Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[Pharoah]

@smcder there is an equivalence in music.
I would say, you can apply Serial Technique with mathematical precision, but that doesn't make a composition make music sense... indeed that makes it amusic.
Conversely, if you compose music, that music then may be shown to apply Serial Technique with mathematical precision.
So, assigning qualia to a mathematical function, because you feel like it, doesn't make it sense.

 

[smcder]

@smcder there is an equivalence in music.
I would say, you can apply Serial Technique with mathematical precision, but that doesn't make a composition make music sense... indeed that makes it amusic.
Conversely, if you compose music, that music then may be shown to apply Serial Technique with mathematical precision.
So, assigning qualia to a mathematical function, because you feel like it, doesn't make it sense.

I agree with that last statement and if that is what Tononi is doing, then fair point. But that's not the point I was making or the question I was asking.

 

[Pharoah]

I agree with that last statement and if that is what Tononi is doing, then fair point. But that's not the point I was making or the question I was asking.

I know... it was the only analogy I could think of.

 

[smcder]

@smcder there is an equivalence in music.
I would say, you can apply Serial Technique with mathematical precision, but that doesn't make a composition make music sense... indeed that makes it amusic.
Conversely, if you compose music, that music then may be shown to apply Serial Technique with mathematical precision.
So, assigning qualia to a mathematical function, because you feel like it, doesn't make it sense.

Let me try this, you say:

btw. you don't have to have any understanding by way of mathematics to workout that IIT is jibberish

I'm not arguing about that, in fact the blogpost I linked has a link at the bottom to a Schwitzgebel article that make the same argument in a non-technical/non-mathematical way, so ... my question is not IIT specific, my question is:

Can you make the same determination (jibberish/not jibberish) about any theory of consciousness without any understanding by way of mathematics?

 

[smcder]

I know... it was the only analogy I could think of.

lol ... and it was a very lovely analogy too!

 

[Soupie]

I think Ive posted this before:

Shtetl-Optimized » Blog Archive » Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious Expander)

I've read this several times, but only just now read Chalmer's response, with which I agree with.

Now, I regard IIT as a serious, honorable attempt to grapple with the Pretty-Hard Problem of Consciousness: something concrete enough to move the discussion forward. But I also regard IIT as a failed attempt on the problem. And I wish people would recognize its failure, learn from it, and move on.

In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem because it unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that no sane person would regard as particularly “conscious” at all: indeed, systems that do nothing but apply a low-density parity-check code, or other simple transformations of their input data. Moreover, IIT predicts not merely that these systems are “slightly” conscious (which would be fine), but that they can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are.

While Aaronson identifies concerns with the math, as indicated above, he views IIT as a serious, honorable attempt to address what he calls the Pretty-Hard Problem of Consciousness. (In other words, it's not rubbish, despite the opinion of our resident HCT guru.) As noted, Koch's enthusiasm and Chalmer's public interest should be considered as well. (None of which means of course that IIT is correct.)

However, I think Aaronson's main critique of IIT is foolish: "In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem because it unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that no sane person would regard as particularly “conscious” at all."

Chalmers' response:

For now, here are some thoughts on your “Pretty Hard Problem”, which I like. It seems to me that there are a few different problems in the vicinity that are worth distinguishing.

The first distinction is between PHP1: “Construct a theory that matches our intuitions about which systems are conscious” and PHP2 “Construct a correct theory that tells us which systems are conscious”. Here I’d say that PHP2 is more important and fundamental than PHP1. As scientists and philosophers we want our theories to be correct. One might think that intuitions are our best guide to a correct theory here, but that’s far from obvious, and in any case even on this view we only care about intuitions as a potential guide to the facts. And certainly I’d say that IIT is intended as an answer to PHP2 rather than PHP1.

If consciousness is fundamental, and it may be, then humans don't have the market cornered. There may be many non-human systems that are having experiences.

Not only do I think Aaronson's critique is erroneous, I also wonder if it is ultimately born out of a confusion regarding consciousness.

The broader point is this: I’ve shown that my system—the system that simply applies the matrix W to an input vector x—has an enormous amount of integrated information Φ. Indeed, this system’s Φ equals half of its entire information content. So for example, if n were 1014 or so—something that wouldn’t be hard to arrange with existing computers—then this system’s Φ would exceed any plausible upper bound on the integrated information content of the human brain.

And yet this Vandermonde system doesn’t even come close to doing anything that we’d want to call intelligent, let alone conscious!

He has apparently shown that some very simple systems could, according to IIT, be experiencing consciousness. As noted, for this reason, he rejects IIT.

In this case, my concern is with his last statement. First, consciousness is not the same as intelligence. I don't think I need to say anything more than that.

Second, for a system to be conscious is for it to feel like something to be that system. What does it feel like to be a system that simply applies the matrix W to an input vector x? I haven't a clue. Perhaps it feels like a prickly rash, perhaps it feels like a shade of purple, perhaps it feels like lavender. It probably doesn't feel like any of those things. And it doesn't have to in order to feel like something.

Third, consciousness is not the same as the human mind and all its wonderful myriad of qualities. That is, for a system to be conscious does not mean that a system must see like us, hear like us, smell like us, taste like us, touch like us, have thoughts like us, have emotions like us, or moods like us, etc.

If consciousness is fundamental, then different systems will mold it into minds in different ways. Do we think that what it feels like to be a bat is the same as what it feels like to be a dog, or a shrew, or someone who is deaf, blind, quadriplegic, and in a vegetative state?

IIT may be wrong, but I don't think Aaronson's intuition proves that it is.

 

[Pharoah]

Let me try this, you say:

btw. you don't have to have any understanding by way of mathematics to workout that IIT is jibberish

I'm not arguing about that, in fact the blogpost I linked has a link at the bottom to a Schwitzgebel article that make the same argument in a non-technical/non-mathematical way, so ... my question is not IIT specific, my question is:

Can you make the same determination (jibberish/not jibberish) about any theory of consciousness without any understanding by way of mathematics?

Well... not sure what the question is. Do you need to know the maths of QM to understand it or recognise flaws or otherwise. I would say no, although a maths understanding is v useful.

 

[Randall]

@ufology you say,
"The problem I see with it however, is that because qualia-space is assumed, there is no explanation for it."
Yes!!

You really know how to drill down to the essence of the issue . I tend to repeat myself and ramble too much, and repeat myself.

 

[Soupie]

@ufology you say,
"The problem I see with it however, is that because qualia-space is assumed, there is no explanation for it."
Yes!!

I'm not sure what you mean when you say Q is assumed.

My understanding of Q is that it is a mathematical representation of the quality of a system's consciousness at any given point in time.

For example, if someone is swimming in a pool, the qualities of their consciousness (what it's like) can be represented mathematically in Q. If they are sitting in a crowded cafe, that also can be represented mathematically in Q.

Q is not meant to refer to a real, physical space, if that is what either of you are thinking.

It is "assumed" because the myriad possible states of the system and the qualities of consciousness which they manifest need to be mapped. Q is how they are mapped.

From past comments made by @Pharoah, my understanding is that he seems to think IIT supposes the qualities of consciousness are arbitrary.

As I've already pointed out to Pharoah, this is not so. Tonini and IIT recognize that organisms (systems) continually adapt to their environments, and thus the information/quality of consciousness manifested by the system is a reflection of the environment. That is, the shape which manifests in Q (the phenomenal landscape experienced by the system) is not arbitrary but rather a result of its adaptation to the environment in which it is enmeshed.

As noted by @smcder and I, on this point, HCT and TENS are not distinguished.

 

[Randall]

I'm not sure I understand what that means without examples, (can you provide an example?) but it strikes me initially as a very remarkable ability.

It's not all that remarkable. The variables of any formula with a practical application are based on some sort of observation or assumption about the way things are. If those observations are accurate and the assumptions are sound, the formulas based on them will be useful. In the IIT example above I looked at the initial premises underlying the equations and commented on the assumption of qualia-space ( formerly Q-Space ). I wonder if they decided to change what they called it because of the Star Trek implications .

To clarify - is the claim that a set of underlying principles can be examined and any resulting equations from those principles can be determined to be either practical or theoretical? Such an ability, it seems to me, would save a tremendous amount of time in developing (or even searching for) equations and would address a practical problem for the mathematician, namely - what problems and principles to pursue.

Yes. Of course. That's the whole point. Where observations provide values for variables, if the equations are sound, accurate predictions can be made. That's why such things as Kepler's Laws work. On the other hand, the values for the variables are based on theoretical assumptions, we may be able to construct internally coherent algorithms, but the values won't necessarily correspond to anything objectively real. That is the problem with making assumptions about such things as alternate dimensions, time travel, or Q-Space. But I digress.

It is also claimed, not universally, but widely I think - that all mathematics has applications ... GH Hardy most famously denied this and I suppose it's not provable, but even some of the most abstract areas of mathematics have turned out to have applications, so finding in advance mathematics that is strictly theoretical would at least be a very interesing result.

I don't claim to be a math wiz. But I know that in high school we were given equations to solve where the variables weren't assigned to any objective problem. They were simply for the exercise of following the rules in order to solve for X or whatever other variable was involved. I never was good at that because I never saw the point. However when I went to university and took an astronomy course, and I could see how the variables related to observations made, it made a lot more sense. It's why I mentioned Kepler's Laws above. So one can do math just as a mental exercise, or one can apply it to real-world problems.

The important thing is to know the difference and not assume that all variables have real-life correlates. For example we can map out all the coordinates of Escher's impossible staircase and express that as a recursive set, but in no way does that mean there can ever be such a thing in the real world. Math that involves spatial dimensions beyond 1, ,2, and 3 or time travel, are similarly impossible in the real world. But because of the complex math and abstract concepts involved, people tend to simply take the word of pop-scientists and new-agey types who exploit the ignorance of the masses to hype their own agendas. But again I digress. Sorry about the mini-rant.

 

[Michael Allen]

Lets go back to a point I made earlier...

Actually it is a question (very poignant): can free will exist in a non-deterministic universe?

(edit) proof sketch:

A "will" must be able to scan the deterministic relations of its environment...in order to pick a choice that will have the results according to its "will" (i.e. goal oriented model)

 

[smcder]

Well... not sure what the question is. Do you need to know the maths of QM to understand it or recognise flaws or otherwise. I would say no, although a maths understanding is v useful.

Right I wasn't clear ... let me try this (and I have a couple of other places to go if this doesn't make sense) ... is there something, some idea or concept in music that can only be conveyed by notation?

 

[Pharoah]

Right I wasn't clear ... let me try this (and I have a couple of other places to go if this doesn't make sense) ... is there something, some idea or concept in music that can only be conveyed by notation?

Short answer: no.
Long answer: A composer could write a note with a symbol notation. As a performer, I could then hit my wastepaper bin with a stick and the composer say, "No that is not quite the sound I had in mind" etc ad infinitum, as I go round my room hitting objects with sticks to try to find the sound that the composer has in mind. Is that notation an idea or concept in music? I would say no, but others (the avandgarde) might say yes. I wuld say that one could play Beethoven's fifth symphony on bins of different timbre because the nature of the sound does not define the music—though not as impactful as an orchestra.
I would say that sound is not necessarily music (or a music idea or concept). E.g. Bird song is not music, rap is not music, poetry is not music, a heart beating is not music. Musical expression (i.e. the evocation of mood, feeling, and concepts structured in sounds) using sound is integral to something being music. Notation is the means of conveying that intent and therefore notation in itself cannot transend musical intent... though that does not stop people from pretending that it can.

 

[smcder]

Short answer: no.
Long answer: A composer could write a note with a symbol notation. As a performer, I could then hit my wastepaper bin with a stick and the composer say, "No that is not quite the sound I had in mind" etc ad infinitum, as I go round my room hitting objects with sticks to try to find the sound that the composer has in mind. Is that notation an idea or concept in music? I would say no, but others (the avandgarde) might say yes. I wuld say that one could play Beethoven's fifth symphony on bins of different timbre because the nature of the sound does not define the music—though not as impactful as an orchestra.
I would say that sound is not necessarily music (or a music idea or concept). E.g. Bird song is not music, rap is not music, poetry is not music, a heart beating is not music. Musical expression (i.e. the evocation of mood, feeling, and concepts structured in sounds) using sound is integral to something being music. Notation is the means of conveying that intent and therefore notation in itself cannot transend musical intent... though that does not stop people from pretending that it can.

I'm working on it a bit more and will post up.

I did here that Toscanini had over 100 symphonies in his head and that he commented that it was more pleasurable for him to read a score than to hear the music - not on point but interesting ... if true.

 

[smcder]

I think I've worked through it - it kind of boiled off once I thought about it -

But it does reinforce my concern from a practical point of view (lacking mathematical sophistication) and while I see the specific critique of IIT, I don't feel like I would have as much without both the equations and the explanations given side by side in the blog.

 

[smcder]

It's not all that remarkable. The variables of any formula with a practical application are based on some sort of observation or assumption about the way things are. If those observations are accurate and the assumptions are sound, the formulas based on them will be useful. In the IIT example above I looked at the initial premises underlying the equations and commented on the assumption of qualia-space ( formerly Q-Space ). I wonder if they decided to change what they called it because of the Star Trek implications .

Yes. Of course. That's the whole point. Where observations provide values for variables, if the equations are sound, accurate predictions can be made. That's why such things as Kepler's Laws work. On the other hand, the values for the variables are based on theoretical assumptions, we may be able to construct internally coherent algorithms, but the values won't necessarily correspond to anything objectively real. That is the problem with making assumptions about such things as alternate dimensions, time travel, or Q-Space. But I digress.

I don't claim to be a math wiz. But I know that in high school we were given equations to solve where the variables weren't assigned to any objective problem. They were simply for the exercise of following the rules in order to solve for X or whatever other variable was involved. I never was good at that because I never saw the point. However when I went to university and took an astronomy course, and I could see how the variables related to observations made, it made a lot more sense. It's why I mentioned Kepler's Laws above. So one can do math just as a mental exercise, or one can apply it to real-world problems.

The important thing is to know the difference and not assume that all variables have real-life correlates. For example we can map out all the coordinates of Escher's impossible staircase and express that as a recursive set, but in no way does that mean there can ever be such a thing in the real world. Math that involves spatial dimensions beyond 1, ,2, and 3 or time travel, are similarly impossible in the real world. But because of the complex math and abstract concepts involved, people tend to simply take the word of pop-scientists and new-agey types who exploit the ignorance of the masses to hype their own agendas. But again I digress. Sorry about the mini-rant.

The variables of any formula with a practical application are based on some sort of observation or assumption about the way things are.

I was thinking of cases where pure mathematics has led to practical applications.

 

[smcder]

Short answer: no.
Long answer: A composer could write a note with a symbol notation. As a performer, I could then hit my wastepaper bin with a stick and the composer say, "No that is not quite the sound I had in mind" etc ad infinitum, as I go round my room hitting objects with sticks to try to find the sound that the composer has in mind. Is that notation an idea or concept in music? I would say no, but others (the avandgarde) might say yes. I wuld say that one could play Beethoven's fifth symphony on bins of different timbre because the nature of the sound does not define the music—though not as impactful as an orchestra.
I would say that sound is not necessarily music (or a music idea or concept). E.g. Bird song is not music, rap is not music, poetry is not music, a heart beating is not music. Musical expression (i.e. the evocation of mood, feeling, and concepts structured in sounds) using sound is integral to something being music. Notation is the means of conveying that intent and therefore notation in itself cannot transend musical intent... though that does not stop people from pretending that it can.

Now I think music isn't just an analogy - it's pretty much the same thing.

The relationship of notation to intution, composition and "discovery"? is it more or less the same as that for mathematics?

is there a musical equivalent of pure mathematics? (Penrose stairs have an analogue auditory illusion ... the sonic barber pole)

I'll bet there are a few examples where the manipulation of notation alone, or the immediately underlying principles has resulted in new music? or musical principles? or is that wrong-headed or not even wrong?

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure what you mean when you say Q is assumed.

My understanding of Q is that it is a mathematical representation of the quality of a system's consciousness at any given point in time.

For example, if someone is swimming in a pool, the qualities of their consciousness (what it's like) can be represented mathematically in Q. If they are sitting in a crowded cafe, that also can be represented mathematically in Q.

Q is not meant to refer to a real, physical space, if that is what either of you are thinking.

It is "assumed" because the myriad possible states of the system and the qualities of consciousness which they manifest need to be mapped. Q is how they are mapped.

From past comments made by @Pharoah, my understanding is that he seems to think IIT supposes the qualities of consciousness are arbitrary.

As I've already pointed out to Pharoah, this is not so. Tonini and IIT recognize that organisms (systems) continually adapt to their environments, and thus the information/quality of consciousness manifested by the system is a reflection of the environment. That is, the shape which manifests in Q (the phenomenal landscape experienced by the system) is not arbitrary but rather a result of its adaptation to the environment in which it is enmeshed.

As noted by @smcder and I, on this point, HCT and TENS are not distinguished.

@Soupie I'm not sure what you mean when you say Q is assumed.

@ufology
@Pharoah

What you mean is that it's a circular argument, correct?

 

[smcder]

Lets go back to a point I made earlier...

Actually it is a question (very poignant): can free will exist in a non-deterministic universe?

(edit) proof sketch:

A "will" must be able to scan the deterministic relations of its environment...in order to pick a choice that will have the results according to its "will" (i.e. goal oriented model)

Basically, you are saying that you have to have rules that can be determined in order for the idea of free will to make any sense? Or ... ?

 

[smcder]

I've read this several times, but only just now read Chalmer's response, with which I agree with.


While Aaronson identifies concerns with the math, as indicated above, he views IIT as a serious, honorable attempt to address what he calls the Pretty-Hard Problem of Consciousness. (In other words, it's not rubbish, despite the opinion of our resident HCT guru.) As noted, Koch's enthusiasm and Chalmer's public interest should be considered as well. (None of which means of course that IIT is correct.)

However, I think Aaronson's main critique of IIT is foolish: "In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem because it unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that no sane person would regard as particularly “conscious” at all."

Chalmers' response:


If consciousness is fundamental, and it may be, then humans don't have the market cornered. There may be many non-human systems that are having experiences.

Not only do I think Aaronson's critique is erroneous, I also wonder if it is ultimately born out of a confusion regarding consciousness.


He has apparently shown that some very simple systems could, according to IIT, be experiencing consciousness. As noted, for this reason, he rejects IIT.

In this case, my concern is with his last statement. First, consciousness is not the same as intelligence. I don't think I need to say anything more than that.

Second, for a system to be conscious is for it to feel like something to be that system. What does it feel like to be a system that simply applies the matrix W to an input vector x? I haven't a clue. Perhaps it feels like a prickly rash, perhaps it feels like a shade of purple, perhaps it feels like lavender. It probably doesn't feel like any of those things. And it doesn't have to in order to feel like something.

Third, consciousness is not the same as the human mind and all its wonderful myriad of qualities. That is, for a system to be conscious does not mean that a system must see like us, hear like us, smell like us, taste like us, touch like us, have thoughts like us, have emotions like us, or moods like us, etc.

If consciousness is fundamental, then different systems will mold it into minds in different ways. Do we think that what it feels like to be a bat is the same as what it feels like to be a dog, or a shrew, or someone who is deaf, blind, quadriplegic, and in a vegetative state?

IIT may be wrong, but I don't think Aaronson's intuition proves that it is.

I found Aaronson's reply back to Chalmers, which I think may be helpful:

David Chalmers #125: Thanks very much for the comment! As I once told you, reading The Conscious Mind as a teenager had a significant impact on my thinking, so it’s an honor to have you here on my blog.

Now, regarding your distinction between PHP1 and PHP2: for me, like for Alex Mennen #132, the key question is whether it’s possible to articulate a sense in which a solution to the Pretty-Hard Problem could “still be verifiably correct,” even though it rendered absurd-seeming judgments about consciousness or unconsciousness in cases where we thought we already knew the answers. And, if so, what would the means of verification be?

It’s worthwhile keeping in front of us what we’re talking about. We’re not talking about a scientific hypothesis that contradicts common sense in some subtle but manifestly-testable way, in a realm far removed from everyday experience—like relativity telling us about clocks ticking slower for the twin on the spaceship. Rather, we’re talking about a theory that predicts, let’s say, that a bag of potato chips is more conscious than you or me. (No, I have no reason to think a bag of potato chips has a large Φ-value, but it will suffice for this discussion.)

I don’t know about you, but if the world’s thousand wisest people assured me that such a theory had been shown to be correct, my reaction wouldn’t be terror that I had gravely underestimated the consciousness of potato-chip bags, or that I’d inadvertently committed mass murder (or at least chipslaughter) at countless snacktimes. My reaction, instead, would be that these wise people must be using the word “consciousness” to mean something different than what I meant by that word—and that the very fact that potato-chip bags were “conscious” by their definition was virtually a proof of that semantic disagreement. So, following a strategy you once recommended, I’d simply want to ban the word “consciousness” from the discussion, and see whether the wise people could then convey to me the content of what had been discovered about potato-chip bags.

By contrast, suppose there were an improved consciousness-measure Φ’, and suppose Φ’ assigned tiny values to livers, existing computers, and my Vandermonde system, large values to human brains, and somewhat smaller but still large values to chimpanzee and dolphin brains; and after years of study, no one could construct any system with a large Φ’ that didn’t seem to look and act like a brain. In that case, I wouldn’t be able to rule out the hypothesis that what people were referring to by large Φ’ was indeed what I meant by consciousness, and would accordingly be interested in knowing the Φ’-values for fetuses, coma patients, AIs, and various other interesting cases.

What I’m missing, right now, is what sort of state of affairs could possibly convince me that (a) potato-chip bags have property X, and (b) property X refers to the same thing that I had previously meant by “consciousness.”