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You also wrote: "The features of the physical world are in actuality features of our perceptual system. Consciousness doesn't supervene on the features of our perceptual system, it supervenes on processes that occur on a level below the features of the perceptual system."
Let us know when Hoffman or someone else can actually prove that. In the meantime that hypothesis remains, as one critic of Hoffman wrote, merely "a framework for a hypothesis." The framework is an as-yet 'wild surmise' that everything evolved and developed in the physical world as we know it (not just on earth but increasingly far afield in the universe) can be accounted for by quantum mechanics, which remains a phenomenon not yet fully understood.
Do watch/listen to this 20-minute lecture by Antonio Damasio. Note: the poor quality of the audio is corrected about a third of the way into the video.
"Evolutionary Origins of Art and Aesthetics: Art and Emotions"
CARTA: Evolutionary Origins of Art and Aesthetics: Art and Emotions - Antonio Damasio
I'm not sure. Chalmers is In think heading in behind Searle and Nagel to become the grand old man of PoM. I've mostly seen him as MC/host/referee in videos of panels and I think he's writing is on "scrutability" and meta-philosophical issues/the state of philosophy.Steve [@smcder] or @Soupie, to your knowledge has Chalmers progressed in his thinking beyond the paper Steve linked recently:
Sentient Developments: David Chalmers: Consciousness is not substrate dependent
This might be relevant: Radiation-induced epigenetic DNA methylation modification of radiation-response pathways. - PubMed - NCBIExtract: "Since environmental epigenetics can promote both trait variation and mutations, it accelerates the engine of evolution in a way that Darwinian mechanisms alone cannot." The question that arises for me is the possible, potential, ways in which epigenetic changes might improve or enhance the adapatation of organisms for survival in stressed environmental circumstances, such as on Mars?
I am persuaded by neuroscience. Namely, the brain-based theory of perception.Soupie wrote: "So if consciousness doesn't supervene at the neural level—and it may not—why does it spend all its time hanging out there?"
What persuades you that it does? Or who so persuades you?
And here we may, as I've noted before, simply need to agree to disagree.Soupie also writes: "Why are we conscious of information in (physiological states of) the brain?"
We're not 'conscious of "information in our brain states"; we, like other animals, are conscious of the environing worldly mileau that we experience directly, including other beings and things within it whose existence and behavior we become better at interpreting and reacting to productively as we learn how to navigate, survive, and thrive in our given mileau.
Again, this is what our best science is telling us about perception (note: not necessarily consciousness).Soupie also wrote:
". . . perception is the process of the brain (or its equivalent in objective r) creating the most adaptive approximation of what's out there. This adaptive approximation will not capture all features of what's-out-there."
How can the neurons capture any features of what's out there since neurons, the physical brain itself, is never in contact with any of them?
I think our perception of environmental energies and environmental energies are very unlike one another.Soupie also wrote:
"we know that what's-out-there is unlike our experience/perception of what's-out-there."
How unlike can it be, though, since most animals coexisting with us are aware of the same physical structures [those produced by nature and those constructed by humans and by some other animals] and the same dynamic changes that take place in the weather systems in our shared environments [including electrical storms, hurricanes, earthquakes etc.] We know too that many animals possess more acute senses than we do about many impending dramatic changes, such as tsunamis. Animals also react to close approaches of ufos in ways similar to our reactions -- fear, confusion, backing away from the scene in most cases [and in some cases so shocked by the event that they won't leave the house they live in for days].
Again, I think we will have to agree to disagree. And I don't think we need to bring Hoffman's Interface Theory into the mix. The brain-based theory of perception suffices here.Soupie also wrote: "Colors, sounds, smells, tastes, feels, etc. are properties of the perceptual system, not properties of what's-out-there.."
No indeed. These phenomenal experiences are combined 'properties' of both the environing physical world and the natural affordances of our and other living species' sensorial access to it. They are the hallmarks of the phenomenological recognition that our experience in the world is a confluence and integration of subjective and objective poles of 'reality' as we experience it. Theorists [and hypothesis generators such as Hoffman], following the ideas nurtured in cognitive neuroscience and computational information theory, reduce and ultimately attempt to erase lived experience, attempt to define it out of existence. People who don't attend to what they are experiencing, and who do not reflect on the nature of their own experienced consciousness and its multiple facets and levels, are vulnerable to taking neuro/techno/'informational' models of consciousness seriously.
Again, note that while perception may be brain-based—and there's very good reason to believe it is—consciousness may not be. There's reason to believe it's not.You also wrote: "What neuroscientists have been increasingly discovering is that the contents of consciousness correlate with neurological processes."
I think, rather, that what they've long been engaged in is seeking evidence to support the presupposition that consciousness and mind can be reduced to brain activity, i.e., that in their discipline correlation amounts to causation. It's overreaching, and they should have known better. Meanwhile they have largely ignored the exploration, in biology and affective neuroscience, of correlations in protoconsciousness and consciousness as moving from bodily awareness and affectivity in primordial organism to the psychological tendencies in evolving species to react emotionally [at the level of feeling] to perceived events and situations, from threats by other animals to desires to exercise their individual aptitudes in obtaining what they need from a commonly shared environment [supportive niches, expanded territory, competition for mates, desires of various kinds]. The comprehension of what consciousness is absolutely requires the study and investigation of the evolution of consciousness in living species.
What would a brain that interacted directly with the world look like?I am persuaded by neuroscience. Namely, the brain-based theory of perception.
Note: In saying that perception is brain-based, one can still hold that consciousness is not brain-based. And indeed, that may be the case.
But why do I believe that consciousness may not be brain-based, but that the perceptual, affectual, and conceptual correlates of the contents of consciousness are located, quite literally, in brain physiology?
Most neuroscientists believe that consciousness supervenes at the neural network level. The reason for this is likely due to the fact that, as I say above, the contents of consciousness—subjective emotions, perceptions, and cognitions—appear to correlate very, very strongly with physiological processes of the brain, specifically neural processes.
What I'm wondering is the following: Okay, lets say the contents of consciousness have their physiological origin in the neural processes of the brain, but consciousness itself originates at a deeper physiological or even non-physiological level.
Why do the contents of consciousness correlate to physiological processes of the brain?
And here we may, as I've noted before, simply need to agree to disagree.
As I say, I subscribe to the brain-based theory of perception. I've linked to several articles over the months (years now?) that support this position.
Here is the theory in a nutshell:
The brain is a black box located securely within our skull. The brain does not interact directly with the environment. Rather, the sensory organs of organisms are attuned via evolution to various energies within their environment. These organs send information (via physiological processes) about the environmental energies to the brain. This information about the environment is filtered, predicted, modulated, attenuated, integrated, and organized in the brain.
The contents of our consciousness are correlated not with the environmental energies (as those energies never directly interact with the brain) but rather with physiological states of the brain.
Let's use the example of the sound of an explosion:
A bomb goes off. A wave moves through millions of air molecules. Seconds later these air waves reach our ears. Little hairs in our ears vibrate. These vibrations are transduced into electrochemical signals. These electrochemical signals are transduced into neural firingings.
What we are conscious of is, technically, not the bomb that went off two minutes ago. We are conscious of the physiological processes that are taking place in our brain because of the explosion.
Again, this is what our best science is telling us about perception (note: not necessarily consciousness).
Just exactly how neural networks capture features of whats out there isnt know, but the theory is pretty simple:
State X of the environment leads to state X1 in the neural networks of the brain.
Why neural networks? This seems to be the location within the organism where all incoming information about the environment is predicted, integrated, and organized. Etc.
I think our perception of environmental energies and environmental energies are very unlike one another.
By all accounts, point particles are devoid of sound, smell, taste, feel, color, etc. Our perceptions of environmental energies on the other hand are not devoid of such things, but rather consist of such things.
Again, I think we will have to agree to disagree. And I don't think we need to bring Hoffman's Interface Theory into the mix. The brain-based theory of perception suffices here.
As noted, colors, smells, sounds, etc. are not properties of environmentsl energies. These properties are not intrinsic to photons nor molecules existing "out there." Rather they are properties of our perceptual systems.
The extent to which a human and a cat have the same perceptual experience when interacting with the environment would seem to be contingent on the similarity and differences between their perceptual systems, not the state of the environment.
Again, note that while perception may be brain-based—and there's very good reason to believe it is—consciousness may not be. There's reason to believe it's not.
But if it's not, why does it seem to be anchored there. At least most of the time...