Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Constance]

The notion that "visual perception provides information about the state of the world" is flawed: as I have argued, the world does not have independent (intrinsic) meaningful informational characteristics.

I think that depends on whether we are assuming information to function always in toto in a closed system operating beneath the awareness of living organisms -- as a sub-experiential informing of an organism -- or whether we also recognize that information comes to us (and other organisms) moment by moment in experience: in every moment of bodily awareness and sensed awareness of what is going on around us in the moment in our environment.

The latter kind of 'information' -- experienced information -- cannot really be understood to be part of a sub rosa operation of 'nature' understood as a closed system. Experienced information depends on the presence of awareness, consciousness, present in particular times and places. Nature is not a closed system but an open one that evolves in temporality, just as we do. Our experience of the world is individual and momentary and cumulative and changes continually, as the weather does, for example.

 

[Constance]

Thus, a baby need not "know" that its leg was damaged nor have learned to care for its leg; the feeling of pain would only motivate the baby to action(s) the might serve to cause the pain to cease; crying and flailing—which would lead a mother to intervene—would seem to be very adaptive actions motivated by the conscious experience of pain.

I see what you're saying, and I think it goes beyond, deeper than, adaptation. The newborn human (and animal) comes into the world capable of expressing its needs immediately, without thought or language. It cries instinctively, prepared by nature to call out for attention to its needs, whether for nourishment or other comfort, as from loneliness or pain or even the chill of a wet diaper. The kitten that has somehow become separated from its mother cries out, and the mother responds immediately to that cry.

 

[Soupie]

Hi @Soupie.
I think the point @Constance was making was that visual sense (for example) is 'attended to' and in being so, is imperative: attention (to aspects of a visual field) is action of a kind. This view suggests that there is no fundamental difference between visual sensation and pain sensation; vision is merely much more finely grained... maybe. We experience, we feel (etc), we attend to, we act.

Furthermore, I am not convinced by the argument that visual perception (for example) gives information about the state of the world but that pain does not. The notion that "visual perception provides information about the state of the world" is flawed: as I have argued, the world does not have independent (intrinsic) meaningful informational characteristics. (This is one of the problems with the orthodoxy on 'information'.) Therefore, to say pain does not give information about the state of the world does not make it an exception... in my view. It just clarifies, rather beautifully, what is wrong with the view that visual perception does give "information" about "the state of the world".

I think you're overthinking the whole "information" notion. I've not encountered anyone in the literature who believes there are bits of information floating out there in the world that our brains somehow obtain and read like a computer program.

When one reads of the brain receiving "information" from the environment, it seems to be understood that one is referring to environmental energies that are (somehow) transduced by an organism's nervous system into meaning (aka information) (whether subpersonal or personal).

In other words, using the term "information" is simply shorthand for the above process (which isn't fully understood of course). I think it is understood in the mainstream that environmental energies themselves contain no intrinsic information/meaning. Information/meaning arises only through interaction, relationships, and informing.

 

[Randall]

I think you're overthinking the whole "information" notion. I've not encountered anyone in the literature who believes there are bits of information floating out there in the world that our brains somehow obtain and read like a computer program.

When one reads of the brain receiving "information" from the environment, it seems to be understood that one is referring to environmental energies that are (somehow) transduced by an organism's nervous system into meaning (aka information) (whether subpersonal or personal).

In other words, using the term "information" is simply shorthand for the above process (which isn't fully understood of course). I think it is understood in the mainstream that environmental energies themselves contain no intrinsic information/meaning. Information/meaning arises only through interaction, relationships, and informing.

That was extremely well put. Nice to see some solid rational thinking going on.

 

[Pharoah]

I think you're overthinking the whole "information" notion. I've not encountered anyone in the literature who believes there are bits of information floating out there in the world that our brains somehow obtain and read like a computer program.

When one reads of the brain receiving "information" from the environment, it seems to be understood that one is referring to environmental energies that are (somehow) transduced by an organism's nervous system into meaning (aka information) (whether subpersonal or personal).

In other words, using the term "information" is simply shorthand for the above process (which isn't fully understood of course). I think it is understood in the mainstream that environmental energies themselves contain no intrinsic information/meaning. Information/meaning arises only through interaction, relationships, and informing.

@Soupie Yes, that is a very good point. Perhaps you are right. This has occurred to me.
Nevertheless, I have been preparing a second paper submission on this and have done quite a bit of research... my conclusion is that information is not, harmlessly, understood in the manner you describe, but that meaningful information is attributed to objects.
Alkins ('Of sensory systems and the aboutness of mental states'—1996) provides a critique of the naturalists' stance arguing that their 'project as commonly conceived, rests upon an intuitive and seemingly banal view of what the senses do—that the senses function to inform the brain of what is going on "out there" in the external world and in ones own body—and that this "banal" view about sensory function is false...' (p. 337/8) She explains that the traditional view is that sensory signals correlate with some property in the world where 'the structure of the relevant relations among the external properties must be preserved in a systematic encoding of those relations;...' (p. 350).
I agree with Atkins.

Incidentally, I am not saying that people believe "there are bits of information floating out there in the world that our brains somehow obtain and read like a computer program." I think the arguments are very subtle and sophisticated.

 

[Constance]

Looking for links to Akins's papers I came across this discussion of the interpretation of her work:

Splendid philosopher of the week; Kathleen Akins

I'm interested in reading her papers (would appreciate any links), and also interested in the paper you're working on now Pharoah.

 

[Constance]

Here is Akins's website and links to some of her papers. Very interesting scholar.

Dr. Kathleen Akins | Publications

 

[Constance]

Akins is cited in this paragraph from SEP's article on 'The Philosophy of Neuroscience':

" . . . Philosophy of science and scientific epistemology are not the only areas where philosophers have lately urged the relevance of neuroscientific discoveries. Kathleen Akins (1996) argues that a “traditional” view of the senses underlies the variety of sophisticated “naturalistic” programs about intentionality. (She cites the Churchlands, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, and Kim Sterelny as examples, with extensive references.) Current neuroscientific understanding of the mechanisms and coding strategies implemented by sensory receptors shows that this traditional view is mistaken. The traditional view holds that sensory systems are “veridical” in at least three ways. (1) Each signal in the system correlates with a small range of properties in the external (to the body) environment. (2) The structure in the relevant relations between the external properties the receptors are sensitive to is preserved in the structure of the relations between the resulting sensory states. And (3) the sensory system reconstructs faithfully, without fictive additions or embellishments, the external events. Using recent neurobiological discoveries about response properties of thermal receptors in the skin as an illustration, Akins shows that sensory systems are “narcissistic” rather than “veridical.” All three traditional assumptions are violated. These neurobiological details and their philosophical implications open novel questions for the philosophy of perception and for the appropriate foundations for naturalistic projects about intentionality. Armed with the known neurophysiology of sensory receptors, for example, our “philosophy of perception” or of “perceptual intentionality” will no longer focus on the search for correlations between states of sensory systems and “veridically detected” external properties. This traditional philosophical (and scientific!) project rests upon a mistaken “veridical” view of the senses. Neuroscientific knowledge of sensory receptor activity also shows that sensory experience does not serve the naturalist well as a “simple paradigm case” of an intentional relation between representation and world. Once again, available scientific detail shows the naivity of some traditional philosophical projects."

The Philosophy of Neuroscience (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Constance]

Here is a link to a pdf of Akins's paper "Of Sensory Systems and the 'Aboutness' of Mental States" ~~~

http://www.sfu.ca/~kathleea/docs/SensorySystems.pdf

 

[Pharoah]

I think the SEP reference to Atkins is the same one that I referenced.
Thanks for the link to her website

 

[Constance]

Hi Pharoah. I just finished the paper you recommended. Akins is brilliant, and wonderfully articulate. I can see why her thinking is of great interest to you given your hierarchical construct theory. I'm looking forward to reading your next paper.

 

[Constance]

ps, somewhere along the way today in my search regarding her I gained the impression that she has a book in the offing. Will look for more information.

 

[Constance]

Linked at her website, this is the paper I want to read next:

"A Bat Without Qualities", in Consciousness, M. Davies and G. Humphreys eds. (Oxford: Blackwells), pp. 258-73, 1993.A Bat Without Qualities

ABSTRACT. Thomas Nagel has claimed, famously, that we could never understand the point of view, the perceptual experience, of the bat, even if we knew all there was to know about the neurophysiology and behaviour of the bat. Nagel offers a number of reasons why this should be but here I look at the intuitive pull that Nagel’s argument exerts upon us. Intuitively, it is hard to see how any description—of neurophysiological states, behaviors or even one’s own first person recounting of perceptual event—could convey the very feel of a event described, at least not without having experienced the same event oneself. Yet if we cannot convey to others even very simple qualitative states There is a difference between the qualitative and the representational/neurophysiological aspects of experience, and science can describe only the latter. This paper tries to up-end the assumption that we have a grasp of the difference between the representational and qualitative aspects of experience. Given very simple perceptual situations, e.g. hearing middle C or seeing a red patch of light on a white wall, such a distinction seems imaginable. Given a more complex perceptual scene, however, we can neither ‘gesture towards’ nor explain what it would be to have a perceptual experience as non-intentional or ‘purely qualitative’. Our intuition that we can so separate our perceptual experience into two aspects is illusory—and hence there is little reason to think that we know what would and would not be explained if we had extensive neurophysiological/behavioural/functional knowledge.

{The offprint is turned 45 degrees (or is it 90?) to the right. It will need to be printed to be read to prevent a serious crick in the neck.}

 

[William Strathmann]

{The offprint is turned 45 degrees (or is it 90?) to the right. It will need to be printed to be read to prevent a serious crick in the neck.}

Hi Constance,
When you open the PDF with Adobe Reader, click "View" on the toolbar, click "Rotate View" on the dropdown menu, then click "Counterclockwise" -- works for me.

 

[Pharoah]

Linked at her website, this is the paper I want to read next:

"A Bat Without Qualities", in Consciousness, M. Davies and G. Humphreys eds. (Oxford: Blackwells), pp. 258-73, 1993.A Bat Without Qualities

ABSTRACT. Thomas Nagel has claimed, famously, that we could never understand the point of view, the perceptual experience, of the bat, even if we knew all there was to know about the neurophysiology and behaviour of the bat. Nagel offers a number of reasons why this should be but here I look at the intuitive pull that Nagel’s argument exerts upon us. Intuitively, it is hard to see how any description—of neurophysiological states, behaviors or even one’s own first person recounting of perceptual event—could convey the very feel of a event described, at least not without having experienced the same event oneself. Yet if we cannot convey to others even very simple qualitative states There is a difference between the qualitative and the representational/neurophysiological aspects of experience, and science can describe only the latter. This paper tries to up-end the assumption that we have a grasp of the difference between the representational and qualitative aspects of experience. Given very simple perceptual situations, e.g. hearing middle C or seeing a red patch of light on a white wall, such a distinction seems imaginable. Given a more complex perceptual scene, however, we can neither ‘gesture towards’ nor explain what it would be to have a perceptual experience as non-intentional or ‘purely qualitative’. Our intuition that we can so separate our perceptual experience into two aspects is illusory—and hence there is little reason to think that we know what would and would not be explained if we had extensive neurophysiological/behavioural/functional knowledge.

{The offprint is turned 45 degrees (or is it 90?) to the right. It will need to be printed to be read to prevent a serious crick in the neck.}

The above makes perfect sense to me.
I have always thought that it is no easier knowing WIIL to be another human than it is knowing WIIL to be a bat. It is illusory to think we can know WIIL to be another human with any true degree of accuracy. Such imaginings are founded on our own experience and our communications with others, which we then extend through the application of certain experiential assumptions.
After a cataracts operation, my mother-in-law was horrified to find that, prior to the operation, she had been wearing an item she saw as blue but which turned out to be purple post operation. If one were to ask her 30 years earlier, what will it be like to be 80, she would image WIIL given certain assumptions... but would she image that blue would look purple? I doubt it. The point being, it is very difficult to know WIIL to be anything other that what is current in one's self.
Of course, the degree of difference would be more marked in a bat, but I don't think the degree of difference is pertinent. WIIL is deeply personal and time specific. I have argued that WIIL is a conflation of notions about WIIL generally and WIIL specifically i.e. WIIL to be human is not the same question as What It Is Actually Like to be a particular person X. Similarly, WIIL to be a bat is conflated with the idea of WIIL to be a specific bat.

 

[Pharoah]

Hi Constance,
When you open the PDF with Adobe Reader, click "View" on the toolbar, click "Rotate View" on the dropdown menu, then click "Counterclockwise" -- works for me.

Or read it lying down in bed... (with a mug of hot chocolate)

 

[Constance]

I think you're overthinking the whole "information" notion. I've not encountered anyone in the literature who believes there are bits of information floating out there in the world that our brains somehow obtain and read like a computer program.

Perhaps not at this point, but my impression is that the idea of 'information' entertained in computational neuroscience has been that obscure until not too long ago. It was the computationalists and the AI fantasists who first brought the problem of consciousness to the foreground in contemporary thought when they imagined that they could produce consciousness in robots and ran into a wall.

When one reads of the brain receiving "information" from the environment, it seems to be understood that one is referring to environmental energies that are (somehow) transduced by an organism's nervous system into meaning (aka information) (whether subpersonal or personal)

Kathleen Akins contributes a great deal to overcoming that vague superstition..

In other words, using the term "information" is simply shorthand for the above process (which isn't fully understood of course).

We've recently read critiques of theories based on a lack of clarity and definition in the use of the term 'information' in science and in philosophy that is heavily influenced by physical and neurological science. Those critiques suggested to me that the ambiguity with which the term is used has not been resolved for the majority of neuroscientists and neurophilosophers.

I think it is understood in the mainstream that environmental energies themselves contain no intrinsic information/meaning. Information/meaning arises only through interaction, relationships, and informing.

Tononi was only beginning to realize that in his third or fourth version of IIT. No doubt he's not alone among neuroscientists in now recognizing the complexity of the relationship of consciousness to the physical world. It seems to me that so far Akins has the best grasp of the difference between how nature informs the body [largely unconsciously] and how conscious interactions with, and reflections on, things in the physical world write a different kind of script, taking 'reality' to a higher level, an experienced and thought level, that Akins properly marvels at.

I'm not sure what you mean by "environmental energies" in that last paragraph. Can you clarify? It seems to me that individuals living (necessarily) in local environments are continually informed consciously by encountering things and processes present in their environment. At the same time, consciousness is always embodied, and its embodiment constitutes another -- and an individual – environment which also affects [though without the individual’s conscious awareness of these affects] what is felt, sensed, and thought through the body and the mind in higher species. Akins recognized the immense intricacy of how our bodies have been fitted for life in the natural world over eons of evolution and almost silently do the job of keeping us upright and alert. There is enormous complexity in that subject in itself, but still more daunting complexity is involved, as Akins indicates, in accounting for our capacity to live and think within the 'aboutness' of our experienced reality. The last paragraph of her paper "Of Sensory Systems and the 'Aboutness' of Mental States" sums up her thinking most succinctly.

http://www.sfu.ca/~kathleea/docs/SensorySystems.pdf[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]

 

[Soupie]

@Constance

Re: environmental energies

I just mean all the various stimuli that organisms encounter in their environments; while these stimuli take many forms, they can all be reduced to energy in some form.

Re: Akins.

I'm very interested to read her work. I'm under no illusion that our conscious perceptions, the phenomenal landscape we all experience, somehow accurately, exhaustively represent (reveal) nature.

While I believe we, as physical organisms, directly experience the physical world, I do not entertain the notion that our conscious perceptions of the world reflect it as it truly is.

In a way, I think of conscious perception as a facade on the true depth and complexity of nature. What we experience of the world is merely a map/model of a much richer, deeper reality that we can only know conceptually, not experientially.

 

[Constance]

I haven't read this yet, am about to. It's a paper I'd saved in my philosophy links, which I just came across tonight.

The Enigma of Reversibility and the Genesis of Sense in Merleau-Ponty | David Morris - Academia.edu

 

[Constance]

ps, do read the paper I linked on MP. When you get to page 14, righthand column, you will find MP asking the same question Akins asks at the conclusion of her paper "Of Sensory Systems and the 'Aboutness' of Mental States." The paper on MP will provide clarification of how his philosophy, going beyond other phenomenological philosophy, attempts to answer that question.