Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

[Constance]

I don't have time to respond to @Soupie's most recent post, and I'll be gone for a number of hours but will return tonight. I hope we continue to develop this current conversation.

 

[Randall]

Veridical:

from Wiktionary, Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License

• adj. True.
• adj. Pertaining to an experience, perception, or interpretation that accurately represents reality; as opposed to imaginative, unsubstantiated, illusory, or delusory.

from the GNU version of the Collaborative International Dictionary of English

• adj. Truth-telling; truthful; veracious.

from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia

• Truth-telling; veracious; truthful.
• True; being what it purports to be.

from WordNet 3.0 Copyright 2006 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.

• adj. coinciding with reality

veridical - definition and meaning

Exactly. People's belief is "true" ( def 1 ) and therefore the perception of that belief represents a reality ( the belief exists ); as opposed to imaginative, unsubstantiated, illusory, or delusory.( def 2 ), but the content of the experiences themselves remain unsubstantiated, and may well be imaginative, illusory, or or delusory. Simply because someone honestly thinks something happened and there happens to be some tenuous circumstantial evidence does not establish the objective veridicality of a claim, and simply adding the word "veridical" as a pre-qualifier to a claim, doesn't actually make it any more veridical unless that claim can be backed up with substantial evidence, which you may think exists, but which others may find questionable ( at best ).

 

[Randall]

I've been more entertaining of a lot of ideas than others in this thread have been. Instead of paring down, I try to keep a lot of things in mind and then come back to them as I've found in the past there are sometimes surprising connections to be made. And because it makes me happy.

I certainly "entertain" ideas, and part of that includes an analysis of them so as to get some idea where they fall in the spectrum between fact and fiction. Within that spectrum a lot of connections can be made, and because of previous analysis, I have a better idea what is and isn't reasonable to believe than someone who doesn't bother. Whether or not that makes me happy isn't relevant because I don't choose to believe things on whether or not they make me happy. In fact, I enjoy being proven wrong more than making claims I believe are true.

 

[smcder]

Thanks. I've been somewhat aware of this viewpoint on what can be achieved (or at least hoped/intended to be achieved): the surcease of sorrow in the world) in and through meditation. It doesn't negate the reality of the hard problem, though. It demonstrates the effort required to come to terms with, find peace with, our condition in the world.

Yes and most schools of western Buddhism have recognized this. Thich Nhat Hahn, a Vietnamese monk during the war, was probably the earliest exponent of activist Buddhism - his efforts continue even as he is in his 80s.
Having spent about ten years in the "helping professions" I think both are equally important.

 

[smcder]

I certainly "entertain" ideas, and part of that includes an analysis of them so as to get some idea where they fall in the spectrum between fact and fiction. Within that spectrum a lot of connections can be made, and because of previous analysis, I have a better idea what is and isn't reasonable to believe than someone who doesn't bother. Whether or not that makes me happy isn't relevant because I don't choose to believe things on whether or not they make me happy. In fact, I enjoy being proven wrong more than making claims I believe are true.

Sounds very sensible ... and enjoyable, I can't argue with you there!

 

[smcder]

@Constance

620pixeltable

The opening paragraphs of Nagel's book The View from Nowhere (the first five paragraphs below) indicate the general distinction he proposes between an individual's subjective view of things or subjective standpoint as against an objective or external view of things that is nobody's in particular.

...

None of it is easy reading. Those who suppose that reading good philosophy can be like drifting through a novel are again in for total disappointment. They have come to the wrong website.
Is all of what is said certain to be to the taste of philosophers keen on explicit clarity and perfect order? Probably not, but their taste needs thinking about. So does a reader's expectation to have a piece of philosophy go forward bumptiously and end confidently. This one, to its credit, does not.

 

[Soupie]

On a somewhat related note, have you read "Killing the Observer?" yet? If so, have a look at this exchange and help me understand it:

I'm reading the paper right now. It's excellent. It expresses precisely what I've been clumsily trying to express throughout this discussion. (The mind is green and the discussion about "experiencing" consciousness.)

As to the discussion. Yes, I understand exactly what he is saying. I'll come back to it when I'm done with the paper.

 

[smcder]

Constance, I was referring to the apparent fact that while we can't seem to locate consciousness in physical space, we can seem to locate it in time. See the following excerpt from an article by Evan Thompson:

Is Consciousness a “Stream”? | The Brains Blog

"For example, recent experiments show that whether a visual stimulus is consciously detected or not depends on when it arrives in relation to the phases of the brain’s ongoing alpha (8–12 Hz) and theta (5–7 Hz) rhythms (see also this study). You’re more likely to miss the stimulus when it occurs during the trough of an alpha wave; as the alpha wave crests, you’re more likely to detect it.

The moral of these new studies isn’t that perception is strictly discrete, but rather that it’s rhythmic; it happens through successive rhythmic pulses (an idea James also proposed), instead of as one continuous flow. Like a miniature version of the wake-sleep cycle, neural systems alternate from moment to moment between phases of optimal excitability, when they’re most “awake” and responsive to incoming stimuli, and phases of strong inhibition, when they’re “asleep” and least responsive. Moments of perception correspond to excitatory or “up” phases; moments of nonperception to inhibitory or “down” phases. A gap occurs between each “up” or “awake” moment of perception and the next one, so that what seems to be a continuous stream of consciousness may actually be composed of rhythmic pulses of awareness."

That is some pretty interesting, exciting stuff!

Consciousness - a stream?

...

Overall, Thompson concludes that while conscious perception is continuous, it isn’t smoothly regular, but comes in pulses. Perhaps we could say that it’s more like the flow of a bloodstream than that of a river.

Still, though – is consciousness actually continuous? Suppose in fact that it was composed of a series of static moments, like the succeeding frames of a film. In a film the frames follow quickly, but we can imagine longer intervals if we like. However long the gaps, the story told by the film is unaffected and retains all its coherence; the discontinuity can only be seen by an observer outside the film. In the case of consciousness our experience actually is the succession of moments, so if consciousness were discontinuous we should never be aware of it directly. If we noticed anything at all, it would seem to us to be discontinuity in the external world.

It’s not, of course, as simple as that; there are two particular issues. One is that consciousness is not automatically self-consciousness. To draw conclusions about our conscious state requires a second conscious state which is about the first one. We’ve remarked here before on Comte’s objection that the second state necessarily disrupts the first, making reliable introspection impossible: James’ view was that the second state had to be later, so that introspection was always retrospection.

This obviously raises many potential complications; all I want to do is pick out one possibility: that when we introspect the first and second order states alternate. Perhaps what we do is a moment of first-order thinking, then a moment of second order reflection on the moment just past, then another moment of simple first-order thought and so on; a process a bit like an artist flicking his gaze back and forth between subject and canvas.

...

 

[smcder]

@Soupie - part of what I am working with is that it seems for a broad range of ideas about consciousness - there is support of one kind or another.

• a different interpretation may be offered for empirical studies (for example the Conscious Entitites response to "Is Consciousness a Stream?"
• Libet's studies have been the subject of many interpretations (in fact, I just came across one in which second order theories are challenged by Libet's experiments)
• Thomas W Clarke's paper on representationalism - I found various general problems with representationalism have been offered and I posted the comment where Clark(e) himself said he had changed his mind on some of it - and another where he reserved the right to change his mind or be wrong

now this is very normal stuff, you can say ... and it is - it is normal for pre-paradigm science. For the lay reader then, there are some particular pitfalls, first let me say again why I posted the paper on problems in Popular Science ... they don't actually just address science in popular media, some of the problems the author contends are wide spread among working scientists themselves ... and I was reading on article this morning on the scientific equivalent of iatrogenesis - "the limits of statistics" Statistics is a specialty area and many working scientists in any given field don't always realize the problems ... statisticians themselves of course have disagreements ... and so too with experimental design. The danger of accepting something because it's in a peer reviewed journal - not doing all the work for yourself (and if you can) is there for experts as well as laypersons.

another point is that to get a grasp on any one "approach" to consciousness requires an enormous investment and with that comes a tendency not to see the errors in the approach (cognitive dissonance) ...

I don't have time to expand this now - but the bottom line isn't at all pessimistic - rather it's recognizing that consciousness studies are pre-paradigmatic ... and it may well be like the "kluge" article that you posted - that there isn't going to be A science of consciousness but rather sciences ... I do think though that some kind of paradigm will arise at some point, or may - and I think people will recognize it when it does ... that paradigm won't be the be all end all - but it will mean a period of "normal science" in which rapid progress can be made (I do not think rapid progress is being made at this point, except perhaps progress toward a state where rapid progress could be made ...) that's one reason I am reluctant to take a position ... as for blowing things up, my point is if just asking questions or jumping to another approach (which to me its not another approach when there's no paradigm) blows something up, well then ... you see where I am going again.

I read the idea yesterday of the hard problem being the "philosopher's stone" of consciousness - Alchemists never found the philosopher's stone but they did come up with effective chemical techniques and processess and alchemy did (maybe) transform into modern chemistry ... we shall see!

 

[Constance]

another point is that to get a grasp on any one "approach" to consciousness requires an enormous investment and with that comes a tendency not to see the errors in the approach (cognitive dissonance) ...

That's certainly the case, and it's been manifested in this lengthy thread. But I think it's important to see the problem in terms of the limitations of any of the existing approaches to consciousness rather than in terms of 'errors'. That is, the error is in thinking that any one of the approaches we've surveyed could be adequate in itself since consciousness is evidently more complex than any single approach can recognize and account for.

There is a parallel to this situation in the efforts in physics to produce an integrated and whole 'theory of everything' based on what is known thus far about parts, components, of the physical world. Quanta recently published an interactive graphic to assist its readers in recognizing the difficulty of integrating these components of 'what-is' physically.

Steve refers to 'paradigms' and 'pre-paradigm' science and the possibility of an eventual 'science of consciousness'. Physics has developed over the last two centuries under a single paradigm variously described as materialist, physicalist, objectivist. Investigations of consciousness and mind have bumped up against this paradigm continually because the physical {to the extent that, and in the way that, we understand it} cannot account for the mental. While many materialist physicists hope that it can, argue that it can, others have called for a paradigm shift that can accommodate experienced reality as well as objectively described components of reality. The Varela paper linked yesterday indicates the effort in phenomenology and neurophenomenology to understand, if not bridge, this gap. This is work concretely pursuing the grounds of a new paradigm and we might speculate here on what that paradigm would be like -- what it would have to include and encompass in terms of both physics and consciousness. Perhaps there is some possibility, as Steve has been suggesting, that consciousness and mind are involved in the evolution of the physical universe we live in, that they exist germinally in some form in the substrate of the universe evolved to the point at which we currently exist in it, observe it, and attempt to describe it. If so, that would be the basis for a significantly different paradigm in which science could eventually recognize consciousness and mind for what they are rather than attempt to 'explain them away' by reduction or elimination.

Anyway, here's a link to Quanta's interactive graphic representing the struggle in physics to produce an integrated theory that can accommodate the parts of what is known at the purely physical level of description. Something similar would be useful in revealing the complexity of consciousness.

Theories of Everything, Mapped | Quanta Magazine

 

[Constance]

Consciousness - a stream?

Overall, Thompson concludes that while conscious perception is continuous, it isn’t smoothly regular, but comes in pulses. Perhaps we could say that it’s more like the flow of a bloodstream than that of a river.

Still, though – is consciousness actually continuous? Suppose in fact that it was composed of a series of static moments, like the succeeding frames of a film. In a film the frames follow quickly, but we can imagine longer intervals if we like. However long the gaps, the story told by the film is unaffected and retains all its coherence; the discontinuity can only be seen by an observer outside the film. In the case of consciousness our experience actually is the succession of moments, so if consciousness were discontinuous we should never be aware of it directly. If we noticed anything at all, it would seem to us to be discontinuity in the external world.

It’s not, of course, as simple as that; there are two particular issues. One is that consciousness is not automatically self-consciousness. To draw conclusions about our conscious state requires a second conscious state which is about the first one. We’ve remarked here before on Comte’s objection that the second state necessarily disrupts the first, making reliable introspection impossible: James’ view was that the second state had to be later, so that introspection was always retrospection.

This obviously raises many potential complications; all I want to do is pick out one possibility: that when we introspect the first and second order states alternate. Perhaps what we do is a moment of first-order thinking, then a moment of second order reflection on the moment just past, then another moment of simple first-order thought and so on; a process a bit like an artist flicking his gaze back and forth between subject and canvas.
...

I read a fascinating paper last night that I wanted to link here in any case, but it seems useful to link it to the speculations expressed in the extract you quote. Whether conscious states switch with 'pulses' connected with the EM fields in our environment or not, I agree essentially with Thompson that we experience it as continuous, in the way in which we experience movies as a continuous flow of events and action even though the movie is constructed of single images/frames. At the same time, we respond with greater attention and effect, consciously and subconsciously, to certain events {e.g., love at first sight, giving birth, death}, which might not be connected with/influenced by pulses of physical fields that penetrate us bodily and affect the ordinary sensed stream of consciousness.

Experiences during and following death are explored in the paper I recommend: The author compares NDEs described by people brought back from a near-death crisis in our time with descriptions of experiences surrounding deaths in former lives reported under hynotic regression. Remarkable correspondences exist concerning the OBEs reported in both groups/sets and the descriptions of post-death consciousness.

The Phenomenology of Near-Death Consciousness in Past-Life Regression Therapy: A Pilot Study
Jenny Wade, Ph.D. Ross, CA

ABSTRACT: Although past-life regression therapy has not been shown to be the re-experiencing of a verifiable previous biological existence, therapists have noted similarities between the phenomenology of post-death awareness reported by regressed subjects and the phenomenology of near-death experiences (NDEs). This paper reports the results of a pilot study exploring those similarities as far as the therapeutic modality normally accommodates post-death phenomena. Similarities and differences between NDEs and postdeath regression phenomena suggest new avenues of research.

http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ofram/wade.pdf

 

[Constance]

Wade also has a book developing another theory of consciousness, which she refers to as 'holonomic'. Here are two review comments and a description of the book from amazon:

"An original theory of the development of consciousness that brings together research from neurology, new-paradigm studies, psychology, and mysticism.

"In this stunningly original book, Dr. Wade presents a theory of development that begins before birth and ends after death. She extends the boundaries of development in a way that leads us to rethink the nature of consciousness and the relation of consciousness to the brain. Dr. Wade draws on a wide range of sources from the fields of developmental psychology, brain research, new-paradigm studies, and mysticism. She brings these sources together in a synthesis that will make an important contribution to consciousness studies and to transpersonal psychology." --Michael Washburn, author of The Ego and the Dynamic Ground and Transpersonal Psychology in Psychoanalytic Perspective

"The author brings together a large body of diverse research and draws on various disciplines--neurology, psychology, psychiatry--as well as the esoteric and spiritual traditions. She develops a unique synthesis in formulating her stages of development. Hers is one of the few truly life-span theories. Although dealing with complex material, she writes clearly and convincingly. This is a tour de force construction of an exciting theory that should be discussed and debated for years to come." -- L. Eugene Thomas, University of Connecticut, Storrs

Changes of Mind unites literature from the new physics, brain research, developmental psychology, and mysticism to produce the first comprehensive theory of individual human consciousness. Assuming a new paradigm reality, the author opens and extends the field of developmental psychology in ways that structure, destructure, and then restructure the subjective experience of time, space, subject, and object.

Wade's theory concerns the development of consciousness per se--not merely its derivatives, such as cognition, social develChopment, and affect--and its neurological bases, something no other developmental theory has taken into account. Using data from a wide range of empirical studies and neurological research, Wade shows that awareness considerably predates birth--probably even conception--and lasts after death, supporting the idea that the self exists outside the boundaries of linear time and a physical body. This book represents a major leap forward in psychological theory and a groundbreaking approach to human perception and being in the world.

Since amazon will not stop substituting its anti-hunger poster for direct links to book pages, please go to the amazon site and search for:

Jenny Wade, Changes of Mind: A Holonomic Theory of the Evolution of Consciousness

 

[Soupie]

Trond says:
I don’t understand Tom Clark’s argument. On one hand he says that the brain and consciousness are completely detached and no effect on each other. On the other hand he acknowledges that the content of consciousness depends on the brain. Isn’t that the very epiphenomenalism he denies?

Tom Clark says:
Trond, thanks for the feedback. What I’m suggesting is that the sense in which one’s consciousness depends on being a representational system, like a brain, isn’t a causal relation. Epiphenomenalists usually think that there’s a one way causal relation from brain to mind, that the physical somehow produces or generates the mental, but that the mental has no effect on the physical. What I’m suggesting is a psycho-physical parallelism between phenomenal consciousness and the brain, with no causal interaction and in which the physical doesn’t have ontological priority (as it does for epiphenomenalists). But of course I reserve the right to be wrong about all this!

Pyscho-physical parallelism. The activity of the brain does not cause, generate, or excrete consciousness; rather, the activity of the brain is consciousness.

So we wouldn't say, in this case, that brain states cause consciousness; rather, we would say (some) brain states *are* consciousness.

One confounding factor, however, is that not all brain states are conscious states. Only some brain states are conscious states.

Some brain states are intentional, and some intentional brain states are conscious. Why some intentional brain states are conscious we do not know.

Its easy to see how some brain states can be intentional, but its not easy to see how some intentional brain states can be conscious. But its easy for me to see that conscious states are intentional states.

Some intentional brain states are conscious states. All conscious states are intentional states.

Trond says:

So in a nutshell you are suggesting that phenomenal consciousness *exists* independently from the brain, but in our case the brain affects consciousness?

Tom Clark says:
I wouldn’t say that consciousness exists independently of the brain. We only find phenomenal states associated with brain states, so there’s clearly a relation. But it doesn’t seem to be a causal relation, since if it were we’d see consciousness as something in addition to brain states that those states produce or generate, and we don’t.

While its true that so far we only find phenomenal states associated with brain states, its possible that phenomenal states could be associated with the states of other non-brain systems.

Not only does consciousness not appear to be something the brain generates, creates, or excretes, it does not even appear to be something that serves an objective function.

In other words, consciousness is not something brain states create, but rather, conscious *is* brain states.

If you want to say that consciousness just *is* those states, perhaps at some functional or representational level, then again there’s no causal relation, but rather an identity. But that would mean when we look at the operations of the brain, we would be literally seeing consciousness, and that seems wrong.

Consciousness isn’t observable from the outside (or inside for that matter); it exists for the instantiating system alone, not as an object of observation but as the (phenomenal) medium of representation which includes the conscious phenomenal subject as an element.

One can't see consciousness; one can only be consciousness.

Consciousness is not objective nor physical. Thus, it is not a contradiction to say that consciousness shares an identity with some brain states, but that when one looks at that those brain states they do not objectively see consciousness.

The shared identity of certain brain states and conscious states is special, no doubt. There is a physical and phenomenal identity.

As Clark indicates, and as I have long suspected, this phenomenal identity is essentialy an intentional identity, and the intentional identity is essentially an informational identity.

What this means is that some brain states have two properties: their physical properties and, in the context of the dynamic brain system, their informational properties.

The physical properties are objective and can be observed from the 3rd-person perspective; the informational, intentional, phenomenal properties are subjective and constitute a 1st-person perspective.

 

[smcder]

Pyscho-physical parallelism. The activity of the brain does not cause, generate, or excrete consciousness; rather, the activity of the brain is consciousness.

So we wouldn't say, in this case, that brain states cause consciousness; rather, we would say (some) brain states *are* consciousness.

One confounding factor, however, is that not all brain states are conscious states. Only some brain states are conscious states.

Some brain states are intentional, and some intentional brain states are conscious. Why some intentional brain states are conscious we do not know.

Its easy to see how some brain states can be intentional, but its not easy to see how some intentional brain states can be conscious. But its easy for me to see that conscious states are intentional states.

Some intentional brain states are conscious states. All conscious states are intentional states.


While its true that so far we only find phenomenal states associated with brain states, its possible that phenomenal states could be associated with the states of other non-brain systems.

Not only does consciousness not appear to be something the brain generates, creates, or excretes, it does not even appear to be something that serves an objective function.

In other words, consciousness is not something brain states create, but rather, conscious *is* brain states.


One can't see consciousness; one can only be consciousness.

Consciousness is not objective nor physical. Thus, it is not a contradiction to say that consciousness shares an identity with some brain states, but that when one looks at that those brain states they do not objectively see consciousness.

The shared identity of certain brain states and conscious states is special, no doubt. There is a physical and phenomenal identity.

As Clark indicates, and as I have long suspected, this phenomenal identity is essentialy an intentional identity, and the intentional identity is essentially an informational identity.

What this means is that some brain states have two properties: their physical properties and, in the context of the dynamic brain system, their informational properties.

The physical properties are objective and can be observed from the 3rd-person perspective; the informational, intentional, phenomenal properties are subjective and constitute a 1st-person perspective.

I read several of Clark's papers - I found an exchange where he talks about closing the gap by the weight of more and more specific evidence about the correlation: mind/brain.

Also psycho-physical parallelism is associated with Monadology and to a lesser extent, the philosophy of Malebranche so that confused.

 

[smcder]

A hit from the search "tom clark psych physical parallelism" - discussing Pocketts theory that CS is an EM field:

Pockett redux

 

[Soupie]

I read several of Clark's papers - I found an exchange where he talks about closing the gap by the weight of more and more specific evidence about the correlation: mind/brain.

I'd be interested in those papers. I didn't see anything of interest on his naturalism page.

Re evidence of correlation:

http://m.medicalxpress.com/news/2015-08-brain-signature-human-emotions.html

"Chang and his colleagues studied 182 participants who were shown negative photos (bodily injuries, acts of aggression, hate groups, car wrecks, human feces) and neutral photos. Thirty additional participants were also subjected to painful heat. Using brain imaging and machine learning techniques, the researchers identified a neural signature of negative emotion—a single neural activation pattern distributed across the entire brain that accurately predicts how negative a person will feel after viewing unpleasant images.

"This means that brain imaging has the potential to accurately uncover how someone is feeling without knowing anything about them other than their brain activity," Chang says. "This has enormous implications for improving our understanding of how emotions are generated and regulated, which have been notoriously difficult to define and measure. In addition, these new types of neural measures may prove to be important in identifying when people are having abnormal emotional responses - for example, too much or too little—which might indicate broader issues with health and mental functioning."

Unlike most previous research, the new study included a large sample size that reflects the general adult population and not just young college students; used machine learning and statistics to develop a predictive model of emotion; and, most importantly, tested participants across multiple psychological states, which allowed researchers to assess the sensitivity and specificity of their brain model.

"We were particularly surprised by how well our pattern performed in predicting the magnitude and type of aversive experience," Chang says. "As skepticism for neuroimaging grows based on over-sold and -interpreted findings and failures to replicate based on small sizes, many neuroscientists might be surprised by how well our signature performed. Another surprising finding is that our emotion brain signature using lots of people performed better at predicting how a person was feeling than their own brain data. There is an intuition that feelings are very idiosyncratic and vary across people. However, because we trained the pattern using so many participants - for example, four to 10 times the standard fMRI experiment—we were able to uncover responses that generalized beyond the training sample to new participants remarkably well.""

As noted above, seeing the brain state pattern in the 3rd person is not the same as being consciousness in the 1st person. We will never observe consciousness via the 3rd person.

Moreover, the brain wasn't "generating" consciousness. Rather, the global brain state pattern—in the context of the intentional brain system—is negative emotion.

While some intentional brain states are conscious intentional brain states, not all of them are. In my discussions with Robin Faichney, he had noted re IIT that he didn't feel there would be a physical cause of consciousness per se (I'm paraphrasing; I may have misunderstood). That is, since brain states don't cause consciousness but rather are consciousness, there is some other, non-physical mechanism that instantiates consciousness. It's possible HOT theories could provide a model.

Note: these informational patterns need not be computationally derived patterns. DST I think offers such a non-computational model.

 

[smcder]

I'd be interested in those papers. I didn't see anything of interest on his naturalism page.

Re evidence of correlation:

http://m.medicalxpress.com/news/2015-08-brain-signature-human-emotions.html

"Chang and his colleagues studied 182 participants who were shown negative photos (bodily injuries, acts of aggression, hate groups, car wrecks, human feces) and neutral photos. Thirty additional participants were also subjected to painful heat. Using brain imaging and machine learning techniques, the researchers identified a neural signature of negative emotion—a single neural activation pattern distributed across the entire brain that accurately predicts how negative a person will feel after viewing unpleasant images.

"This means that brain imaging has the potential to accurately uncover how someone is feeling without knowing anything about them other than their brain activity," Chang says. "This has enormous implications for improving our understanding of how emotions are generated and regulated, which have been notoriously difficult to define and measure. In addition, these new types of neural measures may prove to be important in identifying when people are having abnormal emotional responses - for example, too much or too little—which might indicate broader issues with health and mental functioning."

Unlike most previous research, the new study included a large sample size that reflects the general adult population and not just young college students; used machine learning and statistics to develop a predictive model of emotion; and, most importantly, tested participants across multiple psychological states, which allowed researchers to assess the sensitivity and specificity of their brain model.

"We were particularly surprised by how well our pattern performed in predicting the magnitude and type of aversive experience," Chang says. "As skepticism for neuroimaging grows based on over-sold and -interpreted findings and failures to replicate based on small sizes, many neuroscientists might be surprised by how well our signature performed. Another surprising finding is that our emotion brain signature using lots of people performed better at predicting how a person was feeling than their own brain data. There is an intuition that feelings are very idiosyncratic and vary across people. However, because we trained the pattern using so many participants - for example, four to 10 times the standard fMRI experiment—we were able to uncover responses that generalized beyond the training sample to new participants remarkably well.""

As noted above, seeing the brain state pattern in the 3rd person is not the same as being consciousness in the 1st person. We will never observe consciousness via the 3rd person.

Moreover, the brain wasn't "generating" consciousness. Rather, the global brain state pattern—in the context of the intentional brain system—is negative emotion.

While some intentional brain states are conscious intentional brain states, not all of them are. In my discussions with Robin Faichney, he had noted re IIT that he didn't feel there would be a physical cause of consciousness per se (I'm paraphrasing; I may have misunderstood). That is, since brain states don't cause consciousness but rather are consciousness, there is some other, non-physical mechanism that instantiates consciousness. It's possible HOT theories could provide a model.

Note: these informational patterns need not be computationally derived patterns. DST I think offers such a non-computational model.

It was just a comment somewhere in a discussion ... Google Thomas W Clark psycho-physical parallelism or variants thereof to find it ...

I don't think it's surprising that there's a common signature and that it involves lots of parts of the brain and that it's different than that of pain. We'd have a hard time understanding one another if this weren't the case - I don't know that we pick up brain wave signals from one another, although I have heard the electromagnetic field from the heart can affect other persons some distance away ... but there would also be pheromones released, changes in respiration, pupils, etc etc - we pick up on these subconsciously and we also learn to identify them if we work in a profession where this information may be crucial, for example law enforcement, and obviously this ability is also trained ... I also think of confidence artists here, hypnotherapists, skilled manipulators of all kinds.

There is an intuition that feelings are very idiosyncratic and vary across people. However, because we trained the pattern using so many participants - for example, four to 10 times the standard fMRI experiment—we were able to uncover responses that generalized beyond the training sample to new participants remarkably well.""

Having worked a lot of jobs involving direct contact with a lot of people, you definitely see patterns and similarities - there are outliers of course, but after a while, you get very good at anticipating your interactions with people, even people you've never met (in a limited context of course) - but you do get surprised now and again.

I think of the brain scan research of the doctor who studied psychopaths and also James Austin's book Zen and the Brain, I read about ten years ago in which he discussed the neural correlates of various states of consciousness.

Is all of this your commentary:

As noted above, seeing the brain state pattern in the 3rd person is not the same as being consciousness in the 1st person. We will never observe consciousness via the 3rd person.
Moreover, the brain wasn't "generating" consciousness. Rather, the global brain state pattern—in the context of the intentional brain system—is negative emotion.
While some intentional brain states are conscious intentional brain states, not all of them are. In my discussions with Robin Faichney, he had noted re IIT that he didn't feel there would be a physical cause of consciousness per se (I'm paraphrasing; I may have misunderstood). That is, since brain states don't cause consciousness but rather are consciousness, there is some other, non-physical mechanism that instantiates consciousness. It's possible HOT theories could provide a model.
Note: these informational patterns need not be computationally derived patterns. DST I think offers such a non-computational model.

 

[smcder]

A project at Durham University that started with the premise that we lack an inadequate ontology to understand mental causation:

Department of Philosophy : - Durham University

The departing point of this AHRC-funded project is the conjecture that the debate has been framed with insufficient metaphysical precision, thus causing the apparent insolubility of the problem. Consequently, the aim of our project is to explore recent advances in metaphysics, in particular new accounts of the categories of being and of levels of being, along with developments within the ontology of powers and causation, in order to identify a more fruitful metaphysical framework for the mental causation debate. This would constitute, we contend, a significant step towards the resolution of the problem of mental causation. The first year of the project is concerned with the relevant ontological developments. The second year is concerned with working out the consequences of these developments for the mental causation debate
A full review of what the project has produced so far (2013) in terms of "corrective metaphyiscs" is here:

Department of Philosophy : - Durham University

For some big picture goodness from conscious entities, go here:

More philosophy?

Moreover, there are some identifiable weaknesses in philosophy which are clearly on display in the current volume. First is the fissiparous nature of philosophical discussion.

@Soupie, see it's the very nature of philosophical discussion ...

I said this was an exhibition rather than a manifesto; but wouldn’t a manifesto have been better? It’s not achievable because every philosopher has his or her own view and the longer discussion goes on the more possible views there are. In one way it’s a pleasing, exploratory quality, but if you want a solution it’s a grave handicap. Second, and related, there’s no objective test beyond logical consistency. Experiments will never prove any of these views wrong.

Third, although philosophy is too difficult, it’s also too easy. Someone somewhere once said that Aristotle’s problem was that he was too clever. For him, it was always possible to come up with a theory which justified the outlook of a complacent middle-aged Ancient Greek: theories which have turned out, so far as we can test them, to be almost invariably false or incomplete. Less clever pre-Socratic philosophers like Heraclitus or Parmenides were forced to adopt weirder points of view which in the long run might actually tell us more.

A tad curmudgeonly, methinks, but I like this last point, which he re-iterates thusly:

The current volume, I think, might contain many cases of clever people making cases that broadly justify common sense while the real truth may be out there in the wild regions beyond.

 

[smcder]

I'd be interested in those papers. I didn't see anything of interest on his naturalism page.

Re evidence of correlation:

http://m.medicalxpress.com/news/2015-08-brain-signature-human-emotions.html

"Chang and his colleagues studied 182 participants who were shown negative photos (bodily injuries, acts of aggression, hate groups, car wrecks, human feces) and neutral photos. Thirty additional participants were also subjected to painful heat. Using brain imaging and machine learning techniques, the researchers identified a neural signature of negative emotion—a single neural activation pattern distributed across the entire brain that accurately predicts how negative a person will feel after viewing unpleasant images.

"This means that brain imaging has the potential to accurately uncover how someone is feeling without knowing anything about them other than their brain activity," Chang says. "This has enormous implications for improving our understanding of how emotions are generated and regulated, which have been notoriously difficult to define and measure. In addition, these new types of neural measures may prove to be important in identifying when people are having abnormal emotional responses - for example, too much or too little—which might indicate broader issues with health and mental functioning."

Unlike most previous research, the new study included a large sample size that reflects the general adult population and not just young college students; used machine learning and statistics to develop a predictive model of emotion; and, most importantly, tested participants across multiple psychological states, which allowed researchers to assess the sensitivity and specificity of their brain model.

"We were particularly surprised by how well our pattern performed in predicting the magnitude and type of aversive experience," Chang says. "As skepticism for neuroimaging grows based on over-sold and -interpreted findings and failures to replicate based on small sizes, many neuroscientists might be surprised by how well our signature performed. Another surprising finding is that our emotion brain signature using lots of people performed better at predicting how a person was feeling than their own brain data. There is an intuition that feelings are very idiosyncratic and vary across people. However, because we trained the pattern using so many participants - for example, four to 10 times the standard fMRI experiment—we were able to uncover responses that generalized beyond the training sample to new participants remarkably well.""

As noted above, seeing the brain state pattern in the 3rd person is not the same as being consciousness in the 1st person. We will never observe consciousness via the 3rd person.

Moreover, the brain wasn't "generating" consciousness. Rather, the global brain state pattern—in the context of the intentional brain system—is negative emotion.

While some intentional brain states are conscious intentional brain states, not all of them are. In my discussions with Robin Faichney, he had noted re IIT that he didn't feel there would be a physical cause of consciousness per se (I'm paraphrasing; I may have misunderstood). That is, since brain states don't cause consciousness but rather are consciousness, there is some other, non-physical mechanism that instantiates consciousness. It's possible HOT theories could provide a model.

Note: these informational patterns need not be computationally derived patterns. DST I think offers such a non-computational model.

I believe this is the original study?

http://wagerlab.colorado.edu/files/papers/Chang_2015_PINES_emotion_signature_PBio_1002180.pdf

 

[smcder]

The review of the book produced by the Durham University project above:

Mental Causation and Ontology // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

has a nice summary of non-reductive physicalism:

If each of your actions is caused by your neurons, then how is it that your mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are causes of your actions at all? This question constitutes the familiar problem of mental causation: if every mentally caused action has an underlying neural realizer, then it appears that the mental qua mental has no causal work left to do. This problem is closely related to the famous exclusion argument, which holds that events cannot be systematically overdetermined by mental and physical properties. Given causal closure of the physical, the mental is causally inert.
The view that faces the above two problems most acutely, nonreductive physicalism, has had a longstanding and popular reign. Nonreductive physicalism occupies a middle ground between substance dualism, according to which the mental and physical are distinct substances, and reductive physicalism, according to which the mental just is the physical.

Nonreductive physicalists are committed to three major claims:

(i) distinctness of mental and physical properties,
(ii) causal closure of the physical,
and (iii) the efficacy of the mental qua mental.

Nonreductive physicalists face several extant challenges, such as providing a metaphysically satisfying picture of the relationship between the mental and the physical, vindicating the efficacy of the mental while remaining true to physicalism, and avoiding systematic causal overdetermination.