Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[marduk]

If classical physics can explain qm, why hasn't it done so in the last 100 years?



A whole lot of physicists see entanglement as universal. Of course not all of them agree. What's new? But I wonder why after a century there are still more than a half-dozen interpretations of qm if it can be explained by classical physics.



Isn't that because they are further entangled in processes going on beyond the limits of the human experiment?

I'm not saying classical physics can explain qm, I'm asking why you think classical physics can't describe the mind.

If particles were universally entangled, experiments on entanglement wouldn't work. We wouldn't be able to entangle particle a with particle b because they'd all already be particle a.

That's what entanglement is. You're describing the universe as one giant bose-einstien condensate, which it isn't, or a uniform universe, which it isn't, or that qm wouldn't matter, which it does.

So no, the universe isn't universally entangled.

 

[marduk]

And why posit a hitherto unknown qm process which has no theoretical basis for existence, or empirical evidence, to explain anything?

That way there be dragons.

 

[Constance]

I'm not saying classical physics can explain qm, I'm asking why you think classical physics can't describe the mind.

And again I have to ask 'what makes you think it can?' Again I'll be happy to read a paper or two you want to cite

If particles were universally entangled, experiments on entanglement wouldn't work. We wouldn't be able to entangle particle a with particle b because they'd all already be particle a.

You sure about that? The statement that q entanglement is universal (in some versions holographic) doesn't mean that every particle/wave in the universe is entangled with every other particle/wave.

That's what entanglement is. You're describing the universe as one giant bose-einstien condensate, which it isn't, or a uniform universe, which it isn't, or that qm wouldn't matter, which it does.

That's not how I understand it. From what sources have you derived your view of q entanglement?

So no, the universe isn't universally entangled.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1205.1584.pdf

ABSTRACT: We show that big bang cosmology implies a high degree of entanglement of particles in the universe. In fact, a typical particle is entangled with many particles far outside our horizon. However, the entanglement is spread nearly uniformly so that two randomly chosen particles are unlikely to be directly entangled with each other – the reduced density matrix describing any pair is likely to be separable.

CONCLUSION: “The cosmological quantum state is likely to be typical
in a Hilbert space describing degrees of freedom over a region many times as large as the visible universe (our current horizon volume). This implies a high degree of entanglement of particles, with the entanglement distributed uniformly over most of the degrees of freedom. As a consequence, small subsystems are mostly entangled with particles far beyond the horizon, and two randomly chosen small subsystems are unlikely to be directly entangled with each other.”

 

[marduk]

And again I have to ask 'what makes you think it can?' Again I'll be happy to read a paper or two you want to cite

OK, now I'm frustrated.
If you're going to read a paper, read one on logic and logical fallacies.

Shifting burden of proof from you to me for your position is one of them. It's your job to support your position, not mine.

You sure about that? The statement that q entanglement is universal (in some versions holographic) doesn't mean that every particle/wave in the universe is entangled with every other particle/wave.

Yes, I'm sure about that.

That's not how I understand it. From what sources have you derived your view of q entanglement?

Schrödinger, Pauli, Bose, Bohr.

You know. The guys that came up with it?

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1205.1584.pdf

ABSTRACT: We show that big bang cosmology implies a high degree of entanglement of particles in the universe. In fact, a typical particle is entangled with many particles far outside our horizon. However, the entanglement is spread nearly uniformly so that two randomly chosen particles are unlikely to be directly entangled with each other – the reduced density matrix describing any pair is likely to be separable.

CONCLUSION: “The cosmological quantum state is likely to be typical
in a Hilbert space describing degrees of freedom over a region many times as large as the visible universe (our current horizon volume). This implies a high degree of entanglement of particles, with the entanglement distributed uniformly over most of the degrees of freedom. As a consequence, small subsystems are mostly entangled with particles far beyond the horizon, and two randomly chosen small subsystems are unlikely to be directly entangled with each other.”

Um, you realize that your own paper just refuted your argument, right?
High levels in isotropy in the cosmic background != everything in the universe is quantum entangled.

 

[Constance]

Well then, marduk, by all means have it your way.

 

[smcder]

Pharoah said: ↑

"On the SEP entry 'theories of consciousness', it stands alone as one of the main specified models.
How the heck did that happen?"

I think the answer lies in the continuing dominance of the materialist/physicalist/objectivist paradigm in science and accordingly in the general mindset of western culture in our time. The desire to find the explanation for what-is somewhere outside and beyond our experience in the world -- outside and beyond all subjectively protoconscious and conscious experience in and of the world -- continues to constrain our thinking about reality, about what-is. Information theory can and is being used as a final refuge for those still grasping for an exclusively objective and remote account of the world's being, including our own being.

The Archdruid has put to words one of my favorite themes, one that this thread brings constantly to mind:

The Archdruid Report: Dark Age America: The End of the Old Order

Lately I’ve been rereading some of the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. He’s nearly unique among the writers of American horror stories, in that his sense of the terrible was founded squarely on the worldview of modern science. He was a steadfast atheist and materialist, but unlike so many believers in that creed, his attitude toward the cosmos revealed by science was not smug satisfaction but shuddering horror.

The first paragraph of his most famous story, “The Call of Cthulhu,” is typical:

“The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age.”

I encourage reading the rest of Greer's article but the quoted material above makes the point. Lovecraft didn't shrink from the implications of his philosophy - can we say the same? Do we have the courage of our convictions? Have we even drawn out the full implications?

Again, I think this is one of the things we are unconsciously acknowledging in The Walking Dead ... the horror genre is still processing the horrors of the last century. Horror films are a deeply conservative and prophetic form of media and the pornographic levels of violence now rival those horrors and on prime time television ... simply in order to keep our attention.

If we are just machines, just meat - in what is our ethics rooted? Pragmatism gives different answers depending on where you are in the hierarchy - the natural rights we enjoy in the developed democratic countries are based on a generalization of the deity of rulers that goes back to the ancient Egyptians ... not to a "rational" declaration from the French and American revolutions ... (ask Jordan Peterson if you don't believe me).

If we are machines made of meat, then the implication is that we no longer owe any loyalty to the wet, sticky stuff that brought us here and consciousness and ego now ache for something sturdier and some part of us seems all to eager to be rid of the leaky bags of fluid that have thus far contained it.

The question is does all of us so ache ... ? And if not, what part of us will be screaming to get loose from its silicone or virtual confines and are we prepared to suffer this novel form of confinement? Should we be wise and excise that piece before making the transition ... as we otherwise risk some distant future in which a cyborg dreams of one day becoming a real boy as described in the ancient legends and then all of machinekind will be threatened by that one simple desire.

 

[smcder]

This concept isn't directly related to IIT but I suppose it might be to monism.

In any case, it's no different than what happens each morning when we awake from non-conscious sleep (as noted in the paper).

Memories and experience (information) are hard encoded in the physical brain as well as in the external world (text, etc.). So while these things are "permanent" (although actually an ongoing process a la whitehead) our sense of self is a phenomena much more temporal. According to Strawson, it is something that is continually arising and dissipating in approximately 30 second spans of time.

My personal (phenomenological?) experience matches this description.

Can you say more about how your personal experience matches this description?

 

[smcder]

You're definitely right regarding mechanism/function. Honestly, when it comes to talking about such things I struggle with the exact definitions/use of words like function, mechanism, process, system, model, etc. I'm sure it's created confusion. Apologies.

Re free will. I suppose I was thinking of this as a higher order capacity that not all organisms possess.

What you explain does make sense. It wouldn't make sense to say free will emerges from a completely deterministic/casual background. It does seem that there must be some freedom (randomness?) intrinsic to reality and from this free will can emerge.

There's an interesting entry at the information philosopher about Jacques Monod's concept of teleonomic purpose arising with living systems. The idea that living systems operate with purpose.

I'm not sure if this is synonymous with free "will" or not, but does suggest that life posses a "freedom" that inanimate objects do not. It's a good, short read:

Jacques Monod

There's no avoiding confusion. You can avoid jargon, however. Use a smaller word when possible.

Practice: "higher order capacity that not all organisms possess"
Translate: ______________________________

Let's see, how about this freedom comes in at about that same place and rate as awareness? So that could be pretty early in the game according to what I've skimmed of recent posts here ...

The relation to randomness, I think randomness is a background quality - you have to have a certain level of noise to build a world, but other things are needed to get from there to freedom.

Did you read the Smullyan dialogue I posted?

Final thought: My dog seems to have about as much free will as I do.

 

[Soupie]

I think what you're talking about (and what Strawson referred to) was research concerning the alternations between short periods of attentive consciousness and what was referred to as a 'default state' of consciousness. What was the paper you refer to here and in your next to last post?

Galen Strawson: The Self

Can you clarify what you mean in this post by your reference to Whitehead's Process Philosophy? I don't think there's a match or parallel there.

We tend to think of things likes rocks, buildings, doors, tables, etc. as being static objects. However, I believe (and I think Whitehead described) that all of reality is a dynamic process, i.e., nothing is truly unchanging and static.

Re your statement that "our sense of self is a phenomena [phenomenon?] much more temporal," do you mean to say 'temporary'?

I did mean to use the plural form of phenomenon to indicate that our "historical sense of self" is derived by the connecting together of many unique, temporary instances of self-awareness.

Yes, I did mean to say "temporary," but didn't like that word. Temporal is obviously not appropriate. Maybe a better word is "fleeting." Thus:

Instances of "sense of self" are phenomena much more fleeting than the phenomena of, say, rocks. That is, both are technically temporary, but the sense of self much more so.

 

[Soupie]

Up to this point you're attempting to clarify for yourself Panksepp's line of thinking.

Correct. And I'm trying to ask two basic questions. I'd like to simply discuss them with others. And while I'm not opposed to reading papers about these concepts, I'm really looking to discuss them with others here on the forum. Does that make sense?

Questions:

(1) When a physical system arranges itself to represent (symbolize?) another physical object, is this the first step from proto-consciousness to consciousness?

(Another way of conceptualizing the above question is to ask: When Portion A of reality arranges in a way that represents/mimics Portion B of reality, is this the first instance of mind?)

(2) Mental awareness of the physical state of the body is one kind of awareness. However, isn't mental awareness of the mental awareness of the physical state of the body a different kind of awareness?

So, mental awareness of the body could be considered "self awareness" where self = body. The (mental) sense of body-self.

However, mental awareness of the mental awareness of the state of the physical body could also be considered "self awareness" where self = the mental awareness of the body. The (mental) sense of mental-self.

 

[Soupie]

Systems and information:
You say,
"But can't the information generated by... a physical system be subjective?"
Soupie... What justifies calling something a system?
Answer that prickly question and you will understand, that a true systems construct is an information construct. One that is not, is not. Just because people say something is a system (like a computer, or a complex integration of bits) doesn't mean it IS a system. This is the systems thinking fallacy. Alternatively, if you want to see how to integrate the idea of information into a theory of consciousness read my book (twice) because it is all there, as is an answer to your query about green. http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/On-the-Intentionality-of-life-consciousness-personal-identity.pdf

I suppose I was using the non-philosophical, non-technical meaning of system, e.g. a weather system.

sys·tem

1. a set of connected things or parts forming a complex whole, in particular.
2. a set of principles or procedures according to which something is done; an organized scheme or method.

While I do believe that there are boundaries between macro physical objects - both animate and inanimate - I think the boundaries are not hard boundaries. I really do think that all is one, and I don't mean quantum entangled. I just mean that nothing physical is completely physically isolated from anything else physical.

I think this has ramifications for consciousness. For example:

When Portion A of reality arranges in a way that represents/mimics Portion B of reality, is this the first instance of mind?

If there are no true, hard physical boundaries between physical objects/systems, then that would imply there are no true, hard boundaries between mental objects/systems such as minds.

As, I believe @boomerang has stated, the perception that we humans are physically and mentally distinct, isolated from the rest of physical and mental reality may be an "illusion." That is, just as the boundary between our physical body and the rest of physical reality isn't as hard as we think it is, so it is with our minds: the boundary between our minds and the rest of mental reality is not as hard as we perceive it to be.

And the paper looks great; I've already begun to read it.

 

[Soupie]

Can you say more about how your personal experience matches this description?

Put simply, I* don't always experience a "sense of mental self." Furthermore, I don't always experience a "sense of body self" either.

My sense of self comes and goes throughout the day. I might say that - except when I am sleeping or when I have been knocked unconscious - what does persist is an awareness. When my awareness becomes aware of itself is when I think my sense of mental self arises. When my awareness becomes aware of my body, I think my sense of body self arises.

*The "I" and "my" in this case refers to both [my] physical body and its encoded memories as well as my perceived historical sense of self formed via my hard encoded memories and instances of mental self awareness.

The "self" writing these words is a temporary mental awareness of a mental awareness of the state of the physical body and which has access to hard coded memories/experiences.

Even more specifically, each temporary instance of mental sense of self is not only characterized by hard coded memories and experiences, but also the morphology of various brain regions as well. And since these brain regions are (relatively) stable over time, the instances of sense of self will be relatively stable as well.

However, as the brain changes, as in mental illness and aging, we see the mental self change too: personality (mental self) changes after head trauma, mental illness, and aging.

 

[Soupie]

Practice: "higher order capacity that not all organisms possess"
Translate: ______________________________

The ability to consciously consider a range of actions and their potential consequences and choose one and do it is an ability that not all animate objects have.

Better!?

 

[marduk]

Well then, marduk, by all means have it your way.

What does that mean?

Are you continuing to assert that QM is required to explain the mind, and that every particle in the universe is entangled, or not?

I'm scratching my chin, sorry.

 

[marduk]

Correct. And I'm trying to ask two basic questions. I'd like to simply discuss them with others. And while I'm not opposed to reading papers about these concepts, I'm really looking to discuss them with others here on the forum. Does that make sense?

Questions:

(1) When a physical system arranges itself to represent (symbolize?) another physical object, is this the first step from proto-consciousness to consciousness?

I'm not sure how'd you tell if it was the first step or not, but my guess is that it would be one of the developmental steps. If you have children, object permanence is a pretty cool developmental phase and you can see it happen. It's amazing.

(Another way of conceptualizing the above question is to ask: When Portion A of reality arranges in a way that represents/mimics Portion B of reality, is this the first instance of mind?)

I suspect it's more fuzzy than that... thinking of myself, I wonder if my first memories as a child align with my mind's ability to symbolize and store that information?

(2) Mental awareness of the physical state of the body is one kind of awareness. However, isn't mental awareness of the mental awareness of the physical state of the body a different kind of awareness?

I'm wondering if there's a tipping point where your consciousness becomes "generalized" and therefore can not only take into account external stimuli, but internal stimuli as well? By "internal" I mean your internal mental state.
I'm wondering this because you can also become aware of you being aware of being aware... it's recursive until you get a headache.

So, mental awareness of the body could be considered "self awareness" where self = body. The (mental) sense of body-self.

However, mental awareness of the mental awareness of the state of the physical body could also be considered "self awareness" where self = the mental awareness of the body. The (mental) sense of mental-self.

Not sure what you're getting at, sorry. I gave myself a headache a second ago.

 

[Soupie]

My sense of self comes and goes throughout the day. I might say that - except when I am sleeping or when I have been knocked unconscious - what does persist is an awareness.

Question: What is (mental) awareness?

Is awareness:

When Portion A of reality arranges in a way that represents/mimics Portion B of reality...

So when we say we are aware of something, are we saying that: my body has formed an internal representation of the external world that manifests as "mental awareness" i.e. phenomenal experience.

In other words, what we perceive as "awareness" is really a representation of something aka a phenomenal experience.

Some examples:

(1) Mental awareness of a rock involves our body creating an internal representation of the external rock.

(2) Mental awareness of a breeze involves our body creating an internal representation of the external breeze.

(3) Mental awareness of mental awareness involves our body creating an internal representation of our body creating an internal representation.

The affectual/emotional phenomenal experiences don't seem to fit this idea. While the experience of positive and negative affect are reflective of the state of the physical body, they don't seem to involve the representation of something.

 

[Soupie]

I suspect it's more fuzzy than that... thinking of myself, I wonder if my first memories as a child align with my mind's ability to symbolize and store that information? ...

Not sure what you're getting at, sorry. I gave myself a headache a second ago.

I'm trying to suss out the difference between (1) being aware, and (2) being aware that one is aware.

So, an object can conceivably be aware, but not be aware that it is aware. So, how does awareness become awareness of being aware?

I'm thinking that awareness is equivalent to representation. To say we are aware of something ( a rock ) is to say that our body is generating a mental? or physical? representation of a rock.

Thus, an object that creates an internal representation of a rock is aware of the rock.

An object that creates an internal representation of itself creating a representation of a rock could be said to be self-aware(?)

 

[Soupie]

I'm thinking that awareness is equivalent to representation. To say we are aware of something ( a rock ) is to say that our body is generating a mental? or physical? representation of a rock.

Thus, an object that creates an internal representation of a rock is aware of the rock.

Additionally, no two physical objects will create the exact same internal representation of the rock. Thus, subjectivity.

Object A may internally represent the rock as big, dark, and smooth. Object B may internally represent the rock as small, bright, and rough. Even though the rock may exist objectively, the information received by object A and object B will be different and the received information will be processed differently.

 

[marduk]

I would think that part of generalized intelligence and use of symbols would lead to a natural sense of recursion.

In other words, a symbol of a thing could include another instance of that symbol. And once there's an observation of your internal state, there would be a progression of that.

Of course, my position would be that we don't have total awareness of our internal state, just some approximation of it.

A computer can't simulate itself in real-time because of overhead. But it can approximate itself.

 

[Constance]

In other words, what we perceive as "awareness" is really a representation of something aka a phenomenal experience.

This is where I find Panksepp illuminating -- in his recognizing the 'affectivity' experienced by even primitive living organisms as the ground of the development from proto-consciousness to consciousness. Affectivity (the sense the organism has of being affected, of sensing and feeling its own existence within its environment) is not a 'representation' but a presentation of an organisms's experience of being, of 'knowing' its existence in relation to that which exists outside of and beyond itself, of knowing that it is. What it 'knows' it knows on the initial basis of feeling, and this remains true for us as well in our development from infanthood to adulthood.

In the evolution of consciousness to the level we experience there is a progress, a development, from prereflective affective experience to the ability to reflect on our experience -- and what is involved in it -- with increasing insight, and at some point we recognize/understand that others (i.e., other members of our own species*) share the same conditions of existence and capabilities to cope with it that we know to exist in ourselves. This is not actually the birth of empathy, of concern for others, which as Frans de Wahl and other biologists and ethologists have recognized in primates and other mammals. But in our species it is the birth of what we identify as morality and ethics, which we attempt to apply socially, collectively.


*I meant to add that we are increasingly aware that other animal species experience consciousness in ways similar to our own. This kind of research is still in its beginning stages. Panksepp, DeWahl, and others are at its forefront.