Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

[Soupie]

Abstract of the Barnden article on metaphors of consciousness.

I read this paper.

Here are my thoughts:

Participants in this discussion, and the author of the paper, often say "how it feels to be conscious." Or, "the feeling of being conscious." In fact, the author said this in the opening pages, and I furiously underlined it. Thankfully, the author addressed this later in the paper as one metaphor of consciousness he calls "cognizing as physical sensing." He directly discusses the common usage of the word "feel" when people are talking about consciousness/mental states.

My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.

The paper noted that the metaphors we use to talk about conscious mental states rely on the language of 3D physical space, physical actions, and sensations. This reminded me of theory of executive functioning offer by Russell Barkley. He seems to believe that first-person consciousness is synonymous with executive functioning. (This would of course give consciousness a function, which is controversial and not accepted by the mainstream). However, part of Barkley's theory is built off of Vygotsky's theory of child development.

Barkley states that EF is self-directed action to change behavior and therefore future outcomes.

Barkley theorizes this is accomplished by turning outwardly-directed awareness and behavior inward. So for example:

(1) Awareness of the mother/environment is self-directed and becomes self-awareness (of own behaviors, thoughts, feelings, etc.)

(2) Imposing one's will on the environment is self-directed and becomes self-restraint/inhibition.

(3) Sensing/experiencing the world is self-directed and becomes non-verbal working memory ("mind's eye" metaphor)

(4) Verbal self-expression to others is self-directed and becomes verbal working memory ("internal speech" metaphor).

(5) Emotional responses to others become self-directed and self-regulated.

(6) Motivation valence becomes self-directed and self-regulated.

(7) Creative, curious play is self-directed and becomes planning and problem-solving.

So in this theory, mental and behavioral abilities are developmentally, initially directed outward toward the physical environment, and then over developmental time these abilities are directed at the self. Hence, this might be one (of many) reasons why the language we use to describe the mind relies on language developed to describe external, physical, spaciotemporal processes.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

You recently tweeted out a link to the following, old article. Did you recently revise it?

Here are some thoughts:

Intentionality & Non-Mental Representation | Tye | Philosophy of Consciousness

... Understanding the qualitative relevance of colour

There are two ways of understanding the colour of an object.

From a physical standpoint, an object might reflect light in the frequency 526–606 THz whilst a second object 400-484 THz. That these objects reflect light in these frequencies is objectively the case, whilst the identified frequencies are a correlative concept that humans have determined by associating spectral frequencies (quantified by physics laws) with particular qualitative colour phenomena.

Alternatively, colour can be understood as follows:

Let us say, that on earth, surfaces that reflect frequency 526-606 THz are ubiquitous (for complex reasons that we shall not explore here for the sake of brevity) and that these surfaces are of no material evolutionary benefit to a particular organism species. Conversely, some rare objects that reflect frequency 400-484 THz are highly prized by this particular organism species for their nutritional content. It would be qualitatively pertinent, and responsive to survival pressures, for that species to evolve mechanisms (innate mechanisms) that are hyper-alert to 400-484 THz reflecting colourations as these mechanisms would enable the organisms of that species to locate those nutritional highly prized objects more efficiently.

Conversely, it would be pertinent for innate mechanisms to be indifferent to the ubiquitous 526-606 THz reflecting objects. Additionally, if those desirable 400-484 THz objects had the added characteristic of possessing the contours of a sphere, rather than jagged contours, this would supplement the role of shape in the qualitative identifications of those objects and further benefit those individuals that possessed innate mechanisms capable of making the distinction with automated efficiency. In themselves, these coloured objects have no phenomenal identity, but the organism will tend to evolve innate mechanisms that are phenomenally and qualitatively distinctive and relevant. Their mechanisms might remain innately acquired and therefore, appear both non-representational and “hardwired” much like computational mechanisms, but these appearances would be deceptive as the innate physiologies would be representative of the environment’s qualitative relevance to that organism species.

Thus, it makes sense to interpret each of these frequencies (whose colours we experience as green and red), and each shape (spherical and jagged), as qualitatively differentiated and observer-dependent phenomenologically in this particular species. The organism’s innately acquired mechanisms are an observer-dependent phenomenological representation whose qualitative relevancy is engaged anatomically before any associative learning, introspection, feeling, or emotion capabilities have evolved. ...​

Unfortunately, this scenario does not answer how, when, or why phenomenal color/representation might exist.

You say: It would be qualitatively pertinent, and responsive to survival pressures, for that species to evolve mechanisms (innate mechanisms) that are hyper-alert to 400-484 THz reflecting colourations as these mechanisms would enable the organisms of that species to locate those nutritional highly prized objects more efficiently.

I agree. But such mechanisms could evolve and function effectively in the absence of phenomenal color/representation.

For example, lets suppose the species thus evolved a primitive retina that was "hyper-alert" to 400-484 THz. Lets say the organism possessed flagella that could propel it in any direction. When the retina encountered 400-484 THz, it would send electro-chemical signals to appropriate flagella that would propel it in the direction from whence the 400-484 THz was eminating.

Such a mechanistic processes would check all your boxes. The species will have evolved a mechanism that allowed it to locate and respond to a physical stimuli that was qualitatively relevant to its survival.

However, this can all be accomplished in the absence of phenomenal color/representations.

 

[smcder]

I read this paper.

Here are my thoughts:

Participants in this discussion, and the author of the paper, often say "how it feels to be conscious." Or, "the feeling of being conscious." In fact, the author said this in the opening pages, and I furiously underlined it. Thankfully, the author addressed this later in the paper as one metaphor of consciousness he calls "cognizing as physical sensing." He directly discusses the common usage of the word "feel" when people are talking about consciousness/mental states.

My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.

The paper noted that the metaphors we use to talk about conscious mental states rely on the language of 3D physical space, physical actions, and sensations. This reminded me of theory of executive functioning offer by Russell Barkley. He seems to believe that first-person consciousness is synonymous with executive functioning. (This would of course give consciousness a function, which is controversial and not accepted by the mainstream). However, part of Barkley's theory is built off of Vygotsky's theory of child development.

Barkley states that EF is self-directed action to change behavior and therefore future outcomes.

Barkley theorizes this is accomplished by turning outwardly-directed awareness and behavior inward. So for example:

(1) Awareness of the mother/environment is self-directed and becomes self-awareness (of own behaviors, thoughts, feelings, etc.)

(2) Imposing one's will on the environment is self-directed and becomes self-restraint/inhibition.

(3) Sensing/experiencing the world is self-directed and becomes non-verbal working memory ("mind's eye" metaphor)

(4) Verbal self-expression to others is self-directed and becomes verbal working memory ("internal speech" metaphor).

(5) Emotional responses to others become self-directed and self-regulated.

(6) Motivation valence becomes self-directed and self-regulated.

(7) Creative, curious play is self-directed and becomes planning and problem-solving.

So in this theory, mental and behavioral abilities are developmentally, initially directed outward toward the physical environment, and then over developmental time these abilities are directed at the self. Hence, this might be one (of many) reasons why the language we use to describe the mind relies on language developed to describe external, physical, spaciotemporal processes.

Participants in this discussion, and the author of the paper, often say "how it feels to be conscious." Or, "the feeling of being conscious."

I did a search across the entire forum for these two phrases and only turned up your post.

Very interesting too that we know exactly what the author means here:

Dr. Chandra "So, HAL, how does it feel to be conscious?"
HAL 9000 (after searching deeply through his memory banks for a few seconds) "Dr. Chandra, this is the feeling of being conscious."

In fact, the author said this in the opening pages, and I furiously underlined it. Thankfully, the author addressed this later in the paper as one metaphor of consciousness he calls "cognizing as physical sensing." He directly discusses the common usage of the word "feel" when people are talking about consciousness/mental states.
My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.

Do you have a citation for William James?

Does your conception come from your experience or your experience from your conception? Do you think and maybe even feel the way you do about these things because of your beliefs and experiences?

I don't think the article examined whether these spatial and other metaphors were language, culturally based - you might be tempted to point back to parallels with brain research saying it isn't relative because that's the way brain is ... but then you immediately realize the problem with saying that. I do like the idea that our perceptions might actually be right or might make things right.

There is a Buddhist book: "Thoughts without a thinker."

How would you respond to someone reporting that they have a conception that these are separate, how would you evaluate that? How would you go about telling them they aren't really experiencing that? That in fact these aren't separate phenomena?

I think it would be interesting to look at other cultures and times in terms of what metaphors and what words they have for mental functions.

JMG discusses in his blog I posted above (I think) how civilizations move from concrete to abstract and then how abstractions point to abstractions becoming more and more abstract and then how these civilizations cycle back to the concrete.

 

[smcder]

I think one of the biggest problems with the field of consciousness studies is that there is no agreed upon definition of consciousness. The word is simply associated with too many disparate concepts. And no, I don't think it's because "we have no idea what consciousness is."

Consciousness is associated with:

awareness
self-awareness
emotions
sensations
perceptions (though laymen apparently do not commonly consider perceptions and sensations as consciousness)
empathy
language
thoughts
desires
god
goals
souls
love
meaning
the sense of self
free will/intention
personality
interests
the universe/reality
a phenomenon that emerges from (physical) processes
a phenomenon that emerges from the behavior of neurons
an undifferentiated, non-physical substance
an intelligent substance
a field that permeates the universe

So when someone says "Our neurones generate states capable of becoming conscious experiences — but only because consciousness moulded them over millions of years to be able to do so," one is left wondering what conscious experiences are and how they are different from consciousness. What is consciousness if not conscious experiences?

Our neurons generate states capable of becoming the experience of green, but only because the experience of green has molded them to do so? No?

How can consciousness mold neurons? I can see how a process such as evolution can "mold" neurons? Is he equating consciousness with a process such as evolution?

I can see how a god-like being could teleologically mold neurons. Is he equating consciousness with a god-like, intentional being?

What is the difference for you between neurons shaping consciousness and consciousness shaping neurons?

If raw undifferentiated feeling/experience is the only funda-mental then how do you get intention, qualia (not fundamental for you), mindedness etc without emergence? And if you allow emergence, why do you need undifferentiated feeling/experience to be fundamental? Why not have it emerge as well.

 

[smcder]

I don't think these two approaches can be distinguished in practice.

That is, as we've been discussing, logic is grounded in experience.

So even if we "start" with a theory and conduct experiments to confirm it, the theory will have been based on prior experience/experiments.

I'm encountering this now in Thompson's excellent book "mind in life." He is outlining the thinking of Kant which anticipated much of what humans were to learn about nature; however, as sound as Kant logic was, there simply certain "facts" of nature which he was unaware, and thus couldn't incorporate into his logic/reasoning.

So, I'm not disagreeing per se with your point, Pharoah, just thinking out loud. Of course this relates to what Smcder has been saying about the metaphors and analogies we use to approach consciousness. I just don't think there is a way to avoid it. We reason and theorize with the "facts" that we believe we have regarding the nature of nature.

I found a paper written by a physist regarding what we do and don't know about the nature of reality and particularly the laws of nature. In summary, he says we don't much of anything. His approach was a complex systems and emergence approach (he was not discussing consciousness).

His point was that theory and logic only take us so far as its impossible to predict what will emerge from empirical systems and processes. We essentially don't "know" until it happens.

I recall this happening in the field of deep free diving. It was thought that humans couldn't physically/physiologically surpass a certain depth and survive based of course on current knowledge. However when divers surpassed the noted depth, they survived. It turned out that at certain depths the blood becomes like a plasm (or something) and was able to sustain the divers.

The point being, we can use sound logic and reason all we want, but what actually emerges from nature truly can't be know before hand based on logic/reason alone. New "facts" or phenomena do emerge.

Science, Technology and Society X: Weimar Culture and Quantum Mechanics | The Partially Examined Life | A Philosophy Podcast and Blog

 

[Soupie]

Participants in this discussion, and the author of the paper, often say "how it feels to be conscious." Or, "the feeling of being conscious."

I did a search across the entire forum for these two phrases and only turned up your post.

Sorry. It has been suggested by at least Constance, and I thought you, that consciousness feels like something. As if consciousness was something that we were experiencing. Apologies if that is not a concept either of you endorse.

My point only is that consciousness is not something that we experience; rather consciousness is experience.

Very interesting too that we know exactly what the author means here:

Dr. Chandra "So, HAL, how does it feel to be conscious?"
HAL 9000 (after searching deeply through his memory banks for a few seconds) "Dr. Chandra, this is the feeling of being conscious."

In fact, the author said this in the opening pages, and I furiously underlined it. Thankfully, the author addressed this later in the paper as one metaphor of consciousness he calls "cognizing as physical sensing." He directly discusses the common usage of the word "feel" when people are talking about consciousness/mental states.
My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.

Do you have a citation for William James?

See one of my last posts wherein James says ontologically subject and object are not distinct. The thinker is the thoughts.

Does your conception come from your experience or your experience from your conception? Do you think and maybe even feel the way you do about these things because of your beliefs and experiences?

My conception does not come from introspection. That is, I did not arive at my conception that consciousness is constituted of intentional information embodied by dynamic patterns of neural activity via introspection or personal experience. But I guess you could say it came from reading about other peoples experiences and thoughts about other people's experiences.

I don't think the article examined whether these spatial and other metaphors were language, culturally based - you might be tempted to point back to parallels with brain research saying it isn't relative because that's the way brain is ... but then you immediately realize the problem with saying that. I do like the idea that our perceptions might actually be right or might make things right.

There is a Buddhist book: "Thoughts without a thinker."

How would you respond to someone reporting that they have a conception that these are separate, how would you evaluate that? How would you go about telling them they aren't really experiencing that? That in fact these aren't separate phenomena?

I wouldn't tell them they aren't experiencing that because I'm sure they are. I experience it myself. I experience what feels like an enduring, unchanging self that has experiences. However, I have many reasons to believe that the self is not static, enduring, unchanging and that it is not indeed separate from mental contents, rather that the sense of self is too a mental content.

(I have a similar experience with my body; it feels as if I've always had this body, but I have reason to believe that the physical body I have now is composed of, perhaps entirely, new physical material than the body I had as a child.)

I think it would be interesting to look at other cultures and times in terms of what metaphors and what words they have for mental functions.

JMG discusses in his blog I posted above (I think) how civilizations move from concrete to abstract and then how abstractions point to abstractions becoming more and more abstract and then how these civilizations cycle back to the concrete.

 

[smcder]

Sorry. It has been suggested by at least Constance, and I thought you, that consciousness feels like something. As if consciousness was something that we were experiencing. Apologies if that is not a concept either of you endorse.

My point only is that consciousness is not something that we experience; rather consciousness is experience.


See one of my last posts wherein James says ontologically subject and object are not distinct. The thinker is the thoughts.


My conception does not come from introspection. That is, I did not arive at my conception that consciousness is constituted of intentional information embodied by dynamic patterns of neural activity via introspection or personal experience. But I guess you could say it came from reading about other peoples experiences and thoughts about other people's experiences.


I wouldn't tell them they aren't experiencing that because I'm sure they are. I experience it myself. I experience what feels like an enduring, unchanging self that has experiences. However, I have many reasons to believe that the self is not static, enduring, unchanging and that it is not indeed separate from mental contents, rather that the sense of self is too a mental content.

(I have a similar experience with my body; it feels as if I've always had this body, but I have reason to believe that the physical body I have now is composed of, perhaps entirely, new physical material than the body I had as a child.)

You don't seem to be answering my questions ... my former boss had a great thought about dealing with the media when they ask a question you don't want to answer, "That's not the question I wish you had asked, the question I wish you had asked is X and here is how I would answer it!"

See one of my last posts wherein James says ontologically subject and object are not distinct. The thinker is the thoughts.

OK, but I'm asking for a citation to James' book or lecture where this is in context. I'm doing some Google searches but I assume you have a citation where this came from.

My conception does not come from introspection. That is, I did not arive at my conception that consciousness is constituted of intentional information embodied by dynamic patterns of neural activity via introspection or personal experience. But I guess you could say it came from reading about other peoples experiences and thoughts about other people's experiences.

OK, but I'm asking does this statement:

My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.

... come from you own experience? What is your experience? Can you experience it in fact, both ways? Do you think some people can?

---------------------

I wouldn't tell them they aren't experiencing that because I'm sure they are. I experience it myself. I experience what feels like an enduring, unchanging self that has experiences. However, I have many reasons to believe that the self is not static, enduring, unchanging and that it is not indeed separate from mental contents, rather that the sense of self is too a mental content.

OK, but I'm not asking about enduring, unchanginging selves, I'm asking:

given that:
(My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.)
How would you respond to someone reporting that they have a conception that these are separate, how would you evaluate that? How would you go about telling them they aren't really experiencing that? That in fact these aren't separate phenomena?

...
If you connect the question I'm asking with the statement you make about enduring selves, can you make that connection clearer?

 

[Soupie]

What is the difference for you between neurons shaping consciousness and consciousness shaping neurons?

Typically, when I use or think of the word "consciousness," I think of it like the term "life." That is, life and consciousness are terms that refer to processes that are embodied by physical systems, namely organisms. (I know life and consciousness are apples and oranges.)

When I'm thinking of a particular instance of life, I would use the term organism; if I am referring to a particular instance of conscious, I use the term mind.

However, because of the hard problem/explanatory gap, language gets tricky.

So when I say consciousness may be fundamental, I don't mean minds are fundamental and I don't mean the process of consciousness is fundamental. I really mean some primitive "mental" unit. (Ultimately, what I think is that it's information, which as I've tried to articulate before is essentially the relationship/form of energy/matter at any given time.)

All consciousness is information, but not all information is consciousness. (Why is there something it is like to be some information?)

If raw undifferentiated feeling/experience is the only funda-mental then how do you get intention, qualia (not fundamental for you), mindedness etc without emergence? And if you allow emergence, why do you need undifferentiated feeling/experience to be fundamental? Why not have it emerge as well.

Physical properties/structures emerging from physical processes is well documented, no?

Mental properties/structures emerging from physical processes not so much, right?

However, if both mental and energy are fundamental, then in theory there is no problem with complex, differentiated mental and physical properties emerging/evolving from primitive, undifferentiated mental/energy.

 

[Soupie]

You don't seem to be answering my questions ... my former boss had a great thought about dealing with the media when they ask a question you don't want to answer, "That's not the question I wish you had asked, the question I wish you had asked is X and here is how I would answer it!"

See one of my last posts wherein James says ontologically subject and object are not distinct. The thinker is the thoughts.

OK, but I'm asking for a citation to James' book or lecture where this is in context. I'm doing some Google searches but I assume you have a citation where this came from.

My conception does not come from introspection. That is, I did not arive at my conception that consciousness is constituted of intentional information embodied by dynamic patterns of neural activity via introspection or personal experience. But I guess you could say it came from reading about other peoples experiences and thoughts about other people's experiences.

OK, but I'm asking does this statement:

My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.

... come from you own experience? What is your experience? Can you experience it in fact, both ways? Do you think some people can?

---------------------

I wouldn't tell them they aren't experiencing that because I'm sure they are. I experience it myself. I experience what feels like an enduring, unchanging self that has experiences. However, I have many reasons to believe that the self is not static, enduring, unchanging and that it is not indeed separate from mental contents, rather that the sense of self is too a mental content.

OK, but I'm not asking about enduring, unchanginging selves, I'm asking:

given that:
(My own conception is that it doesn't feel like something to be conscious; as in, I'm conscious, and it feels like something. They are not separate phenomena. A la James, the thinker is the thoughts, the feeler is the feelings, the perceiver is the perception, etc.)
How would you respond to someone reporting that they have a conception that these are separate, how would you evaluate that? How would you go about telling them they aren't really experiencing that? That in fact these aren't separate phenomena?

...
If you connect the question I'm asking with the statement you make about enduring selves, can you make that connection clearer?

Ok. But I'm sure that I have indeed answered your questions.

No, my conception as I said does not come from my experience (ie introspection). So, no. And I've just very clearly explained what my experience is. Not sure how you could have missed that. Maybe try a re-read.

I don't know if you can experience it both ways. Perhaps some Buddhist can experimce no-self.

And I've already answered your second set of questions. Very odd of you here. I would not as I already said tell them they are wrong. How would I evaluate it? I would as I already said say that I experience it too.

Please re-read my post Smcder. Did you read it once?

Connection: if the sense of self is not a mental content, then it is not a mental content. It must be something other than a mental content. If it's not a mental content it may be a dualistic, enduring spiritual self.

 

[Soupie]

What is the difference for you between neurons shaping consciousness and consciousness shaping neurons?

If it's a two-way street, and there's reason to believe it is, I would say the neuronal side is broader.

That is, the activity of neurons has a greater effect on the shape of mental contents, then mental contents have on the shape of neurons.

 

[Constance]

Ok. But I'm sure that I have indeed answered your questions.

Not so far as I can see, Soupie. I don't think you have understood Steve's questions, and I certainly can't make sense of your answers to them. It's quite clear that there is a major failure of communication between you and Steve and also between you and me. Here's an example from one of your recent posts, addressed to me:

I've identified in this discussion before the two major notions of "consciousness."

i. Consciousness is a process that arises from the process of life (organisms). i.e., each unique organism will possess a unique consciousness.

ii. Consciousness is a thing that exists prior to organisms, and into which organisms tap, like a well.

You seem to adhere to the second view, which is not a neurophenomenological view.

I can't see how you could have construed anything I've written -- from part 1 of this thread to this moment in part 4 -- to "adhere to the second view." I can't have been that unclear. Steve has understood what I've written. Perhaps you haven't because you have refused to read the articles I've linked and the extracts from articles that I've posted as most of these concerned the phenomenological approach to consciousness [which you dismiss without doing a minimum of reading in that field] and the scientific insights of Varela, Thompson, and Panksepp (all of which are informed by and inspired by phenomenology). If you actually wish to understand my approach, you'd need to read that which I've linked in support of it, and evidently to read it carefully. I don't see a solution at this point.

I had hoped that by at least interesting you in reading Thompson's Mind in Life:
Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind your interest in neuroscience would have enabled you to see there the differences between reductive cognitive neuroscience and neurophenomenology. But that hasn't happened. Maybe it will by the time you finish that book.

ps : you also need to spend more time reading James.

 

[Constance]

I just saw in the "Coincidence, Chaos, & Archetypes" thread a notice by @Eric Wargo of the publication of a sequel to Irreducible Mind entitled Beyond Physicalism. Here's a description of the book and a link to at amazon:


"The rise of modern science has brought with it increasing acceptance among intellectual elites of a worldview that conflicts sharply both with everyday human experience and with beliefs widely shared among the world’s great cultural traditions. Most contemporary scientists and philosophers believe that reality is at bottom purely physical, and that human beings are nothing more than extremely complicated biological machines. On such views our everyday experiences of conscious decision-making, free will, and the self are illusory by-products of the grinding of our neural machinery. It follows that mind and personality are necessarily extinguished at death, and that there exists no deeper transpersonal or spiritual reality of any sort.

Beyond Physicalism is the product of an unusual fellowship of scientists and humanities scholars who dispute these views. In their previous publication, Irreducible Mind, they argued that physicalism cannot accommodate various well-evidenced empirical phenomena including paranormal or psi phenomena, postmortem survival, and mystical experiences. In this new theory-oriented companion volume they go further by attempting to understand how the world must be constituted in order that these “rogue” phenomena can occur. Drawing upon empirical science, metaphysical philosophy, and the mystical traditions, the authors work toward an improved “big picture” of the general character of reality, one which strongly overlaps territory traditionally occupied by the world’s institutional religions, and which attempts to reconcile science and spirituality by finding a middle path between the polarized fundamentalisms, religious and scientific, that have dominated recent public discourse.

Contributions by: Harald Atmanspacher, Loriliai Biernacki, Bernard Carr, Wolfgang Fach, Michael Grosso, Michael Murphy, David E. Presti, Gregory Shaw, Henry P. Stapp, Eric M. Weiss, and Ian Whicher"

Amazon.com: Beyond Physicalism: Toward Reconciliation of Science and Spirituality (9781442232389): Edward F. Kelly, Adam Crabtree, Paul Marshall: Books

 

[Soupie]

Not so far as I can see, Soupie. I don't think you have understood Steve's questions, and I certainly can't make sense of your answers to them. It's quite clear that there is a major failure of communication between you and Steve and also between you and me. Here's an example from one of your recent posts, addressed to me:



I can't see how you could have construed anything I've written -- from part 1 of this thread to this moment in part 4 -- to "adhere to the second view." I can't have been that unclear. Steve has understood what I've written. Perhaps you haven't because you have refused to read the articles I've linked and the extracts from articles that I've posted as most of these concerned the phenomenological approach to consciousness [which you dismiss without doing a minimum of reading in that field] and the scientific insights of Varela, Thompson, and Panksepp (all of which are informed by and inspired by phenomenology). If you actually wish to understand my approach, you'd need to read that which I've linked in support of it, and evidently to read it carefully. I don't see a solution at this point.

I had hoped that by at least interesting you in reading Thompson's Mind in Life:
Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind your interest in neuroscience would have enabled you to see there the differences between reductive cognitive neuroscience and neurophenomenology. But that hasn't happened. Maybe it will by the time you finish that book.

ps : you also need to spend more time reading James.

Constance, you're correct. I have no idea what you think about consciousness.

You claim to take the neurophenomenological approach to consciousness, which articulates a non-dualistic, fully embodied, emergent view of consciousness, while at the same time expressing the view that consciousness can exist in a disembodied state.

My quotations re James came from a neurophenomenological article. those quotes were chosen as they support neurophenomenological thought. Not sure what to tell you there...

Panksepps theories of emotion hold neurons as necessary components of emotion. That's why it's called affective neuroscience. He is is clearly exploring how the function of neurons give rise to emotion/affectivity.

I have answered Smcders questions. I think it is very ironic that both of you seem to understand (and "like") any of my posts which support your own views, but when I present thinking that challenges or runs counter to your conceptions, it all the sudden becomes unclear.

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, I think you'll be particularly interested in what's available to read in the sampled text from chapter 4: "A Psychobiological Perspective on "Transmission" Models."

 

[Constance]

Constance, you're correct. I have no idea what you think about consciousness.

You claim to take the neurophenomenological approach to consciousness, which articulates a non-dualistic, fully embodied, emergent view of consciousness, while at the same time expressing the view that consciousness can exist in a disembodied state.

"What-is" as a whole in the universe/multiverse/cosmos is much more complex than we know, soupie, and it is open-ended, not a well-defined closed system. Phenomenological insights are essential for understanding the nature and limits of our experience in the local earthworld, but phenomenology (for the most part, with a few exceptions) does not take up the kinds of experiences dealt with in Irreducible Mind and in this new book Beyond Physicalism and which I encourage you to read. They will take you beyond conventional reductive objectivist science to a range of experience that 'science' will not investigate. There is a lot to be learned about consciousness beyond the presuppositions of standard cognitive neuroscience and 'information theory' joined to it. If you read the portion of the chapter I referred you to in Beyond Physicalism you will see that even Tononi and Koch have moved beyond the objectivist presuppositions you've adhered to for the most part in these discussions. Re survival of consciousness, I have personal experiences that leave me without doubt that consciousness survives the death of the physical body, in addition to being persuaded of that by extensive reading in psychical research, reincarnation research, NDE research, and my own spontaneous OBE in young adulthood.

My quotations re James came from a neurophenomenological article. those quotes were chosen as they support neurophenomenological thought. Not sure what to tell you there...

Just give me a link to that article so I can see how James is being interpreted there and the extent to which the author of the article actually represents James's thought in direct and indirect quotations.

Panksepps theories of emotion hold neurons as necessary components of emotion. That's why it's called affective neuroscience. He is is clearly exploring how the function of neurons give rise to emotion/affectivity.

If you will read at least the last paper by Panksepp that I linked here, a few days ago, you will see the difference between 'affectivity' and 'emotion' as he uses those terms and perhaps get to grips with what he is saying about affectivity and seeking behavior in organisms that do not possess neurons.

I have answered Smcders questions. I think it is very ironic that both of you seem to understand (and "like") any of my posts which support your own views, but when I present thinking that challenges or runs counter to your conceptions, it all the sudden becomes unclear.

I don't think either Steve or I are 'challenged' by cognitive neuroscience or information theory; we simply don't find them adequate to account for what consciousness is. Perhaps the posts we've liked are those in which you entertain other perspectives, such as panpsychism. On the whole, though, it's difficult to find consistency and coherence in many of your posts, and some claims you make are unsustainable. Btw, what was the date of that last paper you cited concerning Koch and Anastassiou's research, which the latter is quoted as supporting the 'holy grail' of neuroscience as a completely mechanical description of consciousness and mind? It wasn't long ago that Koch was moving away from thinking like that and toward phenomenology, and that is indeed what Tononi was doing in his last revision of IIT.

 

[Soupie]

"What-is" as a whole in the universe/multiverse/cosmos is much more complex than we know, soupie, and it is open-ended, not a well-defined closed system. Phenomenological insights are essential for understanding the nature and limits of our experience in the local earthworld, but phenomenology (for the most part, with a few exceptions) does not take up the kinds of experiences dealt with in Irreducible Mind and in this new book Beyond Physicalism and which I encourage you to read. They will take you beyond conventional reductive objectivist science to a range of experience that 'science' will not investigate. There is a lot to be learned about consciousness beyond the presuppositions of standard cognitive neuroscience and 'information theory' joined to it. If you read the portion of the chapter I referred you to in Beyond Physicalism you will see that even Tononi and Koch have moved beyond the objectivist presuppositions you've adhered to for the most part in these discussions. Re survival of consciousness, I have personal experiences that leave me without doubt that consciousness survives the death of the physical body, in addition to being persuaded of that by extensive reading in psychical research, reincarnation research, NDE research, and my own spontaneous OBE in young adulthood.



Just give me a link to that article so I can see how James is being interpreted there and the extent to which the author of the article actually represents James's thought in direct and indirect quotations.



If you will read at least the last paper by Panksepp that I linked here, a few days ago, you will see the difference between 'affectivity' and 'emotion' as he uses those terms and perhaps get to grips with what he is saying about affectivity and seeking behavior in organisms that do not possess neurons.



I don't think either Steve or I are 'challenged' by cognitive neuroscience or information theory; we simply don't find them adequate to account for what consciousness is. Perhaps the posts we've liked are those in which you entertain other perspectives, such as panpsychism. On the whole, though, it's difficult to find consistency and coherence in many of your posts, and some claims you make are unsustainable. Btw, what was the date of that last paper you cited concerning Koch and Anastassiou's research, which the latter is quoted as supporting the 'holy grail' of neuroscience as a completely mechanical description of consciousness and mind? It wasn't long ago that Koch was moving away from thinking like that and toward phenomenology, and that is indeed what Tononi was doing in his last revision of IIT.

I can appreciate that what ive shared has been confusing; but i have been similarly confused by what you and Smcder have shared as well.

Here's my approach in a nutshell:

Energy and information are fundamental. Energy and information self-organize into, among other things, living organisms and minds. However, not all physical structures are living, and not all information structures are mental states/experience/consciousness/mind.

As I think of information as ultimately constituting mind, and information as being fundamental, I consider it a form of panpsychism.

How do minds and qualia emerge from information, as I suggest? That is, why is there something it is like to be some information but not all information? (For example, why are some brain states sometimes associated with conscious mental contents, but at other times not?)

This approach is not reductive in the linear cause-effect, mechanical sense of the term. I feel this view is compatible with, and may be supported by neurophenomenology.

Here is the paper from which i got the James quotes. Please read it, the entire paper is excellent. It presents a thorough overview of neurophen. The source material for the James quotes is cited.

Id be curious to know your thoughts on the paper as a whole.

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

 

[smcder]

However, if both mental and energy are fundamental, then in theory there is no problem with complex, differentiated mental and physical properties emerging/evolving from primitive, undifferentiated mental/energy

The problem is in emergence.

Did you read the consciousentities entry on panpsychism? Panpsychism posits the mental as funda-mental so you don't have to rely on emergence and its problems. So you give up the point of panpsychism if you're going to rely on emergence anyway.

 

[smcder]

Ok. But I'm sure that I have indeed answered your questions.

No, my conception as I said does not come from my experience (ie introspection). So, no. And I've just very clearly explained what my experience is. Not sure how you could have missed that. Maybe try a re-read.

I don't know if you can experience it both ways. Perhaps some Buddhist can experimce no-self.

And I've already answered your second set of questions. Very odd of you here. I would not as I already said tell them they are wrong. How would I evaluate it? I would as I already said say that I experience it too.

Please re-read my post Smcder. Did you read it once?

Connection: if the sense of self is not a mental content, then it is not a mental content. It must be something other than a mental content. If it's not a mental content it may be a dualistic, enduring spiritual self.

Please re-read my post Smcder. Did you read it once?

Of course I read it more than once.

I'm done and moving on ... !

 

[smcder]

I just saw in the "Coincidence, Chaos, & Archetypes" thread a notice by @Eric Wargo of the publication of a sequel to Irreducible Mind entitled Beyond Physicalism. Here's a description of the book and a link to at amazon:


"The rise of modern science has brought with it increasing acceptance among intellectual elites of a worldview that conflicts sharply both with everyday human experience and with beliefs widely shared among the world’s great cultural traditions. Most contemporary scientists and philosophers believe that reality is at bottom purely physical, and that human beings are nothing more than extremely complicated biological machines. On such views our everyday experiences of conscious decision-making, free will, and the self are illusory by-products of the grinding of our neural machinery. It follows that mind and personality are necessarily extinguished at death, and that there exists no deeper transpersonal or spiritual reality of any sort.

Beyond Physicalism is the product of an unusual fellowship of scientists and humanities scholars who dispute these views. In their previous publication, Irreducible Mind, they argued that physicalism cannot accommodate various well-evidenced empirical phenomena including paranormal or psi phenomena, postmortem survival, and mystical experiences. In this new theory-oriented companion volume they go further by attempting to understand how the world must be constituted in order that these “rogue” phenomena can occur. Drawing upon empirical science, metaphysical philosophy, and the mystical traditions, the authors work toward an improved “big picture” of the general character of reality, one which strongly overlaps territory traditionally occupied by the world’s institutional religions, and which attempts to reconcile science and spirituality by finding a middle path between the polarized fundamentalisms, religious and scientific, that have dominated recent public discourse.

Contributions by: Harald Atmanspacher, Loriliai Biernacki, Bernard Carr, Wolfgang Fach, Michael Grosso, Michael Murphy, David E. Presti, Gregory Shaw, Henry P. Stapp, Eric M. Weiss, and Ian Whicher"

Amazon.com: Beyond Physicalism: Toward Reconciliation of Science and Spirituality (9781442232389): Edward F. Kelly, Adam Crabtree, Paul Marshall: Books

Some of the philosophical problems that occupied William James longest and deepest, along with solutions he thought most promising, have literally been written out of history. This volume presents the first serious collective attempt since James’ death to revive his project. Its chapters are characterized by an intellectual ethos reminiscent of the ‘father’ of modern American psychology himself: sympathetic open-mindedness made fruitful through disciplined, calm and penetrating rigor. (Andreas Sommer, junior research fellow in history and philosophy of science, Churchill College, University of Cambridge)

I'm going to see if we can find it on interlibrary loan.

 

[smcder]

In another thread someone asked about actually discussion of the paranormal in the C

"What-is" as a whole in the universe/multiverse/cosmos is much more complex than we know, soupie, and it is open-ended, not a well-defined closed system. Phenomenological insights are essential for understanding the nature and limits of our experience in the local earthworld, but phenomenology (for the most part, with a few exceptions) does not take up the kinds of experiences dealt with in Irreducible Mind and in this new book Beyond Physicalism and which I encourage you to read. They will take you beyond conventional reductive objectivist science to a range of experience that 'science' will not investigate. There is a lot to be learned about consciousness beyond the presuppositions of standard cognitive neuroscience and 'information theory' joined to it. If you read the portion of the chapter I referred you to in Beyond Physicalism you will see that even Tononi and Koch have moved beyond the objectivist presuppositions you've adhered to for the most part in these discussions. Re survival of consciousness, I have personal experiences that leave me without doubt that consciousness survives the death of the physical body, in addition to being persuaded of that by extensive reading in psychical research, reincarnation research, NDE research, and my own spontaneous OBE in young adulthood.



Just give me a link to that article so I can see how James is being interpreted there and the extent to which the author of the article actually represents James's thought in direct and indirect quotations.



If you will read at least the last paper by Panksepp that I linked here, a few days ago, you will see the difference between 'affectivity' and 'emotion' as he uses those terms and perhaps get to grips with what he is saying about affectivity and seeking behavior in organisms that do not possess neurons.



I don't think either Steve or I are 'challenged' by cognitive neuroscience or information theory; we simply don't find them adequate to account for what consciousness is. Perhaps the posts we've liked are those in which you entertain other perspectives, such as panpsychism. On the whole, though, it's difficult to find consistency and coherence in many of your posts, and some claims you make are unsustainable. Btw, what was the date of that last paper you cited concerning Koch and Anastassiou's research, which the latter is quoted as supporting the 'holy grail' of neuroscience as a completely mechanical description of consciousness and mind? It wasn't long ago that Koch was moving away from thinking like that and toward phenomenology, and that is indeed what Tononi was doing in his last revision of IIT.

I don't think either Steve or I are 'challenged' by cognitive neuroscience or information theory; we simply don't find them adequate to account for what consciousness is.

That's well put - my own default position is the hard core materialism/reductionism I was brought up in so I'm very comfortable with neuroscience/information theory (I have a fair background in math and the physical sciences as well as computer science). So it's not challenging as in a new idea or as in an idea I'm not comfortable with or somehow want to deny or flies in the face of my beliefs.

But that comfort with physicalism/reductionism also what lead me to question the assumed underpinnings of math and science and to look for a more nuanced dialogue.

I'd really like to look at emergence in particular as a claimed basis for consciousness ... the view from 20,000 feet is epitomized in the "and then a miracle occurs" cartoon-meme. The conscious entities blogpost really made sense to me as a critique of panpsychism. And so my quesiton is

what has to be fundamentally present on the mental side to avoid emergence?

Raw/undifferentiated feeling doesn't seem like enough - after all, there are six kinds of quarks and other fundamental particles for the physical to work with - not raw/undifferentiated prima materia from which everything comes, as well as fields and forces and the "rules of the game" that go into how these things combine - but on the mental side we are only going to allow the bare minimum in?

But only permitting raw/undifferentiated feeling and experience (kind of a paradox in itself) that, right now, doesn't make sense to me as being all we need on the mental side.

"mindedness" not whole minds but "mindedness" qualia/something it is like and maybe even intentionality I think are minimums ... maybe,

so it does make more sense, or at least I'm coming up with a feel for consciousness shaping (or these fundamental qualities constraining) the neurons as much as the neurons "shaping" experience ... we've given primacy to the physical for mainly historical reasons.

And maybe we need to get away from thinking in minimums (and minimal thinking) on the whole.