Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Sorry about the delay in responding on this. I've been busy with other things. I don't have you on ignore or anything like that. I'll try to send you a conversation starter and see if it works from my end.
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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6
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Soupie
Paranormal Adept
I finally had an opportunity to read this paper. Very good. Some very interesting ideas presented in this paper. Thanks for sharing!
A page or two ago I cited a significant book relevant to our recent discussions here:
TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THINKING
Since then I located via academia.edu the introduction to a recent issue of a journal titled HumanaMente exploring Tomasello's and others' interdisciplinary research and emerging theory. Here is the link:
Humanamente 24 - Pointing: Where embodied cognition meets the symbolic mind
The issue as a whole is entitled Pointing: Where embodied cognition meets the symbolic mind. Following is an extract from the introduction to the issue by the editor of the issue, Massimiliano L. Cappuccio, titled "Pointing: A Gesture That Makes Us Special?" This introductory article is impressive in my view, and I think the theory it expounds can be very useful to us in bridging the gap that still separates our approaches in this thread. I hope this extract interests you and
@Pharoah and that you will both read the article as a whole and respond to it.
“. . . the key issues disclosed by pointing lay along the frontiers of the very capability of shared representations and public knowledge, a territory that ranges beyond the jurisdiction of any single disciplinary field. Single scientific disciplines inhabit this territory and flourish on it, but can neither own it nor see its borders. Only a nomadic philosophical approach to science, i.e. an approach that is not at home in any of these disciplines but
programmatically wanders through all of them, can help reach the extreme
frontiers of this investigation. Indeed, the tools for a genealogical investigation on the capability for shared representation and public knowledge has often been prompted by theoretical approaches (like the phenomenologically and empirically informed philosophies of mind) that aim to trace the cognitive pre-conditions of intersubjectivity back into the biological and social history of our most ancient epistemic practices. In fact, whether the gesture of pointing springs from an innate predisposition or not it is always through a network of acquired habits that its particular uses were shaped in local contexts: through an amazingly convoluted history in which natural propensities and socio-cultural conventions intertwined and redefined one another.
Genealogic philosophy can provide only the drive and some of the words to
tell this story, but not the whole story itself. Other disciplines will tell some
parts or some versions of it: developmental psychology, comparative neurosciences, cognitive anthropology and archaeology of mind, primatology and animal cognition, linguistics, semiotics, and analytical philosophy of mind.
In consideration of this plurality of narratives, integration of conceptual analysis, phenomenological description, and empirical investigation becomes not only useful, but indispensable, also from a strictly philosophical point of view. Integration is not an attempt to supplement or corroborate an old
metaphysical agenda with extra-philosophical contents and new methods; integration is itself intrinsically philosophical and productive of a new intellectual awareness, in so far as it involves deep excavations into the ground of the primitive notions assumed by our disciplines, including philosophy itself, and the recognition that these notions come from an obscure abyss of pre-comprehension. Not simply because the genealogy of our concepts is always rooted in a tremendously remote past and eventually leads to many fathers, some of whom might turn to be very different from us (and even pre-human) but also because the meaning of our epistemic practices is silently buried within our every day linguistic games, a medium that is transparent to those who participate in these games without examining them philosophically.
Why is pointing so important for a non-metaphysical rediscovery of our originally embodied, intimately social, and historically situated practices of knowledge? This gesture, the indexical gesture par excellence, is crucial for its transitional, liminal value: it represents a defining acquisition in the development of higher-order, typically human, intellectual capabilities (e.g., collective symbolic imagery) and, at the same time, it relies on quasi-automatic cognitive mechanisms for coordinating visual stimulation and motor execution that are relatively basic and very common across animals species (e.g., gaze following, see Shepherd 2010). This ambivalence is clearly shown by the fact that, while it is the prototypical bodily vehicle of joint attention, the appearance of pointing also predicts the emergence of advanced forms of social cognition, more disembodied and reflective in character, possibly linked to altruistic cooperation (Tomasello 2009), abstract categorization, and – indirectly -- sophisticated social experiences, like mutual recognition (in a strong dialectical sense, cf. Ikaheimo 2010) and public validation. Pointing’s key role in the acquisition of new forms of intelligence raises important issues about both the advent of joint attention in phylogenesis and its role in the evolution of the earliest forms of referential, proto-cultural, and linguistic activity: for example, primatologists investigate whether the declarative function of
pointing is human-specific or not (again see the contributions of Gontier,Moore, and Sultanescu & Andrews); developmental psychologists ask when the earliest instances of pointing come about, and if they imply some pre-linguistic form of mindreading (Sparaci); in cognitive semiotics, it is hotly debated whether pointing’s evolution may have scaffolded non-natural codes of communication for symbolic referencing (Olney).
Arising from the background of these ongoing debates, but hesitating to find a precise position in them, this special issue of Humanamente advances across three theoretical axes, representing the general questions that our collective work addresses. . . . ."
TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THINKING
Since then I located via academia.edu the introduction to a recent issue of a journal titled HumanaMente exploring Tomasello's and others' interdisciplinary research and emerging theory. Here is the link:
Humanamente 24 - Pointing: Where embodied cognition meets the symbolic mind
The issue as a whole is entitled Pointing: Where embodied cognition meets the symbolic mind. Following is an extract from the introduction to the issue by the editor of the issue, Massimiliano L. Cappuccio, titled "Pointing: A Gesture That Makes Us Special?" This introductory article is impressive in my view, and I think the theory it expounds can be very useful to us in bridging the gap that still separates our approaches in this thread. I hope this extract interests you and
@Pharoah and that you will both read the article as a whole and respond to it.
“. . . the key issues disclosed by pointing lay along the frontiers of the very capability of shared representations and public knowledge, a territory that ranges beyond the jurisdiction of any single disciplinary field. Single scientific disciplines inhabit this territory and flourish on it, but can neither own it nor see its borders. Only a nomadic philosophical approach to science, i.e. an approach that is not at home in any of these disciplines but
programmatically wanders through all of them, can help reach the extreme
frontiers of this investigation. Indeed, the tools for a genealogical investigation on the capability for shared representation and public knowledge has often been prompted by theoretical approaches (like the phenomenologically and empirically informed philosophies of mind) that aim to trace the cognitive pre-conditions of intersubjectivity back into the biological and social history of our most ancient epistemic practices. In fact, whether the gesture of pointing springs from an innate predisposition or not it is always through a network of acquired habits that its particular uses were shaped in local contexts: through an amazingly convoluted history in which natural propensities and socio-cultural conventions intertwined and redefined one another.
Genealogic philosophy can provide only the drive and some of the words to
tell this story, but not the whole story itself. Other disciplines will tell some
parts or some versions of it: developmental psychology, comparative neurosciences, cognitive anthropology and archaeology of mind, primatology and animal cognition, linguistics, semiotics, and analytical philosophy of mind.
In consideration of this plurality of narratives, integration of conceptual analysis, phenomenological description, and empirical investigation becomes not only useful, but indispensable, also from a strictly philosophical point of view. Integration is not an attempt to supplement or corroborate an old
metaphysical agenda with extra-philosophical contents and new methods; integration is itself intrinsically philosophical and productive of a new intellectual awareness, in so far as it involves deep excavations into the ground of the primitive notions assumed by our disciplines, including philosophy itself, and the recognition that these notions come from an obscure abyss of pre-comprehension. Not simply because the genealogy of our concepts is always rooted in a tremendously remote past and eventually leads to many fathers, some of whom might turn to be very different from us (and even pre-human) but also because the meaning of our epistemic practices is silently buried within our every day linguistic games, a medium that is transparent to those who participate in these games without examining them philosophically.
Why is pointing so important for a non-metaphysical rediscovery of our originally embodied, intimately social, and historically situated practices of knowledge? This gesture, the indexical gesture par excellence, is crucial for its transitional, liminal value: it represents a defining acquisition in the development of higher-order, typically human, intellectual capabilities (e.g., collective symbolic imagery) and, at the same time, it relies on quasi-automatic cognitive mechanisms for coordinating visual stimulation and motor execution that are relatively basic and very common across animals species (e.g., gaze following, see Shepherd 2010). This ambivalence is clearly shown by the fact that, while it is the prototypical bodily vehicle of joint attention, the appearance of pointing also predicts the emergence of advanced forms of social cognition, more disembodied and reflective in character, possibly linked to altruistic cooperation (Tomasello 2009), abstract categorization, and – indirectly -- sophisticated social experiences, like mutual recognition (in a strong dialectical sense, cf. Ikaheimo 2010) and public validation. Pointing’s key role in the acquisition of new forms of intelligence raises important issues about both the advent of joint attention in phylogenesis and its role in the evolution of the earliest forms of referential, proto-cultural, and linguistic activity: for example, primatologists investigate whether the declarative function of
pointing is human-specific or not (again see the contributions of Gontier,Moore, and Sultanescu & Andrews); developmental psychologists ask when the earliest instances of pointing come about, and if they imply some pre-linguistic form of mindreading (Sparaci); in cognitive semiotics, it is hotly debated whether pointing’s evolution may have scaffolded non-natural codes of communication for symbolic referencing (Olney).
Arising from the background of these ongoing debates, but hesitating to find a precise position in them, this special issue of Humanamente advances across three theoretical axes, representing the general questions that our collective work addresses. . . . ."
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Soupie
Paranormal Adept
The following is one of the most expansive and lucid papers on conscious experience I've read. The author is Ralf-Peter Behrendt, who has a trio of equally expansive books on the topic of mind and behavior. One of which has a favorable review from Jaak Panksepp.
The following paper links together the integrative process of episodic memory formation and the phenomenon of conscious experience.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3667233/pdf/fpsyg-04-00304.pdf
"If an instance of conscious experience of the seemingly objective world around us could be regarded as a newly formed event memory, much as an instance of mental imagery has the content of a retrieved event memory, and if, therefore, the stream of conscious experience could be seen as evidence for ongoing formation of event memories that are linked into episodic memory sequences, then unitary conscious experience could be defined as a symbolic representation of the pattern of hippocampal neuronal firing that encodes an event memory – a theoretical stance that may shed light into the mind-body and binding problems in consciousness research. Exceedingly detailed symbols that describe patterns of activity rapidly self-organizing, at each cycle of the θ rhythm, in the hippocampus are instances of unitary conscious experience that jointly constitute the stream of consciousness. ...
Cognitive-neuroscience theories of consciousness suggest that consciousness arises from stable patterns of activation in widely distributed brain areas. Synchrony and resonance between distributed networks that are activated above threshold would “bind” different perceptual features into a unitary conscious experience (reviewed in Atkinson et al., 2000). Conscious experience, as opposed to unconscious processing, of external stimuli has indeed been associated with synchronized neuronal activity across widely distributed neocortical areas, including parietal areas (Palva et al., 2005; Melloni et al., 2007). The question remains as to how the information content of consciousness can be derived from distributed neocortical modules that are specialized for processing stimuli in relation to functions of attention, working memory, and action disposition or preparation; and that, in posterior parietal areas, encode stimuli in egocentric, action-oriented frames of reference (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Andersen and Buneo, 2002), whereas, consciously, stimuli are perceived in an allocentric frame of reference, that is, in the external context of space and time.
The hippocampus is concerned with continuously recording attended experience, forming memories of events as they happen in their spatiotemporal context (Burgess et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003; Kubik et al., 2007) and linking event codes into episodic memories, that is, “sequences of events that unfold over time and space” (Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2005). The hippocampus also plays a critical role in episodic memory recall – a function that is closely related to mental imagery or internal simulation of goals or outcomes (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). If we were to argue that episodic memory formation is similarly closely related to conscious experience of the seemingly external world, then the neural mechanism underlying episodic memory functions should be closely related, if not identical, to the neural mechanism underpinning consciousness. The hippocampus would “bind” consciousness in as much as it is acting to bind and encode episodic (declarative) memories. The formation of event memories involves the integration of object information and spatiotemporal information into a unique representation through processes of pattern separation and completion in the hippocampus, especially the dentate gyrus and hippocampal region CA3 (Kesner, 2007; Rolls, 2007). Neocortical processes representing features of objects and their external context converge onto a single pattern of neuronal activity rapidly emerging in region CA3. It is proposed that patterns of activity forming in the autoassociation network of CA3 at each cycle of the local θ rhythm encode attended experience and have the informational content of objects or events embedded in an allocentric context – the informational content of unitary conscious experience. ..."
The author/article also discusses how affectivity is integrated into the formation of episodic memories and thus conscious experience.
It's a very robust theory, the best I've come across so far.
Related: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4256084/pdf/pcbi.1003982.pdf
"The hippocampal formation is a key structure for memory function in the brain. The functional anatomy of the brain suggests that the hippocampus may be a convergence zone, as it receives polysensory input from distributed association areas throughout the neocortex. However, recent quantitative graph-theoretic analyses of the static large-scale connectome have failed to demonstrate the centrality of the hippocampus; in the context of the whole brain, the hippocampus is not among the most connected or reachable nodes. Here we show that when communication dynamics are taken into account, the hippocampus is a key hub in the connectome. Using a novel computational model, we demonstrate that large-scale brain network topology is organized to funnel and concentrate information flow in the hippocampus, supporting the long-standing hypothesis that this region acts as a critical convergence zone. Our results indicate that the functional capacity of the hippocampus is shaped by its embedding in the large-scale connectome. ...
The hippocampal formation is among the most studied areas of the brain. Along with adjacent cortical structures, such as the entorhinal, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices, the hippo- campus is thought to facilitate memory function, particularly the initial encoding of memories [1–4]. Lesion studies in various model organisms and in humans, as well as functional neuroim- aging studies, have consistently found that the hippocampal formation appears specialized for forming conjunctions between arbitrarily different external events.
The functional anatomy of the brain supports the notion that the hippocampus may be a central structure that serves to bind together information from distributed sites in neocortex to represent a memory. Sensory information converges upon the hippocampus via multisynaptic projections, such that all fields of the hippocampus receive polysensory input from association
areas of the neocortex, via perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices. ..."
The following paper links together the integrative process of episodic memory formation and the phenomenon of conscious experience.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3667233/pdf/fpsyg-04-00304.pdf
"If an instance of conscious experience of the seemingly objective world around us could be regarded as a newly formed event memory, much as an instance of mental imagery has the content of a retrieved event memory, and if, therefore, the stream of conscious experience could be seen as evidence for ongoing formation of event memories that are linked into episodic memory sequences, then unitary conscious experience could be defined as a symbolic representation of the pattern of hippocampal neuronal firing that encodes an event memory – a theoretical stance that may shed light into the mind-body and binding problems in consciousness research. Exceedingly detailed symbols that describe patterns of activity rapidly self-organizing, at each cycle of the θ rhythm, in the hippocampus are instances of unitary conscious experience that jointly constitute the stream of consciousness. ...
Cognitive-neuroscience theories of consciousness suggest that consciousness arises from stable patterns of activation in widely distributed brain areas. Synchrony and resonance between distributed networks that are activated above threshold would “bind” different perceptual features into a unitary conscious experience (reviewed in Atkinson et al., 2000). Conscious experience, as opposed to unconscious processing, of external stimuli has indeed been associated with synchronized neuronal activity across widely distributed neocortical areas, including parietal areas (Palva et al., 2005; Melloni et al., 2007). The question remains as to how the information content of consciousness can be derived from distributed neocortical modules that are specialized for processing stimuli in relation to functions of attention, working memory, and action disposition or preparation; and that, in posterior parietal areas, encode stimuli in egocentric, action-oriented frames of reference (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Andersen and Buneo, 2002), whereas, consciously, stimuli are perceived in an allocentric frame of reference, that is, in the external context of space and time.
The hippocampus is concerned with continuously recording attended experience, forming memories of events as they happen in their spatiotemporal context (Burgess et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003; Kubik et al., 2007) and linking event codes into episodic memories, that is, “sequences of events that unfold over time and space” (Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2005). The hippocampus also plays a critical role in episodic memory recall – a function that is closely related to mental imagery or internal simulation of goals or outcomes (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). If we were to argue that episodic memory formation is similarly closely related to conscious experience of the seemingly external world, then the neural mechanism underlying episodic memory functions should be closely related, if not identical, to the neural mechanism underpinning consciousness. The hippocampus would “bind” consciousness in as much as it is acting to bind and encode episodic (declarative) memories. The formation of event memories involves the integration of object information and spatiotemporal information into a unique representation through processes of pattern separation and completion in the hippocampus, especially the dentate gyrus and hippocampal region CA3 (Kesner, 2007; Rolls, 2007). Neocortical processes representing features of objects and their external context converge onto a single pattern of neuronal activity rapidly emerging in region CA3. It is proposed that patterns of activity forming in the autoassociation network of CA3 at each cycle of the local θ rhythm encode attended experience and have the informational content of objects or events embedded in an allocentric context – the informational content of unitary conscious experience. ..."
The author/article also discusses how affectivity is integrated into the formation of episodic memories and thus conscious experience.
It's a very robust theory, the best I've come across so far.
Related: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4256084/pdf/pcbi.1003982.pdf
"The hippocampal formation is a key structure for memory function in the brain. The functional anatomy of the brain suggests that the hippocampus may be a convergence zone, as it receives polysensory input from distributed association areas throughout the neocortex. However, recent quantitative graph-theoretic analyses of the static large-scale connectome have failed to demonstrate the centrality of the hippocampus; in the context of the whole brain, the hippocampus is not among the most connected or reachable nodes. Here we show that when communication dynamics are taken into account, the hippocampus is a key hub in the connectome. Using a novel computational model, we demonstrate that large-scale brain network topology is organized to funnel and concentrate information flow in the hippocampus, supporting the long-standing hypothesis that this region acts as a critical convergence zone. Our results indicate that the functional capacity of the hippocampus is shaped by its embedding in the large-scale connectome. ...
The hippocampal formation is among the most studied areas of the brain. Along with adjacent cortical structures, such as the entorhinal, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices, the hippo- campus is thought to facilitate memory function, particularly the initial encoding of memories [1–4]. Lesion studies in various model organisms and in humans, as well as functional neuroim- aging studies, have consistently found that the hippocampal formation appears specialized for forming conjunctions between arbitrarily different external events.
The functional anatomy of the brain supports the notion that the hippocampus may be a central structure that serves to bind together information from distributed sites in neocortex to represent a memory. Sensory information converges upon the hippocampus via multisynaptic projections, such that all fields of the hippocampus receive polysensory input from association
areas of the neocortex, via perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices. ..."
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Soupie
Paranormal Adept
What specifically about this model do you find dubious?
It's what I find missing in most brain/information models for consciousness -- recognition of the felt level of experience that motivates behavior of all kinds, the affectivity (identified by Panksepp and understood in phenomenology) stimulating the motivation and the effort to perceive that which impinges on and exists beyond the organism, the animal, the 'self'.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
I see.
You appear to be looking for a model that explains how consciousness might have a causal influence on the body.
Terms like causality and emergence are very murky.
For my own part, it seems that consciousness emerges from living organisms. Specifically, I believe that consciousness emerges from certain neural processes. The content of consciousness derives from the entire organism, but actual conscious experience (what it's like) emerges from specific neural processes.
Conscious experience is not a physical substance that the body produces like blood, phlegm, or sperm. Thus, although conscious experience emerges from neurophysiological processes, the relationship of mind and body is quite different from, say, the relationship of body and blood.
Thus, I don't believe mind and body share a causal relationship in the same sense as body and blood share a causal relationship.
Thus, I think you will fail in your effort to discover a model of consciousness which explains how conscious experience "causes" behavior.
There is a relationship between mind and body, but it is not causal.
I think the paper we read recently captures this well, The Semiotic Hierarchy.
Ron Away
Paranormal Adept
Constance,Soupie and other regular contributors to this thread I wonder if you could help.I've dipped into this subject on here and found it fascinating if rather beyond my meagre intellect.Is there anything you could recommend for me to read as a complete novice that may put me on the path of at least understanding some of what you discuss.
Thanks in anticipation Ron.
Thanks in anticipation Ron.
I'm not looking for a scientific "model" to 'explain' how consciousness develops in the evolution of living organisms. {That's work in progress in many disciplines, which will have to work together to arrive at understanding how consciousness evolves.} But I think it's clear that consciousness does evolve in the evolution of species. Nor am I looking for a "model" of how protoconsciousness and consciousness influence the body causally. I don't think the two can be separated. The body itself is already conscious in our and most other living species. Panksepp's term 'affectivity' refers to the earliest awakenings of protoconsciousness in primordial organisms that lack neurons and possess bodily sense(s) not yet understood, and these primitive organisms give way over the evolution of species to more complex species with increasing sensitivity to and awareness of their situatedness of in an environment, a 'world'. Consciousness is awakened gradually by the worlds (qua environments) in which all species sense themselves to exist. Consciousness and mind are not divided from the world but nurtured by it and also challenged by it. World and consciousness/mind are not divisible; they arise together in experience, which begins in the affectivity of species of life. Awareness of being is the seed from which consciousness develops.
Yes. We're trying in our time to get over the assumption that every effect we experience or discern in the world has an identifiable hard and fast cause, a notion left over from the mechanical conception of nature and life, which is dying a slow death.
I know that is your approach, but 'emergence' is just a place-holder for a detailed understanding yet to come of the complexity of processes evolved in nature, consciousness, and mind. And I'm still hoping to hear how 'emergence from neural processes' can provide a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
Again, I'm not looking for the kind of model you're hoping to find. And 'behavior' results from a variety of influences including protoconsciousness and consciousness.
Again, I'm not seeking the kind of linear 'causal' relationship you're seeking.
Captures what well? It was an interesting paper but I posted links to several other sources that I think improve on it.
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Hi Ron, and welcome. I'll think about a source (a book or a website) that might serve as a helpful introduction to consciousness studies. I'll also ask Steve, one of our members who is on a hiatus right now, for suggestions. I'm very glad you're interested in this subject.
Ron Away
Paranormal Adept
Thank you very much for your quick reply.I look forward to whatever you recommend.As I say I find it fascinating if a little bewildering.
Pharoah
Paranormal Adept
Hi Ron. Consciousness studies is a big topic. imo it is very much about exploring the area that interests you and then extending your interests and expertise from there.
Start here:
Online papers on consciousness
and see where your interest takes you.
Ron Away
Paranormal Adept
Much appreciated Pharoah.Will dive into it this weekend.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
I am planning to post 4-5 brief papers I've read over the past 2 years that have been most helpful for me in "understanding" this topic. I hope to post them by weeks end. Perhaps you'd find them helpful too.
Ron Away
Paranormal Adept
Cheers Soupie.
I think the most helpful paper at first might be David Chalmers's paper on the 'hard problem' of consciousness. You'll find it linked in the philpapers site that @Pharoah cited above. Search under Chalmers's name and it should come up in list of his works.
@Ron Away, here's a direct link to the Chalmers paper I recommended, entitled "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness." I thought the 'hard problem' was in the title but it's not and it would thus be hard to find in the list of his papers at the philpapers link @Pharoah provided:
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Ron Away
Paranormal Adept
Thanks Constance.
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