Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[smcder]

I know you guys are knee deep in it on HCT ... but I frankly don't get it. I've read lots of posts and lots on Pharoah's website and looked at the infographic. I haven't read the book, it's incredibly dense and laden with terminology. (which is not a critique, it's a description)

I understand this:

3.7 Billions of years ago a unique systems construct emerged as an accidental consequence of the uncontrolled evolution of atomic compounds. What was so special about this systems construct?

Well… this construct was able to control the evolution of its systems structures.

But how does this differ from any other evolutionary description of the universe? Of things moving from the simple, the ultimately simple, to the more complex, according to a simple, ultimately simple, set of rules? (evolution through selection ... or what ever endures according to what is selected to endure - according to which chaos is the ultimate evolutionary product, nothing ever de-selects chaos from the system!)

I also don't understand where HCT is a theory that makes predictions? I understand for example where Relativity extends from Newtonian physics, where it comes from - but where does HCT come from?

I know a little about systems theory and cybernetics, but:

Systems theory is the interdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of elucidating principles that can be applied to all types of systems at all nesting levels in all fields of research.

The term does not yet have a well-established, precise meaning,

but systems theory can reasonably be considered a specialization of systems thinking; alternatively as a goal output of systems science and systems engineering, with an emphasis on generality useful across a broad range of systems (versus the particular models of individual fields).

... but I don't know that it has succeed, there seem to be difficulties in saying what a system is and then applying a principle from one system to another that can't just be developed from simpler principles - in other words, if I study 10 random systems what can I know about the 11th that I couldn't know in any other way?

And if I can, it seems to me more akin to taxonomy or behavioral science - how to classify and say how certain things will act - but not explanatory, in other words, what I think we want is a physics of consciousness ... not literally, but that's the granularity of explanation that we want ... because consciousness seems to be as fundamental as matter and if it's not, then our current conceptual vocabulary is indequate to explain it in materialist terms.

 

[smcder]

So what I'd like to see is:

1. HCT for my twelve year old nephew
2. what does HCT predict? how does it differentiate from other theories?
3. how can we falsify HCT? how do we know it's true?
4. where did HCT come from? what are its closest antecedents and peers? what theories is it in competition with and how is it superior? - (for example, where does it fit in on Chalmer's taxonomy of theories of consciousness)

These I think are basic things needed to get HCT out in the world and see if it survives.

 

[Pharoah]

IIT's major flaw - evident from the abstract:
I thought one could remove the head from the body of integrated information theory by virtue of the fact that the entire thesis is predicated on the assumed validity of the axioms - the five "self-evident truths" - which are used to qualify the standards by which the theory justifies is own efficacy.

Soupie, you have said on two occasions, that you are not so sure about the axioms. "I am probably wrong", you say. Nor am I sure! The criticisms of the axioms could run into hundreds of column inches and no doubt will. I think Tononi could do with referencing some philosophers who might substantiate his claim that these are the five pertinent axioms derived from the phenomenology of consciousness and that they are inclusive. I think he could do with explaining them more rigorously. One or two statements for each is remarkably brief.

Soupie, you say
"Consider a long chain of neurons whose information (a pattern of firings - [perhaps you might mean 'constituted by a pattern of firing'] ) is passed from one end to the other."
I am not sure how non-physical information is passed along a neuron chain.
Undoubtedly, the firing of neurons excite and inhibit the firing of other neurons. This certainly is a self-evident truth. The question as to how this comes to constitute non-physical information about the world and have quality without reference to the world.... that, I have issues with.
"IIT negates all mechanistic (neural) architectures except integrated ones"
Given IIT, I am surprised that the structure of brain is not more homogenous. (A similar problem with the universe is its lack of homogeneity, interestingly). Nevertheless, it is the 'structural perturbations' that make the brain what it is. IIT would seem to suggest that the brain could be a neural soup, but clearly the structures are doing something. But then how do the structures link (sensory perceptions for example) with the 'information' of the "qualia space"?

me: "HCT does make the link by explaining how the environment influences the evolution of life forms to the extent that they develop physiological and neurological mechanisms that are responsive to those environmental specifics as they relate to the organism, its survival, and at its multitude of needs."
Soupie: "Okay. This description however does not exclude IIT."
It does not exclude IIT by default, true, but surely the theory is utterly impotent without an extension-fixing narrative.

There is no physical thing in existence that does not make some kind of difference. What is it of any certain difference (i.e. any physical thing), that one might say of it that its difference makes a special kind of difference?
When talking of intrinsic differences that make a difference in relation to information, how are we to understand 'intrinsic'? What boundaries constitute the object to which we refer as differentiating intrinsic differences, and by what means do we interpret how differences that are not intrinsic (by what ever formulation or definition comes to bear) impact on the differences that are intrinsic?

You ask me whether HCT posits that "humans will have a special neurological mechanism for green, a special neurological mechanism for sour, a special neurological mechanism for happy, a special neurological mechanism for itchy, etc."
That would be absurd.

According to IIT, one need have no external reference to an experience such as 'breen'. And IIT does not preclude experiencing all possible experiences that exist in the universe by virtue of the fact that the neural substrate generates quale independently from the external environment. Therefore, under IIT the brain will evoke any and all possible quales, whether or not they have their correlative environmental equivalent. Under IIT we would experience non environmentally-correlative experiences. They would just happen for no reason... you might be sitting on your sofa and experience the quality of breen and think, 'shit, what was that? someone just walked over my grave or something" for you would have no comprehension in physical reality of knowing what that quale was all about - having never sighted breen. Hey smcder... you might like IIT after all.

Soupie: "IIT negates all mechanistic (neural) architectures except integrated ones,"
I like the feedforwad analogy but I don't think the existence of qualitative experience is as simple as whether or not a mechanism is feedforward or not. Integration may require feedback, but are we really supposedto believe that feedback is the sole requisite for integration and therefore of consciousness?

 

[Constance]

. . . [Systems theory] seems to me more akin to taxonomy or behavioral science - how to classify and say how certain things will act - but not explanatory, in other words, what I think we want is a physics of consciousness ... not literally, but that's the granularity of explanation that we want ... because consciousness seems to be as fundamental as matter and if it's not, then our current conceptual vocabulary is indequate to explain it in materialist terms.

Brilliant. The meta-theoretical thinking you demonstrate is essential if we are to break the habit in both science and philosophy of mis-taking our models to provide comprehensive explanations of reality.

 

[Pharoah]

My two questions are:

1 how to differentiate causation / correlation ... what would an experiment look like that could prove consciousness is generated by/originates in the brain and not just correlated with it? I can't think of one offhand, not have I heard of one ... it certainly hasn't been done, or serious philosophers like chalmers wouldn't consider consciousness as a fundamental property - this is why I say "all cards are still on the table" because I see frequently where someone thinks if this or that is established, then such and such is proven about consciousness ... but they've mistaken correlation for causation.

2 what do we do with evidence that seems to have been scientifically gathered, peer reviewed and statistically validated which indicates things like the big five in parapsychology and which some argue supports the idea that the mind is non-local?

for 2, it seems we can either:

1. dismiss it outright - I can't do that after reading lots of studies that seem to me to be as well designed, executed and analyzed as experiments in other fields, if not more so due to the scrutiny of skeptics
2. identify the flaws in each experiment or locate systematic flaws in all the experiments or identify systematic flaws in experimental design and statistical analysis in general and accept the consequences for mainstream science
3. accept the evidence and explore the consequences

that seem very fair to me ... and until we do that, I'm not going to invest in any particular model that hasn't done one of the three

1.
HCT reveals, that it is not ‘a brain state equals consciousness’ thing. Alternatively, what an ontological reductive explanation does is link the interactive environment to the evolution of the brain itself and thereby explain the phenomenon of consciousness contextually. Instead of it being a brain state equals consciousness thing, it becomes an environmentally integrated construct thing, whereby brain/body processes are explained in terms of their informed interactive meaning in so far as it evinces qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction. Where such relations of qualitative representation are, consciousness - as an informed representation of qualitative relevancy - is evoked. One way of looking at this level of explanation is to say that the causal dynamic is not relevant. Instead, what is relevant is the nature of the integration of environment with regard its qualitative impact on replicative mechanism and the processes that mechanism evinces. The brain and its states are integrated with the environment, and in being so, derive representational features in the manner of their processes from which consciousness becomes the qualitatively relevant feature.
Perhaps that dodges the question... it is not intended to.

The experiment that I would like performed is an artificial consciousness application based on HCT. I tried to become a millionaire to finance it myself, but I ended up a few pennies short. The evidence will always be incomplete. Even if an artificial construct looked as though it was conscious, people would always argue against. I can't think of any experiment that could prove consciousness is generated and not just correlated with the brain. It comes down to weight of evidence for and against, and the relative intuitive and logical coherence of conflicting theories.

2.
I read your threads but not the article because the link was dead.
Did your threads say what the big five were? I can't say that I know what these five things are.

 

[Constance]

HCT reveals, that it is not ‘a brain state equals consciousness’ thing. Alternatively, what an ontological reductive explanation does is link the interactive environment to the evolution of the brain itself and thereby explain the phenomenon of consciousness contextually. Instead of it being a brain state equals consciousness thing, it becomes an environmentally integrated construct thing, whereby brain/body processes are explained in terms of their informed interactive meaning in so far as it evinces qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction. Where such relations of qualitative representation are, consciousness - as an informed representation of qualitative relevancy - is evoked. One way of looking at this level of explanation is to say that the causal dynamic is not relevant. Instead, what is relevant is the nature of the integration of environment with regard its qualitative impact on replicative mechanism and the processes that mechanism evinces. The brain and its states are integrated with the environment, and in being so, derive representational features in the manner of their processes from which consciousness becomes the qualitatively relevant feature.
Perhaps that dodges the question... it is not intended to.

"what an ontological reductive explanation does is link the interactive environment to the evolution of the brain itself and thereby explain the phenomenon of consciousness contextually."

"An ontological reductive explanation" presupposes, assumes, that one has already achieved an 'ontology' sufficient to account for that which one is trying to explain. What you seem to assume in HCT is that the physical environment represents the total environment in which living organisms arise and evolve. Your 'ontology' is mounted on the presupposition that all of 'reality' is physical and can be physically accounted for. But as you yourself seem to recognize (have stated, as I recall), consciousness and mind are non-physical.

The philosophical meaning of 'ontology' has been lost in the way the term is used in computer science -- as a description of what information the computer possesses. This misapplication of the term ontology has led to immense confusion. It might have seeped into your own thinking, Pharoah, under the influence of 'computer science' in our time.

 

[Pharoah]

Use an @ sign in front of the user name to let someone know you are addressing them:

@Pharoah

Did you read the 15 page paper itself or just the extracts I posted?

What is meant by "classical terms" and could you provide the explanations for the examples?

Could you (briefly) provide a correct statement of physicalism and it's relationship to free will and self?

I don't think paranormalism is a field of philosophy is it? I know I'm neither qualified nor interested to write such an article ... what makes you think I am? (you say "still hoping" I would write the article) ... I may have said something misleading.

@smcder
Read the extracts but the link was dead.

Classical terms - standard physical approaches

Correct statement of physicalism:
Jackson states that Physicalism is not the thesis that the world is largely physical but the thesis that the world is entirely physical (Jackson, F. 1986. What Mary Didn’t Know, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291-5.)
What is physical?
Essentially, if I were a physicalist I would have to say that I am entirely physical and of this world. In being so, I would have to conclude that all worldly physical things are potentially explainable in terms of their relation to me.
But having said that, I am not a physicalist although every argument I take is from a physicalist stance.
The idea that physicalism is fixated on bottom up causation and determinism leads to the often claimed 'physicalism is anti freewill' stance, but I find the philosophical arguments against this very satisfying and solid. There is no brief summary.

@smcder , I thought you were the kingpin of the paranormal. I just think that a solid article giving the history, research and theory would be good to come out of this forum.

 

[Constance]

I read your threads but not the article because the link was dead.
Did your threads say what the big five were? I can't say that I know what these five things are.

By "the big five," are you referring to the points Tononi made in IIT.3 to distinguish consciousness from computation?

@smcder, would you repost the link to the whole paper by Kelly and Kelly?

 

[Pharoah]

You may have mentioned this, I've only had time to skim the thread lately ... but did you get your paper published in the Australian (I believe it was?) journal? Have you thought about taking a philosophy of mind course and submitting HCT as a term paper (or a thesis?) - you mentioned peer review being hard to get, so I was trying to think of ways to do that.

I just looked at HCT again a little this morning and read this from your philosophy club talk:

3.7 Billions of years ago a unique systems construct emerged as an accidental consequence of the uncontrolled evolution of atomic compounds. What was so special about this systems construct?

Well… this construct was able to control the evolution of its systems structures.

Have I mentioned Braitenberg vehicles before?

Braitenberg vehicle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A Braitenberg vehicle is an agent that can autonomously move around based on its sensor inputs. It has primitive sensors (measuring some stimulus at a point) and wheels (each driven by its own motor) that function as actuators or effectors. A sensor, in the simplest configuration, is directly connected to an effector, so that a sensed signal immediately produces a movement of the wheel. Depending on how sensors and wheels are connected, the vehicle exhibits different behaviors (which can be goal-oriented). This means that, depending on the sensor-motor wiring, it appears to strive to achieve certain situations and to avoid others, changing course when the situation changes.[1]The connections between sensors and actuators for the simplest vehicles (2 and 3) can be ipsilateral or contralateral, and excitatory or inhibitory, producing four combinations with different behaviours named; fear, aggression and love.[2]

Amazon.com: Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology (9780262521123): Valentino Braitenberg: Books

These imaginative thought experiments are the inventions of one of the world's eminent brain researchers. They are "vehicles," a series of hypothetical, self-operating machines that exhibit increasingly intricate if not always successful or civilized "behavior." Each of the vehicles in the series incorporates the essential features of all the earlier models and along the way they come to embody aggression, love, logic, manifestations of foresight, concept formation, creative thinking, personality, and free will. In a section of extensive biological notes, Braitenberg locates many elements of his fantasy in current brain research.Valentino Braitenberg is a director of the Max Planck Institute of Biological Cybernetics and Honorary Professor of Information Science at the University of Tübingen, West Germany. A Bradford Book

TOC

Introduction:
Let the problem of the mind dissolve in your mind
Vehicle 1 getting around
2. fear and aggression
3 love
4 Values and Special tastes
5 logic
6 selection, the impersonal engineer
7 concepts
8 space, things and movements
9 shapes
10 getting ideas
11 rules and regularities
12 trains of thought
13 foresight
14 egotism and optimism

Cool!
I had heard of Braitenburg (simulations) but did not realise the extent of the behaviours. Will want to read more. I am always suspicious of traditional AI modelling which is not HCT derived and is a deadend in relation to the production of artificial consciousness.

My submission:
Was told that it had been sent to a second reviewer. Gulp! I don't want to dream.
I did once think of going back to study.
My writing and arguments have improved steadily. Part of the problem is knowing what kinds of journals would consider my kind of paper. I am not skilled enough at writing, 'in the style of a particular journal'.

 

[Constance]

We should get our feet wet in systems theory so we realize what we are talking about when we refer to it, what it enables us to understand in various disciplines and what its ontological limits are. We might begin with this page concerning the insights of the founder of systems thinking, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the concluding paragraph of which confirms Steve's critique:

"Thus we find similar structures and functions for different systems, independent of the particular domain in which the system exists. General Systems Theory is based on the assumption that there are universal principles of organization, which hold for all systems, be they physical, chemical, biological, mental or social. The mechanistic world view seeks universality by reducing everything to its material constituents. The systemic world view, on the contrary, seeks universality by ignoring the concrete material out of which systems are made, so that their abstract organization comes into focus."

Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach

 

[Constance]

The idea that physicalism is fixated on bottom up causation and determinism leads to the often claimed 'physicalism is anti freewill' stance, but I find the philosophical arguments against this very satisfying and solid. There is no brief summary.

@smcder , I thought you were the kingpin of the paranormal. I just think that a solid article giving the history, research and theory would be good to come out of this forum.

"There is no brief summary."

Yet you expect that a one-paper summary should be possible for the variety of evidence concerning anomalous phenomena in and of consciousness and mind that has been accumulated in the last century and a half of psychical, parapsychological, and other paranormal experiences?

 

[Pharoah]

So what I'd like to see is:

1. HCT for my twelve year old nephew
2. what does HCT predict? how does it differentiate from other theories?
3. how can we falsify HCT? how do we know it's true?
4. where did HCT come from? what are its closest antecedents and peers? what theories is it in competition with and how is it superior? - (for example, where does it fit in on Chalmer's taxonomy of theories of consciousness)

These I think are basic things needed to get HCT out in the world and see if it survives.

double like.

4. Where did HCT come from? - Well its axiom is Newton's third law. It came out of my head at about 5.30 on Sept 13th 1986 following about 2 years of theoretical exploration. I had not read any philosophy nor heard of systems theories (there was only one dedicated systems journal in existence at the time)
3. How can we falsify HCT? - I don't know how to integrate QM. Therefore, QM might prove troublesome to HCT.
4. what theories is it in competition with? - Funnily enough, I think HCT might be able to incorporate IIT (with some adjustments to IIT). Representationalist theories are all related to HCT. HCT is superior to them all imo.
2. The major prediction is that the evolution of mind is incomplete. It does actually say, by extrapolation, what the next stage consists of but its implications are very difficult to stipulate. It predicts that artificial consciousness is possible (now with current technological capabilities), but that sophisticated ACs will not be possible because of the vast complexities involved. There are many experiments that can be performed to test, but not prove the hypothesis across a wide range of disciplines.
4. It does not fit with Chalmers' taxonomy. I used to think F-monism - that is what I told Chalmers at the time. Before that dualism. But I realise now that the taxonomy is flawed in its assumption that consciousness is experience.
1. An elevator pitch perhaps. You think I haven't tried?

 

[Constance]

By "the big five," are you referring to the points Tononi made in IIT.3 to distinguish consciousness from computation?

I'm still looking for the post in which @smcder used the phrase 'the big five'. Would you clear that up, @Pharoah.

 

[Pharoah]

We should get our feet wet in systems theory so we realize what we are talking about when we refer to it, what it enables us to understand in various disciplines and what its ontological limits are. We might begin with this page concerning the insights of the founder of systems thinking, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the concluding paragraph of which confirms Steve's critique:

"Thus we find similar structures and functions for different systems, independent of the particular domain in which the system exists. General Systems Theory is based on the assumption that there are universal principles of organization, which hold for all systems, be they physical, chemical, biological, mental or social. The mechanistic world view seeks universality by reducing everything to its material constituents. The systemic world view, on the contrary, seeks universality by ignoring the concrete material out of which systems are made, so that their abstract organization comes into focus."

Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach

The systems approach is >99% useless. The term has no meaning having now been adopted by all and sundry to describe anything that is multifaceted. It is on the top 1000 list of most used words in the English language apparently.
There is no coherent definition of or hypothesis for 'system'. IIT might have accidentally found a definition, which I find intriguing, but I am not sure. This is how it might relate to HCT - I have to think about it. It solves a problem that HCT has, namely, how the brain conflates all that immense parallel experience into a non-local singularity (non-local in the brain that is).

 

[Constance]

ps: also interested in hearing the reasoning behind your reaction to the Tononi 5 in a post to #@Soupie today.

 

[Pharoah]

I'm still looking for the post in which @smcder used the phrase 'the big five'. Would you clear that up, @Pharoah.

thread 177

Tononi 5 reaction?

 

[Constance]

The systems approach is >99% useless.

Hmm. An interesting declaration since you seem to be assuming it in HCT. Have you read enough to grok the different ways in which dissipative systems theory is applied in the Varela-Thompson-Neurophenomenology research as opposed to the physicalist-mechanist way in which systems theory has been applied in traditional neuroscience? Those differences are now essential in consciousness studies.

 

[Constance]

thread 177

Got it: "the big five in parapsychology and which some argue supports the idea that the mind is non-local".

Tononi 5 reaction?

IIT's major flaw - evident from the abstract:
I thought one could remove the head from the body of integrated information theory by virtue of the fact that the entire thesis is predicated on the assumed validity of the axioms - the five "self-evident truths" - which are used to qualify the standards by which the theory justifies is own efficacy.

Soupie, you have said on two occasions, that you are not so sure about the axioms. "I am probably wrong", you say. Nor am I sure! The criticisms of the axioms could run into hundreds of column inches and no doubt will. I think Tononi could do with referencing some philosophers who might substantiate his claim that these are the five pertinent axioms derived from the phenomenology of consciousness and that they are inclusive. I think he could do with explaining them more rigorously. One or two statements for each is remarkably brief.

Would you clarify what part of Tononi's IIT.3 descriptions you are referring to? {My first guess was that you were referring to the five characteristics of consciousness he cited to distinguish consciousness from integrated information in computer substrates.) Please quote the 'axioms' you are referring to. Thanks.

 

[Pharoah]

Got it: "the big five in parapsychology and which some argue supports the idea that the mind is non-local".

Would you clarify what part of Tononi's IIT.3 descriptions you are referring to? {My first guess was that you were referring to the five characteristics of consciousness he cited to distinguish consciousness from integrated information in computer substrates.) Please quote the 'axioms' you are referring to. Thanks.

IIT 3.0:

"IIT starts from phenomenological axioms:" (abstract)
IIT identifies "the fundamental properties of experi- ence itself: existence, composition, information, integra- tion, and exclusion. IIT then postulates that the physical substrate of consciousness must satisfy these very properties." (Author summary)

"EXISTENCE: Consciousness exists – it is an undeniable aspect of reality. Paraphrasing Descartes, ‘‘I experience therefore I am’’.

COMPOSITION: Consciousness is compositional (structured): each experience consists of multiple aspects in various combinations. Within the same experience, one can see, for example, left and right, red and blue, a triangle and a square, a red triangle on the left, a blue square on the right, and so on.

INFORMATION: Consciousness is informative: each experience differs in its particular way from other possible experiences. Thus, an experience of pure darkness is what it is by differing,in its particular way, from an immense number of other possible experiences. A small subset of these possible experiences includes, for example, all the frames of all possible movies.

INTEGRATION: Consciousness is integrated: each experience is (strongly) irreducible to non-interdependent components. Thus, experiencing the word ‘‘SONO’’ written in the middle of a blank page is irreducible to an experience of the word ‘‘SO’’ at the right border of a half-page, plus an experience of the word ‘‘NO’’ on the left border of another half page – the experience is whole. Similarly, seeing a red triangle is irreducible to seeing a triangle but no red color, plus a red patch but no triangle.

EXCLUSION: Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only one experience having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences; each experience has definite borders – certain things can be experienced and others cannot; each experience has a particular spatial and temporal grain – it flows at a particular speed, and it has a certain resolution such that some distinctions are possible and finer or coarser distinctions are not." (page 2 right)

 

[Constance]

The systems approach is >99% useless.

An extreme statement. Can you support it? Or cite someone learned in systems theory and its applications who has made this claim and supported it?

The term has no meaning having now been adopted by all and sundry to describe anything that is multifaceted. It is on the top 1000 list of most used words in the English language apparently

That in itself does not mean that systems theory is simply an intellectual fad operating as a mere meme in scientific disciplines.

There is no coherent definition of or hypothesis for 'system'. IIT might have accidentally found a definition, which I find intriguing, but I am not sure. This is how it might relate to HCT - I have to think about it. It solves a problem that HCT has, namely, how the brain conflates all that immense parallel experience into a non-local singularity (non-local in the brain that is).

If so, please tell us how IIT "solves [that] problem that HCT has.".