Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Constance]

A decent definition of 'aporia' is provided at this wiki article:

Aporia - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Constance]

Shaun Gallagher has provided critical insights into how the problem of consciousness must be approached in part through the current interdisciplinary work in consciousness studies. The following version of his article "Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science" is a preprint. I cannot locate a pdf of the article as it appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. As Gallagher recognizes and points out, neurophenomenology as developed by Varela, Thompson, Noe, and others is the path to be followed if we are not to remain stalled in thinking of consciousness itself as an immense aporia..

http://philosophystuff.pbworks.com/...ecent-Phenomenology-in-Cognitive-Science-.pdf

 

[Constance]

ps: I've just edited the above post (#1020) and clarified a number of unclear statements that escaped because I did not proof it before posting it.

 

[Constance]

"the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;" = Chalmers thinking "behaviourism"
"the integration of information by a cognitive system;" = Chalmers thinking "function(alism)"
"the reportability of mental states;" = Chalmers thinking "psychology/language/representation(alism) poss. HOR"
"the ability of a system to access its own internal states" = Chalmers thinking "Cognitive science"

I had actually plugged your examples of the hard problem into these categories of the easy problem (for Chalmers) in a post above - so I was questioning your interpretation of these examples, what you seemed to pose as hard problems, appeared to me in Chalmers categories of easy one.

Just a note, let's move on - I want to see the solution to the hard problem, that should tell me more about your concept (and mine) of it than anything else.

I hope!

i know nothing i know nothing i know nothing

I need to register a mild objection. Only a mild one because it's possible that if you and Pharoah continue the 21 questions approach you might somehow each identify either a clear difference in your and his definitions of the hard problem {which we can all discuss with some specificity} or reach a point of clear agreement on what the hard problem is.

My mild objection concerns only my wish that by now we would have processed the meaning of the hard problem in more detail. But maybe only the 21 questions and their possible answers will get us to some common understanding of what the hard problem of consciousness is.

 

[smcder]

I need to register a mild objection. Only a mild one because it's possible that if you and Pharoah continue the 21 questions approach you might somehow each identify either a clear difference in your and his definitions of the hard problem {which we can all discuss with some specificity} or reach a point of clear agreement on what the hard problem is.

My mild objection concerns only my wish that by now we would have processed the meaning of the hard problem in more detail. But maybe only the 21 questions and their possible answers will get us to some common understanding of what the hard problem of consciousness is.

I don't see a consensus on what the hard problem is, when and how it originated (see the IEP article and Strawson's history) and what it's relationship is to other problems in POM ... I want to hear more from Flesch as an oppotunity to see how he defined the hard problem as the problem of why I am me and not you ... and if he can reference that to Chalmer's work ...

I think the going back and forth on interpreting Chalmers isn't getting us anywhere and if the 21 questions promises to reveal @Pharoah's solution to the hard problem - then we'll either all say "ahhhh!" that's it! and be able to move on because the problem is solved or we'll find out how we diverge in understanding when we say "no, you haven't solved the hard problem at all".

I don't know what else to do on that at this point?

 

[Pharoah]

I don't see a consensus on what the hard problem is, when and how it originated (see the IEP article and Strawson's history) and what it's relationship is to other problems in POM ... I want to hear more from Flesch as an oppotunity to see how he defined the hard problem as the problem of why I am me and not you ... and if he can reference that to Chalmer's work ...

I think the going back and forth on interpreting Chalmers isn't getting us anywhere and if the 21 questions promises to reveal @Pharoah's solution to the hard problem - then we'll either all say "ahhhh!" that's it! and be able to move on because the problem is solved or we'll find out how we diverge in understanding when we say "no, you haven't solved the hard problem at all".

I don't know what else to do on that at this point?

@smcder "we'll all say ahhhh" and leave this mortal coil more like.
I'm on the 21Q case. been busy.

We don't have to agree on the HP.
For DC, HP means "Impossible P". Whatever you 'think' (ie believe religiously) is impossible, is for you, the HP.
I say HCT provides answers to some problems. Many people believe these problems to be HP ie IP.

 

[smcder]

I need to register a mild objection. Only a mild one because it's possible that if you and Pharoah continue the 21 questions approach you might somehow each identify either a clear difference in your and his definitions of the hard problem {which we can all discuss with some specificity} or reach a point of clear agreement on what the hard problem is.

My mild objection concerns only my wish that by now we would have processed the meaning of the hard problem in more detail. But maybe only the 21 questions and their possible answers will get us to some common understanding of what the hard problem of consciousness is.

The world, the devil and Flesch*

Strawson's article - sent by Flesch - puts Chalmers in historical perspective and cites a paper that questions whether Chalmers said anything new. That doesn't necessarily stop us from claiming Chalmers' has put together the definitive version of the hard problem - but for it to be so, it has to cover a lot of ground. Strawson lists a number of formulations of the same problem throughout history, it's not as if Chalmers said "let there be the hard problem" and it was and he saw it was good. In fact, according to Strawson, attention from the hard problem or problems never strayed that much.

And Chalmers points almost immediately to Nagelian whatitislikeness after saying the hard problem is the problem of experience ... I think there is reasonable room for the problem of why I am me to be very, very close to the hard problem - considering the number of people who just say the hard problem is the problem of why I am me, not you - including Flesch - a distinction here would have to make a difference and a split hare could easily run away from us.

*allusion to mundus, caro, et diabolus - the three enemies of the soul, the sources of temptation

 

[smcder]

@smcder "we'll all say ahhhh" and leave this mortal coil more like.
I'm on the 21Q case. been busy.

We don't have to agree on the HP.
For DC, HP means "Impossible P". Whatever you 'think' (ie believe religiously) is impossible, is for you, the HP.
I say HCT provides answers to some problems. Many people believe these problems to be HP ie IP.

I'm happy with something that directly addresses Chalmers and Nagel - that shows me how matter becomes conscious. Afterward, I'd love to be able to go out and if not talk to my dogs, know what it is like to be them ... or know how, in principle, to make a conscious android companion or christen the basic unit of consciousness as one

Pharoahtron

Nagel puts it, I think in the split brain paper - that we could be able to look at a brain from the outside and know what it is like to taste chocolate.

Anything else ... would be uncivilized.*

*reference to Mastercard commercial

 

[Constance]

I don't see a consensus on what the hard problem is, when and how it originated (see the IEP article and Strawson's history) and what it's relationship is to other problems in POM ... I want to hear more from Flesch as an oppotunity to see how he defined the hard problem as the problem of why I am me and not you ... and if he can reference that to Chalmer's work ...

I do see that you are interested in whether the 'hard problem' should be understood as yiamme. As I think I mentioned a day or two ago, it's possible (and I think sensible) to see the question of yiamme as part of the problem of what consciousness is and how it has evolved in the evolution of species of life on earth. That the world as experienced (from a multitude of different subjective points of view including those of other animals) differs radically from a 'world' without awareness, consciousness, and mind is undeniable, and I am interested in the living world in which lived experience provides innumerable sources of meaning and in which we humans must make decisions about how we live and what we do on behalf of our species and others (including whether and how we provide for the survivability of life on this planet). Others, including the other three of you interacting here, hope to find resolution of the problem of consciousness in the makeup and processes of the physical world as measured (and theorized, hypothesized) by physical scientists. Okay, let's see where that goes through the 21 questions.

The difficulty of the problem of consciousness has of course led to the development of what is called 'object-oriented ontology' and more broadly 'objected-oriented philosophy'. Likely we should spend some time with the practitioners of that field of discourse, and if we pursue that discourse it will lead us to an exploration of a wide range of postmodern/poststructuralist theory in the humanities, including philosophy, and the social sciences. All that will be most interesting to pursue and will get us beyond the pot we're stewing in now. It will take us especially to Deleuze and others, to the level of abstractions expressed in the extract I cited from Difference and Repetition.

I think the going back and forth on interpreting Chalmers isn't getting us anywhere and if the 21 questions promises to reveal @Pharoah's solution to the hard problem - then we'll either all say "ahhhh!" that's it! and be able to move on because the problem is solved or we'll find out how we diverge in understanding when we say "no, you haven't solved the hard problem at all".

I don't know what else to do on that at this point?

I agree that we've been going in circles here for too long now. Some of us can barely stand this any longer [include me]. So I will second your move that we proceed through Pharoah's 21 questions just to get past this circularity.

 

[smcder]

I do see that you are interested in whether the 'hard problem' should be understood as yiamme. As I think I mentioned a day or two ago, it's possible (and I think sensible) to see the question of yiamme as part of the problem of what consciousness is and how it has evolved in the evolution of species of life on earth. That the world as experienced (from a multitude of different subjective points of view including those of other animals) differs radically from a 'world' without awareness, consciousness, and mind is undeniable, and I am interested in the living world in which lived experience provides innumerable sources of meaning and in which we humans must make decisions about how we live and what we do on behalf of our species and others (including whether and how we provide for the survivability of life on this planet). Others, including the other three of you interacting here, hope to find resolution of the problem of consciousness in the makeup and processes of the physical world as measured (and theorized, hypothesized) by physical scientists. Okay, let's see where that goes through the 21 questions.

The difficulty of the problem of consciousness has of course led to the development of what is called 'object-oriented ontology' and more broadly 'objected-oriented philosophy'. Likely we should spend some time with the practitioners of that field of discourse, and if we pursue that discourse it will lead us to an exploration of a wide range of postmodern/poststructuralist theory in the humanities, including philosophy, and the social sciences. All that will be most interesting to pursue and will get us beyond the pot we're stewing in now. It will take us especially to Deleuze and others, to the level of abstractions expressed in the extract I cited from Difference and Repetition.



I agree that we've been going in circles here for too long now. Some of us can barely stand this any longer [include me]. So I will second your move that we proceed through Pharoah's 21 questions just to get past this circularity.

Others, including the other three of you interacting here, hope to find resolution of the problem of consciousness in the makeup and processes of the physical world as measured (and theorized, hypothesized) by physical scientists.

Three ... ?
@Pharoah

made the claim that HCT solves the hard problem of consciousness and posited that the actual hard problem of consicousness was the problem of why I am am me - which he calls the noumenal ... but Flesch and others say that the hard problem Chalmers had in mind just is the problem of why I am me.

If that's true, then Pharoah is mistaken about what the hard problem is - it's actually what he calls the noumenal and for that, he offers no definitive solution and recently, if I understand him, says this problem of the noumenal is why he is not a physicalist.

Either way, that would leave one ...

 

[Constance]

@smcder "we'll all say ahhhh" and leave this mortal coil more like.
I'm on the 21Q case. been busy.

We don't have to agree on the HP.
For DC, HP means "Impossible P". Whatever you 'think' (ie believe religiously) is impossible, is for you, the HP.
I say HCT provides answers to some problems. Many people believe these problems to be HP ie IP.
[/QUOTE]


IP=Impossible Problem?

So you will be solving some problems on the way to understanding consciousness? That will surely be a good thing.

I'm not clear on what you mean in the highlighted statements. For example, I don't think the hard problem of consciousness is impossible to resolve, that consciousness cannot be accounted for rationally, unless one expects a wholly physical explanation. I also don't think I hold my perspective on consciousness 'religiously'. Do you think you will be holding your eventual contribution to the understanding of consciousness 'religiously'?

. . .

 

[smcder]

@Constance

And yes, let's get on with it - we can do 21 questions along the way.

Can you give me a reading assignment?

 

[Constance]

Others, including the other three of you interacting here, hope to find resolution of the problem of consciousness in the makeup and processes of the physical world as measured (and theorized, hypothesized) by physical scientists.

Three ... ?
@Pharoah

made the claim that HCT solves the hard problem of consciousness and posited that the actual hard problem of consicousness was the problem of why I am am me - which he calls the noumenal ... but Flesch and others say that the hard problem Chalmers had in mind just is the problem of why I am me.

If that's true, then Pharoah is mistaken about what the hard problem is - it's actually what he calls the noumenal and for that, he offers no definitive solution and recently, if I understand him, says this problem of the noumenal is why he is not a physicalist.

Either way, that would leave one ...

I may be experiencing burn-out of my attention span for the so-called 'hard problem' however it's being conceived. The summary you provide above, highlighted in blue, is obscure to me. Is the issue you are foregrounding the error you think Pharoah has made in not seeing Chalmers's hard problem {via Flesch} as identical to Pharoah's own version of the hard problem? Would Pharoah agree, given Flesch, that C's and his hard problem are identical? If so, why are we having this conversation?

 

[Constance]

@Constance

And yes, let's get on with it - we can do 21 questions along the way.

Can you give me a reading assignment?

??

 

[smcder]

I may be experiencing burn-out of my attention span for the so-called 'hard problem' however it's being conceived. The summary you provide above, highlighted in blue, is obscure to me. Is the issue you are foregrounding the error you think Pharoah has made in not seeing Chalmers's hard problem {via Flesch} as identical to Pharoah's own version of the hard problem? Would he agree that C's and his hard problem are identical? If so, why are we having this conversation?

I understand! ... yes, that's what I am saying and no, Pharoah doesn't agree. He thinks HCT solves Chalmers' hard problem and that the noumenal problem is the real hard problem of consciousness. That is why I want to see his solution of the hard problem. In the meantime, I think we should go ahead in the direction you suggest.

 

[smcder]

??

I'm reading the links you posted recently - the Gallagher paper Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science is excellent ... I'm just saying you'll have to take the lead on a discussion of phenomenology, I don't know where to start.

 

[Constance]

Ah, you mean into OOO, ultimately grappling with Deleuze et al? OK. We took up earlier, here in part 3 I think, the online text of Speculative Realism, edited by Graham Harmon and Levi Bryant if I remember correctly. I'll try to find that link and post it here.

 

[Constance]

Steve, extending my response to what I thought you meant in terms of what to read next:

I understand! ... yes, that's what I am saying and no, Pharoah doesn't agree. He thinks HCT solves Chalmers' hard problem and that the noumenal problem is the real hard problem of consciousness. That is why I want to see his solution of the hard problem. In the meantime, I think we should go ahead in the direction you suggest.

Ah, you mean into OOO, ultimately grappling with Deleuze et al? OK. We took up earlier, here in part 3 I think, the online text of Speculative Realism, edited by Graham Harmon and Levi Bryant if I remember correctly. I'll try to find that link and post it here.

Adding: now it seems you want recommendations in phenomenology. Go with Gallagher's papers, a bunch of them located at consciousness.net. And Varela, Thompson, et al if not MP, but MP is the one to read and his Phenomenology of Perception is also available online. OOO, btw, is critical of the major phenomenological philosophers. I'm actually eager to get back into reading OOO. Let's just all follow our interests where they lead us. I've about exhausted my willingness to speak further here about phenomenology.

 

[smcder]

I'm reading the links you posted recently - the Gallagher paper Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science is excellent ... I'm just saying you'll have to take the lead on a discussion of phenomenology, I don't know where to start.

Yes.

The Gallagher paper makes a great point - that the phenomena that cognitive science studies should constrain its models and theories.

The virtue of both Marbach and Van Gelder is that they abandon polemics and set out to show, in some precise details, how phenomenology, specifically the kind of phenomenology developed by Husserl, can contribute to and constrain scientific approaches to consciousness. Readers of this journal will be familiar with Francisco Varela's (1996) recent treatment of these themes under the title of "neurophenomenology."

Several other works that I will consider here pursue these issues in different ways. McClamrock (1995), working primarily within the framework of cognitive science, attempts to integrate important insights developed in more existential versions of phenomenology. Dreyfus (1996) advances the work of Merleau-Ponty to make it relevant to neural network theory. Okrent (1996) focuses on the existential phenomenology of Heidegger and claims that "Heidegger is relevant to cognitive science insofar as he puts forward a set of constraints which any cognitive system must satisfy if it is to count as similar to our own" (§ 3).

In reviewing these works my intent is to explore the putative relation between phenomenology and cognitive science, and to see in the details whether these different traditions are ready to open clear lines of communication, or whether there are still barriers that will prevent the easing of what at best is an uneasy détente, and at worst, a cold antagonism.

(phenomenology and cognitive science) are patently different in almost every important respect: they have their own literature, practitioners, professional meetings, vocabulary, methods, etc. They have fundamentally different orientations: phenomenology proceeds from the assumption that the study of mind must be rooted in direct attention to the nature of (one's own) experience, whereas cognitive science proceeds from the assumption that a genuine science of mind must be rooted in the observation of publicly available aspects of minds of others (1996, § 4)

 

[smcder]

Steve, extending my response to what I thought you meant in terms of what to read next:



Ah, you mean into OOO, ultimately grappling with Deleuze et al? OK. We took up earlier, here in part 3 I think, the online text of Speculative Realism, edited by Graham Harmon and Levi Bryant if I remember correctly. I'll try to find that link and post it here.

Adding: now it seems you want recommendations in phenomenology. Go with Gallagher's papers, a bunch of them located at consciousness.net. And Varela, Thompson, et al if not MP, but MP is the one to read and his Phenomenology of Perception is also available online. OOO, btw, is critical of the major phenomenological philosophers. I'm actually eager to get back into reading OOO. Let's just all follow our interests where they lead us. I've about exhausted my willingness to speak further here about phenomenology.

That's certainly understandable.

I'll have a look at both, everything and see where I end up.