Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[smcder]

"Arthur Deikman is localized and mortal. But what about his `I', that light illuminating his world, that essence of his existence?"

This experience of "I" as awareness is called experiencing "the deathless" in Buddhism.

From a standard, Darwinian view, this is very interesting that the brain would evolve an impersonal perspective.

Which reminds me @Pharoah we need to finish our discussion of fitness and environment some time.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy is in the top ten list and rejects 95.5% of all submissions.
They said they would not consider a revision.

I have started incorporating the Ability Hyp into the paper. With regards to facts,
"One view about facts is - to be a fact is to be a true proposition.
Another incompatible view is - facts are what make true propositions true." (Paraphrased SEP)
So one can take either stance. I am confused as to how facts do or do not relate to information on the standard view

Ah ... good to know. I am very curious too to know where the AJP gets its standard view ... but if they are in the top ten, they must know something.

 

[Pharoah]

OK - looks like there is a multi-step process on the AJP ... first two steps are referee 1 and 2, I assume you are at referee 1 ... ? Are you going to go on over to the Journal of Consciousness Studies and forget AJP or are you going to try and resubmit to AJP? Need to know where to concentrate my efforts.

*What I am doing here is looking at the mechanics of the paper ... taking the hood off - to see what the referee thinks is wrong. I'm not trying to understand your paper on its own terms right now.

Looking again at what the referee said:
1. Throughout, the author seems to conflate metaphysical and epistemological issues. So for instance, on p. 3, LL14-16, the author writes, “I for one maintain that whilst all facts are informational, not all information is factual.”

On standard philosophical usage, however, the notion of a fact belongs to metaphysics while that of information is more closely aligned with epistemology.

1. Facts belong to metaphysics

Along similar lines, on p. 6, LL57-58, the author writes that “Facts are exclusively conceptual representations about physical reality…” But this is an idiosyncratic understanding of facts. More typically, facts are understood as worldly entities that are not (generally) representations at all, although they can be represented.

2. Facts are worldy entities that are not represenations themselves, but can be represented

(In connection, Jackson’s shift from talk of “physical information” in his 1982 paper to “physical facts” in 1986 should be understood as a move meant to guarantee that his argument had metaphysical and not just epistemological import.)

So, I’m not entirely sure what the author means by the claim that all facts are informational.

1. Does it mean that we can possess information (where “possessing information” is something epistemic) about any fact (something metaphysical)?
2. Does it mean that facts are mind-dependent in a way that blurs the metaphysics/epistemology distinction I’m suggesting (roughly: facts depend on information)?
3. Does it mean something else?

*So ... will you, would you, can you, should you edit the paper (while eating green eggs and ham?) so that:

You can acknowledge:

Facts belong to metaphysics
Facts are worldy entities that are not represenations themselves, but can be represented

and go on to use the word "facts" in this way to make your argument ...
OR
Acknowledge 1 and 2 as the "standard philiosophical usage" but explain why your usage should be accepted ... this seems to me the less likely to succeed.

You could also ask the referee what the source is for the "standard philosophical usage" of these terms.

re "2. Facts are worldy entities that are not represenations themselves, but can be represented"
I take the view and try to elaborate in the re-write 2:
facts are mind-dependent in a way that blurs the metaphysics/epistemology distinction
So I take up the cat sat on the mat example.
But having said that, I am happy just to delete the 'facts=info does not=facts' line. It is not important to the argument.

 

[smcder]

"Arthur Deikman is localized and mortal. But what about his `I', that light illuminating his world, that essence of his existence?"

This experience of "I" as awareness is called experiencing "the deathless" in Buddhism.

From a standard, Darwinian view, this is very interesting that the brain would evolve an impersonal perspective. What is the survival value?

(Which reminds me @Pharoah we need to finish our discussion of fitness and environment some time.)

 

[smcder]

re "2. Facts are worldy entities that are not represenations themselves, but can be represented"
I take the view and try to elaborate in the re-write 2:
facts are mind-dependent in a way that blurs the metaphysics/epistemology distinction
So I take up the cat sat on the mat example.
But having said that, I am happy just to delete the 'facts=info does not=facts' line. It is not important to the argument.

I'm sure you've read the SEP entry on the knowledge argument - it's put there in terms of "information" not "facts" - this was interesting too:


Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary, but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: the case of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal human perceivers. We might want to know what color Fred experiences when looking at things that appear to him in that particular way. It seems clear that no amount of knowledge about what happens in his brain and about how color information is processed in his visual system will help us to find an answer to that question. In both cases cited by Jackson, an epistemic subject A appears to have no access to particular items of knowledge about a subject B: A cannot know that B has an experience of a particular quality Q on certain occasions. This particular item of knowledge about Bis inaccessible to A because A never had experiences of Q herself.

*And, in fact, there are now known to be people who have the ability to see more colors than "normal" people - they probably never knew they had this ability either ... although it is now believe some famous artists has it - by analyzing their color selections with imaging equipment.

But the problem with the Knowledge Argument to me is that it is open to responses like yours - that it's a matter of the ability or opportunity to have certain experiences, but to me that is not the main point - the main point is that a full, physical description would never reveal that there is such a thing as having experiences any experiences in the first place.

 

[Pharoah]

"Similarly, discussions of consciousness (awareness) as `point of view' (Nagel, 1986) or `perspective' do not go far enough in exploring what the `first person perspective' really is. In my own case, it is not myself as Arthur Deikman, psychiatrist, six feet tall, brown hair. That particular person has specific opinions, beliefs, and skills all of which are part of his nominal identity, but all of which are observed by his `I', which stands apart from them.

If awareness is a fundamental in the universe —as proposed most recently by Herbert (1994), Goswami (1993) and Chalmers (1995) —

then it is `I' that is fundamental, as well, with all its ontological implications.

Arthur Deikman is localized and mortal. But what about his `I', that light illuminating his world, that essence of his existence?"

@Pharoah - I think this next sentence, underlined just below ... goes to your point about the Noumenal being the hard problem?

Those studying consciousness, who can see the necessity for according consciousness a different ontological status than the physical, tend not to extend their conclusions to `I'. Yet, it is the identity `I' = awareness that makes the study of consciousness so difficult.

"Güven Güzeldere (1995) asks:

• 
  Why are there such glaring polarities? Why is consciousness characterized as a phenomenon too familiar to require further explanation, as well as one that remains typically recalcitrant to systematic investigation, by investigators who work largely within the same paradigm? (Güzeldere, 1995.)

The difficulty to which Güzeldere refers is epitomized by the problem: Who observes the observer? Every time we step back to observe who or what is there doing the observing, we find that the `I' has jumped back with us.

This is the infinite regress of the observer, noted by Gilbert Ryle, often presented as an argument against the observing self being real, an existent.

But identifying `I' with awareness solves the problem of the infinite regress: we know the internal observer not by observing it but by being it. At the core, we are awareness and therefore do not need to imagine, observe, or perceive it. "

smcder what do you all make of this solution to the Homonculus problem? @Soupie - good enough?
"Knowing by being that which is known is ontologically different from perceptual knowledge. That is why someone might introspect and not see awareness or the `I', concluding — like the travellers — that it doesn't exist. But thought experiments and intropsective meditation techniques are able to extract the one who is looking from what is seen, restoring the missing centre.
Once we grant the identity of `I' and awareness we are compelled to extend to the core subjective self whatever ontological propositions seem appropriate for awareness.

If awareness is non-local, so is the essential self. If awareness transcends material reality so does the `I'.

If awareness is declared to be non-existent then that same conclusion must apply to the `I'. No matter what one's ontological bias, recognition that `I' = awareness has profound implications for our theoretical and personal perspective."

I'll re-quote this from above because it gets at what I think causes a lot of error:

"Knowing by being that which is known is ontologically different from perceptual knowledge. That is why someone might introspect and not see awareness or the `I', concluding — like the travellers — that it doesn't exist. But thought experiments and intropsective meditation techniques are able to extract the one who is looking from what is seen, restoring the missing centre."

... Someone can't do philosophy about something they don't know exists ... I've been trying to come up with some metaphor for what goes on in a lot of consciousness studies ... I haven't been able to come up with very good ones:

a mechanic who has never ridden in a car and is only interested in what's under the hood ...
or, in the case of Phenomenology, someone who has only read Shakespeare's plays and never seen them performed ...

... but this raises an interesting and difficult question which is consciousness the same for every one, are we in fact talking about the same thing? Whatever consciousness is ultimately - for us as embodied human beings, it is related to brain function - and brains are different ... and yet, people do have similar experiences in meditation - even across cultures as shown above. A skilled meditation master it is said can discern when a student has entered a particular kind of state ... Zen masters can strike a pupil at just the right instant to initiate an experience of awakening (well, legend has it ...) ... but then again some people seem constitutionally unable to meditate or introspect. For some, meditation is de-stabilizing.

CAVEAT none of the above says I think anyone in particular or everyone should meditate or introspection. I think it's an open question as to whether an individual researcher needs these experience to understand this aspect of consciouness or whether a conceptual understanding is enough?

I think at the least the author's point needs to be taken into account and compared with Husserl's view and others:

"Once we grant the identity of `I' and awareness we are compelled to extend to the core subjective self whatever ontological propositions seem appropriate for awareness.
If awareness is non-local, so is the essential self. If awareness transcends material reality so does the `I'.
If awareness is declared to be non-existent then that same conclusion must apply to the `I'.

No matter what one's ontological bias, recognition that `I' = awareness has profound implications for our theoretical and personal perspective."

But it's hard to see how awareness illusory (by defintion of illusory) - so this would mean the self (as awareness) isn't an illusion.

@smcder : I think this next sentence, underlined just below ... goes to your point about the Noumenal being the hard problem?
Those studying consciousness, who can see the necessity for according consciousness a different ontological status than the physical, tend not to extend their conclusions to `I'. Yet, it is the identity `I' = awareness that makes the study of consciousness so difficult.
Yes.
I am not sure that I appreciate exactly what some of the quotes you have cited are saying, but I feel that they are addressing the 'elephant in the room'
All I say, is that phenomenal experience is not actually the hard problem - as stated by Chalmers. I my stance is supported by the quotes
If you explain phenomenal experience, part of that explanation says that an entity with phenomenal experience will then possess a first-person perspective. A first-person perspective becomes a 'something that they are', which is embedded experientially. The something that they are, is not the same as the something anybody else is (when you take away all experience). It is this "something" which is hard (impossible) to explain because it is - by appearance, and therefore we assume - not replicated physically ever.

 

[Pharoah]

I'm sure you've read the SEP entry on the knowledge argument - it's put there in terms of "information" not "facts" - this was interesting too:


Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary, but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: the case of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal human perceivers. We might want to know what color Fred experiences when looking at things that appear to him in that particular way. It seems clear that no amount of knowledge about what happens in his brain and about how color information is processed in his visual system will help us to find an answer to that question. In both cases cited by Jackson, an epistemic subject A appears to have no access to particular items of knowledge about a subject B: A cannot know that B has an experience of a particular quality Q on certain occasions. This particular item of knowledge about Bis inaccessible to A because A never had experiences of Q herself.

*And, in fact, there are now known to be people who have the ability to see more colors than "normal" people - they probably never knew they had this ability either ... although it is now believe some famous artists has it - by analyzing their color selections with imaging equipment.

But the problem with the Knowledge Argument to me is that it is open to responses like yours - that it's a matter of the ability or opportunity to have certain experiences, but to me that is not the main point - the main point is that a full, physical description would never reveal that there is such a thing as having experiences any experiences in the first place.

That is the main point.
My alternative premises and conclusions does not undermine the KA. It sets in place an alternative treatment: instead of concluding that physicalism is false, my alternative concludes that our understanding of knowledge is false.
My alternative questions the assumed validity, that it is possible to possess complete physical knowledge in the absence of experience i.e. it questions the standard view that experience is a kind of knowledge that is distinct from factual knowledge. Of course, philosophers will undoubtedly argue that my premises/conclusions are faulty for this or that reason.

 

[smcder]

@smcder : I think this next sentence, underlined just below ... goes to your point about the Noumenal being the hard problem?
Those studying consciousness, who can see the necessity for according consciousness a different ontological status than the physical, tend not to extend their conclusions to `I'. Yet, it is the identity `I' = awareness that makes the study of consciousness so difficult.
Yes.
I am not sure that I appreciate exactly what some of the quotes you have cited are saying, but I feel that they are addressing the 'elephant in the room'
All I say, is that phenomenal experience is not actually the hard problem - as stated by Chalmers. I my stance is supported by the quotes
If you explain phenomenal experience, part of that explanation says that an entity with phenomenal experience will then possess a first-person perspective. A first-person perspective becomes a 'something that they are', which is embedded experientially. The something that they are, is not the same as the something anybody else is (when you take away all experience). It is this "something" which is hard (impossible) to explain because it is - by appearance, and therefore we assume - not replicated physically ever.

Ok, not sure I follow that ... the quotes above sort out the self from I = awareness - that self sounds like what you are describing here:

A first-person perspective becomes a 'something that they are', which is embedded experientially.

But isn't this is the arbitrary aspects of a person's physical and mental being, accumulated by life experience?

The something that they are, is not the same as the something anybody else is (when you take away all experience).

Why couldn't I argue that that awareness is located somewhere in the brain - the fact that anyone can run the experiment above to discern the I = awareness means there must be some underlying physiology to enable that experience .. a physiologist would get busy looking for a "circuit" that does that - that's kind of what Austin does in Zen and the Brain. A better argument would come if every person had a different kind of experience altogether. So on the argument that I = awareness - an undifferentiated kind of experience that all or many can have, I would say it's very likely to be replicated physically - as far as finding some underlying brain anatomy for it - that doesn't prove it's entirely physical, of course - but it doesn't seem to get at a new formulation of the hard problem - which to me is just that a full physical description of a sentient thing would never indicate that there is something that is like to be that thing ...

 

[smcder]

That is the main point.
My alternative premises and conclusions does not undermine the KA. It sets in place an alternative treatment: instead of concluding that physicalism is false, my alternative concludes that our understanding of knowledge is false.
My alternative questions the assumed validity, that it is possible to possess complete physical knowledge in the absence of experience i.e. it questions the standard view that experience is a kind of knowledge that is distinct from factual knowledge. Of course, philosophers will undoubtedly argue that my premises/conclusions are faulty for this or that reason.

Right! But let them argue ... as long as they are buying your book. ;-)

So what is your take on the HP itself in terms of physicalism. You have said your are not a physicalist ... but that seems to be based on your idea of the noumenal?

 

[smcder]

This is nearly EXACTLY it: I think Nagel and Chalmers don't appreciate the stance I advocate, which is that one can reductively explain the why and how, and discriminatory nature (i.e. the first-person characteristic) of phenomenal experience (in general terms) - I claim HCT does this - but importantly this does not entail having to explain "why I am me and you are you". I see them as completely different problems (which is against philosophical orthodoxy). Phenomenal consciousness can be explained reductively, whereas my phenomenal consciousness cannot (this is why I bring noumenon into the equation - perhaps I could borrow the term 'being-in-itself', or 'thing-as-such' but that's another story).

My quote above seems to show Nagel agrees the HP is the plurality of consciousness ..,. I have other questions but for now I want to know what the non-physical Noumenal is for you ... The elephant


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[Pharoah]

Phenomenology:
BBC Radio 4 - In Our Time, Phenomenology

 

[smcder]

Phenomenology:
BBC Radio 4 - In Our Time, Phenomenology

In Our Time is a good show. You know as far as the BBC goes ...,

;-)


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[Constance]

@Pharoah
@Soupie

Came across this while looking at Pharoah's paper and submission to the JCS:

JCS-ONLINE

Abstract:

Introspection reveals that the core of subjectivity — the `I' —is identical to awareness. This `I' should be differentiated from the various aspects of the physical person and its mental contents which form the `self'. Most discussions of consciousness confuse the `I' and the `self'. In fact, our experience is fundamentally dualistic — not the dualism of mind and matter — but that of the `I' and that which is observed. The identity of awareness and the `I' means that we know awareness by being it, thus solving the problem of the infinite regress of observers. It follows that whatever our ontology of awareness may be, it must also be the same for `I'.

1. introspection
2.. "I" - is identical to awareness
3. "self" defined as aspects of the physical person and its mental contents
4. experience is dualistic: I / that which is observed

AND it solves the Homunculs! problem

"

• 
  Experiment 1: Stop for a moment and look inside. Try and sense the very origin of your most basic, most personal `I', your core subjective experience. What is that root of the `I' feeling? Try to find it.

When you introspect you will find that no matter what the contents of your mind, the most basic `I' is something different. Every time you try to observe the `I' it takes a jump back with you, remaining out of sight. At first you may say, `When I look inside as you suggest, all I find is content of one sort or the other.' I reply, `Who is looking? Is it not you? If that ``I'' is a content can you describe it? Can you observe it?' The core `I' of subjectivity is different from any content because it turns out to be that which witnesses — not that which is observed. The `I' can be experienced, but it cannot be `seen'. `I' is the observer, the experiencer, prior to all conscious content."

smcder Experiment 1 is like the "diamond drill" exercise in Tibetan Buddhism.

Every time you try to observe the `I' it takes a jump back with you, remaining out of sight. At first you may say, `When I look inside as you suggest, all I find is content of one sort or the other.' I reply, `Who is looking? Is it not you? If that ``I'' is a content can you describe it? Can you observe it?' The core `I' of subjectivity is different from any content because it turns out to be that which witnesses — not that which is observed. The `I' can be experienced, but it cannot be `seen'. `I' is the observer, the experiencer, prior to all conscious content."

...
@Constance - this is interesting, it challenges the statement that all consciousness is consciousness of something:

Yes. I noted that about a week ago in discussing the Reflective Cogito in relation to the Prereflective Cogito. This distinction is developed in Sartre's Being and Nothingness.

We see the same problem arising in philosophy. After Husserl, nearly all modern Western philosophical approaches to the nature of mind and its relation to the body fail to recognize that introspection reveals `I' to be identical to awareness. [4] Furthermore, most philosophers do not recognize awareness as existing in its own right, different from contents. Owen Flanagan, a philosopher who has written extensively on consciousness, sides with James and speaks of `the illusion of the mind's ``I'' ' (Flanagan, 1992). C.O. Evans starts out recognizing the importance of the distinction between the observer and the observed, `the subjective self', but then retreats to the position that awareness is `unprojected consciousness', the amorphous experience of background content (Evans, 1970). However, the background is composed of elements to which we can shift attention. It is what Freud called the preconscious. `I'/awareness has no elements, no features. It is not a matter of a searchlight illuminating one element while the rest is dark — it has to do with the nature of light itself.

...
Awareness is considered to exist independent of contents and this `pure consciousness' is accessible — potentially — to every one. A more contemporary statement of this position is given by Sri Krishna Menon, a twentieth century Yogi: . . .

I think that understanding the difference between prereflective and reflective consciousness is essential to the project of understanding what consciousness is. And it is not a simple distinction since it is difficult to see how discovery of the reflective consciousness could take place without the prior experience of the conscious subject that begins in the recognition of the subject's phenomenological point of view in the/a world -- its partial, perspectival, relation/relatedness toward things in the environment not fully disclosed and the resulting developing sense of the distinction between consciousness and the physical environment in which it finds itself existing. The issue is that it seems likely that we could not become conscious without first existing in a physical world that presents itself/is available to us in partial perspectives that call forth the desire to explore the world [Panksepp calls this 'seeking' in primordial organisms] in order to cope with it more skillfully and with greater comprehension.

In Thompson's newest book (which we also discussed within the last week or two) he refers to non-dreaming states in sleep in which, based on brain imaging and measurements, a residual degree of self-awareness apparently remains despite the lack of perceptual contents taken up in dreaming activity. I found this particularly fascinating in its suggesting a level of integration of consciousness as being, as presence, that maintains itself despite a temporary lack of perceptual contents. As Thompson argues, we need to pursue the kinds of experiences explored in deep meditation -- of 'non-self' with a residual sense of being remaining in consciousness.

As your post significantly continues:

• 
  He who says that consciousness is never experienced without its object speaks from a superficial level. If he is asked the question `Are you a conscious being?', he will spontaneously give the answer `Yes'. This answer springs from the deepmost level. Here he doesn't even silently refer to anything as the object of that consciousness (Menon, 1952).

In the classical Buddhist literature we find:

• 
  When all lesser things and ideas are transcended and forgotten, and there remains only a perfect state of imagelessness where Tathagata and Tathata are merged into perfect Oneness . . . (Goddard, 1966). [6]

Western mystics also speak of experiencing consciousness without objects. Meister Eckhart declares:

• 
  There is the silent `middle', for no creature ever entered there and no image, nor has the soul there either activity or understanding, therefore she is not aware there of any image, whether of herself or of any other creature' (Forman, 1990).

Similarly, Saint John of the Cross:

• 
  That inward wisdom is so simple, so general and so spiritual that it has not entered into the understanding enwrapped or clad in any form or image subject to sense' (1953).

The failure of Western psychology to discriminate awareness from contents, and the resulting confusion of `I' with mental contents, may be due to a cultural limitation: the lack of experience of most Western scientists with Eastern meditation disciplines. [7]

 

[Constance]

... Someone can't do philosophy about something they don't know exists ... I've been trying to come up with some metaphor for what goes on in a lot of consciousness studies ...

In a majority of consciousness 'studies' by analytical philosophers the purpose is in the first place to support a physicalist/materialist account of what-is that excludes consciousness, eliminates it, or reduces it to some physical explanation. Such work is theory-laden. It will continue to be as long as analytical philosophers do not either read phenomenological and Eastern philosophy or attend to, analyze, the levels of their own consciousnesses, perhaps through meditation practices (though, with you, I don't think such practices are necessary for arriving at the necessary insights into the complex nature of consciousness).

... but this raises an interesting and difficult question which is consciousness the same for every one, are we in fact talking about the same thing? Whatever consciousness is ultimately - for us as embodied human beings, it is related to brain function - and brains are different ... and yet, people do have similar experiences in meditation - even across cultures as shown above. A skilled meditation master it is said can discern when a student has entered a particular kind of state ... Zen masters can strike a pupil at just the right instant to initiate an experience of awakening (well, legend has it ...) ... but then again some people seem constitutionally unable to meditate or introspect. For some, meditation is de-stabilizing.

Setting aside neurological dysfunctions of the brain resulting from physical damage to the organ itself from various sources (which dysfunctions interfere with the degree to which one can engage one's actual surroundings), it seems to me that consciousness is a capability essentially the same for all humans, but more or less developed given individual circumstances and experiences in one's existence.

ADDENDUM: The capability for developing consciousness is the same for all typical ('normal') humans because they all share the same ontological situation -- existentially and phenomenologically -- that provokes and develops consciousness.

 

[Constance]

From a standard, Darwinian view, this is very interesting that the brain would evolve an impersonal perspective.

Indeed. It can't be explained by Darwinians or Neo-Darwinians.

 

[Constance]

My quote above seems to show Nagel agrees the HP is the plurality of consciousness ..,. I have other questions but for now I want to know what the non-physical Noumenal is for you ... The elephant

Yes, I too am most interested in hearing what you consider to be 'the noumenal' and why. Can you reduce your claim to a paragraph or two?

 

[Constance]

That is the main point.
My alternative premises and conclusions does not undermine the KA. It sets in place an alternative treatment: instead of concluding that physicalism is false, my alternative concludes that our understanding of knowledge is false.
My alternative questions the assumed validity, that it is possible to possess complete physical knowledge in the absence of experience i.e. it questions the standard view that experience is a kind of knowledge that is distinct from factual knowledge. Of course, philosophers will undoubtedly argue that my premises/conclusions are faulty for this or that reason.

The above is confusing, at least for me. Are you moving toward a position that claims that consciousness does not exist, that conscious experience does not take place in the first place, much less contribute to our knowledge about the world as we perceive it? Do you also think that we do not perceive things, environments, relationships that enable us to conceive of a world beyond our local horizons in the first place?

 

[Constance]

@smcder : I think this next sentence, underlined just below ... goes to your point about the Noumenal being the hard problem?
Those studying consciousness, who can see the necessity for according consciousness a different ontological status than the physical, tend not to extend their conclusions to `I'. Yet, it is the identity `I' = awareness that makes the study of consciousness so difficult.
Yes.
I am not sure that I appreciate exactly what some of the quotes you have cited are saying, but I feel that they are addressing the 'elephant in the room'
All I say, is that phenomenal experience is not actually the hard problem - as stated by Chalmers. I my stance is supported by the quotes
If you explain phenomenal experience, part of that explanation says that an entity with phenomenal experience will then possess a first-person perspective. A first-person perspective becomes a 'something that they are', which is embedded experientially. The something that they are, is not the same as the something anybody else is (when you take away all experience). It is this "something" which is hard (impossible) to explain because it is - by appearance, and therefore we assume - not replicated physically ever.

You seem to be thinking that 'first-person points of view' and 'subjectivity' refer, or must refer, to the biographical ego. But the Reflective Cogito defined in Sartre and the deeper 'I' referred to in Steve's many examples today both transcend the egoic, biographical sense of 'one's self'. Merleau-Ponty writes in his later philosophy about a level of awareness of self and world in which one can no longer say "I see" but rather that "one sees".

 

[Constance]

A first-person perspective becomes a 'something that they are', which is embedded experientially.

But isn't this is the arbitrary aspects of a person's physical and mental being, accumulated by life experience?

The something that they are, is not the same as the something anybody else is (when you take away all experience).

At a certain level of insight, the deeper conscious experience is the same for everyone. Thus it becomes more than 'existential' in personal terms, in the terms of one's own specifically situated life experiences as interpreted by the situated ego. It becomes a revelation of the nature of conscious existence as a revelation of the nature of being. This is an ontological revelation.

ADDENDUM: Reading Heidegger long and hard enough (because reading H. is hard) can produce a sudden influx of this ontological recognition. It's an experience like no other I've had in reading philosophy.

 

[Pharoah]

You seem to be thinking that 'first-person points of view' and 'subjectivity' refer, or must refer, to the biographical ego. But the Reflective Cogito defined in Sartre and the deeper 'I' referred to in Steve's many examples today both transcend the egoic, biographical sense of 'one's self'. Merleau-Ponty writes in his later philosophy about a level of awareness of self and world in which one can no longer say "I see" but rather that "one sees".

Whilst fascinating to hear this (I do need to immerse myself in this work because I am quite unfamiliar with it) I am committed quite narrowly to phenomenal experience. Perhaps, I feel I now recognise much that distinguishes the nature of our enquiries, and that explains the friction and talking passed one another.

 

[Soupie]

Right, I am skeptical that we are our neurons/that our neurons is us. So was Varela, so are Thompson and his group pursuing neurophenomenology. Again, see the two papers I linked. There is no question that the brain's neurons and their interconnections {a physical network in continual flux} enable consciousness. The body itself also enables consciousness, and so does the complex reality in which any conscious being exists. That is far from saying that consciousness is produced by -- does not extend beyond, does not exceed in its capabilities -- the enabling neuronal network. Unless perhaps you imagine that a number of our neurons are philosophers.

Okay.

It seems that both you and Smcder are very open to the idea that "consciousness" is not something that brains do or "produce," but is rather some thing/stuff that exists independent of organisms; which nevertheless and somehow becomes connected to an organism.

Based on your comment about neurons enabling consciousness (or enabling individual minds to form from consciousness?), perhaps you conceive of consciousness being some field, substance, or something that exists in a neutral, formless way which is then shaped by neurons? Otherwise, if consciousness is some thing that exists independent of neurons, how could their action "enable" it to exist?

This is not how I conceive consciousness at all. I wish both you and @smcder, since you have these unconventional views of consciousness, would speculate more about the origin/nature of consciousness as you conceive it.

I don't understand your last answer in this exchange:

soupie That's not the issue though. My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

smcder Why is that an issue for you? Or what is the issue, exactly?

soupie The issue is that we're all talking about — and seeking a different explanation for — a different part of the elephant

that last answer doesn't seem to match where you say:

My issue is that the two of you seem to be searching for an explanation of something that you havent even defined. Maybe you think its unable to be defined? Who knows.

My question is: even IF we were searching for an explanation of something that we haven't even defined ... why would that be an issue for you?

Your answer:

The issue is that we're all talking about — and seeking a different explanation for — a different part of the elephant.

Doesn't, to me, match.

See above. You and Constance — best I can gather — seem to view consciousness as some contentless field, substance, or thing. This is quite the opposite to how I conceive it.

When I use the word "consciousness," I mean it in the sense that individual organisms — and only individual organisms (systems) — do consciousness. That is, consciousness does not exist independent of organisms. Similar, but different of course, to saying that organisms have, say, breath. That is, breath isn't some formless field, substance, stuff, or thing that fills the universe, rather it is something organisms do.

Since the three of us apparently — as best I can gather — conceive of consciousness so differently, we will all pursue and reject different approaches to the relationship between mind and body.

I feel like I have made my position clear, while your conceptions and "positions" have remained vague and confusing. Smcder, I understand that you don't feel that any current theories/models begin to explain consciousness, but I don't feel that need restrict you from fully expressing your conception of what consciousness is.

And ultimately its fine if both of you choose to refrain from speculation, etc. However, I find it very hard to have a discussion under these circumstances.