Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Soupie]

I want to make sure because you and Pharoah both seem to be confused about my position.

I have no idea what your position is.

I find @Constance 's position to be incoherent. I've asked probing questions many times and have either gotten no answer or unsatisfactory answers.

@Pharoah 's approach is the most coherent to me, but I unfortunately do not see how his model addresses the HP, let alone answers it.

I've made my position pretty clear — that I feel the IP approach to consciousness is the most promising. For what it's worth, Chalmers confirms that the approach is at least coherent, if not a leading approach.

I understand that the three of you find the approach lacking. Ive attempted to identify why.

As noted, after I finish Pharoah's book, I will move on to neurophenomenology. However, from what I've read of it in the past, I feel the approach is more than compatible with IP.

www.neurophenomenology.com

An excerpt from "Mind and Life."

"This problem is known as the large-scale integration problem (Varela et al. 2001). According to dynamical neuroscience, the key variable for understanding large-scale integration is not so much the activity of the individual neural components, but rather the nature of the dynamic links among them. The neural counterparts of mental activity are thus investigated at the level of collective variables that describe emergent and changing patterns of large-scale integration. One recent approach to defining these collective variables is to measure transient patterns of synchronous oscillations between different populations of neurons (Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001; Varela et al. 2001). According to Varela (1995, 1999), these synchrony patterns define a temporal frame of momentary and transient neural integration that corresponds to the duration of the present moment of experience.​

Varela presents the reasoning behind this view in the form of three connected, but logically independent, working hypotheses (1994, 1999, pp 274-277):

Hypothesis I: For every cognitive act. there is a singular, specific neural
assembly that underlies its emergence and operation.

According to this hypothesis, the emergence of any cognitive act requires the rapid coordination of many different capacities (attention, perception, memory, motivation, and so on) and the widely distributed neural systems subserving them. The neurophysiological substrate for this large-scale coordination is assumed to be a neural assembly, which can be defined as a distributed subset of neurons with strong reciprocal connections.

In the context of large-scale integration, a dynamic neural assembly engages vast and disparate regions of the brain. There are reciprocal connections within the same cortical area or between areas at the same level of the network; there are also reciprocal connections that link different levels in different brain regions. Because of these strong interconnections across widely distributed areas, a large-scale neural assembly can be activated or ignited from any of its smaller subsets,whether sensorimotor or internal. These assemblies have a transient, dynamic existence that spans the time required to accomplish an elementary cognitive act and for neural activity to propagate through the assembly.

Various empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that the time-scale of such neurocognitive activity—whether it be a perception/ action state (such as an eye or head movement), passing thought or memory, or emotional appraisal—is in the range of a fraction of a second, roughly 250-500 milliseconds or more (see Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992; Poppel 1988). Varela (1999) calls this scale of duration the “1 scale” of large-scale integration and he distinguishes it from the “1/10 scale” of elementary sensorimotor and neural events (10—l00 milliseconds), and the “I0 scale” of descriptive-narrative assessments involving memory. During successive time intervals at the 1/ 10 and 1 scale, there is competition between different neural assemblies: when a neural assembly is ignited from one or more of its smaller subsets, it either reaches coherence or is swamped by the competing activations of other overlapping assemblies. If the assembly holds together after its activation, then one can assume it has a transitory efficacy.”"​

 

[smcder]

I have no idea what your position is.

I find @Constance 's position to be incoherent. I've asked probing questions many times and have either gotten no answer or unsatisfactory answers.

@Pharoah 's approach is the most coherent to me, but I unfortunately do not see how his model addresses the HP, let alone answers it.

I've made my position pretty clear — that I feel the IP approach to consciousness is the most promising. For what it's worth, Chalmers confirms that the approach is at least coherent, if not a leading approach.

I understand that the three of you find the approach lacking. Ive attempted to identify why.

As noted, after I finish Pharoah's book, I will move on to neurophenomenology. However, from what I've read of it in the past, I feel the approach is more than compatible with IP.

www.neurophenomenology.com

An excerpt from "Mind and Life."

"This problem is known as the large-scale integration problem (Varela et al. 2001). According to dynamical neuroscience, the key variable for understanding large-scale integration is not so much the activity of the individual neural components, but rather the nature of the dynamic links among them. The neural counterparts of mental activity are thus investigated at the level of collective variables that describe emergent and changing patterns of large-scale integration. One recent approach to defining these collective variables is to measure transient patterns of synchronous oscillations between different populations of neurons (Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001; Varela et al. 2001). According to Varela (1995, 1999), these synchrony patterns define a temporal frame of momentary and transient neural integration that corresponds to the duration of the present moment of experience.​

Varela presents the reasoning behind this view in the form of three connected, but logically independent, working hypotheses (1994, 1999, pp 274-277):

Hypothesis I: For every cognitive act. there is a singular, specific neural
assembly that underlies its emergence and operation.

According to this hypothesis, the emergence of any cognitive act requires the rapid coordination of many different capacities (attention, perception, memory, motivation, and so on) and the widely distributed neural systems subserving them. The neurophysiological substrate for this large-scale coordination is assumed to be a neural assembly, which can be defined as a distributed subset of neurons with strong reciprocal connections.

In the context of large-scale integration, a dynamic neural assembly engages vast and disparate regions of the brain. There are reciprocal connections within the same cortical area or between areas at the same level of the network; there are also reciprocal connections that link different levels in different brain regions. Because of these strong interconnections across widely distributed areas, a large-scale neural assembly can be activated or ignited from any of its smaller subsets,whether sensorimotor or internal. These assemblies have a transient, dynamic existence that spans the time required to accomplish an elementary cognitive act and for neural activity to propagate through the assembly.

Various empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that the time-scale of such neurocognitive activity—whether it be a perception/ action state (such as an eye or head movement), passing thought or memory, or emotional appraisal—is in the range of a fraction of a second, roughly 250-500 milliseconds or more (see Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992; Poppel 1988). Varela (1999) calls this scale of duration the “1 scale” of large-scale integration and he distinguishes it from the “1/10 scale” of elementary sensorimotor and neural events (10—l00 milliseconds), and the “I0 scale” of descriptive-narrative assessments involving memory. During successive time intervals at the 1/ 10 and 1 scale, there is competition between different neural assemblies: when a neural assembly is ignited from one or more of its smaller subsets, it either reaches coherence or is swamped by the competing activations of other overlapping assemblies. If the assembly holds together after its activation, then one can assume it has a transitory efficacy.”"​

"I have no idea what your position is."

Good, Then I've done my job well! ;-)

"I find @Constance 's position to be incoherent. I've asked probing questions many times and have either gotten no answer or unsatisfactory answers."

And I don't - so as Moran might say, that's a subjective issue

You aren't going to either unless you immerse yourself in the materials she's pointed us to ... Phenomenology isn't something you can read "about" and unless you are open to understanding the answers on their own terms ... that's frustrating to you ... but believe me it's frustrating on this side too ...

It doesn't mean you'll agree but you will be able to understand the coherence of the position and critique it if you like and then ask better questions.

If you just don't have time or interest that's fine - I argue you are missing good insights but you can choose to focus only on what's interesting and accessible to you at this time until you do have an opportunity to study other areas.

 

[smcder]

It seems that the greater scientific and philosophic communities agree that there are no models which fully account for consciousness. As a microcosm, we here at the PC also find that we have no models which explain consciousness, though some of us have preferences for certain approaches.

One "problem" I see is that people conceive of the phenomena of consciousness differently, and thus the solution/explanation they seek will differ accordingly.

For instance, @smcder, you seem to be searching for an explanation/solution that explains a consciousness that has causal influence over matter (a la free will and PSI). If someone proposes a theory/model that does not address these facets of consciousness (as some conceive it) then some will reject this model out of hand.

My post above was an effort to define the phenomenon that we are discussing here in this thread, or at least the define what each of us is looking for a model to explain. So that when a model/theory is proposed and/or discussed, we can all be clear about whether it considers certain facets of consciousness that some of us want it to.

So for example, some may feel strongly that consciousness cannot be constituted of information because they can't see how information might have causal influence over matter. Without making this perceived problem known, others may be left confused as to why a model is being rejected. Or someone may strongly that consciousness is natural, and therefore any models which do not account consciousness via natural processes will be rejected.

We all have different conceptions of what consciousness is, ergo we're all looking for different explanations.

From August 2014

Soupie

"It seems to me that your position is the opposite of mine: You take OBEs, NDEs, and past lives to be primary, and thus try to understand consciousness secondarily."

No. Let me lay it out again:

1. I am agnostic as to the major theories of consciousness - from what I've seen, they are all inadequate and even their strong proponents seem to admit this. As to the hard problem - and I've said this before - Chalmers and Nagel and others still tell us we don't even know what an answer would look like. If you want to dueling quotes - we can.

And then,

From your post above (yesterday)

@smcder, you seem to be searching for an explanation/solution that explains a consciousness that has causal influence over matter (a la free will and PSI)

 

[Soupie]

@smcder

The other thing I think plagues us in this discussion is taking as foundational there being an absolute distinction to be made between matter and mind. This has been an issue for Soupie from the beginning, as I see it, and I think it also conditions what Pharoah is able to think. [in both cases, they seem to feel the need for a physical account in which matter must be explanatory, in which mind must somehow be fully accounted for by matter or by physical information originating in matter].

Here Constance seems to be critiquing my affinity for the idea of a mind-body duality. She seems to be implying that assuming a duality between body and mind is an error.

This implies that she believes there is an ontological identity between body and mind. That is, she seems to be suggesting there is no mind-body duality.

However, incoherently, she continues on to critique the idea that mind can be fully accouted for by physical processes.

What? You don't find that incoherent?

There is no mind-body duality. The mind can't be explained by the body.

Sure. Whatever.

Furthermore, Constance has made it clear she favors a naturalistic approach to mind. She has an affinity for neurophenomenology; the marriage of neuroscience and phenomenology.

However, Constance is skeptical that consciousness arises from neural processes in the brain, but rather favors a quantum explanation for consciousness.

Ok.

I'm sorry but I find all of that pretty mich incoherent.

I've asked her to explain a) whether a human and a squid might have the same kind of mind, and b) why or why not.

I got no answer, but rather she became very defensive (why, Im not sure).

I asked her what insights she had gained from her first-person reflections that allowed her to determine her mind was not constituted of information, and she noted that she once experienced a stream of reflective consciousness.

How this answers my question, I don't know.

 

[Soupie]

No. Let me lay it out again:

1. I am agnostic as to the major theories of consciousness - from what I've seen, they are all inadequate and even their strong proponents seem to admit this. As to the hard problem - and I've said this before - Chalmers and Nagel and others still tell us we don't even know what an answer would look like. If you want to dueling quotes - we can.

And then,

From your post above (yesterday)

@smcder, you seem to be searching for an explanation/solution that explains a consciousness that has causal influence over matter (a la free will and PSI)

Yesterday's post was in response to your rejection of Chalmers' indication that IP was a potentially fruitful approach to the HP. You posted something like "how does this explain the evidence."

Based on Chalmers' statement, one would assume it did account for "the evidence." Thus, it's pretty obvious that there is "evidence" that you are seeking an explanation for that Chalmers is not, i.e, PSI and free will. No?

 

[smcder]

@smcder


Here Constance seems to be critiquing my affinity for the idea of a mind-body duality. She seems to be implying that assuming a duality between body and mind is an error.

This implies that she believes there is an ontological identity between body and mind. That is, she seems to be suggesting there is no mind-body duality.

However, incoherently, she continues on to critique the idea that mind can be fully accouted for by physical processes.

What? You don't find that incoherent?

There is no mind-body duality. The mind can't be explained by the body.

Sure. Whatever.

Furthermore, Constance has made it clear she favors a naturalistic approach to mind. She has an affinity for neurophenomenology; the marriage of neuroscience and phenomenology.

However, Constance is skeptical that consciousness arises from neural processes in the brain, but rather favors a quantum explanation for consciousness.

Ok.

I'm sorry but I find all of that pretty mich incoherent.

I've asked her to explain a) whether a human and a squid might have the same kind of mind, and b) why or why not.

I got no answer, but rather she became very defensive (why, Im not sure).

I asked her what insights she had gained from her first-person reflections that allowed her to determine her mind was not constituted of information, and she noted that she once experienced a stream of reflective consciousness.

How this answers my question, I don't know.

Didn't we go through this last time before you dropped off the thread?

I remember quoting the quantum remarks back to you as being yours, you had attributed them to Cobstance ... I will pull that up later to be sure I remember correctly. I could be wrong - I remember thinking it was strange at the time.

I read the quote from @Constance above differently than you do.

 

[smcder]

Yesterday's post was in response to your rejection of Chalmers' indication that IP was a potentially fruitful approach to the HP. You posted something like "how does this explain the evidence."

Based on Chalmers' statement, one would assume it did account for "the evidence." Thus, it's pretty obvious that there is "evidence" that you are seeking an explanation for that Chalmers is not, i.e, PSI and free will. No?

Probably not - but I would have to go through those posts to see what you mean.

I think we have to deal with the evidence one way or another and I laid out what I think the options are ... several times in fact, since Part 1.

I think.

 

[smcder]

Ok. No joy with AJP.
This is a link to the paper
Knowledge Argument | New perspectives | Philosophy of Consciousness
It is password protected. The password is: Paracast
I have attached below the abstract a pdf of the paper and a pdf of the referee's comments and my response.
I would be very grateful for any critical or explanatory feedback.

Ok ... Going to have a look ...

 

[smcder]

Yesterday's post was in response to your rejection of Chalmers' indication that IP was a potentially fruitful approach to the HP. You posted something like "how does this explain the evidence."

Based on Chalmers' statement, one would assume it did account for "the evidence." Thus, it's pretty obvious that there is "evidence" that you are seeking an explanation for that Chalmers is not, i.e, PSI and free will. No?

It will be helpful if you can provide the post(s)? I think I see how you misunderstood.

 

[Soupie]

Here is the post I made: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 14 | The Paracast Community Forums

And here was your response:

@Soupie ...

I'll start with the broken record ;-)

1. How do we fit "the evidence" into this scheme or do we dismiss or discredit it or reinterpret it?

2. I'll have to refresh but what bugs me right now is that subjectivity isn't information ... see the article I posted above on the problem of God (from this I took it that God has a very different kind of "mind" than we do!) otherwise I could know what it's like to be you.

Secondly is that information sounds suspiciously like arrangements of matter which leaves us needing the other aspect only for the pesky leftover matter of subjectivity ... but how does that plug into matter ... via information which is instantiated physically and communicated energetically?

For that matter what is energy? Are all these things "stem cells" that interconvert to make form of emptiness (Mu)?

What rules allow self-replicating structures in the first place? (Or the last place ... ) are the rules information? It's one thing to have something instead of nothing but we have something that can give rise to self replicating, intelligent and self-aware systems ... at least.

Yes, last time I got frustrated with the discussion involved me asking Constance to provide an overview of her conception of consciousness. She produced a post about quantum entanglement and increasing complexity, etc.

That's not the issue though. My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

 

[Constance]

Here is the post I made: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 14 | The Paracast Community Forums

And here was your response:


Yes, last time I got frustrated with the discussion involved me asking Constance to provide an overview of her conception of consciousness. She produced a post about quantum entanglement and increasing complexity, etc.

That's not the issue though. My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

Soupie, you'd be less frustrated if you would follow the links to papers that Steve and I have posted. The links are not there for decoration. They are there to provide you with background in other approaches to the investigation of consciousness than the one you adhere to from a fairly narrow background in philosophy and none whatever in phenomenology. If you won't do the reading you will not understand what we are talking about. Given that you have refused to educate yourself about these other approaches to consciousness (theoretical, empirical, and experimental), you're really crossing the line in the tone and content of your complaints today, especially concerning me. What's up with that?

 

[Constance]

I've asked her to explain a) whether a human and a squid might have the same kind of mind, and b) why or why not.

I got no answer, but rather she became very defensive (why, Im not sure).

I don't remember the exchange you're referring to in which you asked that question about human minds and squid minds. Must have been quite a while back in the thread. If you're going to accuse me of ignoring the question {it's possible that I did} and then becoming "very defensive," you should in fairness quote the posts you're talking about.

 

[Constance]

Here is the post I made: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 14 | The Paracast Community Forums

And here was your response:


Yes, last time I got frustrated with the discussion involved me asking Constance to provide an overview of her conception of consciousness. She produced a post about quantum entanglement and increasing complexity, etc.

That's not the issue though. My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

I do remember suggesting to you here in Part III that "defining" consciousness is hopeless until we comprehend the whole range of characteristic behaviors and activities of the mind in its interactions with the world. What you still have not recognized is that mind-world interactions take place in the compresence of both subjective consciousness and objective phenomena in the world. You want all mind-world interactions to take place inside the braincase, among the interactions of neurons, which become a virtual homunculus in your descriptions. You need to read phenomenology. So does Pharoah.

Re my reference to quantum entanglement and complexity, I was probably referring to the best physical explanation to date of psi phenomena involving nonlocality. Again, I would appreciate it if you would copy here the exchange you're describing rather than characterizing it in your own rather flippant terms.

 

[Constance]

Bottom line, Soupie: you're acting out and making unfair claims and judgments. We won't get anywhere here in our attempt to sort out and make progress in weighing the various approaches to consciousness in interdisciplinary consciousness studies unless we give each of those approaches a fair hearing, and that requires that we first understand what those different approaches are. There's no reason we can't do this in a congenial, colleaguial manner. None of our lives depends on our holding, or being considered to hold, the whole answer now.

 

[smcder]

Here is the post I made: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 14 | The Paracast Community Forums

And here was your response:


Yes, last time I got frustrated with the discussion involved me asking Constance to provide an overview of her conception of consciousness. She produced a post about quantum entanglement and increasing complexity, etc.

That's not the issue though. My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

1. I'm not sure that's possible. At any rate, I don't identify with it.
2. Why is that an issue for you? Or what is the issue, exactly?

 

[smcder]

CAVEATS

I am NOT the "universal dubeity" kingpin.
I am NOT a new mysterian.

And anyone who implies otherwise is itchin' for a fight ....

That said, here are two articles that I like. I like them because they give me some sense of perspective on the problem of consciousness.

http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/USAconscious-140130a.pdf
All machine and no ghost?

 

[Soupie]

Bottom line, Soupie: you're acting out and making unfair claims and judgments.

I'm claiming that I don't understand your position, and that imo many of your statements seem contradictory.

No, I'm not a phenomenologist. Yes, I've read many of the links that you and Smcder have provided. No, phenomenology cannot and will not solve the HP. Please, tell me what insights phenomenology has given us as to the ontology of consciousness. And/or tell me what insights practicing it has given you.

This is an internet forum. I'm not a philosopher nor a neurscientist. Yes, I have and will read books and articles on the subject. But if you can't give me the quick and dirty version, then so be it.

As noted, phenomenology alone cannot tell us whether or not con is constitiuted of information or no.

Neurophenomenology. Ive articulated myself that 1st person investigation needs to be complimented by 3rd. Thats what neurophenom is. Its wonderful. Neurophenom seems compatible with IP. That is, phenomenal states appear to be correlated to brain states. Brain states = information.

2. Why is that an issue for you? Or what is the issue, exactly?

The issue is that we're all talking about — and seeking a different explanation for — a different part of the elephant.

 

[Constance]

Steve and I have been having a separate dialogue on some of the issues up in the air in this stage of the thread and he has suggested that I post this comment of mine from that dialogue:

I recall one koan, vaguely, to the effect of a question: 'how can the mind work upon the mind without an immense confusion?'
I have no recollection where I read it or who might have spoken it. I think it came from a Buddhist source, perhaps in Zen Buddhism.

The other thing I think plagues us in this discussion is taking as foundational there being an absolute distinction to be made between matter and mind. This has been an issue for Soupie from the beginning, as I see it, and I think it also conditions what Pharoah is able to think. [in both cases, they seem to feel the need for a physical account in which matter must be explanatory, in which mind must somehow be fully accounted for by matter or by physical information originating in matter]

I think we have to put that so-called distinction/duality in brackets and then approach again what we experience, which is the ground of all our thinking {even the thinking of those who do not accept that experience is the ground of all thinking}, and which recognition demonstrates to us that our thinking incorporates both subjective and objective poles of 'reality' -- two origins or streams flowing into [mingling in] consciousness/mind that cannot be completely separated or reduced to a single one of those streams. At least not while we live as embodied consciousnesses.

@smcderHere Constance seems to be critiquing my affinity for the idea of a mind-body duality. She seems to be implying that assuming a duality between body and mind is an error.

I'm not sure what you mean, have ever meant, by the idea of mind-body duality for which you claim to have an 'affinity'. What I was talking about as problematic is the hard distinction between mind and matter implicit in your effort to account for mind as produced by physical 'information' processed by our neurons, rather than ourselves as embodied consciousnesses interacting directly with our environment.

This implies that she believes there is an ontological identity between body and mind. That is, she seems to be suggesting there is no mind-body duality.

Nothing I've said implies "an ontological identity" between body and mind. What do you mean by 'ontological' in that sentence?

However, incoherently, she continues on to critique the idea that mind can be fully accouted for by physical processes.

That's not an incoherent critique given the enactive phenomenological philosophy of consciousness and the neurophenomenology that has developed out of it. I've given you two sources in which you can obtain a fundamental grasp of these approaches and have to say again that unless you read then you will not be in a position to understand what I said above. If you've gone ahead and obtained Varela and Thompson's The Embodied Mind, why don't you read it and we'll talk later.[/quote]

What? You don't find that incoherent?

There is no mind-body duality. The mind can't be explained by the body.

Sure. Whatever.

I'm not sure what you're trying to say there. Is the middle line meant to summarize what you think I've said? Indeed the mind can't be explained by the body or we wouldn't be having this conversation, and the field of consciousness studies wouldn't exist. But consciousness and mind develop in an embodied relationship with nature as we encounter our 'lived reality', in which both nature and culture influence what we can think but do not determine what we can think..

Furthermore, Constance has made it clear she favors a naturalistic approach to mind. She has an affinity for neurophenomenology; the marriage of neuroscience and phenomenology.

What do you mean by "a 'naturalistic' approach to mind." Watch the video of Dermot Moran's lecture that Steve linked today, or better yet read the paper to which it is linked. Moran traces the changes of the idea/definition of 'naturalism' through a hundred years of philosophy and science in the context of Husserl's decades-long grappling with the misunderstandings carried along in that history. Where does your version of 'naturalism' fit in?

However, Constance is skeptical that consciousness arises from neural processes in the brain, but rather favors a quantum explanation for consciousness.

Right, I am skeptical that we are our neurons/that our neurons is us. So was Varela, so are Thompson and his group pursuing neurophenomenology. Again, see the two papers I linked. There is no question that the brain's neurons and their interconnections {a physical network in continual flux} enable consciousness. The body itself also enables consciousness, and so does the complex reality in which any conscious being exists. That is far from saying that consciousness is produced by -- does not extend beyond, does not exceed in its capabilities -- the enabling neuronal network. Unless perhaps you imagine that a number of our neurons are philosophers.

 

[Constance]

addendum:

However, Constance is skeptical that consciousness arises from neural processes in the brain, but rather favors a quantum explanation for consciousness.

What I've said is that quantum entanglement might account for certain nonlocal phenomena experienced in consciousness and also demonstrated in psi and parapsychological experiments, not that q. entanglement or other quantum processes can account for consciousness.

 

[smcder]

I'm claiming that I don't understand your position, and that imo many of your statements seem contradictory.

No, I'm not a phenomenologist. Yes, I've read many of the links that you and Smcder have provided. No, phenomenology cannot and will not solve the HP. Please, tell me what insights phenomenology has given us as to the ontology of consciousness. And/or tell me what insights practicing it has given you.

This is an internet forum. I'm not a philosopher nor a neurscientist. Yes, I have and will read books and articles on the subject. But if you can't give me the quick and dirty version, then so be it.

As noted, phenomenology alone cannot tell us whether or not con is constitiuted of information or no.

Neurophenomenology. Ive articulated myself that 1st person investigation needs to be complimented by 3rd. Thats what neurophenom is. Its wonderful. Neurophenom seems compatible with IP. That is, phenomenal states appear to be correlated to brain states. Brain states = information.


The issue is that we're all talking about — and seeking a different explanation for — a different part of the elephant.

The quick and dirty version:

The Odyssey: man gets lost for 20 yrs while his wife's suitors eat him out of house and home

Socrates: irritating little man proves no one knows what they are talking about and is put to death for it

Buddhism: sit down and try to make yourself go away

Christianity: Rabbi heals the sick, raises the dead and feeds multitudes ... forgives everyone, even God

The Renaissance: for irrational reasons, a bunch of dead white guys deify reason

Moby Dick: a man suffering from OCD and depression hunts a stupid whale who doesn't even know he exists

Relativity: E=mc^2

Phenomenology: sorry, no easy summary available





Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk