Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Constance]

Coevolving Innovations | What is a system? (and the challenges of definition)

The commentator following your comment at the page you linked for us cited this google forum as the inspiration for the piece you cited concerning 'definitions' in systems thinking. Here's a helpful post from that forum, but the more detailed and analytic posts preceding and following it are essential in order to grasp the universe of discourse concerning being and meaning in which these cyberneticists are necessarily participating.

Janet Singer

1/18/14

"Duane - Very good points. Communities of practice don't rely on 'definitions' per se: they rely on building up experience with examples of language in use. Dictionaries can help bootstrap this learning for newcomers/outsiders, but part of the way they do this is by juxtaposing etymologies, synonyms, examples in use, etc., to provide a sense of the 'family' of meanings for a term.
Specifying exact definitions is useful only to the extent that the language use needs to be controlled, e.g., from 'somewhat controlled' in a voluntary standard to 'strictly controlled' in a machine ontology. So in defining 'system', the question becomes to what extent is the goal developing appreciation for families of meaning across communities of practice vs attempting to develop a controlled vocabulary. The SPF was targeted at the former goal, and there looseness was an essential part of the design. For the latter goal, how strictly controlled it should be and what approach to take depends on the intended use.
Steve - I agree. If we want to co-locate multiple meanings in one coherent scheme, a pragmatic process philosophy meta theory is the way to go. (This is in line with John Sowa's foundational use of the work of Peirce and Whitehead.)"



Google Groups
NOTE: at that link scroll down to the post by David Ing to reach the thread I'm referring to. Further note: I can't get google to track back to the thread. Will try to remedy that later tonight. Pity. That thread is very informative.


I also followed the link provided by another of the commentators on your cited page to this source:

Metasystem Transitions in Biology

and following further links within that site arrived at the page from which I extract the following paragraphs. At this point I have to stop reading and leave for the evening but I will return to see what others have to say given these additional orientations to thinking about systems, both engineered and occurring in nature. As I see it, systems theory and complexity theory are now essential as our species pursues further understanding of the natural world within which we engineer computational mechanisms and seek understanding of the structures of consciousness.

"...complexity is a measure of how difficult it is to understand how a system will behave or to predict the consequences of changing it. It occurs when there is no simple relationship between what an individual element does and what the system as a whole will do, and when the system includes some element of adaptation or problem solving to achieve its goals in different situations. It can be affected by objective attributes of a system such as by the number, types of and diversity of system elements and relationships, or by the subjective perceptions of system observers due to their experience, knowledge, training, or other sociopolitical considerations. This view of complex systems provides insight into the kind of system for which systems thinking and a systems approach is essential.

Complexity and Engineered Systems
The different perspectives on complexity are not independent when considered across a systems context. Both problem situations and potential solutions may contain subjective and objective complexity; structural complexity of a system-of-interest (SoI) may be related to dynamic complexity when the SoI also functions as part of a wider system in different problem scenarios. People are involved in most system contexts, as system elements and as part of the operating environment. People are also involved with systems throughout the lifetimes of those systems.

Sheard and Mostashari (Sheard and Mostashari 2011) show the ways different views of complexity map onto product system, service system and enterprise system contexts, as well as to associated development and sustainment systems and project organizations. Ordered systems occur as system components and are the subject of traditional engineering. It is important to understand the behaviors of such systems when using them in a complex system. One might also need to consider both truly random or chaotic natural or social systems as part of the context of an engineered system. The main focus for systems approaches is organized complexity, the ways we choose to structure system elements to help manage and mitigate both objective and subjective complexity.
Sillitto (Sillitto 2009) considers the link between the types of system complexity and system architecture. The ability to understand, manage and respond to both objective and subjective complexity be they in the problem situation, the systems we develop or the systems we use to develop and sustain them is a key component of the Systems Approach Applied to Engineered Systems and hence to the practice of systems engineering."

Complexity - SEBoK

 

[smcder]

Thanks for this. I need to know where I am gibberish
qualitative impact on replicative mechanism - translation: the impact on the quality of mechanisms that replicate (not 'impacts replication' itself) where quality is define by how something comes to influence the survival potential of the replicator.
qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction - I agree this is poor. translation: (I am talking abut the relation between a mechanism that replicates and its environment). The relation between the environment and mechanisms that replicate must be qualitative because a qualitative relation is pertinent to the survival of a mechanism. Only replicating mechanisms can pass on their structure to offspring, and the structures that are more qualitatively response to environment are more likely to propagate... soreplication is a vital conduit to the evolution of mechanisms that are qualitatively response to environment.
Too wordy now hey smcder?

I remember the scene in Amadeus where the King says "Too many notes!" ... ;-)

Alternatively, in competition with IIT HCT gives that explanation, though admittedly, none of you seem to understand my theory despite your efforts to do so.

I do like smcder's highlighting of phrases that he says are not clear. That allows me to target my efforts

Do you have any one else who does understand the theory? Someone who might be able to give you back that elevator speech or put that understanding in their own words?

I suspect this has largely been an individual effort because you seem to have developed the language from scratch ... you're so familiar with the ways these words are used that it may be hard for you to understand how others understand those same words - so the problem is one of translation.

It's not unusual in the history of philosophy for the students of an innovator to be the ones to move the philosophy forward by doing this translation. The ability to form or discover new concepts by no means goes with the ability to convey them.

Here is my current understanding of HCT:

it's basically an evolutionary theory in which structures, physical systems form arbitrarily according to physical rules and one product of those systems is consciousness and it is retained and increases in complexity because it contributes to the system's ability to maintain stability and to reproduce

where it may differ from mainstream evolutionary theory is that it seems to have a teleology or direction (although it's not clear that you think this is an inevitable part of evolution) consciousness gets more complex and you predict a fifth stage or cycle

mainstream evolutionary theory would say consciousness is a by product of physical evolution and is either epiphenomenal but rides along through the selection process because it is connected to structures that are adaptative or it is adapative itself - although causal closure tends to prevent most from seeing how subjectivity could be causal - at the end, it's neurons firing that does all the work - consciousness is just how it feels ...

I don't see where HCT addresses the hard problem which is how matter can give rise to subjective feeling, the what it is like to be a phenomenon ... Nagel's challenge was how to describe in purely physical terms (objectively) subjective experience. It's not apparent from the physical properties of matter that it could be arranged in any way that would give rise to "what it is like to be"

So if I were skimming a journal, I would categorize HCT as a (possibly) teleological theory of the evolution of consciouness, but otherwise pretty mainstream ... what would I be missing?

 

[Pharoah]

I remember the scene in Amadeus where the King says "Too many notes!" ... ;-)

Alternatively, in competition with IIT HCT gives that explanation, though admittedly, none of you seem to understand my theory despite your efforts to do so.

I do like smcder's highlighting of phrases that he says are not clear. That allows me to target my efforts

Do you have any one else who does understand the theory? Someone who might be able to give you back that elevator speech or put that understanding in their own words?

I suspect this has largely been an individual effort because you seem to have developed the language from scratch ... you're so familiar with the ways these words are used that it may be hard for you to understand how others understand those same words - so the problem is one of translation.

It's not unusual in the history of philosophy for the students of an innovator to be the ones to move the philosophy forward by doing this translation. The ability to form or discover new concepts by no means goes with the ability to convey them.

Here is my current understanding of HCT:

it's basically an evolutionary theory in which structures, physical systems form arbitrarily according to physical rules and one product of those systems is consciousness and it is retained and increases in complexity because it contributes to the system's ability to maintain stability and to reproduce

where it may differ from mainstream evolutionary theory is that it seems to have a teleology or direction (although it's not clear that you think this is an inevitable part of evolution) consciousness gets more complex and you predict a fifth stage or cycle

mainstream evolutionary theory would say consciousness is a by product of physical evolution and is either epiphenomenal but rides along through the selection process because it is connected to structures that are adaptative or it is adapative itself - although causal closure tends to prevent most from seeing how subjectivity could be causal - at the end, it's neurons firing that does all the work - consciousness is just how it feels ...

I don't see where HCT addresses the hard problem which is how matter can give rise to subjective feeling, the what it is like to be a phenomenon ... Nagel's challenge was how to describe in purely physical terms (objectively) subjective experience. It's not apparent from the physical properties of matter that it could be arranged in any way that would give rise to "what it is like to be"

So if I were skimming a journal, I would categorize HCT as a (possibly) teleological theory of the evolution of consciouness, but otherwise pretty mainstream ... what would I be missing?

That is a helpful overview and you are absolutely correct in saying it is a translation problem. In the early days, my ideas were entirely abstract. When I read those early versions, I think that it makes perfect sense, and wonder why nobody understood? It is a puzzle to me. Similarly now, I am in the dark as to what is not understood and why.
I also recognise that I am developing an understanding of what the theory implies myself and am continually learning how it relates to approaches in philosophy of consciousness. The theory is always evolving. I have to say that I never think it is going backwards.
With regard to 'students' furthering the work of new ideas, I do think that HCT impacts in many different ways in many different fields of study. I cannot follow every avenue, and my interpretative explorations are focused in limited areas. I cannot address all the skeptics' questions, but have to be selective. There are many ways of applying HCT which would be beyond my capabilities, knowledge, creative powers etc.

A key difference between HCT and evolutionary theory is that HCT describes and explains the emergence of novel types of systems-forms. It is not just a linear growth of complexity of, for example, physical structures: the evolution of complexity leads to step-changes - emergent forms that are constructed from different types of constituent 'elements' (to borrow a term from IIT). These novel 'higher' forms cannot exert downward causation on those forms below it, but they are constituted by them. Incidentally, the causal implications are an example of another area that I could explore, but requires much time, reading and skill.

I do think HCT addresses the hard problem (of experience) which is how matter can give rise to subjective feeling, the what it is like to be a phenomenon.
I can see that I need to make a clearer argument in this regard. I have been working on this...

 

[smcder]

That is a helpful overview and you are absolutely correct in saying it is a translation problem. In the early days, my ideas were entirely abstract. When I read those early versions, I think that it makes perfect sense, and wonder why nobody understood? It is a puzzle to me. Similarly now, I am in the dark as to what is not understood and why.
I also recognise that I am developing an understanding of what the theory implies myself and am continually learning how it relates to approaches in philosophy of consciousness. The theory is always evolving. I have to say that I never think it is going backwards.
With regard to 'students' furthering the work of new ideas, I do think that HCT impacts in many different ways in many different fields of study. I cannot follow every avenue, and my interpretative explorations are focused in limited areas. I cannot address all the skeptics' questions, but have to be selective. There are many ways of applying HCT which would be beyond my capabilities, knowledge, creative powers etc.

A key difference between HCT and evolutionary theory is that HCT describes and explains the emergence of novel types of systems-forms. It is not just a linear growth of complexity of, for example, physical structures: the evolution of complexity leads to step-changes - emergent forms that are constructed from different types of constituent 'elements' (to borrow a term from IIT). These novel 'higher' forms cannot exert downward causation on those forms below it, but they are constituted by them. Incidentally, the causal implications are an example of another area that I could explore, but requires much time, reading and skill.

I do think HCT addresses the hard problem (of experience) which is how matter can give rise to subjective feeling, the what it is like to be a phenomenon.
I can see that I need to make a clearer argument in this regard. I have been working on this...

If you've solved or resolved the hard problem ... this would be a major achievement in philosophy. I would keep that under wraps until you had confirmed it with someone like Chalmers or Nagel. I'm very serious.

But my concern, were I in your position, would be that not having a background in CS or POM prior to coming up with HCT and not pursuing a wider understanding of relevant fields in order to focus on HCT ... That I might have reinvented the wheel or may not have understood the requirements of solving the hard problem.

I don't have much formal background in philosophy but between myself @Soupie and @Constance we've looked at the hard problem in some depth and are at least familiar with the seminal papers and I would think we might be able to see if it were addressed in HCT by now. On the other hand new concepts are very hard to grasp ... and convey so I am eager to understand your solution.

That said Chalmers and many others have said that not only do we not have a solution - we don't even know what one might look like ... See especially McGinns "New Mysterian" position ... solving or otherwise disposing of the HP would be a tremendous achievement.

 

[Soupie]

Given IIT, I am surprised that the structure of brain is not more homogenous. (A similar problem with the universe is its lack of homogeneity, interestingly). Nevertheless, it is the 'structural perturbations' that make the brain what it is. IIT would seem to suggest that the brain could be a neural soup, but clearly the structures are doing something. But then how do the structures link (sensory perceptions for example) with the 'information' of the "qualia space"?

Okay, I thought you might be making this assumption.

Yes, IIT says that subjectivity -- "phenomenal feel" -- arises from integrated neurons. However, IIT does not say that the brain consists of one giant homogeneous cluster of integrated neurons. No.

IIT specifically states (but does not go into detail) that neural complexes (brain regions) evolved in direct response to regular patterns of stimuli (over billions of years).

Again, as I've said, this is the "link." It's the same link you outline in HCT, and I don't think this is a novel idea. The phenotype of all organisms -- their bodies, brains, behaviors, and minds -- reflect the environment in which they evolved/adapted over billions of years. As you note, we can consider the phenotype to actually be a representation of the environment in which the phenotype is enmeshed.

What IIT says is that it's one thing to say the phenotype is a representation, but quite another to say that it feels like something to be a representation. Yes, as self-aware humans, we can say there is a qualitative "link" between the organism and its environment, but that does not in itself cause subjectivity to pop into existence.

What is subjectivity? We can say it's related to representation(s), but what is its ontology?

IIT says that, yes, organisms are representations of their environment; that is, they've adapted to their environment. This adaptation allows them to represent their environment with their bodies (nervous system) and their brains (neural complexes). However, IIT does something HCT does not; it says that these representations get their feel due to the manner in which they are generated, i.e., causally integrated neurons/information.

Now, (1) this hypothesis may be utterly wrong -- however, the authors have empirical research linking reports of consciousness to neural complexes of integrated neurons. (2) This is not an explanation of why/how causally integrated neurons give rise to phenomenality.

Pharaoh: "HCT does make the link by explaining how the environment influences the evolution of life forms to the extent that they develop physiological and neurological mechanisms that are responsive to those environmental specifics as they relate to the organism, its survival, and at its multitude of needs."

Soupie: "Okay. This description however does not exclude IIT."

Pharaoh: It does not exclude IIT by default, true, but surely the theory is utterly impotent without an extension-fixing narrative.

Again, the authors of IIT are not suggesting that a human missing a, say, visual cortex will still have experiences of phenomenal colors. The human visual cortex is linked to the environment. (However, there is a lot of evidence that the human brain is incredibly plastic, and that when its so-called "specialized" regions of the brain are damaged or even missing (!) that other parts of the brain take over. This does suggest some high level of homogeneity.)

You ask me whether HCT posits that "humans will have a special neurological mechanism for green, a special neurological mechanism for sour, a special neurological mechanism for happy, a special neurological mechanism for itchy, etc."

That would be absurd.

I agree. Okay, so if each unique qualitative feel does not always arise from a unique, direct "link" to the environment, doesn't that suggest there is a general internal principle/process from which subjectivity arises?

According to IIT, one need have no external reference to an experience such as 'breen'. And IIT does not preclude experiencing all possible experiences that exist in the universe by virtue of the fact that the neural substrate generates quale independently from the external environment. Therefore, under IIT the brain will evoke any and all possible quales, whether or not they have their correlative environmental equivalent. Under IIT we would experience non environmentally-correlative experiences. They would just happen for no reason... you might be sitting on your sofa and experience the quality of breen and think, 'shit, what was that?

No and yes.

No. Both IIT and HCT suggest that organisms have adapted to their environments and thus produce adaptive representations of their environment (of which they are a part of, etc.) See above for how you've misinterpreted ITT as saying that organisms and their phenomenal landscape are not adapted to their environment. In fact, Tonini has referenced research that indicates that organisms using principals of integration to represent the environment are more successful. (I'm not saying these studies are accurate, only pointing out that Tonini/IIT are not neglecting the "link.")

Yes. People do have "non environmentally-correlative experiences" all the time! No, they don't experience "breen," but -- despite your insistence -- IIT does not predict that they would. Again, ITT is not suggesting that the human brain is a homogeneous lump of integrated neurons. Tonini has actually studied real brains, and thought about real brains. The process of how a human sees phenomenal green does not start with integrated neurons; it's a very complex process.

And nothing in IIT says that the various neural complexes of integrated neurons are all homogeneous. There can be heterogeneous complexes of integrated neurons (and probably are).

Integration may require feedback, but are we really supposed to believe that feedback is the sole requisite for integration and therefore of consciousness?

No.

Causally integrated neurons are not the "sole requisite" for subjectivity. However, it may turn out that -- so far as cognition having a "feel" -- they are the key mechanism/process.

HCT reveals, that it is not ‘a brain state equals consciousness’ thing.

IIT does not suggest that either. "Consciousness" is a process that involves the environment, the body, and the brain. What IIT does suggest, however, is that representations acquire their qualitative feel from causally integrated neurons.

[IIT] does not provide a link between what makes the 'quality' (in qualitative phenomena) and the external environment... which is great to your way of thinking, but in my view makes it impotent and essentially non-explanatory.

So far as I understand, IIT does not suggest that organisms are not adaptive representations of their environment.

So far as I understand, HCT does not give an explanation of how adaptive representations (organisms) of environments acquire a phenomenal feel.

 

[Pharoah]

Okay, I thought you might be making this assumption.

Yes, IIT says that subjectivity -- "phenomenal feel" -- arises from integrated neurons. However, IIT does not say that the brain consists of one giant homogeneous cluster of integrated neurons. No.

IIT specifically states (but does not go into detail) that neural complexes (brain regions) evolved in direct response to regular patterns of stimuli (over billions of years).

Again, as I've said, this is the "link." It's the same link you outline in HCT, and I don't think this is a novel idea. The phenotype of all organisms -- their bodies, brains, behaviors, and minds -- reflect the environment in which they evolved/adapted over billions of years. As you note, we can consider the phenotype to actually be a representation of the environment in which the phenotype is enmeshed.

What IIT says is that it's one thing to say the phenotype is a representation, but quite another to say that it feels like something to be a representation. Yes, as self-aware humans, we can say there is a qualitative "link" between the organism and its environment, but that does not in itself cause subjectivity to pop into existence.

What is subjectivity? We can say it's related to representation(s), but what is its ontology?

IIT says that, yes, organisms are representations of their environment; that is, they've adapted to their environment. This adaptation allows them to represent their environment with their bodies (nervous system) and their brains (neural complexes). However, IIT does something HCT does not; it says that these representations get their feel due to the manner in which they are generated, i.e., causally integrated neurons/information.

Now, (1) this hypothesis may be utterly wrong -- however, the authors have empirical research linking reports of consciousness to neural complexes of integrated neurons. (2) This is not an explanation of why/how causally integrated neurons give rise to phenomenality.


Again, the authors of IIT are not suggesting that a human missing a, say, visual cortex will still have experiences of phenomenal colors. The human visual cortex is linked to the environment. (However, there is a lot of evidence that the human brain is incredibly plastic, and that when its so-called "specialized" regions of the brain are damaged or even missing (!) that other parts of the brain take over. This does suggest some high level of homogeneity.)


I agree. Okay, so if each unique qualitative feel does not always arise from a unique, direct "link" to the environment, doesn't that suggest there is a general internal principle/process from which subjectivity arises?


No and yes.

No. Both IIT and HCT suggest that organisms have adapted to their environments and thus produce adaptive representations of their environment (of which they are a part of, etc.) See above for how you've misinterpreted ITT as saying that organisms and their phenomenal landscape are not adapted to their environment. In fact, Tonini has referenced research that indicates that organisms using principals of integration to represent the environment are more successful. (I'm not saying these studies are accurate, only pointing out that Tonini/IIT are not neglecting the "link.")

Yes. People do have "non environmentally-correlative experiences" all the time! No, they don't experience "breen," but -- despite your insistence -- IIT does not predict that they would. Again, ITT is not suggesting that the human brain is a homogeneous lump of integrated neurons. Tonini has actually studied real brains, and thought about real brains. The process of how a human sees phenomenal green does not start with integrated neurons; it's a very complex process.

And nothing in IIT says that the various neural complexes of integrated neurons are all homogeneous. There can be heterogeneous complexes of integrated neurons (and probably are).


No.

Causally integrated neurons are not the "sole requisite" for subjectivity. However, it may turn out that -- so far as cognition having a "feel" -- they are the key mechanism/process.


IIT does not suggest that either. "Consciousness" is a process that involves the environment, the body, and the brain. What IIT does suggest, however, is that representations acquire their qualitative feel from causally integrated neurons.


So far as I understand, IIT does not suggest that organisms are not adaptive representations of their environment.

So far as I understand, HCT does not give an explanation of how adaptive representations (organisms) of environments acquire a phenomenal feel.

Soupie, I'm going to burst a blood vessel over this
"IIT says that subjectivity -- "phenomenal feel" -- arises from integrated neurons." Why does it? Why should it?

 

[Soupie]

Why does it?

A question for a physician?

Why should it?

A question for a metaphysician?

If phenomenal green does turn out to be information generated by an organism, then I think we can say that information is adaptive for a system that generates it, ergo phenomenal green is adaptive for organisms.

As I've noted, I think Chalmers' Zombie Problem is flawed given the above "if" statement. That is, to say that a physical clone of me can exist but not experience consciousness, would be like saying a physical clone of me can exist but not carry/generate information. I argue that can't happen in our (part of the) universe.

From a law of physics perspective, why might information generated via causally integrated neurons have a qualitative feel? I haven't a clue.

 

[Soupie]

I'll look for myself of course, but does anyone know off hand any articles that outline flaws in "representation model of consciousness?"

 

[Soupie]

Soupie, I'm going to burst a blood vessel over this
"IIT says that subjectivity -- "phenomenal feel" -- arises from integrated neurons." Why does it? Why should it?

Note: Phenomenal feel/qualitative feel means more than just good or bad. Right?

 

[smcder]

I'll look for myself of course, but does anyone know off hand any articles that outline flaws in "representation model of consciousness?"

Do you mean this

Representational Theories of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) ?

 

[Pharoah]

A question for a physician?


A question for a metaphysician?

If phenomenal green does turn out to be information generated by an organism, then I think we can say that information is adaptive for a system that generates it, ergo phenomenal green is adaptive for organisms.

As I've noted, I think Chalmers' Zombie Problem is flawed given the above "if" statement. That is, to say that a physical clone of me can exist but not experience consciousness, would be like saying a physical clone of me can exist but not carry/generate information. I argue that can't happen in our (part of the) universe.

From a law of physics perspective, why might information generated via causally integrated neurons have a qualitative feel? I haven't a clue.

"From a law of physics perspective, why might information generated via causally integrated neurons have a qualitative feel? I haven't a clue."
Yea right...!! and nor has Tononi!
So let's just summarise
IIT is a theory of conscious. Why does integrated information have anything to do with consciousness or qualitative experience? "I have no idea"
I am please we have worked out the fundamental flaw now.
Perhaps you might want to consider what it actually is a theory of now.

 

[Pharoah]

I'll look for myself of course, but does anyone know off hand any articles that outline flaws in "representation model of consciousness?"

Natural theories of consciousness
is very good. written by a repreesentationalist

not read this reply but it will be good

http://www.theassc.org/files/assc/2434.pdf

 

[Soupie]

IIT is a theory of conscious. Why does integrated information have anything to do with consciousness or qualitative experience? "I have no idea"

That's a different question.

How causally integrated neurons generate qualitative feel/phenomenality is one question. I imagine Tonini will address that at some point.

What causally integrated neurons have to do with consciousness and qualitative feel is another. For example, it appears that reports of qualitative experience (representations) are strongly correlated with regions of the brain possessing causally integrated neurons; so strongly correlated that a physicalist -- such as Tonini -- hypothesizes that qualitative feel arises from causally integrated neurons.

I am please we have worked out the fundamental flaw now.

I thought the flaw was that IIT didn't connect representations with the environment?

Or is that IIT doesn't connect the qualitative feel of representations to the environment? (It doesn't.)

Incidentally, I don't see how HCT does the latter either (if that is what you are claiming). As noted, I don't grok how HCT accounts for qualitative feel at all.

But again, I want to clarify: When you use the phrase "qualitative feel" to refer to, say, green, are you referring to the experience of green itself or only whether we feel good or bad about green? I ask that serious question because in your book, I began to notice that you seem to define "qualitative" as a good or bad feeling.

Perhaps you might want to consider what it actually is a theory of now.

It's a physicalist theory about how phenomenal experiences acquire their feel. If it's true that "what it's like" arises from causally integrated neurons, then the next question will be: Why do causally integrated neurons produce information that it feels like something to be.

For all I know, Tonini et al may already have a hypothesis. Phenomenal feel may be pure causality. A difference that (feels like) a difference.

 

[Soupie]

Or is it that IIT doesn't connect the qualitative feel of representations to the environment? (It doesn't.)

I just wanted to clarify this statement:

ITT does connect the qualitative feel of representations to the environment in the sense that the evolved phenotype is a representation of the environment.

What IIT doesn't do is say that the "feel" of a representation is intrinsic to the physical stimuli which it is representing.

For example, phenomenal green may be our evolved representation of wavelength X, but the way it feels to be phenomenal green doesn't derive from a property of wavelength X.

 

[Pharoah]

ok soupie... that's it for me. I'm writing up my critique for my website but i hav had enough discussing it here.

 

[Constance]

. . . A key difference between HCT and evolutionary theory is that HCT describes and explains the emergence of novel types of systems-forms. It is not just a linear growth of complexity of, for example, physical structures: the evolution of complexity leads to step-changes - emergent forms that are constructed from different types of constituent 'elements' (to borrow a term from IIT). These novel 'higher' forms cannot exert downward causation on those forms below it, but they are constituted by them. Incidentally, the causal implications are an example of another area that I could explore, but requires much time, reading and skill.

Sounds to some extent like Developmental Systems Theory, but with a major difference:

". . . although it does not claim that all structures are equal, development systems theory is fundamentally opposed to reductionism of all kinds. In short, developmental systems theory intends to formulate a perspective which does not presume the causal (or ontological) priority of any particular entity and thereby maintains an explanatory openness on all empirical fronts.[1] For example, there is vigorous resistance to the widespread assumptions that one can legitimately speak of genes ‘for’ specific phenotypic characters or that adaptation consists of evolution ‘shaping’ the more or less passive species, as opposed to adaptation consisting of organisms actively selecting, defining, shaping and often creating their niches.[2]"

Developmental systems theory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Issues highlighted here:
Developmental systems theory: Information from Answers.com

Links to further reading and research at the end of the Wikipedia page as usual.

I do think HCT addresses the hard problem (of experience) which is how matter can give rise to subjective feeling, the what it is like to be a phenomenon.
I can see that I need to make a clearer argument in this regard. I have been working on this...

I think that is the major problem HCT faces. How can/will it demonstrate that "matter can give rise to subjective feeing" and thus to consciousness and mind? Note the clause highlighted in blue above. This, as Panksepp realizes, is the nut of the problem.

 

[Constance]

Pharoah said: ↑
"Given IIT, I am surprised that the structure of brain is not more homogenous. (A similar problem with the universe is its lack of homogeneity, interestingly). Nevertheless, it is the 'structural perturbations' that make the brain what it is. IIT would seem to suggest that the brain could be a neural soup, but clearly the structures are doing something. But then how do the structures link (sensory perceptions for example) with the 'information' of the "qualia space"?"

That is precisely the question being pursued in Neurophenomenology, built on the accumulating insights of Maturana and Varela and many others in biological and mind sciences. Sorry to repeat myself again, but you have only to spend an evening reading the two papers I linked (concerning Varela and by Thompson) to see the productivity and the challenge of this project.

 

[smcder]

ok soupie... that's it for me. I'm writing up my critique for my website but i hav had enough discussing it here.

?

 

[Soupie]

ok soupie... that's it for me. I'm writing up my critique for my website but i hav had enough discussing it here.

I'm going to finish your collection of writings, but I'd love to read a ~20 page paper that presented the core of HCT, and particularly how it answers the hard problem (as defined by Chalmers).

 

[Pharoah]

Pharoah said: ↑
"Given IIT, I am surprised that the structure of brain is not more homogenous. (A similar problem with the universe is its lack of homogeneity, interestingly). Nevertheless, it is the 'structural perturbations' that make the brain what it is. IIT would seem to suggest that the brain could be a neural soup, but clearly the structures are doing something. But then how do the structures link (sensory perceptions for example) with the 'information' of the "qualia space"?"

That is precisely the question being pursued in Neurophenomenology, built on the accumulating insights of Maturana and Varela and many others in biological and mind sciences. Sorry to repeat myself again, but you have only to spend an evening reading the two papers I linked (concerning Varela and by Thompson) to see the productivity and the challenge of this project.

@Constance Reading phenomenology papers at moment
@Soupie Will do 20 page... it has been on my mind for some time.
@smcder ? There is only so much wriggle room...
And the research is as flawed as the theory A Theoretically Based Index of Consciousness Independent of Sensory Processing and Behavior
The term "integration" is defined as "distributed interactions in the brain (integration)", and
the term "information" is defined as the "algorithmic complexity (information)" evident in the spatiotemporal pattern of neural responses.
So that when the brain is perturbed by transcranial magnetic stimulation
The perturbational complexity index measures, by its own theoretical definition, the levels of "information" and "integration" (yes, by its own definition) and by doing so determines the "level of consciousness" - unsurprisingly by virtue of the definition that states that consciousness is defined by levels of information and integration.
Alternatively one might say that levels of brain activity have something to do with levels of consciousness. As I said in a thread when IIT was first broached; "It's the brain wot does it" hardly ground breaking.