is an error.
I think phenomenal consciousness does arise (or as I say, is generated) from what we might think of as very basic information processing systems. I would say that any physical "system" - like the example of tree rings given above - that can be said to create and/or store information that is "representative" of physical reality, can be said to generate phenomenal consciousness (although such phenomenal consciousness would be incredibly non-rich).
Chalmers has argued for the HP via his conceivability argument re zombies. That we can conceive of a zombie that was physically isomorphic to humans in every way, but that did not experience phenomenal consciousness. I have always rejected this argument. In my view, information = phenomenal consciousness. Thus, if a system, such as a zombie, were to create integrated information, it would, by my definition, be creating phenomenal consciousness.
In other words, it's false to say the zombie could create integrated information but not phenomenal consciousness.
A bad analogy might be to argue that it's conceivable that one could create water but not a liquid. In other words, what the conceivability arguments deals with is semantics and concepts, both of which may not be isomorphic with reality.
Below are two non-philosophical papers that I feel indirectly address these issues:
The above paper is a little unclear, but the ability to chemically process sugars does not seem genetically related to being able to taste sugars. So, via Chalmer's argument, Hummingbirds could still seek out sugar and benefit nutritionally from sugars, but not phenomenally experience them...
However, what this paper seems to suggest is that the genetic ability to "detect" sugars is synonymous with being able to "taste" sugars. This would suggest that if zombie hummingbird could detect sugar, it would also be able to taste sugar. If a zombie hummingbird couldn't detect/taste sugar, well then it wouldn't be a hummingbird.
Again, smell and touch are regarded as measurements (information) of physical reality external to the organism (information processing system). If a "zombie" system were capable of measuring the chemical composition of the air and skin pressure, then they would be phenomenally experiencing. The "processing" and/or "creation" of representational information structures is the generating of phenomenal experience.
I don't see where Chalmers makes a false duality in his theories ... but maybe ... the problem itself does not, it's simply:
"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colours and tastes." - as conceived by Nagel in What It's Like to Be a Bat it was a problem presented to physicalism - and largely rhetorical - he essentially says you can't objectively explain subjectivity.
To solve the hard problem then, your theory needs to answer the how and why questions above.