Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Constance]

@Constance

"They explore the conceptual possibilities where one might eventually formulate a scientific theory, but they do not themselves formulate scientific theories. "

That's a good statement about one of the ways philosophy relates to science.

So is this science we're hearing from the resident computationalist philosophers?

 

[smcder]

So is this science we're hearing from the resident computationalist philosophers?

May be ... with an "ismic" quality to it ... ?

;-)

 

[Constance]

May be ... with an "ismic" quality to it ... ?

;-)

Oh yeah. In spades.

 

[smcder]

Can someone list for me, the various types of explanation?

There is this from the IEP

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Keyword "theory of explanation"

Epistemic
Realist

 

[smcder]

Can someone list for me, the various types of explanation?

There is this from the IEP

Mobile Site Preview

Keyword "theory of explanation"

Epistemic
Realist

More here: (if that was anything like what you were looking for?)

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"Yet another general issue concerns the extent to which it is possible to construct a single model of explanation that fits all areas of science. It is uncontroversial that explanatory practice—what is accepted as an explanation, how explanatory goals interact with others, what sort of explanatory information is thought to be achievable, discoverable, testable etc.—varies in significant ways across different disciplines. Nonetheless, all of the models of explanation surveyed above are “universalist” in aspiration—they claim that a single, “one size” model of explanation fits all areas of inquiry in so far as these have a legitimate claim to explain. Although the extreme position that explanation in biology or history has nothing interesting in common with explanation in physics seems unappealing (and in any case has attracted little support), it seems reasonable to expect that more effort will be devoted in the future to developing models of explanation that are more sensitive to disciplinary differences. Ideally, such models would reveal commonalities across disciplines but they should also enable us to see why explanatory practice varies as it does across different disciplines and the significance of such variation. "

 

[smcder]

Wikipedia "Explanation" - note also the Wallace Stevens poem it disambiguates from ...

"There are many and varied events, objects, and facts which require explanation. So too, there are many different types of explanation.

Aristotle recognized at least four types of explanation.

Other types of explanation are Deductive-nomological, Functional, Historical, Psychological, Reductive, Teleological, Methodological explanations." "

There is also Meta-explanation to not be forgotten.

 

[smcder]

Here is the Wallace Stevens poem that disambiguates stop the Wikipedia entry for Explanation:


Explanation

Ach, Mutter,
This old, black dress,
I have been embroidering
French flowers on it.

Not by way of romance,
Here is nothing of the ideal,
Nein,
Nein.

It would have been different,
Liebchen,
If I had imagined myself,
In an orange gown,
Drifting through space,
Like a figure on the church-wall.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

I disagree that the proposition that information is immaterial is semantics.

If I told you:

1 = H

2 = E

3 = L

4 = O

And then I created the following physical structures:

12334

12

1233

1432

I could say the above physical structures “carry” information. We know what information they carry. The information is very real. It exists. But where is the information physically located? Nowhere because it is nothing.

Right, my phrasing was confusing - but my point was about defining the word "immaterial" in terms of "material" compared to ( for example) "physical" and "mental" ... it's hard to find an English word for immaterial that isn't defined as a negation of another word ( incorporeal) and doesn't have a religious connotation ... Ethereal ?


.[/QUOTE]

 

[smcder]

In this example, “chair” is no different from “five.” Both “chair” and “five” are immaterial concepts; however, certain organisms can apparently interact with a system of particles and experience “a chair” or “a five.”

In this case, we can say the systems of particles are material and they can be objectively described and measured.

However, phenomenal experience is different.

The example of “five” and “chair” are just that, examples. Metaphors, even. Again, we can’t objectively describe subjective experience. We are subjective experience.

A system of particles (chair) interacts with another system of particles (organism) and the immaterial experience of a chair is realized.

The experience of a chair is not in the particles of either system. It is nowhere because it is nothing. But it is real. It does exist. It is meaning. It is information.


I agree with you re the experiment.

The point I’m trying to make is that so far doctors have been able to build artificial eyes, ears, and hands that are capable of interacting with the body-brain in such a way that the “realization” of phenomenal experience can proceed whereas before it was lacking.

If I understand correctly, it seems this is done via electrical impulses. Thus, if our sensory organs can be “reduced” to electrical impulses and phenomenal experiences can still be realized, than this is informative.

To me, this means one of two things: (1) somewhere in the body – other than our sense organs – incoming data triggers the “release” of a substance constituting phenomenal experience, or (2) the data itself becomes phenomenal experience by way of being meaningful information.

In other words, with the success of artificial sense organs, we are narrowing down list of physical systems required for the existence of phenomenal experience.



I think that remains to be seen actually; that is, whether matter has 3-dimensions as an intrinsic property or whether 3 dimensions are extrinsic/relational.

Maybe matter only has properties in relation to other matter: time, space, mass, velocity, etc. It certainly makes sense to me. Co-dependent arising. One unit of matter could never arise independently from the Unus Mundus; only multiple instances of matter could arise and persist due to the extrinsic relationships that “emerge.”



I don’t necessarily have a point per se; I’m simply attempting to think about the relationship between matter, information, and mind using the most concise concepts possible.

I disagree that the proposition that information is immaterial is semantics.

If I told you:

1 = H

2 = E

3 = L

4 = O

And then I created the following physical structures:

12334

12

1233

1432

I could say the above physical structures “carry” information. We know what information they carry. The information is very real. It exists. But where is the information physically located? Nowhere because it is nothing.

I'm still not following what is new in the artificial arm report ...

"If I understand correctly, it seems this is done via electrical impulses. Thus, if our sensory organs can be “reduced” to electrical impulses and phenomenal experiences can still be realized, than this is informative."

I understand the arm has been tuned to give the feel of a real arm or close but how is that different from what we know about integrating "artificial" input say with cochlear implant or I think there are artificial vision systems or even earlier versions of the artificial hand - all provided input that was then realized as phenomenal experience? I'm trying to get at exactly what we have learned that is new from this particular report?


"In other words, with the success of artificial sense organs, we are narrowing down list of physical systems required for the existence of phenomenal experience."

What are the physical systems we currently know are required and what physical systems are left on the list - to the extent that's answerable?

I would think

1. sense organs
2. Brain (substructures listed as 2.1a etc)

Or do I misunderstand?

I'd thought you posted something about consciousness existing outside the body but I found this:

"Regarding the "survival" of an information structure:

Said information structure would need to be embodied physically. Thus, in order for a mind to survive the death of its body, it would need to be embodied in another physical body. The only requirement is that the body be physical."

and in another post

"For example, if the mind is an information structure, can this information structure survive the death of the physical body? I think it is theoretically possible."

So one question is how is the information structure transmitted? Something like a radio transmission?

Another is what information structures specifically are preserved?

You mentioned that Langan thought the universe preserved a persons information structure after death? Did he say how?

Found it ...

"Thus, while we are transparent to the global syntax of the global conscious agency "God", we cannot see everything that God can see. Whereas God perceives one total act of creation in a parallel distributed fashion, with everything in perfect superposition, we are localized in spacetime and perceive reality only in a succession of locally creative moments.

This parallelism has powerful implications. When a human being dies, his entire history remains embedded in the timeless level of consciousness...the Deic level.

In that sense, he or she is preserved by virtue of his or her "soul". And since the universe is a self-refining entity, that which is teleologically valid in the informational construct called "you" may be locally re-injected or redistributed in spacetime. In principle, this could be a recombinative process, with the essences of many people combining in a set of local injections or "reincarnations" (this could lead to strange effects...e.g., a single person remembering simultaneous "past lifetimes")."

 

[smcder]

I think I would limit it to very short passages of texts or to concepts. But for me, I would want to come away with concrete conclusions, which would be a challenge and would probably be not what others would want.
I have been in three mastermind groups and they are very difficult to structure in order to determine decisive actions let alone decisive thought. But I think that philosophical community, at its creative pinnacle, would function in this manner.

I think I would limit it to very short passages of texts or to concepts. But for me, I would want to come away with concrete conclusions, which would be a challenge and would probably be not what others would want.

I have been in three mastermind groups and they are very difficult to structure in order to determine decisive actions let alone decisive thought. But I think that philosophical community, at its creative pinnacle, would function in this manner.

Before you head out to the Google group, can you offer something from the mastermind groups in terms of structure?

The Partially Examined Life has a members forum and "Not School" groups - the groups are run by a volunteer, they pick a topic and a date and post it and then people join and they read a given text and hold a discussion by video-chat. This is a weeks to months process.

I'm not sure if the administrator has a set of rules to follow, but I don't think members do. Having the video chats helps in lots of obvious ways.

On the onlinphilosophyforum the administrator has to approve all questions (new threads) and there is a sticky with rules for philosophical discussion (I think anyone can go to the site and view or registration is free and painless).

Also, can you give an example of a short passage or concept you might pick?

some simple ways of structuring a small group are to rotate who picks the topic and that person is responsible for some shape and closure to it - providing a brief summary of conclusions at the end ... (set time limit for discussion and move on to the next topic) - it would be nice to archive the conclusions/summaries somehow but I'm not sure that's possible on this forum?

 

[smcder]

1. MasterMind groups:
Business communities do mastermind groups. They are private and confidential. They discuss members' business strategies and implementations etc. They have a chairperson, regular meetings online and in person, they pay for administrators to arrange meetings and finance resources for the group. They can cost 10s of thousands to join because they work. They are supportive, analytical, connecting.

2. the yes/no method:
peer review is a rubbish way to do philosophy, as are conferences. The ancient Greeks had something better, that is for sure. You see Dennett being quizzed by Hameroff at the Tuscon conference and he is allowed to wriggle away from questions. I would want to take one of DD's statements, get the best philosophers on the planet to drill down on the statement - in a room together! - Yes no prevents wriggle. That is the kind of philosophical masterminding I would expect the Greeks to have been up to. Everyone on equal terms, open immediate dialogue, focal analytical consideration, openness to new ideas and disciplines. I don't know what I am talking about really, but it is worth thinking about.

The patent dies and goes to heaven - but a better person and looking a bit better for it

Dyslexia is a short term memory disability for many. If organising life is a problem, if you are above average intelligence, if your eyes have to re-read lines/words over and over (eyes moving from side to side) then maybe you are laterally gifted like all dyslexics.

the re-reading lines/words over and over I can relate to, not sure I have all the other qualifications ... have you tried any kind of therapies/techniques for this? Here in the US we would offer you a number of medications ... actually, the non stimulant Strattera seems to be a little less reluctantly prescribed than the amphetaimines (Ritalin) ... but I bet there are other, non-medication options?

 

[Pharoah]

There is no change in our forum software that should cause this. It doesn't happen at all to me, and it should auto save content. So I wonder if there isn't something in your setup that's causing this problem. I haven't had other complaints. Anyone?

Maybe the internet connection went and the autosave wasn't happening... then when Constance went to post... v frustrating.

 

[Pharoah]

In the human world (deftly displaced from these digitalized theories of consciousness and mind) you pays your money and you takes your choice about what you take to be significant in your experience in the world. Iow, you arrange your own hierarchies.

This probably sounds strange to people who think of themselves as strange loops.

I meant, can you not say of one person, they organise experience like "this" which corresponds to others'.
Are there no principles governing experience?
Or if there are, are you not interested in that possibility?

 

[Pharoah]

I think I would limit it to very short passages of texts or to concepts. But for me, I would want to come away with concrete conclusions, which would be a challenge and would probably be not what others would want.

I have been in three mastermind groups and they are very difficult to structure in order to determine decisive actions let alone decisive thought. But I think that philosophical community, at its creative pinnacle, would function in this manner.

Before you head out to the Google group, can you offer something from the mastermind groups in terms of structure?

The Partially Examined Life has a members forum and "Not School" groups - the groups are run by a volunteer, they pick a topic and a date and post it and then people join and they read a given text and hold a discussion by video-chat. This is a weeks to months process.

I'm not sure if the administrator has a set of rules to follow, but I don't think members do. Having the video chats helps in lots of obvious ways.

On the onlinphilosophyforum the administrator has to approve all questions (new threads) and there is a sticky with rules for philosophical discussion (I think anyone can go to the site and view or registration is free and painless).

Also, can you give an example of a short passage or concept you might pick?

some simple ways of structuring a small group are to rotate who picks the topic and that person is responsible for some shape and closure to it - providing a brief summary of conclusions at the end ... (set time limit for discussion and move on to the next topic) - it would be nice to archive the conclusions/summaries somehow but I'm not sure that's possible on this forum?

Well.. with what looks like a maximum of 4 people, I would ask for suggestions as to what people want it to be. It can function in many ways and different levels and serve different purposes. I am sure that it would gradually change to suit the group over time.

This is the welcome message I have posted in the group:
"Welcome to the Paracast Philosophy MasterMind group.

What do you want to get out of it? e.g. I want help from people in order to improve the content of my book about HCT. I want to gain knowledge about relevant areas. I want to help others achieve their goals or aspirations in their areas of interest.
Do you want to establish goals? e.g. to choose texts to read by a certain date, for potential discussion. To set targets for essay or article completion. To set social philosophy engagement targets. To set up blogging by such and such date...
What proportion of time do you want assign, and to what areas?
Do you want just correspondence by writing, or do you want online discussion meetings?
How much time do you want to spend on MM activities per week/month?
How else could this group facilitate what you want to get out of it?"

Discussion topics would include recent suggestions:
Soupie's enquiries into information.
Constance's suggested SEP passage on phenomenology.
I have read some stuff on Merleau-Ponty and would engage in discussion on his ideas, but I am not sure what Constance wants me to gain from it...

As I say, it is what people would want it to be...

 

[Pharoah]

the re-reading lines/words over and over I can relate to, not sure I have all the other qualifications ... have you tried any kind of therapies/techniques for this? Here in the US we would offer you a number of medications ... actually, the non stimulant Strattera seems to be a little less reluctantly prescribed than the amphetaimines (Ritalin) ... but I bet there are other, non-medication options?

Isn't Ritalin for ADHD. I think Panksepp makes a case for why it is a bad thing.
There are lots of strategies for dealing with it. But they are strategies not cures.
I suspect my grandfather was dyslexic. His brother did all the paper work for his businesses because he could not read. Then his brother got him to sign his business to him and they never spoke to each other again. So... quite often people do not know they are dealing with some of these kinds of issues. I only found out in my thirties that it was not just a reading thing and it was a profound shock to me: My son was tested and he couldn't recall two digits in reverse order to hearing them... However he could remember longer sequences than the average, if he had repeat them in the same sequential order as he heard them. This illustrated the short term memory to medium term memory problem - which obviously affects reading because of the construction of words from syllables etc.

 

[Soupie]

The science of emotions: Jaak Panksepp at TEDxRainier

 

[Pharoah]

My understanding is that information/meaning requires a coder, a physical container, and a decoder.

On my (primitive) view, I wonder if the "physical container" is the physical environment and the "decoder" is the physical organism.

So the question is, who is the coder? Who is coding meaning into the physical environment? My (again primitive) view is that it may have something to do with a self-replicating physical system's ability to store data/information and pass it along from generation to generation; that is, its ability to learn and eternally embody this learning in successive generations.

This is why I'm excited about HCT and Pankseep's work. I think the phenomenal affect states of organisms are informational states about their body-environment.

Thus, the "coder" is (past) experience retained in the organism and passed on to future generations, the container is the environment, and the decoder is the (present) organism.

Organisms are conscious because they are meaning-making systems.


This is certainly an idea worthy of investigation as well. I believe DNA may be one such structure; that is, container and decoder. Mutation and natural selection perhaps being the coder. A similar process may occur on the macro level as well.

Soupie, there are a few points that you have raised that I want to pick up on. These are,

1. "information/meaning requires a coder, a physical container, and a decoder"
2. "who is the coder? - it may have something to do with a self-replicating physical system's..."
3. "to learn and eternally embody this learning in successive generations"
4. "I think the phenomenal affect states of organisms are informational states"
5. "Thus, the "coder" is (past) experience retained in the organism and passed on to future generations, the container is the environment, and the decoder is the (present) organism."

In quote 1 you use terms "coder" "container" and "decoder". These terms, with their "er" letter endings, suggest 'agency' doing the coding /decoding. Many theories assume agency without explaining it. Creationist, adaptationist, evolutionary psychologist, dualist, integrated information(ist), computationalist the list is endless really. One can explore the nature of agency from many perspectives. But do any of them provide a coherent explanation of it? (or could they? - yes or no question). Many answer, "maybe", and devote their life to the task from a particular standpoint. Jerry Fodor addresses agency in relation to adaptationism and, in my view, does a pretty good if rather complicated job of shredding it... in this article:
http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/Fodor/Fodor_Against_Darwinism.pdf
Interestingly, one does not have to think of agency as necessarily inclusive or necessarily exclusive of the philosophy of mind or of the phenomenon of consciousness. This is why one individual might contest that a particular standpoint has anything to so with consciousness, whilst conversely, another individual might say of the same standpoint that it solves the problem of consciousness.
In quote 2, you tentatively suggest a possible vehicle of agency. How and why do these things fulfil the role of agency?
Quote 2. Can we can say, that the "who is the coder?" route - i.e. who is the agency route - is ultimately a route that cannot lead to a coherent physicalist thesis? If so, you, like me I think, must ask not who is agency, but how and why is their agency. And yet still, there need be no obvious engagement in PoM or phenomenal consciousness at this stage of our enquiry.
Quote 3. most people associate learning with consciousness, and that consciousness is not carried through from generation to generation. So you make a conceptual leap into PoM and phenomenal consciousness. Consequently,
Quote 4. your 'how and why agency' answer needs to account for the conceptual leap into the phenomenal landscape that Constance is so eager for us to contemplate. This leap is a crucial one because for many the physical relation is unbridgeable. Could the how and why explain the qualitative and characteristic aspects of phenomenal experience? If so, what are the limits of such an explanation?
Quote 5. "The coder is experience" you say. Environmental interaction (my broader term for 'experience') is a critical feature. But different things are 'informed' by environmental interaction in different ways. The encoding, i.e. the representing, differs markedly. Is there a classification of ways? yes or no. If "maybe", what is that classification and why does it both exist and come into existence without the need for extrinsic agency? And what determines the distinctiveness of different embodiments of informed constructs?
Finally in quote 5 you say, "retained in the organism": "retained in" implies external agency because it gives a sense that the organism is a conduit of something extrinsic to its own construct, rather than the information being part and parcel of the organism construct. It is an easy trap to fall into but must be avoided.

Soupie, I think you are on a journey of HCT discovery for yourself via information enquiries. I am asking you these questions because I feel that if you explore them yourself, you will arrive at HCT. Ultimately, there are many roads that one can take to try to address the phenomenon of consciousness, but there can only be one decisive coherent physicalist road - but importantly, I do say there is ultimately far more to 'us' humans than that. So I am basically being a bit devious in my questioning, so let me know if that is a bad thing.

 

[Constance]

Because of the communication problems we've experienced throughout this thread -- vagueness of terms, substitutions of terms for one another, sometimes the collapse of terms into one another to the point that identities are claimed between their referrents that do not exist -- I think we should spend some time reading current linguistic theory. Its connection with our main topic, consciousness, is obvious. I suggest that we all read and then discuss the linked paper.

Giulio Benedetti, "A semantics “outside language”: Operational Semantics
A new semantic theory, based on the nature and structure of thought

Abstract
In this article, the author briefly introduces a new theory in Semantics, Operational Semantics (OS). OS deals with the meanings of all the basic linguistic elements that are indispensable for any linguistic expression, that is, mainly all the “grammatical” words (conjunctions, prepositions, articles, most pronouns and corresponding adjectives, fundamental verbs like “to be”, “to have” etc, the main adverbs) and, in the large number of languages that have a more or less rich morphology, almost all morphemes (the ones which indicate cases, in languages that have cases, the number and gender of nouns and adjectives, moods and tenses of verbs etc). The fundamental presupposition of OS is that the meanings of such linguistic elements are essentially sequences of elemental mental operations, amongst which the ones of attention play a key role. The author proposes a list of these elemental mental operations and shows how it is possible, by basing ourselves on these, to identify the meanings of the aforesaid linguistic elements. A new linguistic theory, dealing with the “deep” structure of language, derives from this. This theory also allows us to define the fundamental concepts of Linguistics (such as “noun”, “subject”, “object” etc) in a simple and clear way, propose new solutions for some other problems in Linguistics and Psycholinguistics, and open new research
perspectives. In the last part of the article, the author also mentions a possible short-term practical application of OS, i.e. a device to improve the quality of machine translation, and highlights the limits of OS.
Keywords
mind, mental operations, consciousness, attention, thought, language, Italian Operational School,
operational semantics, linguistics, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, semantics, grammar, philosophy,
cognitive psychology, neurobiology

Extract:
"Operational Semantics is a completely new solution to the problem of the meaning of words and morphemes belonging to the third class. The fundamental thesis of OS is that these words designate sequences of mental operations (the name “Operational Semantics” derives from this), amongst which the ones of attention play a key role. Ceccato called these sequences of mental operations “mental categories” (because they have some analogies with the categories of Kant’s philosophy). OS has adopted this name as well. We must point out that the meaning OS gives to the term “category” is completely different from the meaning that Cognitive Psychology and Linguistics give to the same term. Typically, Cognitive Psychology
and Linguistics use the term “category” to highlight the fact that, since many objects of the physical world share common features, but are not identical, we create classes (that is, categories) by means of a mental process of abstraction (Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Rosch, 1973, 1978). On the contrary, OS calls “mental categories” the meanings of the words such as those listed in point 3. Ceccato called the mental operations that make up the mental categories elemental mental operations. Once again, we must point out that the use OS makes of the expression “elemental mental operations” differs completely from the use that cognitive sciences make of the same expression: while for OS the expression denotes only the elemental operations that make up mental categories, for cognitive sciences it has a wider meaning, denoting various kinds of operations that may be considered “elemental”, such as, for example, basic operations of perception. In this paper we shall therefore use, as much as possible, the more specific expression “elemental operations that make up mental categories”, or its acronym EOMC. Therefore, defining the meaning of a word that designates a mental category means, according to OS, identifying the structure of that mental category, that is, the sequence of elemental mental operations that make it up. We call this task “analysis of a mental category”.

If we tackle the task of analysing the mental categories, the things that we have to understand are essentially the following:
1) what are, from a general point of view, the elemental mental operations which make up
mental categories;
2) in particular, what combination of these elemental operations makes up every single mental
category considered (that is, it is necessary to have a method by which we can carry out the
analyses and it is also very desirable to be in some way able to verify the analyses we obtain).
All of this is extremely difficult. We make up mental categories continuously, because they are a fundamental component of linguistic thought. Nevertheless, even if we know very well how to carry out the operations that make up mental categories, we carry them out in a completely unconscious, and moreover in an extremely fast way and without any effort, so that discovering them is really a very difficult task. . . .

http://www.mind-consciousness-language.com/A%20semantics%20outside%20language.pdf

 

[Constance]

Can Language Influence Our Perception of Reality?



New research suggests that subtle linguistic differences can frame our approaches to difficult problems— and even affect our views on space and time
By Mitch Moxley

Extract:

". . . If changing the way you speak your language affects thinking, what happens when you switch languages altogether? Opinions on the subject date back centuries (Charlemagne once said, “to have a second language is to have a second soul”). In the 1930s, two American linguists, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf popularized the hypothesis that the languages we speak may shape the ways we think.

There are some 7,000 languages spoken in the world, and they exhibit tremendous variance. Boroditsky and her colleagues’ research has shown that language—from verb tenses to gender to metaphors—can shape the most fundamental dimensions of human cognition, including space, time, causality, and our relationships with others.

“I was always interested in how humans become so smart. How do we build complex knowledge? How are we able to think about things that go far beyond our physical experience?” she says. “It became clear quite early that there wasn’t any way to explain how we build such complex and sophisticated knowledge unless you look at patterns in language.”

For a striking example of how language shapes thought, Boroditsky points to Aboriginal languages in Australia that don’t use terms like “left” and “right.” Instead, they use cardinal directions—east, west, etc. “There is an ant on your southwest leg,” a speaker might say.

Studies have found that speakers of such languages are remarkably good at staying oriented, even when inside a building. When asked to lay out a series of cards that included earlier and later events, members of the community will arrange the cards from east to west (the direction of the sun) no matter which direction they are facing. English speakers, meanwhile, will lay them out left to right (the way English is written), while Hebrew speakers will lay the cards out right to left (the direction of Hebrew script).

There are practical implications to better understanding how language shapes the way we perceive reality. In a courtroom, for example, the way in which English, Spanish or Japanese speakers recall events can be dramatically different—which, of course, can be candy to lawyers.

English speakers usually describe events in terms of agents doing things: “John broke the vase.” Speakers of Spanish or Japanese are less likely to mention the agent when describing an accident: “The vase broke.” These differences can affect how speakers of different languages actually remember the same event. In one study, speakers of English, Spanish, and Japanese watched videos of two people popping balloons, breaking eggs, and intentionally or unintentionally spilling drinks. When asked later who broke what, speakers of Spanish and Japanese did not remember who was responsible for the accidents as well as English speakers did. But they had no problem identifying who was responsible for intentional events, for which their language would mention the agent.

Boroditsky is currently looking at metaphors used to describe economic inequality. She’s trying to understand whether there are differences that result from describing inequality as a “gap” or a “chasm,” or the result of a race—winning or falling behind in a race—or climbing and falling off a ladder.

“We’re asking if these metaphors actually have different consequences,” Boroditsky says. “We use metaphor because issues like crime or the economy are hard to think about. They are complex systems that we’re talking about. None of us has a complete understanding of the systems, so we draw on knowledge of what’s familiar to us.”

It is, to use an aptly fraught metaphor, a rich vein of inquiry."

Can Language Influence Our Perception of Reality? - SPONSORED CONTENT presented by University of California

 

[Constance]

The Beneditti paper on Operational Semantics is one of many available at this research website on the topic of Mind, Consciousness, and Language. All appears appear to be downloadable in English translation. Follow the Articles link to survey the articles available and the Commentaries link for critiques and discussions.

Mind, Consciousness, and Language [Homepage]