Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Pharoah]

Re rovelli and johnson
1. I was contemplating my insignificance in relation to the cosmos. This entailed taking a third-person perspective on myself and visualsng zooming away from the earth and from the solar system and then galaxy (curiously something that could not have been done hundreds of years ago. How might someone have gone through a similar exercise in the belief the earth was flat, for example).
2. Then I tried to do the same centred from a first-person perspective... to feel the earth at my feet and then the expanse of the planet and then beyond. Altogether a more difficult task, as if my mind can not imagine collosal space around my person.
But then, are we to assume that, like those who thought the earth was flat, we too, have flaws in our imaginings (as of 1.). For example, one can imagine zooming in or out (from the third person perspective) faster than light, and when we do it, we don't see back in time at the past as we should.
In contemplating ourselves like this, what should we be seeing?
Just a thought...

 

[Constance]

Re rovelli and johnson
1. I was contemplating my insignificance in relation to the cosmos. This entailed taking a third-person perspective on myself and visualsng zooming away from the earth and from the solar system and then galaxy (curiously something that could not have been done hundreds of years ago. How might someone have gone through a similar exercise in the belief the earth was flat, for example).
2. Then I tried to do the same centred from a first-person perspective... to feel the earth at my feet and then the expanse of the planet and then beyond. Altogether a more difficult task, as if my mind can not imagine collosal space around my person.
But then, are we to assume that, like those who thought the earth was flat, we too, have flaws in our imaginings (as of 1.). For example, one can imagine zooming in or out (from the third person perspective) faster than light, and when we do it, we don't see back in time at the past as we should.
In contemplating ourselves like this, what should we be seeing?
Just a thought...

" . . . In contemplating ourselves like this, what should we be seeing?"


From the NDE research we learn that those who remember these experiences describe a swift (and accompanied) passage through a tunnel of light, usually following an out of body experience in which the individual observes himself or herself from someplace near the ceiling, often at the farthest corner, of the hospital room, or from a distance above the scene in the case of an accident out on a road (or falling from a mountain -- the occasion of the first NDE widely reported NDE in the 20th c.). I haven't read that such experiencers look backward over their lives at first but rather are focused on seeing their bodies from a distance [not a frightening experience but a liberating one] and then focused forward on the path outward in leaving earth. As I recall the experience of the mountaineer who fell 70 feet from a mountain top (and survived), he saw himself falling from a distance from his body.


In the spontaneous OBE I had at 21 I found myself {as consciousness/mind} instantly out of my body, which I could see sitting at the desk across the room. It was the radical change in perspective that was at first somewhat shocking, but being a mind set free of my body did not feel all that strange, almost as if I recognized what that state was. I did not fear it and paid close attention to what unfolded. I never had another OBE, but I would like to and expect that I will some time, probably at the point of bodily death.


In the year after I lost my daughter's presence, her cherished being-here with me, following a car accident eight years ago, I spent a lot of time reading about NDE's, Ian Stevenson's reincarnation investigations, past-life regressions, books and papers on psychic phenomena by SPR researchers and hundreds of pages of transcripts in the SPR's mediumship archives, and also in that period receiving unmistakable in the body [my body] phenomena demonstrating Annie's survival as herself, in her personal consciousness. After one long evening occupied this way I looked up from the book I was reading and saw the familiar room around me literally as a veneer, no thicker than a sheet of film, and within minutes of that saw my head out in space close to, next to, earth (my head being nearly the same apparent size as earth).


I hate to fly in airplanes but the only thing I worry about in an NDE passage is the speed of what takes place. I actually think I'd otherwise enjoy that flight and feel comfortable in it.


When I awoke late this morning it was out of a dream in which some white liquid was being poured over my hands, and what woke me was the sensation of this cool liquid on my hands. I don't remember feeling sensations in dreams before.


Who knows what we are connected to in our conscious and unconscious minds and memory, what experiences we have had and forgotten, and resume again with ease. How much influence does the mind have on the body that dreaming the visual flow of a thick white liquid over my hands I should also feel its coolness and liquidity.

I just received a copy of Evan Thompson's
Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. Maybe I'll find out more there.

 

[Constance]

Amazon description of Waking, Dreaming, Being:

"A renowned philosopher of the mind, also known for his groundbreaking work on Buddhism and cognitive science, Evan Thompson combines the latest neuroscience research on sleep, dreaming, and meditation with Indian and Western philosophy of the mind, casting new light on the self and its relation to the brain.

Thompson shows how the self is a changing process, not a static thing. When we are awake we identify with our body, but if we let our mind wander or daydream, we project a mentally imagined self into the remembered past or anticipated future. As we fall asleep, the impression of being a bounded self distinct from the world dissolves, but the self reappears in the dream state. If we have a lucid dream, we no longer identify only with the self within the dream. Our sense of self now includes our dreaming self, the "I" as dreamer. Finally, as we meditate--either in the waking state or in a lucid dream--we can observe whatever images or thoughts arise and how we tend to identify with them as "me." We can also experience sheer awareness itself, distinct from the changing contents that make up our image of the self.

Contemplative traditions say that we can learn to let go of the self, so that when we die we can witness its dissolution with equanimity. Thompson weaves together neuroscience, philosophy, and personal narrative to depict these transformations, adding uncommon depth to life's profound questions. Contemplative experience comes to illuminate scientific findings, and scientific evidence enriches the vast knowledge acquired by contemplatives."

 

[Constance]

The essay below... spot on re information. Super!

"On the Evolution of Determinate Information" Conrad Dale Johnson June 26, 2013

"This essay argues for Wheeler’s original idea – not just that the physical world is made of information, but that information depends on measurements. Not only those made by observers in a lab, of course. Wheeler imagined the universe itself as an information-defining system, in which we and our measuring devices participate on the same basis as everything else.[3] "

"The “measurement problem” in QM comes down to this question – at what point then does a measurement occur? When and how do superpositions “collapse” to give a factual result? Since there seems to be no issue with measuring things in classical physics, this seems to be an issue unique to QM. But I think the reason it remains unresolved, after so many decades, is that we have no idea what a measurement is, even in classical physics. All we know is that they happen – that we do have access to well-defined information about the things around us. But the linearity of the quantum equations tell us no such thing can happen. When things interact, their superpositions never collapse; they only get entangled in larger superpositions.[5]
Objectively, I think this is right. There’s no point at which a system physically changes from a superposition to a definite state. But let’s pull back from looking at individual events, and gradually widen our viewpoint, taking account of more and more of the web of interaction surrounding these atoms and molecules. At some point, we know, we’ll reach a higher level of structure that does provide measurement-contexts, where many kinds of interaction work together to set traps for specific information, that helps specify other information.
Even at that point, though, there’s no reason to think that any objective physical collapse occurs. If we could stand outside the universe and “see” the web objectively, not as participants in it, presumably we’d still find only superpositions of all possible correlated interactions. But from the viewpoint of local systems inside the web, there’s a tiny subset of all these possible interactions that happens to be able to define a mutually-supporting set of coherent facts. For systems in this sub- network, interactions that happen to fit its self-defining structure do define and communicate specific information, that contributes to contexts defining other information. Interactions that don’t happen to fit this structure aren’t physically eliminated; they’re just irrelevant to the ongoing process that makes things within this network observable to each other."p.4

You're right. This is an excellent paper, and you've selected well the key passages you've quoted in that post. I think they express the complexity of Johnson's interpretation of 'information' as exchanged at uncountable levels of interaction, including informed interactions of protoconsciousness and consciousness going forward in the temporal world/universe. I want to requote this paragraph:

". . . Even at that point, though, there’s no reason to think that any objective physical collapse occurs. If we could stand outside the universe and “see” the web objectively, not as participants in it, presumably we’d still find only superpositions of all possible correlated interactions. But from the viewpoint of local systems inside the web, there’s a tiny subset of all these possible interactions that happens to be able to define a mutually-supporting set of coherent facts. For systems in this sub- network, interactions that happen to fit its self-defining structure do define and communicate specific information, that contributes to contexts defining other information. Interactions that don’t happen to fit this structure aren’t physically eliminated; they’re just irrelevant to the ongoing process that makes things within this network observable to each other."p.4

 

[Constance]

@Pharoah, I think you also wrote above (though I can't find the post now) that you missed a treatment of hierarchical constructs in Johnson's theory. I do think you are correct to recognize a hierarchy of degrees and types of consciousness developed in the evolution of species, and I would bet that Johnson would also agree with that. It would probably be good for the two of you to correspond about this.

 

[Soupie]

This problem is actually more general, for avoiding Chalmers' misleading emphasis on qualia, it is, at least in vision/audition, the problem of the origin of the image of the external world. How does this image arise, or get generated, or in general is it accounted for? If you are still holding, as Rowlands, that the brain employs representations, then you have the "coding" problem that the concept of representations involves. Three dots (...) can stand for an "S" in Morse code, or three tomatoes, or a stove. One must know the domain to which to map the code, and the brain would then, in effect, have to already know what the external world (the domain) looks like to use its "representational" code (for the neural-chemical code cannot look anything like the external world). If to solve this, you are relying surreptitiously on the external structure (or field) , say, the optic array, then at what scale of time are you conceiving this structure/array/field to exist - the scale of a "buzzing" fly in the field, a fly slowly flapping his wings like a heron, a fly as a vibrating ensemble of atoms, or what? If the external field is indeed holographic (as one could also construe the optic array) - a massive interference pattern - then it is un-imageable - at any scale of time. You cannot just assume the environment as a nice "external structure" that the brain uses - as though somehow the image of the external world as we know it already exists! Yet this is what is going on in Rowlands, or in O'Regan and Noë for that matter. Further, the external structure is not static, it is dynamically transforming with buzzing flies, falling leaves, rotating cubes. One does not need action from the body to "make the structure change." But now you open another set of problems, for now you need a theory of the basic "memory" that allows the brain to specify (or us to perceive) these transforming events - as extended events over time. It is a problem hidden currently under the notion of "temporal consciousness" that is equally a problem of qualia, in fact has greater primacy, for all perceived qualia extend over time.

I think the "coding problem" presented here is very interesting, but I don't think it is actually a problem. I think @Pharoah HCT offers a compelling account of how organisms and their environments have evolved together over time all the while maintaining a qualitative, reciprocal relationship. This so-called "mapping" problem evaporates when we realize the intimate, reciprocal relationship shared between the environment and the organisms existing not within, but as part of the environment.

Regarding the representational ground of consciousness and mind:

A coworker and I were commenting on another coworker of ours who happened to be wearing a costume that completely restricted her arms (today is 10/30). This led to me noting having read an essay by an amputee who had noted their hobby of running being dangerous. They had fallen on several occasions and instinctively "reached out their arm" to break their fall, but since the arm had been amputated, they had damaged their face.

My coworker noted that her daughter had been born without her right arm. She also loved to run but suffered from overheating due to the arm being unavailable to dissipate heat via sweating. Fascinating. In any case, my coworker went on to explain that her daughter had always felt the presence of a right arm despite the fact that she was born without it (phantom limb). This is just like the case noted by Metzinger and his PSM.

My coworker said that for example, when her daughter is driving, she will often try to grab the steering wheel with "her right arm." Her daughter also finds this baffling, she said. I told her about Metzinger's PSM theory, and she was very interested. Since this woman has never had a right arm and thus never used a right arm, we can't rely on that to explain the sensation of having a right arm.

@smcder linked me to an SEP article regarding problems with the representational approach to consciousness and mind. I think I need to read that. If anyone else knows of a succinct article that outlines problems with representationalism, I'd be interested in read that too. Also, it occurred to me that Robin Faichney's concept of "intentional information" is related but distinct from representationalism, but just how escapes me at the moment.

 

[Constance]

Now that we are talking about the bottomless well and web of interactions and integrations of 'information' in the world/universe as we are coming to understand it, the following extract from Bem's paper "Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognition and Affect" is relevant. This
extract is from the concluding section of the paper, on pages 54-55 at
http://www.dbem.ws/FeelingFuture.pdf

"Familiarity and Belief: But How Can it Be Like That?

Among psi phenomena, precognition and retroactive influence might seem to be the most anomalous because they not only challenge our classical conceptions of space and distance, as telepathy and clairvoyance do, but also those of time and causality. Although less well known than discussions of nonlocality, alternative conceptions of time and causality also constitute an active area of discussion within physics (Barbour, 2001). An interdisciplinary conference of physicists and psi researchers sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was organized in June of 2006 specifically to discuss the physics of time and retrocausation. The proceedings have been published as a book by the American Institute of Physics (Sheehan, 2006). A central starting point for such discussions is the consensus that the fundamental laws of both classical and quantum physics are time-symmetric. In particular,

'They formally and equally admit time-forward and time-reversed solutions.…Thus, though we began simply desiring to predict the future from the present, we find that the best models do not require—in fact, do not respect—this asymmetry.… [Accordingly,] it seems untenable to assert that time-reverse causation (retrocausation) cannot occur, even though it temporarily runs counter to the macroscopic arrow of time (Sheehan, 2006, p. vii).'

But perhaps the most fundamental reason that precognition and retroactive influence might seem to us to be more anomalous than telepathy or clairvoyance is that we can relate the latter to familiar phenomena. That is, we have many everyday phenomena in which information travels invisibly through space. Thus, even those who are not convinced that telepathy actually exists can still readily imagine possible mechanisms for it, such as electromagnetic signal transmissions from one brain to another (which, incidentally, is not supported by the results of experiments in telepathy). Another example is provided by the apparent clairvoyant ability of migratory birds to find their way along unfamiliar terrain even at night. This ceased to be a psi-like anomaly once it was discovered that they are sensitive to the earth’s magnetic field. Recently it has even been shown that the relevant sensory mechanism is located in the birds’ visual systems; in a fairly literal sense, they can “see” the magnetic field (Deutschlander, Phillips, & Borland, 1999). In contrast, we have no familiar everyday phenomena in which information travels backwards in time. This makes it difficult even to imagine possible mechanisms for precognition and retroactive influence, thereby leading to the puzzled query, “But how can it be like that?”

Unfortunately, even if quantum-based theories eventually mature from metaphor to genuine models of psi, they are still unlikely to provide intuitively satisfying mechanisms for psi because quantum theory fails to provide intuitively satisfying mechanisms for physical reality itself. Physicists have learned to live with that conundrum but most non-physicists are simply unaware of it; they presume that they don’t understand quantum physics only because they lack the necessary technical and mathematical expertise. They need to be reassured. Richard Feynman (1994), one of the most distinguished physicists of the twentieth century and winner of the Nobel Prize for his work on quantum electrodynamics, put it this way:

'The difficulty really is psychological and exists in the perpetual torment that results from your saying to yourself, ‘But how can it be like that?’ which is a reflection of uncontrolled but utterly vain desire to see it in terms of something familiar….Do not keep saying to yourself…‘But how can it be like that?’ because you will get…into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that [emphasis added].' (p. 123)"

 

[Constance]

I think the "coding problem" presented here is very interesting, but I don't think it is actually a problem. I think @Pharoah HCT offers a compelling account of how organisms and their environments have evolved together over time all the while maintaining a qualitative, reciprocal relationship. This so-called "mapping" problem evaporates when we realize the intimate, reciprocal relationship shared between the environment and the organisms existing not within, but as part of the environment.

Regarding the representational ground of consciousness and mind:

A coworker and I were commenting on another coworker of ours who happened to be wearing a costume that completely restricted her arms (today is 10/30). This led to me noting having read an essay by an amputee who had noted their hobby of running being dangerous. They had fallen on several occasions and instinctively "reached out their arm" to break their fall, but since the arm had been amputated, they had damaged their face.

My coworker noted that her daughter had been born without her right arm. She also loved to run but suffered from overheating due to the arm being unavailable to dissipate heat via sweating. Fascinating. In any case, my coworker went on to explain that her daughter had always felt the presence of a right arm despite the fact that she was born without it (phantom limb). This is just like the case noted by Metzinger and his PSM.

My coworker said that for example, when her daughter is driving, she will often try to grab the steering wheel with "her right arm." Her daughter also finds this baffling, she said. I told her about Metzinger's PSM theory, and she was very interested. Since this woman has never had a right arm and thus never used a right arm, we can't rely on that to explain the sensation of having a right arm.

@smcder linked me to an SEP article regarding problems with the representational approach to consciousness and mind. I think I need to read that. If anyone else knows of a succinct article that outlines problems with representationalism, I'd be interested in read that too. Also, it occurred to me that Robin Faichney's concept of "intentional information" is related but distinct from representationalism, but just how escapes me at the moment.

" . . . @smcder linked me to an SEP article regarding problems with the representational approach to consciousness and mind. I think I need to read that. If anyone else knows of a succinct article that outlines problems with representationalism, I'd be interested in read that too. Also, it occurred to me that Robin Faichney's concept of "intentional information" is related but distinct from representationalism, but just how escapes me at the moment."

I'm also interested in reading that article, Soupie. Do you have the link? I think we should try to nail down the objection of various consciousness researchers to standard applications of the concept of 'representation' in neuroscience and POM based in mainstream neuroscience.

 

[Soupie]

" . . . @smcder linked me to an SEP article regarding problems with the representational approach to consciousness and mind. I think I need to read that. If anyone else knows of a succinct article that outlines problems with representationalism, I'd be interested in read that too. Also, it occurred to me that Robin Faichney's concept of "intentional information" is related but distinct from representationalism, but just how escapes me at the moment."

I'm also interested in reading that article, Soupie. Do you have the link? I think we should try to nail down the objection of various consciousness researchers to standard applications of the concept of 'representation' in neuroscience and POM based in mainstream neuroscience.

Here is the SEP entry @smcder provided awhile ago: Representational Theories of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

However, I really recommend reading the "killing the observer" article as well, as it clears up much of the confusion created by the idea that we are observers of conscious experiences about the world. The article clarifies the position that we—phenomenal selves—are conscious experience.

 

[Soupie]

Thompson shows how the self is a changing process, not a static thing. When we are awake we identify with our body, but if we let our mind wander or daydream, we project a mentally imagined self into the remembered past or anticipated future. As we fall asleep, the impression of being a bounded self distinct from the world dissolves, but the self reappears in the dream state. If we have a lucid dream, we no longer identify only with the self within the dream. Our sense of self now includes our dreaming self, the "I" as dreamer. Finally, as we meditate--either in the waking state or in a lucid dream--we can observe whatever images or thoughts arise and how we tend to identify with them as "me." We can also experience sheer awareness itself, distinct from the changing contents that make up our image of the self.

I'd like to read this book as well, as Thompson has exhibited a firm grasp on the subject and presents his ideas so well. It seems he--especially with his affinity for Buddhist thought--focuses on the "process" nature of the self as well. I'm curious, however, as to the nature of the "we" he uses in the above paragraph. To my way of thinking, the "we" used here would be the "body self." The body (physical organism/system) is the observer/experiencer of what-is.

 

[Constance]

Here is the SEP entry @smcder provided awhile ago: Representational Theories of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

However, I really recommend reading the "killing the observer" article as well, as it clears up much of the confusion created by the idea that we are observers of conscious experiences about the world. The article clarifies the position that we—phenomenal selves—are conscious experience.

Thanks for that link, Soupie. I did read the "killing the observer" article, but I was not persuaded by it. I think our sense of individual 'selfhood' is an inescapable aspect of consciousness and hope to indicate why in a further post tonight or tomorrow. I've taken some notes but need to organize them before I post them.

 

[Constance]

I'd like to read this book as well, as Thompson has exhibited a firm grasp on the subject and presents his ideas so well. It seems he--especially with his affinity for Buddhist thought--focuses on the "process" nature of the self as well. I'm curious, however, as to the nature of the "we" he uses in the above paragraph. To my way of thinking, the "we" used here would be the "body self." The body (physical organism/system) is the observer/experiencer of what-is.

I'm going to focus on reading the Thompson book and also the Rowland book before anything else, and I hope you'll find time to read them both as well. I think we're coming to a point in this discussion where we can clarify the differences between our approaches to consciousness but also some fundamentally shared ideas about consciousness.

ps, I think by 'we' in the Thompson paragraphs [actually amazon's paragraphs describing the book] that I quoted and that you refer to above, Thompson is using 'we' simply as a plural pronoun to refer to all of us humans and the experiences we share in common. But I'll look back at those paragraphs to be sure since I haven't read them since I copied and posted them.

 

[Soupie]

It appears that there is a difference between Intentional models of consciousness and Representational models of consciousness. I'm not 100% sure what the difference is, but Intentional models seem to be broader.

To wit, Imperativism is an apparently new approach to consciousness, particularly pain and other homeostatic/body-related sensations, that falls under the Intentional model. Very, very interesting.

Imperativism: The Big Picture | The Brains Blog

http://www.manolomartinez.net/documents/Disgusting_Smells.pdf

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, can you comment on the extent to which the amazon reviewer of the Rowlands book I cited in this post is correct in describing Rowlands as holding on to a 'representational' theory of vision? I'm highlighting the paragraph at issue in blue below.

Here is a well-informed review of a book we should cite in this thread: Mark Rowlands, The New Science of Mind.

The review:

An Extensive Enterprise
By Stephen E. Robbins on August 14, 2013
4 of 4 people found this review helpful

This book [The New Science of the Mind], I must note right away, is truly for the philosophical elite and for the philosophical psychology folks, with the scales tipping heavily to the philosophical side. The work is an extensive and intensive effort to examine notions of embedded mind, embodied mind, enactive mind, extended mind, while arriving at the author's particular view of extended mind. A key component of this framework is "action on external structures [ e.g., the environment] that transforms the information they contain from merely present to available... " Characterizing positions nicely and lucidly, he arrives at a position he terms "amalgamated," combining the embodied and the extended views. In this effort he reviews the visual theories and work of Marrs, O'Regan and Noë, Vygotsky, and Gibson, each discussion clear and well done. Gibson's concept of the "optic array," Rowlands notes, qualifies as the "external structure" of information par excellence, while his emphasis on the organism's action to transform this structure, thus isolating invariants and making this information available also fits perfectly.

The extended mind thesis that Rowlands defends is that at least some mental processes extend into the organism's environment in that they are composed of actions performed on the world around the organism. This therefore extends the notion of cognition beyond the brain, in that the whole body is (or can be) involved. In this general conception, Rowlands reserves a role for the standard notion of representations current in cognitive science, and in this he differs explicitly from the view that Gibson denied such a construct in his view of the brain. In all this, he emphasizes that this is to be viewed as process, rather than cognitive "states." It is obvious that this thesis is not the version of extended mind, e.g., a panpsychic-like framework, that some might be looking for, in fact, from this perspective, the thesis seems very conservative. Yes, it is different from the pure centered-on-the-brain notion that is attributed to the Cartesian view, but it still almost becomes a question of just how could this be really that controversial? Further, it is very unclear just why this view is not already implemented in and furtherable in, robotic/connectionist architecture, in fact, in studying Rowlands' (very interesting) discussion of certain elements of connectionist architecture and the subsumption architectures of situated robotics, it seems that he views this to be the case. In fact, it was not clear to me, given the book, why such robots are not perfectly conscious?

The extended mind thesis that Rowlands might have arrived at would indeed be radical had he not ignored several major questions. The first is the problem of qualia, only obliquely approached in his examination of Nagel, but not come to grips with in terms of Chalmers. This problem is actually more general, for avoiding Chalmers' misleading emphasis on qualia, it is, at least in vision/audition, the problem of the origin of the image of the external world. How does this image arise, or get generated, or in general is it accounted for? If you are still holding, as Rowlands, that the brain employs representations, then you have the "coding" problem that the concept of representations involves. Three dots (...) can stand for an "S" in Morse code, or three tomatoes, or a stove. One must know the domain to which to map the code, and the brain would then, in effect, have to already know what the external world (the domain) looks like to use its "representational" code (for the neural-chemical code cannot look anything like the external world). If to solve this, you are relying surreptitiously on the external structure (or field) , say, the optic array, then at what scale of time are you conceiving this structure/array/field to exist - the scale of a "buzzing" fly in the field, a fly slowly flapping his wings like a heron, a fly as a vibrating ensemble of atoms, or what? If the external field is indeed holographic (as one could also construe the optic array) - a massive interference pattern - then it is un-imageable - at any scale of time. You cannot just assume the environment as a nice "external structure" that the brain uses - as though somehow the image of the external world as we know it already exists! Yet this is what is going on in Rowlands, or in O'Regan and Noë for that matter. Further, the external structure is not static, it is dynamically transforming with buzzing flies, falling leaves, rotating cubes. One does not need action from the body to "make the structure change." But now you open another set of problems, for now you need a theory of the basic "memory" that allows the brain to specify (or us to perceive) these transforming events - as extended events over time. It is a problem hidden currently under the notion of "temporal consciousness" that is equally a problem of qualia, in fact has greater primacy, for all perceived qualia extend over time.

This is where Rowlands goes wrong in holding that Gibson is compatible with representational models. Gibson was well aware of the problem of the origin of the external image of the world, and further, the difficulty with invariants defined only over time, for example form as defined only over flow fields. No static representations can capture this - no symbolic manipulation or connectionist architecture as I think Rowlands fails to see. An invariant defined over time cannot exist as a "bit" traveling along the nerves. This is why Gibson went to the notion that the brain is "resonating" (a time-extended process) to these invariants and in this resonance is "specific to" the environment. This "specific to" has been the problem, for how does this "specific to" actually explain the origin of the image of the external environment and at a certain scale of time? This brings us to the greatest philosopher of the extended mind, apparently unknown, despite Rowlands' attention to Heidegger (with another nice exposition), Husserl, Sartre, and others, and this is Bergson. Bergson, I have argued, presciently (and uniquely) using the essence of holography, fills in the missing piece of Gibson, but Bergson's mode of mind is indeed extended, for the relation and the difference between subject and object is not in terms of space, but of time. (See for example [Collapsing the Singularity: Bergson, Gibson and the Mythologies of Artificial Intelligence]) In this the brain is seen as an entirely different form of device, with a critical dynamics that is far from achievable by the connectionist or robotic or computer model. The neglect of Bergson in this embedded, embodied, enactive, extended literature - even if only to consider and reject his vision for hopefully solid reasons - is indeed unfortunate.

I could add more analytical objections for I see problems in the conception of cognition, the role of consciousness in cognition, the nature of the problem of memory (one can have no theory of the "storage" of experience when the problem of perception - the very origin of experience - is unresolved). However, the book, as I noted, is an extensive and intensive piece of thought, attacking effectively the Cartesian framework and making a case for a wider view of mind. Rowlands, obviously in tune with the state of various minds in his field, sees this as necessary, noting that his amalgamated (embodied/extended) vision is yet seen in these quarters as "outlandish." As such, the case needs to be made; there is just, imo, far more room to extend."

There are other helpful reviews at this amazon.com link:

http://www.amazon.com/dp/0262014556/?tag=rockoids-20

The beginning pages of Rowland's book at the amazon link summarize clearly the deeper issues concerning mind (and thus consciousness) to which recent neuroscience, studies of cognition, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology have brought us.

"This is where Rowlands goes wrong in holding that Gibson is compatible with representational models. Gibson was well aware of the problem of the origin of the external image of the world, and further, the difficulty with invariants defined only over time, for example form as defined only over flow fields. No static representations can capture this - no symbolic manipulation or connectionist architecture as I think Rowlands fails to see. An invariant defined over time cannot exist as a "bit" traveling along the nerves. This is why Gibson went to the notion that the brain is "resonating" (a time-extended process) to these invariants and in this resonance is "specific to" the environment. This "specific to" has been the problem, for how does this "specific to" actually explain the origin of the image of the external environment and at a certain scale of time? This brings us to the greatest philosopher of the extended mind, apparently unknown, despite Rowlands' attention to Heidegger (with another nice exposition), Husserl, Sartre, and others, and this is Bergson. Bergson, I have argued, presciently (and uniquely) using the essence of holography, fills in the missing piece of Gibson, but Bergson's mode of mind is indeed extended, for the relation and the difference between subject and object is not in terms of space, but of time. (See for example [Collapsing the Singularity: Bergson, Gibson and the Mythologies of Artificial Intelligence]) In this the brain is seen as an entirely different form of device, with a critical dynamics that is far from achievable by the connectionist or robotic or computer model. The neglect of Bergson in this embedded, embodied, enactive, extended literature - even if only to consider and reject his vision for hopefully solid reasons - is indeed unfortunate."

You've looked into vision and representation issues more deeply than the rest of us, so your responses to the reviewer's claim would be very helpful. Rowland himself begins his discussion of vision and representation within the introductory sample from his book on pg. 27ff and other places in the book where he discusses represention are searchable. Thanks.

 

[Pharoah]

It appears that there is a difference between Intentional models of consciousness and Representational models of consciousness. I'm not 100% sure what the difference is, but Intentional models seem to be broader.

To wit, Imperativism is an apparently new approach to consciousness, particularly pain and other homeostatic/body-related sensations, that falls under the Intentional model. Very, very interesting.

Imperativism: The Big Picture | The Brains Blog

http://www.manolomartinez.net/documents/Disgusting_Smells.pdf

You might also be interested in http://www.colinklein.org/papers/JointKleinMartinez.pdf
But, I disagre that pain demands action. When a young infant experiences pain, it only finds through learning that such pain can be avoided through action. I am of the view that in very young infant humans, the locus of pain is not known. A baby does not know it has arms and legs... it discovers them. When in pain, it flails.

 

[Pharoah]

Further to above comment #335, visual perception does have imperative characteristics. One's eyes are compelled to action in response to what is present in the field of view: my eyes are drawn to other people's eyes, movements, bright colourations and so on. If I were to suffer from multiple pain sources, I too would have my attention drawn to one over another and my actions would respond accordingly prioritising my attempts to relieve in order of priority.
Imperativism is a nonstarter surely...
Feel free to persuade me otherwise.

 

[Constance]

Further to above comment #335, visual perception does have imperative characteristics. One's eyes are compelled to action in response to what is present in the field of view: my eyes are drawn to other people's eyes, movements, bright colourations and so on.

It seems to me that attention itself is a form of action and reaction. Our attention is drawn outward, visually as well as audially, tactilely, in scent and in taste, and these five senses are not necessarily the total number of and types of senses we possess which collectively open us up to the world beyond ourselves, as well as drawing our attention inward to bodily events (e.g., sexual arousal, pain, the major event of childbirth, the 'let down' reflex of nursing mothers, and even the sense of peace that becomes prominent in listening to certain music, interacting with animals, walking into a greenhouse, hearing the voice of someone we love.

@Pharoah, let me know if that response makes no sense to you.

Imperativism is a nonstarter surely...
Feel free to persuade me otherwise.

It might just be the opener for some further useful observations and speculations. @Soupie, would you link further blogs in this series?

 

[Pharoah]

It seems to me that attention itself is a form of action and reaction. Our attention is drawn outward, visually as well as audially, tactilely, in scent and in taste, and these five senses are not necessarily the total number of and types of senses we possess which collectively open us up to the world beyond ourselves, as well as drawing our attention inward to bodily events (e.g., sexual arousal, pain, the major event of childbirth, the 'let down' reflex of nursing mothers, and even the sense of peace that becomes prominent in listening to certain music, interacting with animals, walking into a greenhouse, hearing the voice of someone we love.

@Pharoah, let me know if that response makes no sense to you.



It might just be the opener for some further useful observations and speculations. @Soupie, would you link further blogs in this series?

Yes, I think so...

 

[Soupie]

You might also be interested in http://www.colinklein.org/papers/JointKleinMartinez.pdf
But, I disagre that pain demands action. When a young infant experiences pain, it only finds through learning that such pain can be avoided through action. I am of the view that in very young infant humans, the locus of pain is not known. A baby does not know it has arms and legs... it discovers them. When in pain, it flails.

Hm, I don't follow. Isn't flailing an action?

Also, according to the Imperative model, pain is imperative and not indicative, thus pain wouldn't give us information about the state of the world (and our bodies) per se, but only serve to motivate us to action which might cause the pain to cease.

Thus, a baby need not "know" that its leg was damaged nor have learned to care for its leg; the feeling of pain would only motivate the baby to action(s) the might serve to cause the pain to cease; crying and flailing—which would lead a mother to intervene—would seem to be very adaptive actions motivated by the conscious experience of pain.

 

[Pharoah]

Hm, I don't follow. Isn't flailing an action?

Also, according to the Imperative model, pain is imperative and not indicative, thus pain wouldn't give us information about the state of the world (and our bodies) per se, but only serve to motivate us to action which might cause the pain to cease.

Thus, a baby need not "know" that its leg was damaged nor have learned to care for its leg; the feeling of pain would only motivate the baby to action(s) the might serve to cause the pain to cease; crying and flailing—which would lead a mother to intervene—would seem to be very adaptive actions motivated by the conscious experience of pain.

Hi @Soupie.
I think the point @Constance was making was that visual sense (for example) is 'attended to' and in being so, is imperative: attention (to aspects of a visual field) is action of a kind. This view suggests that there is no fundamental difference between visual sensation and pain sensation; vision is merely much more finely grained... maybe. We experience, we feel (etc), we attend to, we act.

Furthermore, I am not convinced by the argument that visual perception (for example) gives information about the state of the world but that pain does not. The notion that "visual perception provides information about the state of the world" is flawed: as I have argued, the world does not have independent (intrinsic) meaningful informational characteristics. (This is one of the problems with the orthodoxy on 'information'.) Therefore, to say pain does not give information about the state of the world does not make it an exception... in my view. It just clarifies, rather beautifully, what is wrong with the view that visual perception does give "information" about "the state of the world".