Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[smcder]

The Goldilocks thread

I hoped to show above, by reversing @Soupie's words, that there is an underlying structure - a sense that can be made in talking about "consciousness" even if we can argue over exactly all of the details. (In the Reversi analogy) we can still agree on the board, the pieces and the allowed moves - rather these things seem to me to impose themselves on the players/discussants.

So it's good I think that there is the variety of views and interests on this thread. Any narrower and it would have reduced to a technical discussion, any broader and it would have spun off into distinct conversations.

 

[smcder]

Consciousness constitutes (once again) the means by which we make what progress we can in understanding 'what-is' as a whole and decide what responsibilities we have within it, what possibilities (individual and social) we can and should pursue, what we should do with our existence.

Ive just started reading about a second axial age - and it seems to fit in with "integral thinking" and Gebser's work we discussed in earlier threads. But ... gone mainstream. There was a Berkley talk and Karen Armstrong has a book. The Axial Age was the move from tribal/ritual consciousness to the breakthroughs in consciousness of Confucianism, Daosim, Jainism, Buddhism and the Abrahamic, monotheistic religions.

The second Axial Age recognizes plurality in relgious affiliation and practice as well as "spiritual, but not religious" as a major category of religion.

(agnosticism, atheism was recognized in one writing but it was noted that they basically couldn't get it together in terms of a social movement - as they say, no cathedrals are built to Socrates)

And the level of "consciousness" (another use for this word!) needed is now global. It seems we are doing a bad job of this now.

I watched a video of Derek Parfit and he seemed just at a loss in discussing how much we should give - "more" was what he kept coming back to - for me it showed the limits of human intelligence as currently framed in the face of this problem - if I can find it I'll post it, I do think he was very sincere and very groping for an answer.

In connection with what you are saying @Constance above - it seems there is an urgent need for us to figure out an identity that is stable, healthy, vital and global - an "us" that is an "I" and a "we" - this seems to go beyond the first axial age answers of self/ego and recognition of others - love they neighbor is now when thy neighbor is everyone on the planet - similar discussions could be had for Buddhism for which I think there were early hopes it could fit the bill with universal loving kindness, but has not.

 

[smcder]

at 12:00 ... we should give more, but if you ask how much more, clearly I think the answer is, "the more the better" - this made me think of the possibility of a new mathematics, the basic operators would be "more" and "less" and the equivalence replaced by a "sufficient" sign, the calculus involved would be built on optimizing empathy rather than running to limits or measuring areas under curves.

See also Parfit's: "The Repugnant Conclusion"

 

[Soupie]

I don't entirely disagree, but it does raise the question of how those processes/functions are controlled when not under 'subconscious' control.

So I think it's fair to ask—when those processes seem to be under 'subconscious control'—whether control has truly been wrested from the typically conscious control mechanisms or whether something more nuanced is happening. I'm not suggesting that subconscious processes doesn't have an effect on these typically conscious processes, but I question whether 'subconsciousness' is an entity/process capable of doing automatically what typically conscious processes do.

I think normal and non altered-states of consciousness are very informative here. In what little breathing meditiation I have done, I have experienced—if only for a brief moment before I ruined it—my own thoughts arising from somewhere as if I had consciously summoned them. And we've all experienced moments where we do or say—sometimes complex—things while intentionally, consciously willing it.

The lack of control over our bodies and the world that we sometimes sub-consciously perceive may not be reflective of reality. Again, that's not to say that the subconscious has not influence on the body, but I wonder if it's as direct as we subconsciously perceive it to be?

That's an interesting thought experiment but it doesn't follow, does it?

The Cartesian model of consciousness as a humunclian Observer calling all the shots doesn't seem to fit the evidence (although it may fit the experience of a typical adult human).

It's like saying the CEO of an automobile manufacturer typically runs the entire operation on her own, simultaneously; except when she doesn't, and in those cases she hands control over to hundreds of minor exects and workers.

Regarding the paper discussing mind-body dialogue:

It's very loose and speculative. The argument goes as follows:

(1) Human cognition is analogous information processing.

(2) Consciousness is analogous to modeling of the system/world.

(3) The mind is analogous to a virtual machines.

(4) Virtual machines obey non-physical laws and so do minds.

(5) Virtual machines causally influence/control the hardware they run on; and minds influence/control the bodies that generate them.

I'll post a link to the article asap. Sloman is one author.

I know information processing approaches to animal intelligence and consciousness are not favored here, but for my part, I think they've given us the most promising pre-theoretic models lately.

 

[smcder]

That's an interesting thought experiment but it doesn't follow, does it?

The Cartesian model of consciousness as a humunclian Observer calling all the shots doesn't seem to fit the evidence (although it may fit the experience of a typical adult human).

It's like saying the CEO of an automobile manufacturer typically runs the entire operation on her own, simultaneously; except when she doesn't, and in those cases she hands control over to hundreds of minor exects and workers.

Regarding the paper discussing mind-body dialogue:

It's very loose and speculative. The argument goes as follows:

(1) Human cognition is analogous information processing.

(2) Consciousness is analogous to modeling of the system/world.

(3) The mind is analogous to a virtual machines.

(4) Virtual machines obey non-physical laws and so do minds.

(5) Virtual machines causally influence/control the hardware they run on; and minds influence/control the bodies that generate them.

I'll post a link to the article asap. Sloman is one author.

I know information processing approaches to animal intelligence and consciousness are not favored here, but for my part, I think they've given us the most promising pre-theoretic models lately.

doesn't "seem" to fit the evidence - based on who's seeming ... that was one of my points

The Cartesian model of consciousness as a humunclian Observer calling all the shots doesn't seem to fit the evidence (although it may fit the experience of a typical adult human).

I don't think that's a good way to characterize the above ... which referred to some processes, typically, etc - but yes it's pretty fanciful! more a warning about words and metaphors

we have to be careful with metaphors - in this case because a CEO may have a mind of his or her own ... also, you left out the board and the stock-holders, auditors, government regulators ... etc etc ;-)

also evidence is evidence and is gathered from where you look for it - based on the model you bring to looking for the evidence ... and a host of other factors, funding, etc ... so the exercise above was more broadly about "seeming" and different perspectives - not to try and prove you "wrong"

 

[smcder]

This one: ?

Virtual machines and consciousness

 

[Pharoah]

I have sent emails to @Soupie @smder @Constance forwarding a paper that Jaak Panksepp has sent me. Not sure that it is open source, otherwise I'd put it on here for all to see.
@Constance... let me know if you don't get it. I am not sure I have a good email for you.

 

[smcder]

I have sent emails to @Soupie @smder @Constance forwarding a paper that Jaak Panksepp has sent me. Not sure that it is open source, otherwise I'd put it on here for all to see.
@Constance... let me know if you don't get it. I am not sure I have a good email for you.

Got it thanks! Now, if I can understand it!

 

[Constance]

I don't disagree but I wonder: Do you think it's conceivable that we humans could understand/explain how consciousness relates to living organisms and yet fail to understand what-is as a whole?

I don't remember who you addressed that question to, @Soupie, but I wonder how you arrive at the question in the first place. Who in this discussion has suggested that understanding the relationship of consciousness to living beings, i.e., to life, would enable us to "understand what-is as a whole"?

 

[Constance]

This one: ?

Virtual machines and consciousness

Interested to find out if it is. I've started reading it and it is anything but 'pre-theoretic' (which is how @Soupie characterized it). Indeed it's theory-driven.

 

[Constance]

I have sent emails to @Soupie @smder @Constance forwarding a paper that Jaak Panksepp has sent me. Not sure that it is open source, otherwise I'd put it on here for all to see.
@Constance... let me know if you don't get it. I am not sure I have a good email for you.

I did receive it, Pharoah. I'm going to message you the email I prefer to use now for future reference.

 

[smcder]

Interested to find out if it is. I've started reading it and it is anything but 'pre-theoretic' (which is how @Soupie characterized it). Indeed it's theory-driven.

Im not clear on what a pre-theoretic model is?

@Soupie does this work address the concerns brought up on the thread about computational models?

 

[Soupie]

Here is the excerpt from Panksepp's 1998 article in which he speculates about how feelings might emerge from neurodynamics. It is a wild, novel idea that I don't believe I had come across before.

https://www.researchgate.net/profil...r=0&pdfJsDownload=0&origin=publication_detail

"How might such a system of SELF-representation actually generate intrinsic affec- tive value structures within the organism? If various distinct emotional and motiva- tional inputs (i.e. the specific emotional circuits described in Panksepp, 1998) modulate the SELF-schema in distinct ways, each with characteristic neurodynamic and neurochemical signatures (Panksepp, 1993; 1999a), the result may be a variety of fundamental subjectively experienced feeling states. For instance, feelings of anger may reflect the generation of an energized bodily stance — a forceful pounding-type of sensory-motor dynamic that inundates the SELF schema when RAGE circuits of the brain are aroused. FEAR circuits may generate a qualitatively different, up-tight, trembly type of neural dynamic within the SELF. PLAY and LUST circuits may establish more flexible, rounded and flowing types of neurodynamics, while separa- tion distress circuit may lead to repeated spikes (pangs), followed by shallow waves of distress characteristic of sadness. In other words, the neurodynamics of the various basic emotional states may eventually be visualized as topographically unique chaotic attractors within the extended neural representation of the SELF (Panksepp, 1999a). Even though this type of neuronal isomorphism is not a mandatory prediction of the present view, I share these analogical images in the hope that they may help us fathom, in neuro-theoretical terms, how the conceptual gap between our verbal con- cepts and our subjective experiences can be narrowed.

According to such a view of affective experience, the various neurodynamics of emotions will be characterized as hedonically desirable or distressing (i.e. the various positive and negative affects), not only by higher neural monitors but also via reaffer- ents within the instinctual motor apparatus. In other words, the natural types of emotion-specific neurodynamic may have evolved not only to regulate motor outputs through various relatively stereotyped action tendencies in both somatic and visceral output systems, but also to continually gauge the physical consequences of actions in a feedback manner. Those types of arousal that are not resonant with the resting rhythms of the SELF, may generate withdrawal behaviours and be experienced as un- desirable. Those that are resonant with the resting rhythms or facilitate certain har- monics of those rhythms may be deemed desirable. At this level of analysis, the ‘explanatory gap’ between neural, bodily and affective activities appears narrowed considerably. In any event, whether such understandable neural dynamics actually mediate affective experience becomes an empirically testable proposition (Freeman, 1995; Panksepp, 1999a). Only with additional encephalization, and the emergence of sophisticated learning abilities, including facility with languages that can re-symbolize such basic neuronal firing patterns, might a ‘conceptual gap’ have emerged. In other words, I think the explanatory gap is constructed by the ways we think about these matters linguistically rather than by the underlying primary-process brain matters themselves."

And while the paper is filled with language such as information, circuits, processing, modeling, representation, symbols, the above seems to me to be along the lines of dynamic systems thinking that I've been anxious to read more about.

 

[Soupie]

Im not clear on what a pre-theoretic model is?

@Soupie does this work address the concerns brought up on the thread about computational models?

I've been interpreting pre-theoretic to mean speculative in light of the fact that there are no good models approaching a resolution of the HP and MBP.

He doesn't address concerns in this paper but points to another paper in which he addresses those who argue that organisms are not information processers and those that argue that only humans are information (ie meaning) processors.

My main interest in the paper is the notion that the mind and virtual machines are non-physical but can (he argues) exert influence on their physical substrate.

Although he appears to go to some length to clear up just what the concept conscious refers too, he doesn't succeed. However, he notes that we are currently in a position where we don't even know the right questions to ask about consciousness. I respect that. And he notes, and I agree, that people working in the field of AI machines are stumbling on some new questions.

 

[smcder]

Here is the excerpt from Panksepp's 1998 article in which he speculates about how feelings might emerge from neurodynamics. It is a wild, novel idea that I don't believe I had come across before.

https://www.researchgate.net/profil...r=0&pdfJsDownload=0&origin=publication_detail

"How might such a system of SELF-representation actually generate intrinsic affec- tive value structures within the organism? If various distinct emotional and motiva- tional inputs (i.e. the specific emotional circuits described in Panksepp, 1998) modulate the SELF-schema in distinct ways, each with characteristic neurodynamic and neurochemical signatures (Panksepp, 1993; 1999a), the result may be a variety of fundamental subjectively experienced feeling states. For instance, feelings of anger may reflect the generation of an energized bodily stance — a forceful pounding-type of sensory-motor dynamic that inundates the SELF schema when RAGE circuits of the brain are aroused. FEAR circuits may generate a qualitatively different, up-tight, trembly type of neural dynamic within the SELF. PLAY and LUST circuits may establish more flexible, rounded and flowing types of neurodynamics, while separa- tion distress circuit may lead to repeated spikes (pangs), followed by shallow waves of distress characteristic of sadness. In other words, the neurodynamics of the various basic emotional states may eventually be visualized as topographically unique chaotic attractors within the extended neural representation of the SELF (Panksepp, 1999a). Even though this type of neuronal isomorphism is not a mandatory prediction of the present view, I share these analogical images in the hope that they may help us fathom, in neuro-theoretical terms, how the conceptual gap between our verbal con- cepts and our subjective experiences can be narrowed.

According to such a view of affective experience, the various neurodynamics of emotions will be characterized as hedonically desirable or distressing (i.e. the various positive and negative affects), not only by higher neural monitors but also via reaffer- ents within the instinctual motor apparatus. In other words, the natural types of emotion-specific neurodynamic may have evolved not only to regulate motor outputs through various relatively stereotyped action tendencies in both somatic and visceral output systems, but also to continually gauge the physical consequences of actions in a feedback manner. Those types of arousal that are not resonant with the resting rhythms of the SELF, may generate withdrawal behaviours and be experienced as un- desirable. Those that are resonant with the resting rhythms or facilitate certain har- monics of those rhythms may be deemed desirable. At this level of analysis, the ‘explanatory gap’ between neural, bodily and affective activities appears narrowed considerably. In any event, whether such understandable neural dynamics actually mediate affective experience becomes an empirically testable proposition (Freeman, 1995; Panksepp, 1999a). Only with additional encephalization, and the emergence of sophisticated learning abilities, including facility with languages that can re-symbolize such basic neuronal firing patterns, might a ‘conceptual gap’ have emerged. In other words, I think the explanatory gap is constructed by the ways we think about these matters linguistically rather than by the underlying primary-process brain matters themselves."

And while the paper is filled with language such as information, circuits, processing, modeling, representation, symbols, the above seems to me to be along the lines of dynamic systems thinking that I've been anxious to read more about.

What is the conceptual/explanatory gap referred to here?

Only with additional encephalization, and the emergence of sophisticated learning abilities, including facility with languages that can re-symbolize such basic neuronal firing patterns, might a ‘conceptual gap’ have emerged. In other words, I think the explanatory gap is constructed by the ways we think about these matters linguistically rather than by the underlying primary-process brain matters themselves."

 

[smcder]

I've been interpreting pre-theoretic to mean speculative in light of the fact that there are no good models approaching a resolution of the HP and MBP.

He doesn't address concerns in this paper but points to another paper in which he addresses those who argue that organisms are not information processers and those that aregue that only humans are information (ie meaning) processors.

My main interest in the paper is the notion that the mind and virtual machines are non-physical but can (he argues) excert influence on their physical substrate.

Although he appears to go to some length to clear up just what the concept conscious refers too, he doesn't succeed. However, he notes that we are currently in a potention where we don't even know the right questions to ask about consciousness. I respect that. And he notes, and I agree, that people working in the field of AI machines are stumbling on some new questions.

https://philosophy.tamucc.edu/courses/spring-2010/minds-and-machines/02-11-10

Can we understand evolved computational systems?

I think one of these references the argument (Penrose) that the process humans use to find new mathematical theorems isnt computable.

My main interest in the paper is the notion that the mind and virtual machines are non-physical but can (he argues) excert influence on their physical substrate.

How do they do this?

 

[smcder]

@Pharoah's HCT I think has something to say about a global level of consciousness? The fifth construct/hierarchy may relate?

 

[smcder]

Panksepp's paper on antidepressants looks interesting - what caused the depression in the first place? if it was in part the person's thoughts - if they had a causal action on the brain, then these new agents will still be in competition for this effect - Prozac was extremely effective for a few years and then dropped off precipitously, I think many/most other ADs have the same pattern - if a person persists in the same thnking or in the same hopeless situation ... will it become a matter of endlessly replenshing/repairing chemical connections?

I also read an article recently that new studies showed psychotherapy - years of in depth talk therapy was proving very effective while brief, cognitive type interventions were proving less and less effective in the last few years - the idea was put forward that people might actually need to deal with their inner issues, with their experiences in a comprehensive way - that their current mind state was developed over a period of time and that it would take time to change them - that brief, relatively superficial changes, like finding errors in thinking (all or none) and challenging them - the core of CBT was not effective for deep seated problems.

 

[Constance]

I've been interpreting pre-theoretic to mean speculative in light of the fact that there are no good models approaching a resolution of the HP and MBP.

He doesn't address concerns in this paper but points to another paper in which he addresses those who argue that organisms are not information processers and those that argue that only humans are information (ie meaning) processors.

My main interest in the paper is the notion that the mind and virtual machines are non-physical but can (he argues) exert influence on their physical substrate.

Although he appears to go to some length to clear up just what the concept conscious refers too, he doesn't succeed. However, he notes that we are currently in a position where we don't even know the right questions to ask about consciousness. I respect that. And he notes, and I agree, that people working in the field of AI machines are stumbling on some new questions.

@Soupie, are you talking about Sloman here, and did Steven identify the paper you are reading a few posts back? Would you please identify the paper you've been extolling so that the rest of us can read it?

I've been interpreting pre-theoretic to mean speculative in light of the fact that there are no good models approaching a resolution of the HP and MBP.

Once again, the models you've brought forward can't be described as 'pre-theoretical'. Their theories are embedded in the hypotheses on which they are constructed. They operate on presuppositions. They differ in this from phenomenological approaches which are genuinely empirical in the sense that James already recognized in his protophenomenological later thought -- that we must begin descriptively with what is experienced by the experiencer. To do so involves investigating first-person perspectives and second-person perspectives as well as third-person perspectives -- a move into the experiential that has not been permitted in physicalist/objectivist-dominated modern science, but is finally opened up in the new discipline of neurophenomenology.

You also write:

Although he [Sloman?] appears to go to some length to clear up just what the concept conscious refers too, he doesn't succeed. However, he notes that we are currently in a position where we don't even know the right questions to ask about consciousness.

A grandiose and over-reaching claim given the history of philosophy of mind {both analytical and phenomenological} and of science, of society and law, of art, expression, values, and ethics. And especially blind given the complexity and depth of investigations of consciousness and mind in interdisciplinary consciousness studies over the last quarter-century.

 

[Constance]

quoting from Panksepp in 1998: "Those types of arousal that are not resonant with the resting rhythms of the SELF, may generate withdrawal behaviours and be experienced as un- desirable. Those that are resonant with the resting rhythms or facilitate certain har- monics of those rhythms may be deemed desirable. At this level of analysis, the ‘explanatory gap’ between neural, bodily and affective activities appears narrowed considerably. In any event, whether such understandable neural dynamics actually mediate affective experience becomes an empirically testable proposition (Freeman, 1995; Panksepp, 1999a). Only with additional encephalization, and the emergence of sophisticated learning abilities, including facility with languages that can re-symbolize such basic neuronal firing patterns, might a ‘conceptual gap’ have emerged. In other words, I think the explanatory gap is constructed by the ways we think about these matters linguistically rather than by the underlying primary-process brain matters themselves."

Re the sentence highlighted in red, note that Panksepp says that the explanatory gap is "narrowed" by affective neuroscientific analysis, not that it is closed. Nor does he say that the explanatory gap can be dismissed through cognitive neuroscience or information theory or AI.

Re the blue-highlighted portion of the extracted text [expand Soupie's post quoted above], we should discuss what we (from our diverse approaches) interpret Panksepp to mean in these statements. I'll start. I think he means to say that the explanatory gap is less a gap than current analytical POM proposes, and that we will recognize what the gap signifies when we better understand the evolution of consciousness, brain, and mind in nature.