Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Soupie]

Okay, so I have a few more than 4-5 articles. In any case, here is a collection of articles I've read over the past several months that have helped frame the concept of consciousness and the questions it raises for us.

As @Pharoah said, the topic of consciousness is wide ranging. Thus, the articles I've found most helpful may not be of much interest to others. The articles are roughly grouped by topic.

Framing the Concept of Consciousness

 

[Soupie]

Exploring the Concept of Consciousness

 

[Soupie]

Neurophysiological Framing of Consciousness

 

[Soupie]

Pre-Theoretic Models/Approaches to Consciousness

 

[Ron Away]

Thanks for your help Soupie.I've got a break coming up that will give me plenty time for some reading.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie @Constance @smcder @ufology
Without a shadow of a doubt this would not have happened without the critical input I have received here over the past months. On the strength of a 500 word submission:

"Thank you for your abstract submission for the upcoming The Science of Consciousness Conference in Tucson Arizona,April 25-30, 2016. We received well over 500 abstracts, and the selection process was very difficult. We are pleased to inform you that yours has been accepted for a Poster Presentation, and we are also considering it for a Concurrent talk. We will let you know as soon as possible if we can move it into a Concurrent session."

Two thing:
1. Re the design of the 7' by 3' display. What bullet points/element of HCT do you think need emphasis. What content would you want to see on it?
2. Do you want to come along and fight the fight with me?... Answer questions... It's a once in a lifetime opportunity and... You can say you were there!

 

[Constance]

Congratulations Pharoah!!! This is a wonderful development for you and your theory. Best of luck in Tucson. You'll be able to meet and talk with many key researchers in consciousness studies. If I were closer to Tucson I'd come to the conference and cheer you on. I might possibly be able to do that, but we'll see if it works out. Go Pharoah.

 

[Soupie]

Re the design of the 7' by 3' display. What bullet points/element of HCT do you think need emphasis. What content would you want to see on it?

Congrats Pharoah! You are an example of what it means to follow one's dreams and passion. I hope this opens many doors for you.

Re the poster: I'm not sure of the context here but you might consider highlighting the aspects of HCT that set it apart from other approaches.

1. Explains a function for consciousness and thus how and why c evolved (but controversially you say it doesn't resolve the MBP)

2. Reveals that there is a direction to evolution. Teleology. (Very controversial.)

3. That consciousness emerges as something ontologically new in nature.

4. Consciousness is discontinuous.

5. There are many "constructs" that have emerged hierarchically in the history of the universe. (See 2 above.) There is at least one more hierarchical construct level to emerge.

 

[Constance]

I think those are good suggestions, @Soupie. I'm not sure @Pharoah would agree that consciousness/mind present a second ontological primitive once they evolve in nature. I'm very interested to hear what he has to say about that. And also what your point of view is at this point concerning that question.

 

[Pharoah]

Congrats Pharoah! You are an example of what it means to follow one's dreams and passion. I hope this opens many doors for you.

Re the poster: I'm not sure of the context here but you might consider highlighting the aspects of HCT that set it apart from other approaches.

1. Explains a function for consciousness and thus how and why c evolved (but controversially you say it doesn't resolve the MBP)

2. Reveals that there is a direction to evolution. Teleology. (Very controversial.)

3. That consciousness emerges as something ontologically new in nature.

4. Consciousness is discontinuous.

5. There are many "constructs" that have emerged hierarchically in the history of the universe. (See 2 above.) There is at least one more hierarchical construct level to emerge.

Those sound like pretty good points to me @Soupie... thanks.
I think I do see a new ontology with the emergence of human awareness of phenomenal consciousness. However, my doubts are fuelled by my uncertainty as to what is required to make something ontologically new... what qualifies ontological status; you could argue the toss over that.
On the teleology, yes in a universe with our physical laws acting as they do, consciousness (and the next hierarchical levels) necessarily emerge and evolve. It's not however, teleological in the sense that some higher principle (either metaphysical or physical) is driving or conducting emergence and evolution; Mother Nature or God is not driving the bus.

 

[Soupie]

I think I do see a new ontology with the emergence of human awareness of phenomenal consciousness.

Hm, this is language that I don't recall you using so overtly before. My initial thought is that the phrase "awareness of phenomenal consciousness" is redundant.

Are awareness and phenomenal consciousness distinct phenomena?

Asked differently: Does phenomenal consciousness exist in the absence of awareness? Or, perhaps, does it exist if it is not "in our awareness?"

If your answer is yes, phenomenal consciousness does exist in the absence of awareness, I wonder does it "feel like something?" Or does it only "feel like something" when it is in our awareness?

It may seem like I'm splitting hairs, but we did just begin to touch on this very issue a few months back when I was really making a strong effort to fully understand HCT.

If phenomenal consciousness does not "feel like something" when it is not in our awareness, then I would argue that calling it "phenomenal consciousness" is unwarranted.

Said differently, if phenomenal consciousness (as articulated by you in HCT) only feels like something when it is "in our awareness" then calling it "phenomenal" and "consciousness" is misleading imo.

So, I will be very curious whether HCT holds that phenomenal consciousness exists "outside" of what you refer to as human awareness.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie
Are awareness and phenomenal consciousness distinct phenomena?
Yes
Does phenomenal consciousness exist in the absence of awareness?
Yes (as in non-human animals)
does it exist if it is not "in our awareness?"
Yes
If your answer is yes, phenomenal consciousness does exist in the absence of awareness, I wonder does it "feel like something?"
Yes (it may draw our awareness to it. So, I may have a sore foot, but I don't "notice" it... and then I do.)
Or does it only "feel like something" when it is in our awareness?
No
If phenomenal consciousness does not "feel like something" when it is not in our awareness, then I would argue that calling it "phenomenal consciousness" is unwarranted.
N/A
Said differently, if phenomenal consciousness only feels like something when it is "in our awareness" then calling it "phenomenal" and "consciousness" is misleading imo.
N/A

I think of the terms 'consciousness' and 'awareness' as abbreviations.

So, an animal may be 'conscious of the qualitative phenomenon of its experiences'. It responds accordingly; it responds to the qualities of its changing experiences and its behaviour and vocalisations reflect only those changing qualitative feelings. They happen: the animal feels: the animal responds.
An animal that is 'aware that it is conscious of the qualitative phenomenon of its experiences', reflects on the phenomenon of qualitative experiences. It introspects about the subjective nature of the experience of qualitative consciousness. It responds to these (necessarily) rational contemplations and its vocalisations are about those introspective ideas i.e., it develops a grammatical structure to its vocalisations because such a structure is necessary for the expression of those kinds of contemplations about the phenomenon of consciousness.

So to be human is to be aware and conscious
To be a non-human animal is to be conscious only (unless a primitive insect, which does not have consciousness either).

Another sense of the term "awareness" (that I do not advocate) is when it is used to mean "attention to" something. In this usage, a non-human animal can be described as "aware that such and such is the case", because, behaviourally it is "attending to that situation" by focusing its attention on it. I don't use the term in this sense but it has its uses. In fact, you can use the term "conscious" in exactly the same way and more besides.

 

[Soupie]

Soupie: Does phenomenal consciousness exist in the absence of awareness?

Yes (as in non-human animals)

An animal that is 'aware that it is conscious of the qualitative phenomenon of its experiences', reflects on the phenomenon of qualitative experiences. It introspects about the subjective nature of the experience of qualitative consciousness. It responds to these (necessarily) rational contemplations and its vocalisations are about those introspective ideas...

So to be human is to be aware and conscious
To be a non-human animal is to be conscious only

Okay, I think I follow you. And if I do, I agree.

In this context, "awareness" seems almost identical to conceptual thinking (or conceptual consciousness), e.g., animals have phenomenal consciousness, but lack conceptual consciousness. Therefore, their phenomenal consciousness feels like something, but they do not conceptualize their phenomenal consciousness; thus, they are not "aware" that they are conscious. That is, they do not carry the concept, "I am having experiences; I am conscious." [In the past, in this discussion, I've referred to this as meta-awareness; with phenomenal conciousness being awareness, and conceptual consciousness being awareness of awareness or meta-awareness.]

Again, it seems to me that "introspecting" or "reflecting" on one's phenomenal consciousness essentially entails "conceptualizing" it; something that most non-human animals cannot do, at least not to the extent that we humans can do.

And I agree with you that the terms aware, attention, conscious, and others are used interchangeably.

However, there is a sense in which one can train their attention (some might say awareness) on a specific facet of their phenomenal consciousness, e.g., as in certain meditation practices when one seeks to suspend conceptual thinking and merely hold a perception, such as their breathing, in their attention/awareness.

I don't think this challenges the above so long as the terms don't get confused.

 

[Pharoah]

Okay, I think I follow you. And if I do, I agree.

In this context, "awareness" seems almost identical to conceptual thinking (or conceptual consciousness), e.g., animals have phenomenal consciousness, but lack conceptual consciousness. Therefore, their phenomenal consciousness feels like something, but they do not conceptualize their phenomenal consciousness; thus, they are not "aware" that they are conscious. That is, they do not carry the concept, "I am having experiences; I am conscious." [In the past, in this discussion, I've referred to this as meta-awareness; with phenomenal conciousness being awareness, and conceptual consciousness being awareness of awareness or meta-awareness.]

Again, it seems to me that "introspecting" or "reflecting" on one's phenomenal consciousness essentially entails "conceptualizing" it; something that most non-human animals cannot do, at least not to the extent that we humans can do.

And I agree with you that the terms aware, attention, conscious, and others are used interchangeably.

However, there is a sense in which one can train their attention (some might say awareness) on a specific facet of their phenomenal consciousness, e.g., as in certain meditation practices when one seeks to suspend conceptual thinking and merely hold a perception, such as their breathing, in their attention/awareness.

I don't think this challenges the above so long as the terms don't get confused.

Sounds good to me. Yes I remember your "meta-awareness"... I get it now

 

[Pharoah]

Incidentally @Soupie, when considering the validity of what HCT says about phenomenal consciousness, it is useful to be mindful of the distinction between consciousness and awareness (terminology as above) ; it is difficult to imagine being, and to consider the motivations of a phenomenal consciousness that is devoid of introspective awareness i.e., it is difficult not to conflate the two 'realms', if I can put it that way.
So, "red" is a conceptual label. In considering its qualitative character, we as humans tend to analyse conceptually and introspect about it. But the true qualitative character is outside linguistic utterances. It is purely 'a feel' to which something response comparatively. It is a comparative qualitative feel that moderates action. Awareness, in contrast, brings into the mix a descriptive, layered and rich language of analogy and creative imaginings.

 

[Soupie]

So, "red" is a conceptual label. In considering its qualitative character, we as humans tend to analyse conceptually and introspect about it. But the true qualitative character is outside linguistic utterances. It is purely 'a feel' to which something response comparatively. It is a comparative qualitative feel that moderates action. Awareness, in contrast, brings into the mix a descriptive, layered and rich language of analogy and creative imaginings.

You have highlighted this issue before, and I am with you (as far as anyone accustomed to conceptual thinking can be).

Having never had an experience with psychedelics, I can't exactly say, but I imagine a powerful aspect of the altered state is the experience of phenomenal qualities for which one does not have concepts. I wonder if this phenomena makes the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and conceptual consciousness "pop out" to the experiencer?

In any case, the underline sentence above captures two questions/issues I continue to have with HCT. Maybe the current context of our discussion can help you answer my questions, or help you understand my questions if you haven't before.

You say: "It is purely 'a feel' to which something responds comparatively."

(1) It's easy (or at least easier) to see how consciousness can carry informational* content, e.g., we consciously perceive a red ball versus a green square; alternatively, it's hard to see how consciousness can carry phenomenal qualities ("feels") such as redness or greeness.

It seems to me that HCT explains how phenomenal consciousness has informational content about the world; it's not clear to me that HCT explains why phenomenal consciousness has "feels." That is, why phenomenal consciousness feels like something.

This leads to question (2): You say the physical organism responds to these phenomenal "feels." My understanding is that this assertion invokes the MBP; how is it that a phenomenal "feel" can interact causally with a physical process, such as the firing of neurons or the contraction of muscles?

It occurs to me that our differences when it comes to whether HCT answers these questions (I've asked the same two questions of you many times), may involve our approaches to the concepts of physical, phenomenal, and conceptual.

In my way of thinking, physical processes are ontologically distinct from phenomenal and conceptual processes. But I wonder if you would make the same ontological distinction.

It's not clear to me how phenomenal "feels" arise from physical processes, nor how phenomenal "feels" could causally influence physical processes.

However, I want to be clear that I'm open to the possibility that they could. It's just not clear to me how they could.

*I could substitute the word "conceptual." Does this conceptual/phenomenal distinction inform the MBP?

 

[Pharoah]

You have highlighted this issue before, and I am with you (as far as anyone accustomed to conceptual thinking can be).

Having never had an experience with psychedelics, I can't exactly say, but I imagine a powerful aspect of the altered state is the experience of phenomenal qualities for which one does not have concepts. I wonder if this phenomena makes the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and conceptual consciousness "pop out" to the experiencer?

In any case, the underline sentence above captures two questions/issues I continue to have with HCT. Maybe the current context of our discussion can help you answer my questions, or help you understand my questions if you haven't before.

You say: "It is purely 'a feel' to which something responds comparatively."

(1) It's easy (or at least easier) to see how consciousness can carry informational* content, e.g., we consciously perceive a red ball versus a green square; alternatively, it's hard to see how consciousness can carry phenomenal qualities ("feels") such as redness or greeness.

It seems to me that HCT explains how phenomenal consciousness has informational content about the world; it's not clear to me that HCT explains why phenomenal consciousness has "feels." That is, why phenomenal consciousness feels like something.

This leads to question (2): You say the physical organism responds to these phenomenal "feels." My understanding is that this assertion invokes the MBP; how is it that a phenomenal "feel" can interact causally with a physical process, such as the firing of neurons or the contraction of muscles?

It occurs to me that our differences when it comes to whether HCT answers these questions (I've asked the same two questions of you many times), may involve our approaches to the concepts of physical, phenomenal, and conceptual.

In my way of thinking, physical processes are ontologically distinct from phenomenal and conceptual processes. But I wonder if you would make the same ontological distinction.

It's not clear to me how phenomenal "feels" arise from physical processes, nor how phenomenal "feels" could causally influence physical processes.

However, I want to be clear that I'm open to the possibility that they could. It's just not clear to me how they could.

*I could substitute the word "conceptual." Does this conceptual/phenomenal distinction inform the MBP?

I am not sure how to create the eureka moment for you on this @Soupie. You understand, that for me that moment happened before I knew any philosophy. The eureka moment for me came about from my recognition of, what i regard as, the nomological component of HCT which I don't think I have detailed in the forum. I will be posting something on this in the next month.

If you see a consciousness / awareness distinction (as expressed above) then perhaps there is some room to work with.
What HCT says is that there are not these two, but three hierarchical layers (well, five actually, but we are not concerned with two of them in this forum). Being part of a hierarchy means that a higher level cannot exist without the lower levels: [This provokes a powerful response to the zombie argument.] You can't have concepts (awareness) without phenomenal experience (consciousness). Similarly, you can't have phenomenal experience (consciousness) without a qualitatively relevant physiology i.e., consciousness requires a body (goodbye panpsychism):

Physiologies bear a correspondence with environmental characteristics (survival dictates that this is so... I think this is obvious). Physiologies are qualitative insofar as they institute biochemical functions that lead to responses that bear the relevance of that environmental correspondence. Every aspect of the environment that can be sensed, can potentially institute a corresponding biochemical function (evolutionary adaptation permitting) that reflects the merit or otherwise of that environmental aspect.
Moving forward, to be conscious of the qualitative merits of sensation is to calculate (neurologically) when and how (cue the emergence of temporal individuation and subjectivity) those qualities apply and when they may not. To be phenomenally conscious is to be able to adapt behaviourally (i.e., to learn). To be conscious is to be cognisant of the relation between environment and its corresponding qualities (as instituted by complex biochemical mechanisms) and to respond, vocalise and accommodate behaviourally to that associated correspondence.

Good grief... that seems turgid. But am I getting anywhere? it's 3.22am here...

 

[Pharoah]

Actually, if 3.22am was spatially and temporally consistent and objectively observable, it would have a phenomenal feel equivalent to "brown"

 

[Soupie]

What HCT says is that there are not these two, but three hierarchical layers (well, five actually, but we are not concerned with two of them in this forum). Being part of a hierarchy means that a higher level cannot exist without the lower levels: [This provokes a powerful response to the zombie argument.] You can't have concepts (awareness) without phenomenal experience (consciousness). Similarly, you can't have phenomenal experience (consciousness) without a qualitatively relevant physiology i.e., consciousness requires a body (goodbye panpsychism):

Yep, I follow all that. And I am aware of your appeal to nomological reasoning.

The issue you seem to be ignorant of (which I doubt) or seem to be side-stepping is the question of downward causation.

It's one thing to say that consciousness emerges (hierarchically) within nature; it's another thing to say that this ontologically new substance/property/construct can causally influence the substrate from which it emerged.

Note, I'm not saying it cannot; I'm only saying that we don't currently have models of how this might be the case.

I think it's safe to say, Pharoah, that most mainstream thinkers in philosophy would agree that consciousness emerges from living organisms. However, those same philosophers would stop at the notion that consciousness causally influences the organism. This seems to be a tenant of HCT. I think you need to own it and address it. I would lump most physicists and neuroscientists into this category as well. (Note that I'm saying "most " not all.)

Interestingly and not-without-confusion, the field of psychology/psychiatry seems—on the whole—to grant that consciousness emerges from the physical brain, while at the same time holding that consciousness can causally influence the body.

The fields of psychology and psychiatry are fundamentally a mess at their core for this very reason: we have no working model of the "psychophysical nexus" although it seems self-evident!

Approaches to, say, mental illness either appeal to physical, neurological processes or conceptual, social-emotional processes. There are no good models which combine the two. The reality is that there is a psychophysical nexus when it comes to mental health and mental illness, but there are no working, explanatory models!

Incidentally, I have discovered a philosopher who believes that there is causal dialogue between the mind and body, and he presents the beginnings of a model. I have a paper of his that I am reading now.

 

[Pharoah]

Yep, I follow all that. And I am aware of your appeal to nomological reasoning.

The issue you seem to be ignorant of (which I doubt) or seem to be side-stepping is the question of downward causation.

It's one thing to say that consciousness emerges (hierarchically) within nature; it's another thing to say that this ontologically new substance/property/construct can causally influence the substrate from which it emerged.

Note, I'm not saying it cannot; I'm only saying that we don't currently have models of how this might be the case.

I think it's safe to say, Pharoah, that most mainstream thinkers in philosophy would agree that consciousness emerges from living organisms. However, those same philosophers would stop at the notion that consciousness causally influences the organism. This seems to be a tenant of HCT. I think you need to own it and address it. I would lump most physicists and neuroscientists into this category as well. (Note that I'm saying "most " not all.)

Interestingly and not-without-confusion, the field of psychology/psychiatry seems—on the whole—to grant that consciousness emerges from the physical brain, while at the same time holding that consciousness can causally influence the body.

The fields of psychology and psychiatry are fundamentally a mess at their core for this very reason: we have no working model of the "psychophysical nexus" although it seems self-evident!

Approaches to, say, mental illness either appeal to physical, neurological processes or conceptual, social-emotional processes. There are no good models which combine the two. The reality is that there is a psychophysical nexus when it comes to mental health and mental illness, but there are no working, explanatory models!

Incidentally, I have discovered a philosopher who believes that there is causal dialogue between the mind and body, and he presents the beginnings of a model. I have a paper of his that I am reading now.

@Soupie
Imagine an animal that has no motivation. Nevertheless, it may have sensory input, and that input might engage biochemical mechanisms such that we might say, "that animal is conscious of the phenomenal character of its experience". But still it sits there (like a brain in a vat) unmotivated to act on its experiences.
However, what we can then imagine, is that the animal has biochemical priorities. A switch in its intereoceptive system says, "I need feeding" or "I need a mate" or "it is too cold". Suddenly, its conscious experience is pertinent to any one of a number of inclinations that it might have.
So, on its own, the phenomenal consciousness is caused but has no motivation to cause, in and of itself.
In a way, there is a feedback that is moderated by phenomenal consciousness and its qualitative relevance to certain primal needs.
One of the main aspects of HCT is this idea of construct equilibrium. Environmental interaction invariably destabilises a construct's equilibrium state. The reacquisition of equilibrium is a responsive motivational imperative. The character of that motivation is determined by the type of construct (i.e. by the hierarchical level of construct you are looking at)

SEP says of mental causation:
"In metaphysics mental causation is said to be “at the heart of the mind-body problem” (Shoemaker 2001, p. 74),"
This is basically saying that the problem of mental causation is about the bridging of the mind/body chasm—what direction is the traffic flowing on the bridge? That is to say, it is about the problem of the two categories of mind and body conceived as two ontologically distinct realms.
SEP says, "It's plausible to think that if the mental has any casual powers at all, it can affect the physical world." which is to imply that the mental, so conceived, is distinct from the physical world, or in some way separated from it.
I reject this notion of causation as it relates to the mental.