Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

[smcder]

I read a fascinating paper last night that I wanted to link here in any case, but it seems useful to link it to the speculations expressed in the extract you quote. Whether conscious states switch with 'pulses' connected with the EM fields in our environment or not, I agree essentially with Thompson that we experience it as continuous, in the way in which we experience movies as a continuous flow of events and action even though the movie is constructed of single images/frames. At the same time, we respond with greater attention and effect, consciously and subconsciously, to certain events {e.g., love at first sight, giving birth, death}, which might not be connected with/influenced by pulses of physical fields that penetrate us bodily and affect the ordinary sensed stream of consciousness.

Experiences during and following death are explored in the paper I recommend: The author compares NDEs described by people brought back from a near-death crisis in our time with descriptions of experiences surrounding deaths in former lives reported under hynotic regression. Remarkable correspondences exist concerning the OBEs reported in both groups/sets and the descriptions of post-death consciousness.

The Phenomenology of Near-Death Consciousness in Past-Life Regression Therapy: A Pilot Study
Jenny Wade, Ph.D. Ross, CA

ABSTRACT: Although past-life regression therapy has not been shown to be the re-experiencing of a verifiable previous biological existence, therapists have noted similarities between the phenomenology of post-death awareness reported by regressed subjects and the phenomenology of near-death experiences (NDEs). This paper reports the results of a pilot study exploring those similarities as far as the therapeutic modality normally accommodates post-death phenomena. Similarities and differences between NDEs and postdeath regression phenomena suggest new avenues of research.

http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ofram/wade.pdf

This is a fascinating paper ... I pasted it into Word so I could highlight and make notes ... it's also a good review of the veridical aspects of NDEs, for example:

• Indeed, many memories survivors have of the events they observed have been independently validated by family members and medical personnel
• since survivors of near-death experiences also often display veridical, telepathic knowledge of the unspoken thoughts of the living people present.

And this:

• The difficulties of "proving" past-lives to be true recollections are outside the scope of this paper, but research on the veridical re-creation of earlier somatic states impossible to mimic, such as the Babinski reflex (Raikov, 1980), and the retention of past-life wounds as birthmarks in children (Stevenson, 1975-80, 1980, 1987, 1997) suggest that earlier physiological states may be held in the body's memory.
• Mapping shifts in the body's electromagnetic fields, especially brain energy patterns, during past-life regression for comparison with biological
  death might illuminate troublesome issues in both areas.

 

[Soupie]

Nonreductive physicalists are committed to three major claims:

(i) distinctness of mental and physical properties,
(ii) causal closure of the physical,
and (iii) the efficacy of the mental qua mental.

Nonreductive physicalists face several extant challenges, such as providing a metaphysically satisfying picture of the relationship between the mental and the physical, vindicating the efficacy of the mental while remaining true to physicalism, and avoiding systematic causal overdetermination.

Ha, the above is a perfect example of the below:

The current volume, I think, might contain many cases of clever people making cases that broadly justify common sense while the real truth may be out there in the wild regions beyond.

 

[smcder]

Ha, the above is a perfect example of the below:

Not sure I follow that ...

 

[Soupie]

This may be of interest.

Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

"Abstract: There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Even so, this paper argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela (1996), endorses a form of non-reductionism, that despite it ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves the hard problem of consciousness. We expose that neurophenomenology is not a natural solution to that problem. We defend the view that whatever else neurophenomenology might achieve it cannot close the gap between the phenomenal and the physical if there is no such gap to close. Building on radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science that deny that the phenomenal and the physical are metaphysically distinct (Hutto and Myin 2013), this paper concludes by discussing how neurophenomenology might be reformulated under the auspices of a radically enactive and embodied account of cognition."

 

[Soupie]

Not sure I follow that ...

The nonreductive physicalists are clever people making cases to broadly justify common sense.

Yes, that was my commentary following the article quotes.

I'm not sure brain states are similar to pheromones, facial expressions, tone of voice, etc.

Humans and other animals can and do sense all those other "correlates" of conscious states, but until recently, we did not ever see the brain states of others. Brain states are thus a different kind of correlate all together.

 

[smcder]

This may be of interest.

Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

"Abstract: There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Even so, this paper argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela (1996), endorses a form of non-reductionism, that despite it ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves the hard problem of consciousness. We expose that neurophenomenology is not a natural solution to that problem. We defend the view that whatever else neurophenomenology might achieve it cannot close the gap between the phenomenal and the physical if there is no such gap to close. Building on radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science that deny that the phenomenal and the physical are metaphysically distinct (Hutto and Myin 2013), this paper concludes by discussing how neurophenomenology might be reformulated under the auspices of a radically enactive and embodied account of cognition."

Can you give us your summary?

 

[smcder]

The nonreductive physicalists are clever people making cases to broadly justify common sense.

Yes, that was my commentary following the article quotes.

I'm not sure brain states are similar to pheromones, facial expressions, tone of voice, etc.

Humans and other animals can and do sense all those other "correlates" of conscious states, but until recently, we did not ever see the brain states of others. Brain states are thus a different kind of correlate all together.

No, the one quote was from the book review of the Durham project - it was a description of the commitments of nonreductive physicalists, the other quote was from Conscious entities and the author said that was applicable to the whole field of philosophy.

I understand all of that about brain states Soupie, what I am saying is very simple - that I'm not surprised the scans show that people have similar, not idiosyncratic, emotions ... and that people who work with large numbers of varied kinds of people know this ...

 

[smcder]

This may be of interest.

Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

"Abstract: There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Even so, this paper argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela (1996), endorses a form of non-reductionism, that despite it ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves the hard problem of consciousness. We expose that neurophenomenology is not a natural solution to that problem. We defend the view that whatever else neurophenomenology might achieve it cannot close the gap between the phenomenal and the physical if there is no such gap to close. Building on radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science that deny that the phenomenal and the physical are metaphysically distinct (Hutto and Myin 2013), this paper concludes by discussing how neurophenomenology might be reformulated under the auspices of a radically enactive and embodied account of cognition."

I haven't read this - but it sounds a lot like the ad hoc nature of a lot of work in philosophy ... what leads to the "fissiparous nature of philosophical discussion" ... someone puts out a paper or an approach and its easy to pole holes in it, and then someone comes along and responds to that - and then there is a cottage industry of defending this view or that view based on the gaps ... as the quote above from Conscious Entities puts it:

Second, and related, there’s no objective test beyond logical consistency. Experiments will never prove any of these views wrong.

There is experiment and then there is interpretation ... I've been looking for a while from a quote by a consciousness researcher, Ive posted it on the forum - that goes to this ... again, without a paradigm, the experiments aren't that helpful in one sense, to me we've known for thousands of years that there is a correlation and I fully expect to be able to get that correlation down tighter and tighter - after all we already know that the correlation is onene in some respects (I wont put all the caveats in here - I leave that as a fissiparous exercise for the gentle reader) ... in any event, experiments aren't arguments - Constance points this out as applicable in the case of physics and I always think of McGinn's comment that his mysterianism is really everywhere, not just the hard problem of consciousness - a feature of our human condition.

I'm wary of attempts to simplify that.

 

[Soupie]

Blowing, blowing, gone! Haha.

Everytime there is a scientific article shared which appears to sharper our understanding or knowledge about the mind/body problem, you trot out papers and/or arguments about 1) how broken science is, 2) how broken philosophy is, or 3) Mysterianism.

I got ya. There's still more to learn about the physical world, there's new metaphysical paradigms to be had, and we are limited due to being mortal humans. Got it loud and clear.

Having said all that, progress can and is being made on the mind/body problem despite those previously and continuously noted obstacles.

 

[smcder]

Blowing, blowing, gone! Haha.

Everytime there is a scientific article shared which appears to sharper our understanding or knowledge about the mind/body problem, you trot out papers and/or arguments about 1) how broken science is, 2) how broken philosophy is, or 3) Mysterianism.

I got ya. There's still more to learn about the physical world, there's new metaphysical paradigms to be had, and we are limited due to being mortal humans. Got it loud and clear.

Having said all that, progress can and is being made on the mind/body problem despite those previously and continuously noted obstacles.

My message is almost (but not quite) that simple!

I'm interested in new approaches. Correlation of some kind and to some degree has been established. I have no problem with identifying brain states and consciousness, as far as it goes ... and I have no problem with accepting this as "brute fact" ... that subjectivity is just what it feels like for a particular brain state ... that's a very reasonable position - that might well be more than a human limitation, it might be something even the gods can't know because it's simply inscrutable, no possible mind could know it because it's simply the way it is. But it doesn't, for me, solve or dis-solve the hard problem. As you know, I've taken the hard problem as a personal koan, and I sit and meditate on it for three hours every morning under an ice cold waterfall just outside my fortress of solitude.

All of that is with just one little caveat (you knew this was coming! ;-) - and that is that the more I read studies that seem to show that consciousness isn't always localized (see Constance's last posts) the more I can't simpy dismiss it - as far as I can tell, it meets all the criteria of science.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

Does "Big Data" Have a Ramsey Theory Problem?

want to answer but am afraid that you (OP) already know what I want to say and am actually talking about something else, so I will put this as a comment. Yes, you are right that there will inevitably be patterns in large data sets. Some people even use "Data Mining" as a perjorative term meaning exactly finding these spurious patterns by accident. One of our main defences against this is to split the data randomly into pieces (in many different ways) and then see how well a model or rule learned from one piece generalises to the other pieces. This idea is called cross-validation.

 

[Constance]

SEE Interesting Stuff FOR CLARK'S ARGUMENTS

Not only does consciousness not appear to be something the brain generates, creates, or excretes, it does not even appear to be something that serves an objective function.

?? Do you mean an objective physical function in the neural networking of the brain? I don't see how it could not given that one act of the mind {perception, feeling, thought, idea} leads to another producing further connections in the brain.

Or do you mean consciousness does not function in orienting the individual in his or her explorations of things and objective situations in the world? (which it surely does)

Or do you mean that consciousness does not interact with and thus understand the objectiveness of things relative to its own subjective perspective?

In other words, consciousness is not something brain states create, but rather, conscious *is* brain states.

It seems that consciousness produces brain states, but I don't see how it could be identical with brain states. Also, there are brain states in unconscious persons. Further, both prereflective and reflective consciousness produce brain states.

The shared identity of certain brain states and conscious states is special, no doubt. There is a physical and phenomenal identity.

Can you explain what you mean in more detail? How can the 'brain' experience phenomena -- the phenomenal appearance of things? Conscious beings experience phenomena through direct sensual acquaintance and contact with that which appears in their vicinity. They also reflect on and gradually recognize the nature of their own experience in terms of its partial access to the being of 'things' through their openness to the phenomenal appearances of things. Eventually conscious beings like ourselves think about the meaning and consequences of this relation between the subjective and objective aspects of reality bodied forth -- realized -- in our experience. These are all activities grounded in consciousness and mind. What is grounded in the brain? What is the nature of the 'information' with which the brain itself works if not that which is obtained in experience by consciousness?

Your subsequent comments continue to make statements and claims that I think need further explication:

As Clark indicates, and as I have long suspected, this phenomenal identity is essentialy an intentional identity, and the intentional identity is essentially an informational identity.

What this means is that some brain states have two properties: their physical properties and, in the context of the dynamic brain system, their informational properties.

The physical properties are objective and can be observed from the 3rd-person perspective; the informational, intentional, phenomenal properties are subjective and constitute a 1st-person perspective.

This paper by Zahavi will, I think, clarify the phenomenological understanding of consciousness:

http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publi...ousness_and_pre-reflective_self-awareness.pdf

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosohy has an exceptionally clear article on the centrality of time-consciousness, temporality, in phenomenology:

Phenomenology and Time-Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

[Constance]

My message is almost (but not quite) that simple!

I'm interested in new approaches. Correlation of some kind and to some degree has been established. I have no problem with identifying brain states and consciousness, as far as it goes ... and I have no problem with accepting this as "brute fact" ... that subjectivity is just what it feels like for a particular brain state ... that's a very reasonable position - that might well be more than a human limitation, it might be something even the gods can't know because it's simply inscrutable, no possible mind could know it because it's simply the way it is. But it doesn't, for me, solve or dis-solve the hard problem. As you know, I've taken the hard problem as a personal koan, and I sit and meditate on it for three hours every morning under an ice cold waterfall just outside my fortress of solitude.

I can't accept (or even take seriously) the claim that 'subjectivity is just what it feels like for a particular brain state'. The brain doesn't have feelings or cope with feelings. It can't even feel the surgeon's knife when it penetrates the brain. Precisely what grounds the hypothesis that the brain produces subjective feelings and, further, creates the capabilities of subjectivity and consciousness to disclose the world in which conscious beings are embedded?

All of that is with just one little caveat (you knew this was coming! ;-) - and that is that the more I read studies that seem to show that consciousness isn't always localized (see Constance's last posts) the more I can't simpy dismiss it - as far as I can tell, it meets all the criteria of science.

It's the same for me. That paper by Jenny Wade was a real eye-opener and mind-expander for me as well. It broke through the boundaries within which I've primarily been thinking about consciousness for a year now -- attempting to account for consciousness (as we experience it) in naturalistic terms, on the basis of its long development in the evolution of biological life. After reading Wade's paper, I see how much more there is to explore.

 

[Soupie]

@Constance

If you know of an objective function for consciousness, please share it. As it stands now, as per Chalmers' Zombie thought experiement which we've discussed at length, there is no identifiable objective function for consciousness. @Pharoah apparently felt this was absurd as well, and yet he failed to produce one.

Re consciousness causing brain states. First of all, im not claiming brain states cause consciousness; im agreeing with the notion that brain states are consciousness. Second, you appear to contradict your claim that consciousness causes brain states by asserting that unconscious people have brain states.

All conscious states share an identity with brain states; but not all brain states share an identity with consciousness.

How does the brain experience the "phenomenal appearance of things," you ask? It doesn't, and that's not what I was claiming. Clark's paper goes a long way toward explaining why this is not the case.

The brain (organism) doesn't experience consciousness. Rather, the organism experiences the environment (including its own body).

The brain (organism) is a physical system existing within its environment (what-is). The organism experiences the environment by way of being an intentional system. Stimuli in the environment perturb the organism/intentional system. The perturbations—patterns within the dynamic, intentional system—inform the organism (dynamic system) as to the nature of the external stimuli. In other words, the patterns of perturbation are intentional information about external stimuli.

This is how an organism experiences its environment. Why some of these intentional patterns within the system become "conscious" to the system, I don't know.

 

[Constance]

@Constance

If you know of an objective function for consciousness, please share it. As it stands now, as per Chalmers' Zombie thought experiement which we've discussed at length, there is no identifiable objective function for consciousness. @Pharoah apparently felt this was absurd as well, and yet he failed to produce one.

What work do you want Chalmer's zombie thought experiment to do? As I recall, Chalmers did not claim that the zombies he imagined were possible but rather that they were 'thinkable'.


You ask "If you know of an objective function for consciousness, please share it." Do you think 'objects' and 'objectivity' could be thought without the presence and being of consciousness? How could such comprehension of half of the nature of reality occur without the experience of the world enabled by the consciousness that reveals it -- reveals it problematically through reflection on the nature of phenomenal appearances of things available to consciousness; and reveals thereby the codependent arising of mind and world?

Re consciousness causing brain states. First of all, im not claiming brain states cause consciousness; im agreeing with the notion that brain states are consciousness.

Again, I can't agree with that claim. I think brain states are brought about as a result of both prereflective and reflective consciousness and also, clearly, by dreams.

Second, you appear to contradict your claim that consciousness causes brain states by asserting that unconscious people have brain states.
All conscious states share an identity with brain states; but not all brain states share an identity with consciousness.

A very good point and something that requires further study. This is one of the subjects that Evan Thompson is attending to in his recent book Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. Steve pointed out earlier in this thread that Thompson has recognized basic, but muted, conscious activity (expressed in a measured brain state) even in nondreaming sleep, sleep in its deepest state. This supports the research von Lommel reported going forward in Dutch hospitals concerning marked changes in brain activity measured in patients in deep coma states once preparations have begun to turn off their life support. The EEGs and other measurement devices attached to these patients as these preparations are underway demonstrate sudden increases in brain activity, up to 90 percent above that of the prior brain state, which is sustained for periods as long as five minutes before life support is shut down. Naturally this discovery has led to comprehensive doubt in the minds of medical scientists (and the families of persons in deep coma and formerly judged to be hopelessly 'brain dead') about whether enough is known yet about the possibility of a full return to consciousness by these patients. Even if such a return to full consciousness is in many cases not sustainable {given more time for recovery), the evidence more than suggests that, once attached to a human life, consciousness remains connected with that life, monitors what happens to that life, and is affected by the knowledge that that life will soon be ended.

These examples, and the Jenny Wade paper concerning the similarities of near-death and after-death memories of regressed patients compared with the experiences reported by NDE subjects, persuade me at this point that consciousness has a source outside embodied experience and that it is not simply the property of evolved embodied organisms. I'm going to come right out and say that all of the foregoing supports the idea of a 'soul' or 'spirit' that attaches to embodied beings during their gestation and survives the deaths of those bodies.

What could be the source of those souls that accompany us (and likely other highly evolved animals) in our adventures in the physical world? It would have to be a nonlocal source from somewhere beyond the world visible or measureable to us and beyond the margins of what we think of as the universe, a region beyond the universe's finitude.


I'll come back to your other comments tonight.

 

[Constance]

How does the brain experience the "phenomenal appearance of things," you ask? It doesn't, and that's not what I was claiming. Clark's paper goes a long way toward explaining why this is not the case.

His claim, then, would apparently accord with what I've been saying. Your own claims do not, so far as I can see, proceed from Clark's conviction [a past conviction?] since you seem below to try to bring consciousness back in a partial role in some experiences. I gather from your next comment below that Clark was arguing in the paper you cited that the brain "experiences the environment (including its own body)" but not awareness or consciousness of the organism's experiences in and of the environment -- or, further, the conscious sense of these experiences being the organism's 'own'. I think that claim is attractive to you since you continue to look for a materialist/objectivist explanation for consciousness (which reduces if not eliminates consciousness as phenomenologically described and analyzed. But somewhere in this recent discussion of Clark it's been observed by someone that Clark has since revised his thinking. Can you give us an idea of what changes his thinking has undergone since writing that paper and do you agree with his subsequent thinking?

The brain (organism) doesn't experience consciousness. Rather, the organism experiences the environment (including its own body).

The brain (organism) is a physical system existing within its environment (what-is). The organism experiences the environment by way of being an intentional system. Stimuli in the environment perturb the organism/intentional system.The perturbations—patterns within the dynamic, intentional system—inform the organism (dynamic system) as to the nature of the external stimuli. In other words, the patterns of perturbation are intentional information about external stimuli.

This is how an organism experiences its environment. Why some of these intentional patterns within the system become "conscious" to the system, I don't know.

What persuades you that 'organisms' are [or can be] reductively equated with 'intentional systems' operating only in the brain? Perception opens an organism to further details of that which lies around and beyond it and enables the development of intentionality, but perception is only part of the means by which preconscious and conscious organisms sense their situation within a mileau beyond their skin, their personal boundaries, and gradually come to react to things and others within the environment with increased intentionality. Consciousness begins in a state of what Husserl referred to as a "passive synthesis" with its mileau, and moves toward and achieves a more purposeful "active synthesis." I think it might be useful for you at this point to read the following work or some expert commentaries on it:


Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic
Edmund Husserl
Springer Science & Business Media, Oct 31, 2001 - Philosophy - 661 pages

"Coming from what is arguably the most productive period of Husserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation into English of Husserl's renowned lectures on `passive synthesis', given between 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected to judgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on the crisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide an archaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented layers of meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in `active synthesis'.

Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences, the Analyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtle emergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology of association that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis, temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and the unconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body in its affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of these diverse modes of evidence and their modalizations (transcendental aesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of truth up to judicative achievements (transcendental logic).

Joined by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method, the Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by the majority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students of phenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an indispensable work."

Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis


I think you're still resisting phenomenology in an effort to work out a brief for Tononi's abstract and manifestly indirect informational systems thinking, which he himself has modified in his most recent version of IIT where he begins to recognize the essential contributions of the phenomenology of embodied consciousness to the understanding of consciousness.

 

[smcder]

Blowing, blowing, gone! Haha.

Everytime there is a scientific article shared which appears to sharper our understanding or knowledge about the mind/body problem, you trot out papers and/or arguments about 1) how broken science is, 2) how broken philosophy is, or 3) Mysterianism.

I got ya. There's still more to learn about the physical world, there's new metaphysical paradigms to be had, and we are limited due to being mortal humans. Got it loud and clear.

Having said all that, progress can and is being made on the mind/body problem despite those previously and continuously noted obstacles.

What progress do you see?

I don't think science or philosophy are broken - I really wish you would read Kuhn. It clearly describes what is going on with the study of consciousnesss now.

I also wish you would read the McGowan article. It does point out what may be wrong with how science is being done currently.

Any limit on the ability to ask questions and point out flaws is not part of science - especially when fundamental questions like the hard problem and mental causation - when we dobt even know what an answer might look like.

When you dont know why some intentional states are conscious ... That should make yiu question the whole approach not just say
"Oh thats just a matter of time - if we just keep going in the same direction im sure well figure it out."

It could happen - and people need to keep going in that direction to see .. But its also reasonable if a few people split off and look beyond the illumination of the street lamp. ;-)

and thats why ill probably continue to sound like a broken record into the foreseeable future - although i will try to tone it down a bit. ;-)

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, I'm still hoping that you'll engage these more immediate questions I asked a few posts back.

[slightly edited] "Can you explain what you mean in more detail? How can the 'brain' experience phenomena -- the phenomenal appearance of things? Conscious beings experience phenomena through direct sensual acquaintance and contact with that which appears in their vicinity. They also reflect on and gradually recognize the nature of their own experience in terms of its partial access to the being of 'things' through their openness to the phenomenal appearances of things. Eventually conscious beings like ourselves think about the meaning and consequences of this relation between the subjective and objective aspects of reality bodied forth -- realized -- in our experience. These are all activities grounded in consciousness and mind. What is grounded in the three-pound brain in itself? What is the nature of the 'information' with which the brain works if not the tangible, sensed, and felt information obtained in and through direct experience in the environment and in the increasing self-awareness of conscious beings?"

 

[Constance]

Everytime there is a scientific article shared which appears to sharper our understanding or knowledge about the mind/body problem, you trot out papers and/or arguments about 1) how broken science is, 2) how broken philosophy is, or 3) Mysterianism.

I got ya. There's still more to learn about the physical world, there's new metaphysical paradigms to be had, and we are limited due to being mortal humans. Got it loud and clear.

Having said all that, progress can and is being made on the mind/body problem despite those previously and continuously noted obstacles.

It isn't that science is 'broken' but that it is hidebound by its current preconceptions about the nature of reality, which is still an open question in physics as it is in consciousness studies. Analytical philosophy has erred in attempting to adhere too closely (and uncritically) to the dominant scientific preconceptions of our time. Both have excluded anomalous experiences and capabilities as subject matter to be investigated. Indeed, both have for the most part studiously avoided the subject of consciousness itself until several decades ago. There were exceptions in 19th-century German philosophy, leading to the phenomenological turn taken there and among French and other European philosophers in the 20th century. But phenomenological philosophy remains a minor enterprise in British and American philosophy departments today. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies, however, a variety of practitioners in philosophy, neuroscience, computer science, and other research disciplines have already recognized the necessity to pursuse an understanding of phenomenological analyses of consciousness.

At the same time, increasing numbers of philosophers, scientists (in particular quantum physicists and quantum theorists, psychologists, and neuroscientists have become aware of the importance of Eastern philosophy and meditation practices and even urge their colleagues to pursue them. In doing so they are exploring nonlocal influences on consciousness and the physical effects of deep meditation on the brain itself. The next step, which is essential, is a broader investigation of psychical and parapsychological phenomena, building on what has already been learned by researchers about these phenomena over the last 130 years. Consciousness includes these phenomena, recorded over all of written human history and intriguingly expressed by pre-literate cultures in our deep past. What consciousness is cannot be understood without investigation of marginal, liminal, and anomalous experiences in and aptitudes of consciousness that have recurred throughout human experience.

 

[smcder]

This may be of interest.

Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

"Abstract: There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Even so, this paper argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela (1996), endorses a form of non-reductionism, that despite it ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves the hard problem of consciousness. We expose that neurophenomenology is not a natural solution to that problem. We defend the view that whatever else neurophenomenology might achieve it cannot close the gap between the phenomenal and the physical if there is no such gap to close. Building on radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science that deny that the phenomenal and the physical are metaphysically distinct (Hutto and Myin 2013), this paper concludes by discussing how neurophenomenology might be reformulated under the auspices of a radically enactive and embodied account of cognition."

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You have to sign up 2 read the adticle but it looks like a critique of the approach you posted ... a good eaercise woukd be to read both - then you defend this one andd ill defend the one you posted.