Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[smcder]

Resonates with how I am coming to understand HCT

Stability: how life began and why it can’t rest – Addy Pross – Aeon

The first part reminds me of how consciousness is often discussed:

"... there seems to be a chasm between the animate and inanimate realms.

I believe that it is now possible to bridge that gap. But before I explain how, it is worth mentioning how modern biology has generally dealt with it. Bluntly, it has dropped the problem into the ‘too hard’ basket and looked the other way. This has meant fencing off biology from physics and chemistry, and developing a separate philosophy of science. One of the leading evolutionary biologists of the 20th century, Ernst Mayr, openly argued for the ‘autonomy of biology’. Physics and chemistry deal with inanimate matter, he insisted, biology deals with living systems, and, at least for the time being, that’s that."

Then, the HCTish part:

The second insight is even more momentous. Evolution exhibits an identifiable driving force, a direction if you like, and this ‘teleological’ tendency acts at both the chemical and biological stages; that is, it operates both during, as well as after, what we think of as abiogenesis. Thus the purpose-driven character of life, the very thing that seemed to distinguish biology from the rest of nature, turns out not to be unique to life after all. Its beginnings are already discernible in certain inanimate systems, provided they are replicative and able to evolve. And this driving force can be described in strictly physical terms.
Put simply, it is nature’s drive towards greater stability – a drive that is as ubiquitous in physics as it is in biology.

...

We talk a lot about stability both in science and in everyday life. It means pretty much the same thing in either context: long-lasting, persistent, unchanging over time. And true to the prediction of our little logical truism above, there is indeed a law of physics and chemistry that says that things, in general, become more stable over time.

I’m talking about the Second Law of Thermodynamics, one of the most famous laws in all of science.

 

[Soupie]

I posted this awhile ago, but think it got lost in the shuffle.

A New Physics Theory of Life - Scientific American

 

[Pharoah]

"Crucial to an account of emergence, however, is a view concerning the relationship of such levels.

On this score, we find that there are, in fact, two rather different pictures of emergence, one represented by Mill and Broad, and the other represented by Alexander.

1. For Mill and Broad, emergence involves the appearance of primitive high-level causal interactions that are additional to those of the more fundamental levels.

2. Alexander, by contrast, is committed only to the appearance of novel qualities and associated, high-level causal patterns which cannot be directly expressed in terms of the more fundamental entities and principles. But these patterns do not supplement, much less supersede, the fundamental interactions. Rather, they are macroscopic patterns running through those very microscopic interactions. Emergent qualities are something truly new under the sun, but the world's fundamental dynamics remain unchanged."

It seems HCT is more at #1. The most popular contemporary take is epistemological - that breaks into two and then the article continues to discuss ontolofgical emergence - you may be well versed in this and have already rejected these categories, or maybe there is something helpful there.

Newton's law why? Very good question. There is no answer except I will say that if two interacting bodies ("constructs" expands the Newtonian concept of material "bodies" beyond the realm of mass and velocity, and thereby incorporates the idea of mental constructs that are thought in terms of not being material) do not behave equitably when interacting with one another and do not determine an equilibrium in their response to one another, then the universe cannot exist. There may be universes where Newton's law does not hold, but they do not lead to the physical relations that our universe has. Mental agency can only come about in a universe where this principle holds of constructs, but why this should be so is ultimately unanswerable.

OK ... so "this principle" refers to the ability of mental constructs (non material) to interact with physical ones, correct?

So we have a 1. direction, teleology 2. emergence and it appears to follow Mills and Broad (this is something I can look at more closely now when I go back into HCT to read) 3. mental causation - this is very helpful

"Why do we fool ourselves? Why not an honest search for equilibrium"
Welcome to construct #5 grasshopper.

Ah, good ... look forward to that, I think I have read a bit on #5, you have something on the web ... or you put something in the forums as to what you think #5 will be, right?

Re Emegence: I can't remember why I have not liked any versions. I will look up Mill and Broad again to get specific thoughts.
re mental constructs interacting with the physical: All the constructs engage interactively with environment. The environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is. The higher the hierarchical level the more sophisticated the type of environmental representation that it effects.
Each construct exists because its structure is justified for having engaged and survived environmental intersction. Consequently, each hierarchical level has a transcendentally separate type of justification for existing. The human justification is a belief derived from concepts. A plant species has a physiological adaptation that comes to justify its survival in evolutionary terms.

 

[Pharoah]

@Pharoah - a short way through the Nagel article, see the last bit on the bulleted list below

also may be interesting to @Burnt State

"But highly regarded scientists have made similar arguments. "Life is almost bound to arise, in a molecular form not very different from its form on Earth," wrote Christian de Duve, a Nobel laureate in physiology or medicine, in 1995. Robert Hazen, a mineralogist and biogeologist at the Carnegie Institution for Science, struck a similar note in 2007: "With autotrophy, biochemistry is wired into the universe. The self-made cell emerges from geochemistry as inevitably as basalt or granite." Harold J. Morowitz, a biophysicist at George Mason University, argued that evolution has an arrow built into it: "We start with observations, and if the evolving cosmos has an observed direction, rejecting that view is clearly nonempirical. There need not necessarily be a knowable end point, but there may be an arrow."

"When you have millions of species taking random walks through the wilds of genetic variation and natural selection, some will, by the luck of the draw, become more complex and more capable. That is, when there is an overall increase in variance, some of the variants will be more complex and capable than their ancestors. Biologists say that such ascents in complexity happen "passively."

Yet some scientists think that increases in complexity also happen "actively," that is, driven by physical laws that directly favor increases in complexity. As a group, these scientists have no sympathy for intelligent design. However, they do see reasons to think that seen as a whole, life does go from simple to complex, from instinctual to intellectual. And they are asking if there are fundamental laws of nature that make it happen."

• Stuart Kauffman - autocatylytic networks
• Simon Conway Morris - natural structures such as eyes, neurons, brains, and hands are so beneficial that they will get invented over and over again ... attractors in an abstract biological space that pull life in their direction. Contingency and catastrophe will delay them but cannot stop them. ... "If we humans had not evolved, then something more or less identical would have emerged sooner or later."
• zero-force evolutionary law (diversity and complexity necessarily increase even without a change in the environment)
• The chemist Addy Pross, at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, in Israel, argues that life exhibits "dynamic kinetic stability," in which self-replicating systems become more stable through becoming more complex—and are therefore inherently driven to do so.

Hooray for Addy Pross!!! Not necessarily more stable. Stable is stable... just more complex forms that possess temporal stabiliity... And not just self-replicating systems. You have to add the transcendent emergent levels too.
"The chemist Addy Pross, at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, in Israel, argues that life exhibits "dynamic kinetic stability," in which self-replicating systems become more stablethrough becoming more complex—and are therefore inherently driven to do so."

 

[Pharoah]

Still other scientists have asked how we could measure increases in complexity without being biased by our human-centric perspective. Robert Hazen, working with the Nobel Prize winner Jack Szostak, has proposed a metric he calls "functional information," which measures the number of functions and relationships an organism has relative to its environment. The Harvard astrophysicist Eric Chaisson has proposed measuring a quantity that he calls "energy-rate density": how much energy flows through one gram of a system per second. He argues that when he plots energy-rate density against the emergence of new species, the clear result is an overall increase in complexity over time.

...
But Nagel's goal was valid: to point out that fundamental questions of origins, evolution, and intelligence remain unanswered, and to question whether current ways of thinking are up to the task. A really good book on this subject would need to be both scientific and philosophical: scientific to show what is known, philosophical to show how to go beyond what is known. (A better term might be "metascientific," that is, talking about the science and about how to make new sciences.)
The pieces of this book are scattered about the landscape, in a thousand scraps of ideas from biologists, physicists, physicians, chemists, mathematicians, journalists, public intellectuals, and philosophers. But no book has yet emerged that is mighty enough to shove aside the current order, persuading scientists and nonscientists alike, sparking new experiments, changing syllabi, rejiggering budget priorities, spawning new departments, and changing human language and ways of thought forever. On the Origin of Species did it in 1859. We await the next Darwin

(or Wallace ... or whoever it really was ;-)

I am the Gromit

 

[Pharoah]

Resonates with how I am coming to understand HCT

Stability: how life began and why it can’t rest – Addy Pross – Aeon

The first part reminds me of how consciousness is often discussed:

"... there seems to be a chasm between the animate and inanimate realms.

I believe that it is now possible to bridge that gap. But before I explain how, it is worth mentioning how modern biology has generally dealt with it. Bluntly, it has dropped the problem into the ‘too hard’ basket and looked the other way. This has meant fencing off biology from physics and chemistry, and developing a separate philosophy of science. One of the leading evolutionary biologists of the 20th century, Ernst Mayr, openly argued for the ‘autonomy of biology’. Physics and chemistry deal with inanimate matter, he insisted, biology deals with living systems, and, at least for the time being, that’s that."

Then, the HCTish part:

The second insight is even more momentous. Evolution exhibits an identifiable driving force, a direction if you like, and this ‘teleological’ tendency acts at both the chemical and biological stages; that is, it operates both during, as well as after, what we think of as abiogenesis. Thus the purpose-driven character of life, the very thing that seemed to distinguish biology from the rest of nature, turns out not to be unique to life after all. Its beginnings are already discernible in certain inanimate systems, provided they are replicative and able to evolve. And this driving force can be described in strictly physical terms.
Put simply, it is nature’s drive towards greater stability – a drive that is as ubiquitous in physics as it is in biology.

...

We talk a lot about stability both in science and in everyday life. It means pretty much the same thing in either context: long-lasting, persistent, unchanging over time. And true to the prediction of our little logical truism above, there is indeed a law of physics and chemistry that says that things, in general, become more stable over time.

I’m talking about the Second Law of Thermodynamics, one of the most famous laws in all of science.

Yes this is all consistent with HCT. It then extrapolates into phenomenal consciousness and the human mental perspective too... up the hierarchy

 

[Pharoah]

"The DKS selection rule thereby becomes an additional sub-set of the global selection rule, ‘less stable to more stable’, discussed earlier."
This is another way of talking of transcendence... 'a sub-set of the global selection rule'

from Journal of Systems Chemistry | Full text | The nature and mathematical basis for material stability in the chemical and biological worlds
by addy pross

 

[Pharoah]

Yep... Addy Pross has got it only half right.
He identifies two stability kinds. Dynamic kinetic stability and thermodynamic.
Where he is wrong is in thinking that this corresponds with inanimate vs animate (living) systems.
Alternatively, both kinds of stability (using his way of thinking and applying it to HCT) apply to each hierarchical level.

So, with inanimate matter, you get thermodynamic stability (increasing entropy and dissipation) BUT you also get increasingly stable complex elements and compounds (which is against the thermodynamic gradient).
With living organisms you get extinction and death (which is consistent with a thermodynamic equilibrium) BUT you also get increasinlgy complex stable physiologies.

That is not where he is at with his model unfortunately.

 

[Pharoah]

I posted this awhile ago, but think it got lost in the shuffle.

A New Physics Theory of Life - Scientific American

From the link: "Jeremy England, a 31-year-old assistant professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has derived a mathematical formula that he believes explains this capacity. The formula, based on established physics, indicates that when a group of atoms is driven by an external source of energy (like the sun or chemical fuel) and surrounded by a heat bath (like the ocean or atmosphere), it will often gradually restructure itself in order to dissipate increasingly more energy."
This is not new:
"Furthermore, Swenson(1988,1989) maintains that under certain conditions, ordered flows of energy can maximise the rate at which a system satisfies the second law thereby making it more effective at dissipating energy than chaotic flows." (me 12ish years ago)
Swenson, R. (1988). Emergence and the principle of maximum entropy production: Multi-level system theory, evolution, and non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the International Society for General Systems Research, 32
Swenson, R. (1989). Emergent attractors and the law of maximum entropy production: Foundations to a theory of general evolution. Systems Research, 6, 187-197

 

[Pharoah]

One of the key flaws in Pross can be seen in this sentence:
"Moreover, the dynamic kinetic stability (DKS) formulation suggests that, in contrast to an isolated thermodynamic system, where the maximal (energetic) stability of the equilibrium state is achievable, in biological systems maximal stability (in the time/persistent sense) is unachievable "

The error is in the use of the term system.
Thermodynamic "systems" are generally not actually systems-constructs but are instead made up of lots of little separate parts interacting with one another until equilibrium is met by probability. Scientists call them systems because they are treated mathematically as such; treated as a singular body whose entropy is increasing. But thermodynamic so called "systems" are not a singular construct.
Biological "systems" on the other hand are a singular construct (as are elements and compounds). Yes they are made of parts, but the interaction of the parts do not invoke thermodynamic laws on the whole.
It is a common error because the word system is used so loosely without thought. Terrence Deacon's work (Alicia Juarrero's to many) has the same issues.

Don't know who published first but Pross is basically saying that life came out of thermodynamic processes exactly as is deacon's view. This is going to be a very pervasive and powerful idea that needs to be challenged vigourously

 

[smcder]

One of the key flaws in Pross can be seen in this sentence:
"Moreover, the dynamic kinetic stability (DKS) formulation suggests that, in contrast to an isolated thermodynamic system, where the maximal (energetic) stability of the equilibrium state is achievable, in biological systems maximal stability (in the time/persistent sense) is unachievable "

The error is in the use of the term system.
Thermodynamic "systems" are generally not actually systems-constructs but are instead made up of lots of little separate parts interacting with one another until equilibrium is met by probability. Scientists call them systems because they are treated mathematically as such; treated as a singular body whose entropy is increasing. But thermodynamic so called "systems" are not a singular construct.
Biological "systems" on the other hand are a singular construct (as are elements and compounds). Yes they are made of parts, but the interaction of the parts do not invoke thermodynamic laws on the whole.
It is a common error because the word system is used so loosely without thought. Terrence Deacon's work (Alicia Juarrero's to many) has the same issues.

Don't know who published first but Pross is basically saying that life came out of thermodynamic processes exactly as is deacon's view. This is going to be a very pervasive and powerful idea that needs to be challenged vigourously

HCT is timely then ... does this help with publication strategies?

 

[smcder]

A brief break to read the following paper might be clarifying here:

Wambacq, Judith
Subject-object in Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour and Manuel De Landa

Subject-object in Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour and Manuel De Landa#

{follow the word 'transcend'}

Just When I think he's going eastern he pulls up and makes a move like this:

"The value of an artwork exists in its mediating role: it allows subject as well as object to partake in the happening of being. The work of art can thus not be thought in hylemorphic terms, since also the materiality of an artwork contributes to the revealing of being."

 

[smcder]

"In accordance to behavioral AI, De Landa does not believe that, in the case of a bird, the birds brain would typically contain representations of the world, forming a cognitive map of the animal’s surroundings. Building a nest is not a symbolic operation performed on these representations and only later implemented as actions in the real world. The birds brain consists of a collection of neural networks, each of which is directly and dynamically connected to the outside world. Each neural network is in a non-linear stable state (or attractor) which is associated with a similarly stable pattern in the animal’s environment, without the intervention of representations of the outside world. A pattern of the outside world can then be recognised by the animal without forming an explicit internal symbol to stand in for that pattern.This theory differs strongly from the point of view of symbolic AI. The latter decomposes the brain into relatively large functional modules (perception, execution) that must be activated by central representations (beliefs, desires, intentions). The way the environment is thought or felt of, is the basis of a concrete evaluation of this environment. This results in a very causal, hence, linear and static model for human-outer world relations. Mobility is only possible if the central representations change. Change and meaning always depart from the subject pole.

Behavioural AI, on the other hand, does not presuppose high level general modules but postulates low level specific modules. High level skills emerge out of the interactions of these micro-modules, none of which can be said to possess the skill. One cannot speak of an internal generation of a world model because the organisms are directly involved with the real world.

The objective features of the environment function as an external memory that determines behaviour momentarily. The exclusion of reflection, and hence of rather fixed beliefs about the world, in combination with the ever-changing environmental circumstances as the only source for knowledge, render this model to a very dynamic representation of the brain. For example, a bird can conclude from its muscular intelligence and the behaviour of other animals whether a swampy surface provides enough suitable support to walk on, without the need for an internal `world model’ which includes representations of dry and wet land.

The world seems to possess a kind of intrinsic

`proto-semantics’,

which are meaningful to the subject in a fundamental way."

 

[smcder]

A brief break to read the following paper might be clarifying here:

Wambacq, Judith
Subject-object in Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour and Manuel De Landa

Subject-object in Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour and Manuel De Landa#

{follow the word 'transcend'}

I want to hear your take on this article @Constance.

I'm working through it. I read it once and now I pasted it in Word and I'm breaking it apart.

 

[smcder]

Re Emegence: I can't remember why I have not liked any versions. I will look up Mill and Broad again to get specific thoughts.

re mental constructs interacting with the physical: All the constructs engage interactively with environment. The environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is. The higher the hierarchical level the more sophisticated the type of environmental representation that it effects.

Each construct exists because its structure is justified for having engaged and survived environmental intersction. Consequently, each hierarchical level has a transcendentally separate type of justification for existing. The human justification is a belief derived from concepts. A plant species has a physiological adaptation that comes to justify its survival in evolutionary terms.

OK, I want to know more about mental causation.

Mental constructs are non-material (I can't find your original post for the exact way you are using non-material) and above you say all constructs engage interactively with the environment, the environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is ...

So when I think about mental causation, the main problem is how does the non-material affect the material? So in your use of "justification" you say human justification is a belief derived from concepts - so belief has to be causal in your view? Beliefs ---> actions ... right?

If so, how do you get around the difficulties of overdeterminism?

neurons firing ----> actions
neurons firing ----> beliefs

or what is the causal relationship(s) between actions, beliefs and neurons?

 

[smcder]

@Constance

I pick up Spanish literature when I'm out in public (we have a large Hispanic community here) to practice reading and translating and I was reading this poem this morning:

La Fuente

Asi como la fuenta honra el agua.
Asi como la hoja honra al arbol,
Asi como el iris honra al color purpura ,
Asi como el atardacer honra al sol,
yo Te honro a Ti, Dios.

The form is:

As the fountain honors the water,

and continues pairwise with:

leaf - tree
iris - purple
evening - sun
I - God

I just realized there's a nice parallel with these lines from the subject-object paper:

Yet there is more. The work of art does not only show the thingliness of things, but its own thingliness engenders reality.

Standing there, the Greek temple holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence.

The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night.

The temples firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air.

The lesson in hylemorphism is appreciated too:

Hylemorphism is a necessary precondition for holding together the Greek dualistic universe. The gap between the world of ideas and the world of matter is negotiated through form (part of the world of ideas), which imposes its principals on matter. Matter is by itself inert and meaningless: it acquires existence from form.

I think he's headed east, culminating here:

It even becomes difficult to speak of objects and subjects, since both transcend each other by their focus on being (das Sein). Being is a dynamic process wherein object and subject are hardly distinguishable from each other. Being, in other words, bridges the gap between subject and object. Or rather, in the light of being, there has never been a separation between the two.

aka "form is emptiness, emptiness is form" ...

But then:

The value of an artwork exists in its mediating role: it allows subject as well as object to partake in the happening of being. The work of art can thus not be thought in hylemorphic terms, since also the materiality of an artwork contributes to the revealing of being.

 

[Pharoah]

OK, I want to know more about mental causation.

Mental constructs are non-material (I can't find your original post for the exact way you are using non-material) and above you say all constructs engage interactively with the environment, the environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is ...

So when I think about mental causation, the main problem is how does the non-material affect the material? So in your use of "justification" you say human justification is a belief derived from concepts - so belief has to be causal in your view? Beliefs ---> actions ... right?

If so, how do you get around the difficulties of overdeterminism?

neurons firing ----> actions
neurons firing ----> beliefs

or what is the causal relationship(s) between actions, beliefs and neurons?

A can of worms here.

Matter is physical, but is it material? - that all depends on the nature of something's relation to it:
Worldly facts would seem to vary in their temporal relevancy. Some endure whilst others are fleeting. Superficially, matter itself is thought as enduring, solid, and foundational. However, it is not straightforward to simply express the view that it is ‘a physical fact’ (specifically) that matter is solid, enduring, and foundational. For instance, much about matter’s constituents, i.e., its atoms and their constituents, is fleeting and enigmatic. One can deduce from this that in identifying temporal stabilities such as the solidity of matter, humans are identifying certain relational consistencies. And so might we say that the fact of matter, is a human’s particular way of relating to ‘the stuff of which things are made which apparently is solid, enduring, and foundational’ rather than, that the fact of matter is that it is actually solid, enduring, and foundational. Indeed, it is questionable that there is such a thing as a non-relational ‘physical fact of matter’ or indeed that there is any kind of non-relational physical fact. If this is true, then if some matter were ‘red’ by virtue of it reflecting certain wavelengths of light, then that ‘redness’ would not constitute a non-relational fact of matter either. (This is not necessarily to sanction an anti-realist stance however, for all physical entities are referential to other physical entities. For example, matter has a referential relation to matter being solid and foundational, which contrasts with a neutrino’s referential relation to matter). We can think of our experience of red in a similar fashion to our experience of matter. We think that they are enduring properties of things, but in reality these appearances are facts regarding only our particular way of referring to them and are no more than superficially indicative of a physical fact, as ‘physical facts’ on this view are necessarily relationally dependent.

This last bit about red is pertinent to, "above you say all constructs engage interactively with the environment, the environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is".
Red light has a wavelength of 400–484 THz. It has one causal impact on cone cells in the retina. This is not the same mechanism that causes the phenomenal experience red. This is why there is a transcendent gap between the hierarchical levels: different kinds of physical mechanism cause different representational 'properties' (alternatively, 'characteristics' or 'effects'). Of course, the experience of red does not happen exactly when the cone cell is stimulated - there is no overdeterminism going on.

Another way of thinking about this is that all physical events are processes and processes are not identities. What I mean by this, is that we think of matter as a static, rigid, solid, identity but it is not. Matter is a process of subatomic interactions and is identified as solid only because we, as a material body ourselves, relate to it in that way.
Consequently, we can think of complex processes—that are no less physical than those of material processes—creating mental characteristics that are not apparently substantially material (substantially material in terms of a solid rigid identity).

Belief, action, neurons
Whilst actions and beliefs require physical causal mechanisms, physical causal mechanisms do not require beliefs nor the kind of actions associated with human mental activity. This is why I say there is an upward causal relation but that the transcendent gap denies a downward causal relation. Mental processes require neurones because mental mechanisms are driven by neural processes (and biochemical processes !! - we can say with confidence that the term ‘neural correlate’ is a misnomer because it ignores the importance of biochemical mechanisms whilst overemphasising the assumed computational and essentially barren primacy of neural activity in the production of qualitative experience).

I don't know whether this is answering the questions. Let me know if I am on cue... I could go on.

 

[Pharoah]

On teleology:
I have read that Hegel's goal is an "absolute knowledge understood as a complete correspondence of concept and object." (Richard Norman 1976 - Hegel's phenomenology)
This sounds like my HCT teleology of concepts: namely to seek an all-embracing concept about (the object of) reality

 

[smcder]

A can of worms here.

Matter is physical, but is it material? - that all depends on the nature of something's relation to it:
Worldly facts would seem to vary in their temporal relevancy. Some endure whilst others are fleeting. Superficially, matter itself is thought as enduring, solid, and foundational. However, it is not straightforward to simply express the view that it is ‘a physical fact’ (specifically) that matter is solid, enduring, and foundational. For instance, much about matter’s constituents, i.e., its atoms and their constituents, is fleeting and enigmatic. One can deduce from this that in identifying temporal stabilities such as the solidity of matter, humans are identifying certain relational consistencies. And so might we say that the fact of matter, is a human’s particular way of relating to ‘the stuff of which things are made which apparently is solid, enduring, and foundational’ rather than, that the fact of matter is that it is actually solid, enduring, and foundational. Indeed, it is questionable that there is such a thing as a non-relational ‘physical fact of matter’ or indeed that there is any kind of non-relational physical fact. If this is true, then if some matter were ‘red’ by virtue of it reflecting certain wavelengths of light, then that ‘redness’ would not constitute a non-relational fact of matter either. (This is not necessarily to sanction an anti-realist stance however, for all physical entities are referential to other physical entities. For example, matter has a referential relation to matter being solid and foundational, which contrasts with a neutrino’s referential relation to matter). We can think of our experience of red in a similar fashion to our experience of matter. We think that they are enduring properties of things, but in reality these appearances are facts regarding only our particular way of referring to them and are no more than superficially indicative of a physical fact, as ‘physical facts’ on this view are necessarily relationally dependent.

This last bit about red is pertinent to, "above you say all constructs engage interactively with the environment, the environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is".
Red light has a wavelength of 400–484 THz. It has one causal impact on cone cells in the retina. This is not the same mechanism that causes the phenomenal experience red. This is why there is a transcendent gap between the hierarchical levels: different kinds of physical mechanism cause different representational 'properties' (alternatively, 'characteristics' or 'effects'). Of course, the experience of red does not happen exactly when the cone cell is stimulated - there is no overdeterminism going on.

Another way of thinking about this is that all physical events are processes and processes are not identities. What I mean by this, is that we think of matter as a static, rigid, solid, identity but it is not. Matter is a process of subatomic interactions and is identified as solid only because we, as a material body ourselves, relate to it in that way.
Consequently, we can think of complex processes—that are no less physical than those of material processes—creating mental characteristics that are not apparently substantially material (substantially material in terms of a solid rigid identity).

Belief, action, neurons
Whilst actions and beliefs require physical causal mechanisms, physical causal mechanisms do not require beliefs nor the kind of actions associated with human mental activity. This is why I say there is an upward causal relation but that the transcendent gap denies a downward causal relation. Mental processes require neurones because mental mechanisms are driven by neural processes (and biochemical processes !! - we can say with confidence that the term ‘neural correlate’ is a misnomer because it ignores the importance of biochemical mechanisms whilst overemphasising the assumed computational and essentially barren primacy of neural activity in the production of qualitative experience).

I don't know whether this is answering the questions. Let me know if I am on cue... I could go on.

Yessir, it is answering questions.

Red light has a wavelength of 400–484 THz. It has one causal impact on cone cells in the retina. This is not the same mechanism that causes the phenomenal experience red. This is why there is a transcendent gap between the hierarchical levels: different kinds of physical mechanism cause different representational 'properties' (alternatively, 'characteristics' or 'effects'). Of course, the experience of red does not happen exactly when the cone cell is stimulated - there is no overdeterminism going on.

overdeterminism
I'm not sure I follow how this addresses overdeterminism, the problem I have in mind is:

------> means "causal impact" or just "causes"

red light ----> cones ----> brain ----> phenomenal experience red

so far so good ...

but now I decide to put on the brakes ... my (subjective) phenomenal experience of deciding has nothing to do with the brakes actually being applied, right? Because of the transcendent gap, phenomenal experience can't feed back down into action, so subjective experience is causally impotent (epiphenomenal) and "I" am literally and figuratively along for the ride?


(this is what makes zombies conceivable to some folks)

 

[smcder]

A can of worms here.

Matter is physical, but is it material? - that all depends on the nature of something's relation to it:
Worldly facts would seem to vary in their temporal relevancy. Some endure whilst others are fleeting. Superficially, matter itself is thought as enduring, solid, and foundational. However, it is not straightforward to simply express the view that it is ‘a physical fact’ (specifically) that matter is solid, enduring, and foundational. For instance, much about matter’s constituents, i.e., its atoms and their constituents, is fleeting and enigmatic. One can deduce from this that in identifying temporal stabilities such as the solidity of matter, humans are identifying certain relational consistencies. And so might we say that the fact of matter, is a human’s particular way of relating to ‘the stuff of which things are made which apparently is solid, enduring, and foundational’ rather than, that the fact of matter is that it is actually solid, enduring, and foundational. Indeed, it is questionable that there is such a thing as a non-relational ‘physical fact of matter’ or indeed that there is any kind of non-relational physical fact. If this is true, then if some matter were ‘red’ by virtue of it reflecting certain wavelengths of light, then that ‘redness’ would not constitute a non-relational fact of matter either. (This is not necessarily to sanction an anti-realist stance however, for all physical entities are referential to other physical entities. For example, matter has a referential relation to matter being solid and foundational, which contrasts with a neutrino’s referential relation to matter). We can think of our experience of red in a similar fashion to our experience of matter. We think that they are enduring properties of things, but in reality these appearances are facts regarding only our particular way of referring to them and are no more than superficially indicative of a physical fact, as ‘physical facts’ on this view are necessarily relationally dependent.

This last bit about red is pertinent to, "above you say all constructs engage interactively with the environment, the environment's causal impact differs depending on what type of construct it is".
Red light has a wavelength of 400–484 THz. It has one causal impact on cone cells in the retina. This is not the same mechanism that causes the phenomenal experience red. This is why there is a transcendent gap between the hierarchical levels: different kinds of physical mechanism cause different representational 'properties' (alternatively, 'characteristics' or 'effects'). Of course, the experience of red does not happen exactly when the cone cell is stimulated - there is no overdeterminism going on.

Another way of thinking about this is that all physical events are processes and processes are not identities. What I mean by this, is that we think of matter as a static, rigid, solid, identity but it is not. Matter is a process of subatomic interactions and is identified as solid only because we, as a material body ourselves, relate to it in that way.
Consequently, we can think of complex processes—that are no less physical than those of material processes—creating mental characteristics that are not apparently substantially material (substantially material in terms of a solid rigid identity).

Belief, action, neurons
Whilst actions and beliefs require physical causal mechanisms, physical causal mechanisms do not require beliefs nor the kind of actions associated with human mental activity. This is why I say there is an upward causal relation but that the transcendent gap denies a downward causal relation. Mental processes require neurones because mental mechanisms are driven by neural processes (and biochemical processes !! - we can say with confidence that the term ‘neural correlate’ is a misnomer because it ignores the importance of biochemical mechanisms whilst overemphasising the assumed computational and essentially barren primacy of neural activity in the production of qualitative experience).

I don't know whether this is answering the questions. Let me know if I am on cue... I could go on.

Another way of thinking about this is that all physical events are processes and processes are not identities. What I mean by this, is that we think of matter as a static, rigid, solid, identity but it is not. Matter is a process of subatomic interactions and is identified as solid only because we, as a material body ourselves, relate to it in that way.
Consequently, we can think of complex processes—that are no less physical than those of material processes—creating mental characteristics that are not apparently substantially material (substantially material in terms of a solid rigid identity).

Consequently, we can think of complex processes—that are no less physical than those of material processes—creating mental characteristics that are not apparently substantially material (substantially material in terms of a solid rigid identity).


complex processes - here refers to those creating mental characteristics, theses processes are no less physical than those of material processes (so you distinguish material from phyical - I'll have to come back to that ... )

mental characteristics are not apparently substantially material (in terms of a solid rigid identity)

The above seems to be an attempt to give an objective account of subjectivity (Nagel's original hard problem and to say it's "rhetorically incoherent" is no defense, because that is the hard problem ) except that "apparently" refers to a subjective evaluation ... so you have to call in subjectivity to objectively describe it? Or am I missing something?