"Similarly, discussions of consciousness (awareness) as `point of view' (Nagel, 1986) or `perspective' do not go far enough in exploring what the `first person perspective' really is. In my own case, it is not myself as Arthur Deikman, psychiatrist, six feet tall, brown hair. That particular person has specific opinions, beliefs, and skills all of which are part of his nominal identity, but all of which are observed by his `I',
which stands apart from them.
If awareness is a fundamental in the universe —as proposed most recently by Herbert (1994), Goswami (1993) and Chalmers (1995) —
then it is `I' that is fundamental, as well, with all its ontological implications.
Arthur Deikman is localized and mortal. But what about his `I', that light illuminating his world, that essence of his existence?"
@Pharoah - I think this next sentence, underlined just below ... goes to your point about the Noumenal being the hard problem?
Those studying consciousness, who can see the necessity for according consciousness a different ontological status than the physical, tend not to extend their conclusions to `I'. Yet, it is the identity `I' = awareness that makes the study of consciousness so difficult.
"Güven Güzeldere (1995) asks:
Why are there such glaring polarities? Why is consciousness characterized as a phenomenon too familiar to require further explanation, as well as one that remains typically recalcitrant to systematic investigation, by investigators who work largely within the same paradigm? (Güzeldere, 1995.)
The difficulty to which Güzeldere refers is epitomized by the problem: Who observes the observer? Every time we step back to observe who or what is there doing the observing, we find that the `I' has jumped back with us.
This is the infinite regress of the observer, noted by Gilbert Ryle, often presented as an argument against the observing self being real, an existent.
But identifying `I' with awareness solves the problem of the infinite regress: we know the internal observer not by observing it but by being it. At the core, we are awareness and therefore do not need to imagine, observe, or perceive it. "
smcder what do you all make of this solution to the Homonculus problem?
@Soupie - good enough?
"
Knowing by being that which is known is ontologically different from perceptual knowledge. That is why someone might introspect and
not see awareness or the `I', concluding — like the travellers — that it doesn't exist. But thought experiments and intropsective meditation techniques are able to extract the one who is looking from what is seen, restoring the missing centre.
Once we grant the identity of `I' and awareness we are compelled to extend to the core subjective self whatever ontological propositions seem appropriate for awareness.
If awareness is non-local, so is the essential self. If awareness transcends material reality so does the `I'.
If awareness is declared to be non-existent then that same conclusion must apply to the `I'. No matter what one's ontological bias, recognition that `I' = awareness has profound implications for our theoretical and personal perspective."
I'll re-quote this from above because it gets at what I think causes a lot of error:
"
Knowing by being that which is known is ontologically different from perceptual knowledge. That is why someone might introspect and
not see awareness or the `I', concluding — like the travellers — that it doesn't exist. But thought experiments and intropsective meditation techniques are able to extract the one who is looking from what is seen, restoring the missing centre."
... Someone can't do philosophy about something they don't know exists ... I've been trying to come up with some metaphor for what goes on in a lot of consciousness studies ... I haven't been able to come up with very good ones:
a mechanic who has never ridden in a car and is only interested in what's under the hood ...
or, in the case of Phenomenology, someone who has only read Shakespeare's plays and never seen them performed ...
... but this raises an interesting and difficult question which is consciousness the same for every one, are we in fact talking about the same thing? Whatever consciousness is ultimately - for us as embodied human beings, it is related to brain function - and brains are different ... and yet, people do have similar experiences in meditation - even across cultures as shown above. A skilled meditation master it is said can discern when a student has entered a particular kind of state ... Zen masters can strike a pupil at just the right instant to initiate an experience of awakening (well, legend has it ...) ... but then again some people seem constitutionally unable to meditate or introspect. For some, meditation is de-stabilizing.
CAVEAT none of the above says I think anyone in particular or everyone should meditate or introspection. I think it's an open question as to whether an individual researcher needs these experience to understand this aspect of consciouness or whether a conceptual understanding is enough?
I think at the least the author's point needs to be taken into account and compared with Husserl's view and others:
"Once we grant the identity of `I' and awareness we are compelled to extend to the core subjective self whatever ontological propositions seem appropriate for awareness.
If awareness is non-local, so is the essential self. If awareness transcends material reality so does the `I'.
If awareness is declared to be non-existent then that same conclusion must apply to the `I'.
No matter what one's ontological bias, recognition that `I' = awareness has profound implications for our theoretical and personal perspective."
But it's hard to see how awareness illusory (by defintion of illusory) - so this would mean the self (as awareness) isn't an illusion.
