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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

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Constance I share your appreciation for this hypothesis. From what Pharoah has said in the past, i think he agrees with the notion that phenomenal consciousness (in this case, affective consciousness) preceeded "conceptual" consciousness.

What do you think the above implies? Do you think it is a notion that hasnt been recognized by those participating in this discussion? As noted, i think at least pharoah and i have recognized it.

As ive outlined at length in the past, i feel that both panksepp's and barretts approaches to affectivity are needed to explain human emotion.

However, constance, im still not sure that panksepp is implying such affectivity preceeded the evolution and action of neurons. (If that is what youre thinking.)

What do you think the above implies? Do you think it is a notion that hasnt been recognized by those participating in this discussion? As noted, i think at least pharoah and i have recognized it.

lol
 
As i understand it, the whole point of panpsychism is that the universe is awash with consciousness. Taken in the context of the current, dominant physicalist paradigm, this means that all matter/energy is conscious.

However, there are different flavors of panpsychism. As chalmers explains, to be a panpsychist does not mean one must asseert that, say, electrons have minds like ours. But to be a panpsychist might mean that one believes even electrons have some form of consciousness. There is something it is like to be an electron. That is, it feels like something to be an electron.

How this relates to the hard problem: the hard problem -- as explained by chalmers -- is to explain how feeling emerges from physical processes.

Panpyschism avoids the hard problem by suggesting that feeling (consciousness), like matter/energy, just is.

And what i am saying is that in the same way that all the plethora of physical structures in our reality are constituted of (raw) energy, so might all the plethora of phenomenal structures in our reality be constitued of (raw) consciousness.

Conscious Entities » Blog Archive » Quark consciousness
 
What do you think the above implies? Do you think it is a notion that hasnt been recognized by those participating in this discussion? As noted, i think at least pharoah and i have recognized it.

lol
Do you believe affective/phenomenal consciousness preceeds conceptual consciousness in the evolution of life and mind?

From what I gather, the answer is no as you entertain the notion that whole minds are fundamental and irreducible.

Have i misunderstood?
 
Do you believe affective/phenomenal consciousness preceeds conceptual consciousness in the evolution of life and mind?

From what I gather, the answer is no as you entertain the notion that whole minds are fundamental and irreducible.

Have i misunderstood?

That is an entertaining notion! What appears to be fundamental AND irreducible :-) is assumptions, maybe that's what the universe is made of ...
 
1. Did you read the link on quarks?

B. Distinguish affective/phenomenal CS vs conceptual CS?
 
Do you believe affective/phenomenal consciousness preceeds conceptual consciousness in the evolution of life and mind?

From what I gather, the answer is no as you entertain the notion that whole minds are fundamental and irreducible.

Have i misunderstood?

Ah ... wasn't laughing at you ... Just tickled me b/c there are just us four participants
 
1. Did you read the link on quarks?

B. Distinguish affective/phenomenal CS vs conceptual CS?
No, but I do plan to. There was a interesting paper linked in the comments as well.

Phenomenal consciousness would be perceptions of colors, sounds, smells, tastes, pressure, location, time, etc.

Affective consciousness would be global feeling states characterized by valence and intensity among other things.

Conceptual consciousness would be semantic, discursive inner speech.
 
Ah ... wasn't laughing at you ... Just tickled me b/c there are just us four participants

But we four do cover the key issues in the terrain of consciousness studies to a good extent, I think. Hurray for us. :)

I think Panksepp's research is essential for consciousness studies because it brings us closer to recognizing the roots of consciousness in phenomenal awareness and affectivity even in preneuronal primordial organisms. Awareness is rooted in affectivity, develops on the basis of affectivity. Affectivity and awareness constitute the grounds out of which protoconsciousness, consciousness, and mind develop. Affectivity is the first sign of the 'mental' arising out of the physical world, producing the difference that 'makes a difference' in what-is. Pharoah doesn't want to pursue Panksepp's research further at this point (perhaps later?), but the remaining three of us are now I think getting down to the core issue that enables understanding of consciousness and mind in humans and other animals. Mind is developed out of consciousness and perception of the world that surrounds us. Living organisms, even simple primitive organisms, feel and negotiate their place in the world we inhabit long before thinking becomes possible, and what we think arises out of and on the basis of what we experience.
 
No, but I do plan to. There was a interesting paper linked in the comments as well.

Phenomenal consciousness would be perceptions of colors, sounds, smells, tastes, pressure, location, time, etc.

Affective consciousness would be global feeling states characterized by valence and intensity among other things.

Conceptual consciousness would be semantic, discursive inner speech.

I was reading the one on metaphrs of consciousness, I downloaded and printed it the other day - I'll check the link I posted above, but last time I tried it - it was dead, is very interesting to read in light of our Qs and As.

Phenomenal consciousness would be perceptions of colors, sounds, smells, tastes, pressure, location, time, etc.

Affective consciousness would be global feeling states characterized by valence and intensity among other things.

Is there a (subjective) difference in the consciousnesses? Or just in the objects of?
 
I was reading the one on metaphrs of consciousness, I downloaded and printed it the other day - I'll check the link I posted above, but last time I tried it - it was dead, is very interesting to read in light of our Qs and As.

Phenomenal consciousness would be perceptions of colors, sounds, smells, tastes, pressure, location, time, etc.

Affective consciousness would be global feeling states characterized by valence and intensity among other things.

Is there a (subjective) difference in the consciousnesses? Or just in the objects of?
In my way of thinking, any subjective differences are the "objects of consciousness."
 
I had a dream:
I was inside a circular turret of a room with a diameter of 25 feet. I could not see the ceiling - To look up was as if to look into a well with no discernible end to it.
The walls were stone and there was no staircase, nor any furniture or doorways.
I was running in circles within this turret... I was running from a creature that was the devil, but it was benign. But still I ran.
I had to climb the turret to escape.
I was being led by the hand by God or an angel of God and as I did so my feet began to climb by stepping on pillars of air, and yet I would stumble and fall a little way. Nevertheless, I climbed further and I asked in my head.
Why do you make the air stairway so difficult to climb?
The answer came to me...
Because if it was a stone stairway, the devil would be able to follow.
I woke.
 
I had a dream:
I was inside a circular turret of a room with a diameter of 25 feet. I could not see the ceiling - To look up was as if to look into a well with no discernible end to it.
The walls were stone and there was no staircase, nor any furniture or doorways.
I was running in circles within this turret... I was running from a creature that was the devil, but it was benign. But still I ran.
I had to climb the turret to escape.
I was being led by the hand by God or an angel of God and as I did so my feet began to climb by stepping on pillars of air, and yet I would stumble and fall a little way. Nevertheless, I climbed further and I asked in my head.
Why do you make the air stairway so difficult to climb?
The answer came to me...
Because if it was a stone stairway, the devil would be able to follow.
I woke.

There is a kind of group meeting, known as a "dream circle" - I believe it is based on Jungian psychology or the method was developed by Jungian psychologists. The way that it works is that an individual shares a dream with the group. Then each member reflects on the dream, starting with the premise:

if it were my dream ...

The dreamer then takes what is given them and reflects on this, they may, after the group has finished - give their reflections by saying what was helpful or what in the group's comments resonated with them.

If it were my dream, I would look at:

  • the exact measurement of 25 feet in diameter and also the meanings of twenty five (mathematical, religious, etc) ... see Ezekiel's vision of the temple for example
  • inversion looking up into a well
  • no staircase, furniture or doors - is this an isolated/neglected room in the mind? or a kind of prison (but one that lets up into infinity)
  • the devil is benign
  • the devil is a fallen angel but can not climb on the pillars of air
  • a divine force is leading you up but you ask why do you make the pillars so hard to climb (is you you or you the divine? - if it's you, then why do you need the divine hand holding to ascend something you yourself made?)
 
Interlude

The Well of Galabes: September 2014

Interestingly enough, that difficulty doesn’t work both ways. Concrete representations are inclusive to the point of tolerating incoherence—you can take things that are mutually contradictory and relate them to the same mental image without any sense of contradiction—while abstract concepts are exclusive precisely because they demand rational coherence. Thus the image of the world in Unicorn Time tends to be complete but inconsistent, while the image of the world in Dragon Time is consistent but incomplete:the monks of the Middle Ages, for example, had no difficulty making logic a part of their curriculum of study, while many scientists today can be reduced to spluttering fury by the mere suggestion that anything outside the strictest canon of rationalism has any value at all. The flexibility inherent in the monks’ attitude is one reason why Unicorn Time sees civilizations rise, just as the rigidity in that of the scientists is one reason why Dragon Time sees them fall.

A crucial shift in focus underlies this distinction.The characteristic thinking of every civilization’s Dragon Time becomes far more concerned with the relationship of abstractions to each other than it is with the relationship of those abstractions to the world of concrete experience. Where gaps open up between abstraction and experience, in turn, the thinkers of the latter years of Dragon Time tend to be more interested in explaining away the gaps than they are in adjusting the abstractions.A corpus of standard arguments typically evolves to help believers in the currently accepted set of abstractions argue away any experiences that might fail to do what they’re told.
 
I can not.
Haha ok. In any case, what of my answer? I think it provided an opportunity for me to express my view re the mind is green a little more clearly perhaps? Perhaps not.

In any case, here is a directly related question: what does the following question ask?

"Why is there a subjective component to experience?"

It comes from the following, so far excellent, paper.

Robbins, B. D., & Gordon, S. (2015). Humanistic neuropsychology: The implications of neurophenomenology for psychology. In K. J. Schneider & J. F. Pierson (Eds.), The handbook of humanistic psychology: Leading edges in theory, research, and practice (2nd ed., pp. 195-211). | Susan Gordon - Academia.edu

If anyone can explain what that question is asking, it would be appreciated. And perhaps related to the question you were asking Smcder.

Ps I had already added the metaphor paper to my cloud, so if the link is currently bad, I've already got it.
 
Haha ok. In any case, what of my answer? I think it provided an opportunity for me to express my view re the mind is green a little more clearly perhaps? Perhaps not.

In any case, here is a directly related question: what does the following question ask?

"Why is there a subjective component to experience?"

It comes from the following, so far excellent, paper.

Robbins, B. D., & Gordon, S. (2015). Humanistic neuropsychology: The implications of neurophenomenology for psychology. In K. J. Schneider & J. F. Pierson (Eds.), The handbook of humanistic psychology: Leading edges in theory, research, and practice (2nd ed., pp. 195-211). | Susan Gordon - Academia.edu

If anyone can explain what that question is asking, it would be appreciated. And perhaps related to the question you were asking Smcder.

Ps I had already added the metaphor paper to my cloud, so if the link is currently bad, I've already got it.

In any case, what of my answer?
I can not make it the more clear either.

I've already got it.
Then read it!

It's on academia.edu, you need to register but it's free.
 
Haha ok. In any case, what of my answer? I think it provided an opportunity for me to express my view re the mind is green a little more clearly perhaps? Perhaps not.

In any case, here is a directly related question: what does the following question ask?

"Why is there a subjective component to experience?"

It comes from the following, so far excellent, paper.

Robbins, B. D., & Gordon, S. (2015). Humanistic neuropsychology: The implications of neurophenomenology for psychology. In K. J. Schneider & J. F. Pierson (Eds.), The handbook of humanistic psychology: Leading edges in theory, research, and practice (2nd ed., pp. 195-211). | Susan Gordon - Academia.edu

If anyone can explain what that question is asking, it would be appreciated. And perhaps related to the question you were asking Smcder.

Ps I had already added the metaphor paper to my cloud, so if the link is currently bad, I've already got it.

In any case, here is a directly related question: what does the following question ask?
"Why is there a subjective component to experience?"


Are you asking what does "Why is there a subjective component to experience?" - ask?
It comes from the following, so far excellent, paper. (implying you haven't finished reading it?)
Robbins, B. D., & Gordon, S. (2015). Humanistic neuropsychology: The implications of neurophenomenology for psychology. In K. J. Schneider & J. F. Pierson (Eds.), The handbook of humanistic psychology: Leading edges in theory, research, and practice (2nd ed., pp. 195-211). | Susan Gordon - Academia.edu
If anyone can explain what that question is asking, it would be appreciated.

Do you think it is asking something other than "Why is there a subjective component to experience?" ... if so, what do you think it is asking ... if not, is your confusion related to the use of the word "experience"?
 
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