Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7

[smcder]

Since all physical matter can be reduced to fundamental particles, all physical matter is essentially the same substrate just arranged differently.

So with any physical phenomenon, it's the arrangement that matters, not the substrate.

Ie if cs is a physical phenomenon there will be multiple pathways to it.

this is one where you cant just do philosophy by proclamation ... the only examples we have are all biological and pretty similar ... what other pathways can you conceive of? or perhaps we are missing existing examples of cs/intelligence?

 

[Randall]

all you are saying is that everything physical is made of fundamental particles ... what substrate dependence means is that only the functional organization matters ... so a brain made of tinker toys organized the way a brain made of sillicone organized the way a brain made of carbon would all be conscious ... but theres another implication to what you are saying ... do you see it?

You've extrapolated the fundamental substrate into the macro level in a manner that incorrectly assumes that it makes no difference to function.

 

[Soupie]

all you are saying is that everything physical is made of fundamental particles ...

what substrate dependence means is that only the functional organization matters ... so a brain made of tinker toys organized the way a brain made of sillicone organized the way a brain made of carbon would all be conscious ...

but theres another implication to what you are saying ... do you see it?

That is all I am saying, yes. If consciousness is physical, then it should be possible to cause the phenomenon via physical systems that duplicate what the necessary and sufficient physical systems of the brain do.

 

[Randall]

That is all I am saying, yes. If consciousness is physical, then it should be possible to cause the phenomenon via physical systems that duplicate what the necessary and sufficient physical systems of the brain do.

Absolutely, and in fact, we perform such duplication on a regular basis. Biological reproduction is the literal duplication of physical systems, and if all goes well, we get exactly the results we expect, including consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

I'll use the example of autopoiesis:

Autopoiesis - Wikipedia

"The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system.

One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the hard problem of consciousness, how and why we have qualia.[14]

A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of enactivism. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness.[15]"

This is one of the most rigorous attempts to explain the origin of cognition and consciousness via physical processes.

However, if it's true that organic autopoietic cells are conscious then there is no reason that non-organic or synthetic autopoietic cells shouldn't be conscious.

 

[Soupie]

Absolutely, and in fact, we perform such duplication on a regular basis. Biological reproduction is the literal duplication of physical systems, and if all goes well, we get exactly the results we expect, including consciousness.

The trick with this—a la the interface theory—is that our perception of this duplication process and the Reality of this duplication process /=.

 

[Randall]

The trick with this—a la the interface theory—is that our perception of this duplication process and the Reality of this duplication process /=.

Can you restate the above in more definitive terms? I'd rather not have to guess, even if to you it seems that it should be obvious.

 

[smcder]

That is all I am saying, yes. If consciousness is physical, then it should be possible to cause the phenomenon via physical systems that duplicate what the necessary and sufficient physical systems of the brain do.

Can you give an example ... ?

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[smcder]

I'll use the example of autopoiesis:

Autopoiesis - Wikipedia

"The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system.

One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the hard problem of consciousness, how and why we have qualia.[14]

A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of enactivism. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness.[15]"

This is one of the most rigorous attempts to explain the origin of cognition and consciousness via physical processes.

However, if it's true that organic autopoietic cells are conscious then there is no reason that non-organic or synthetic autopoietic cells shouldn't be conscious.

Unless it's substrate dependent.

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[smcder]

I'll use the example of autopoiesis:

Autopoiesis - Wikipedia

"The connection of autopoiesis to cognition, or if necessary, of living systems to cognition, is an objective assessment ascertainable by observation of a living system.

One question that arises is about the connection between cognition seen in this manner and consciousness. The separation of cognition and consciousness recognizes that the organism may be unaware of the substratum where decisions are made. What is the connection between these realms? Thompson refers to this issue as the "explanatory gap", and one aspect of it is the hard problem of consciousness, how and why we have qualia.[14]

A second question is whether autopoiesis can provide a bridge between these concepts. Thompson discusses this issue from the standpoint of enactivism. An autopoietic cell actively relates to its environment. Its sensory responses trigger motor behavior governed by autopoiesis, and this behavior (it is claimed) is a simplified version of a nervous system behavior. The further claim is that real-time interactions like this require attention, and an implication of attention is awareness.[15]"

This is one of the most rigorous attempts to explain the origin of cognition and consciousness via physical processes.

However, if it's true that organic autopoietic cells are conscious then there is no reason that non-organic or synthetic autopoietic cells shouldn't be conscious.

And these synthetic autopoetic cells can be made of anything?

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[smcder]

You've extrapolated the fundamental substrate into the macro level in a manner that incorrectly assumes that it makes no difference to function.

I think so ... Chalmers says as long as you can duplicate the functional organization you get cs ... I think he uses the tinkertoy example but not sure you'd get the speed, number of connections etc with tt

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[Soupie]

Can you give an example ... ?

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The phenomenon of liquid can be realized via multiple physical paths.

Unless it's substrate dependent.

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Yes, unless it's substrate dependent. What reason do we have to believe it is?

And these synthetic autopoetic cells can be made of anything?

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Theoretically yes. As long as the synthetic cell meets the necessary and sufficient requirements for autopoesis.

 

[smcder]

Haven't read this yet but seems to be on point

Philosophical Disquisitions: Chalmers vs Pigliucci on the Philosophy of Mind-Uploading (1): Chalmers's Optimism

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[Soupie]

Can you restate the above in more definitive terms? I'd rather not have to guess, even if to you it seems that it should be obvious.

I'm just saying that—in sticking with the interface theory of the relation between R and conscious perception of R—it's true that "something" in R is indeed being duplicated, but our human perception of this duplication does not equal the duplication.

Ie the causal forces at play in fundamental reality are not perceived by humans. Among other things, it may be one cause of quantum (from our perspective) weirdness.

 

[Randall]

I think so ... Chalmers says as long as you can duplicate the functional organization you get cs ... I think he uses the tinkertoy example but not sure you'd get the speed, number of connections etc with tt

I suspect that this tinker-toy analogy is used to illustrate a point other than what it seems to be on the surface, that being the conceptual difference between things and properties of things. Things aren't their properties and properties aren't things. Water is wet but wetness isn't water. Brains are conscious but consciousness isn't the brain.

 

[Soupie]

Didn't read yet but:

Scientists think this is where your consciousness lives

 

[Randall]

Didn't read yet but: Scientists think this is where your consciousness lives

Upon cursory inspection, a more accurate description, in very loose terms, would be that they've identified components of the on-off switch, or a critical part of the circuit. In this analogy consciousness would be the light and the rostral dorsolateral pontine tegmentum would be a routing point for fibers involved in actuation of the more complex Thalamocortical Loop, which in this analogy seems to be more akin to the light-bulb element.

 

[smcder]

Upon cursory inspection, a more accurate description, in very loose terms, would be that they've identified components of the on-off switch, or a critical part of the circuit. In this analogy consciousness would be the light and the rostral dorsolateral pontine tegmentum would be a routing point for fibers involved in actuation of the more complex Thalamocortical Loop, which in this analogy seems to be more akin to the light-bulb element.

Well Minister, if you ask me for a straight answer, then I shall say that, as far as we can see, looking at it by and large, taking one thing with another in terms of the average of departments, then in the final analysis it is probably true to say, that at the end of the day, in general terms, you would probably find that, not to put too fine a point on it, there probably wasn't very much in it one way or the other. As far as one can see, at this stage.

 

[Soupie]

Upon cursory inspection, a more accurate description, in very loose terms, would be that they've identified components of the on-off switch, or a critical part of the circuit. In this analogy consciousness would be the light and the rostral dorsolateral pontine tegmentum would be a routing point for fibers involved in actuation of the more complex Thalamocortical Loop, which in this analogy seems to be more akin to the light-bulb element.

I think discoveries like this serve to highlight just how non-physical consciousness is.

Regardless of how successful we are at determining the necessary and sufficient physical correlates of consciousness, we will never objectively observe the consciousness of another organism/system.

Why is that? Why can two conscious subjects simultaneously observe physical, objective processes within reality, but not be able to observe the subjective experiences of one another in the same way?

You made a nice comparison between the property of liquidness and consciousness earlier, but the comparison ultimately fails.

Two subjects can objectively observe the liquidness of a system/process in a way they can never objectively observe the consciousness of an organism/system.

So while both may be properties of systems, they are in two vastly different categories of property types.

 

[smcder]

You've extrapolated the fundamental substrate into the macro level in a manner that incorrectly assumes that it makes no difference to function.

Well Soupie has.

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