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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

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@Constance

are we focusing on:


  • Fundamental Awareness: A Framework for Integrating Science, Philosophy and Metaphysics
    Neil D. Theise, MD1 Menas C. Kafatos, PhD2

  • Sentience Everywhere: Complexity Theory, Panpsychism & the Role of Sentience in Self-Organization of the Universe
    Neil D. Theise*1 & Menas C. Kafatos2
1Departments of Pathology & of Medicine, Beth Israel Medical Center, Albert Einstein

... or both? I got a bit lost ...

I wish "Word" had a "marginalia" function ...

"I wish "Word" had a "marginalia" function."

This essay from The Guardian discusses the uses of marginalia and mentions some advances toward providing spaces for it in some online reading programs. Like the author of that piece, I too write in the margins of most of my own books [but not in library books] -- those concerning philosophy, POM, consciousness studies, and literary criticism and theory. Mainly I use the margins to add references, ask questions, or argue with the author. Word does provide us a means to do so when online texts come over as Word docs (not too often, unfortunately) but even pdfs can be copied into Word, where we can interpolate our own questions, arguments, etc., as we read. I do this very often with articles we discuss and others in the fields noted above. Word also enables the insertion of marginalia in the editing software, in a narrow column adjacent to the text in which one can write one's own responses to a portion of the text in balloons. I couldn't function without Word.

Re the two texts you ask about in your post, as I recall they are different versions of the selfsame argument bearing different titles. The first, more comprehensive, one is the one @Soupie linked for us. The latter, retitled from "Fundamental Awareness" to "Sentience Everywhere" is a shorter version, probably to comply with the limitations in length required by the journal in which it was published.
 
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"I wish "Word" had a "marginalia" function."

This essay from The Guardian discusses the uses of marginalia and mentions some advances toward providing spaces for it in some online reading programs. Like the author of that piece, I too write in the margins of most of my own books [but not in library books] -- those concerning philosophy, POM, consciousness studies, and literary criticism and theory. Mainly I use the margins to add references, ask questions, or argue with the author. Word does provide us a means to do so when online texts come over as Word docs (not too often, unfortunately) but even pdfs can be copied into Word, where we can interpolate our own questions, arguments, etc., as we read. I do this very often with articles we discuss and others in the fields noted above. Word also enables the insertion of marginalia in the editing software, in a narrow column adjacent to the text in which one can write one's own responses to a portion of the text in balloons. I couldn't function without Word.

Re the two texts you ask about in your post, as I recall they are different versions of the selfsame argument bearing different titles. The first, more comprehensive, one is the one @Soupie linked for us and is. The latter, retitled from "Fundamental Awareness" to "Sentience Everywhere" is a shorter version, probably to comply with the limitations in length required by the journal in which it was published.

@Constance ... Re: "Word also enables the insertion of marginalia in the editing software, in a narrow column adjacent to the text in which one can write one's own responses to a portion of the text in balloons." is that the "add note" function? lt sounds like we do similar things in Word with these texts ... I pull in PDFs too and add notes in a variety of ways. I've done that with the longer Thiese Kafatos text.
 
If you're referring to what you can do to Word documents in the 'Review' posture, yes. I've used the review posture in Word to edit other peoples' manuscripts typed in Word. Is that where you're seeing an 'add comment' function? In my Word program the command is 'new comment'.
 
If you're referring to what you can do to Word documents in the 'Review' posture, yes. I've used the review posture in Word to edit other peoples' manuscripts typed in Word. Is that where you're seeing an 'add comment' function? In my Word program the command is 'new. comment'.

Yes, it's "new comment".
 
Re these two paragraphs, which appear in the notes to Dreyfus's paper:

"John Searle formulates both a logical and phenomenological requirement for something to be an intentional state. The logical requirement is that each type of intentionality have its conditions of satisfaction [See J. Searle Intentionality]. My intentional state is satisfied if what I believe is true, what I remember happened, what I perceive is in front of me causing my visual experience, what I expect occurs, etc. The phenomenological requirement is that these conditions of satisfaction be represented in the mind, i.e., that they are structures of a conscious subject separate from, and standing over-against an object.

Merleau-Ponty would not dispute the logical requirement, but he would reject the phenomenological requirement. The question is whether all intentional content is mental content? If it were, one could describe the conditions of satisfaction of all mental intentional states apart from the question whether those conditions were satisfied, i.e., one could study the intentional correlates of all types of acts of consciousness in isolation from the world. This intentional content would be the condition of the possibility of objective experience in general, so Husserl would be justified in his imperturbable conviction that, by a detailed description of the intentional structure of consciousness, he could develop a transcendental phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of mental intentional content thus underlies his rejection of Husserl’s transcendental reduction."


I'm in doubt about the adequacy of Searle's -- and Dreyfus's -- understanding of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's contributions to phenomenological philosophy given Dreyfus's claim in this sentence:

"The phenomenological requirement is that these conditions of satisfaction be represented in the mind, i.e., that they are structures of a conscious subject separate from, and standing over-against an object."

Dreyfus (and Searle) might have drawn that conclusion from reading earlier texts of Husserl written before his later work. Merleau-Ponty did indeed reject H's concept of a 'transcendental ego' attainable through the 'transcendental reduction', but my understanding from both M-P and Dan Zahavi [the acknowledged expert exponent of the stages of Husserl's philosophy] is that Husserl himself revised his thinking in his later works, recognizing that in existentially lived experience we cannot 'transcend the object' through mental representation.

To think we can do so is to reify consciousness as capable of separating itself from the physical world of objects and others, counter to the world phenomenologically understood to be constituted mutually by -- 'worlded by' -- subjects and objects existing in chiasmic relationships with one another, as fully expressed in MP's later philosophy.
 
To clarify, in both the later Husserl and in Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is neither purely bodily nor purely mental; the mind-body dualism is overcome in phenomenology.
 
... the mind-body dualism is overcome in phenomenology.
Claiming that mind-body dualism is overcome by phenomenology is a bit of a stretch. Rather than overcome dualism, it seems to me more like it rejects the classical notion of dualism and attempts to explain the situation from a different vantage point using different terms. To me rejecting and overcoming are not synonymous.

It's worthwhile to consider phenomenology, but ultimately it doesn't change the situation that minds and bodies can still be viewed as distinctly different types of phenomena ( or objects or whatever other synonym is relevant ). The only way to eliminate dualism that I've run across is to adopt Subjective Idealism, which IMO would be utterly ridiculous. At any rate, I don't see how eliminating dualism advances us any closer to our unobtainable dinner. Dualism is easily enough addressed simply by accepting that it exists, and then by not letting ourselves get roped into arbitrary self-serving paradigms that claim to show otherwise.


A Couple of Papers:


- The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
- MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY
 
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Re these two paragraphs, which appear in the notes to Dreyfus's paper:

"John Searle formulates both a logical and phenomenological requirement for something to be an intentional state. The logical requirement is that each type of intentionality have its conditions of satisfaction [See J. Searle Intentionality]. My intentional state is satisfied if what I believe is true, what I remember happened, what I perceive is in front of me causing my visual experience, what I expect occurs, etc. The phenomenological requirement is that these conditions of satisfaction be represented in the mind, i.e., that they are structures of a conscious subject separate from, and standing over-against an object.

Merleau-Ponty would not dispute the logical requirement, but he would reject the phenomenological requirement. The question is whether all intentional content is mental content? If it were, one could describe the conditions of satisfaction of all mental intentional states apart from the question whether those conditions were satisfied, i.e., one could study the intentional correlates of all types of acts of consciousness in isolation from the world. This intentional content would be the condition of the possibility of objective experience in general, so Husserl would be justified in his imperturbable conviction that, by a detailed description of the intentional structure of consciousness, he could develop a transcendental phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of mental intentional content thus underlies his rejection of Husserl’s transcendental reduction."


I'm in doubt about the adequacy of Searle's -- and Dreyfus's -- understanding of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's contributions to phenomenological philosophy given Dreyfus's claim in this sentence:

"The phenomenological requirement is that these conditions of satisfaction be represented in the mind, i.e., that they are structures of a conscious subject separate from, and standing over-against an object."

Dreyfus (and Searle) might have drawn that conclusion from reading earlier texts of Husserl written before his later work. Merleau-Ponty did indeed reject H's concept of a 'transcendental ego' attainable through the 'transcendental reduction', but my understanding from both M-P and Dan Zahavi [the acknowledged expert exponent of the stages of Husserl's philosophy] is that Husserl himself revised his thinking in his later works, recognizing that in existentially lived experience we cannot 'transcend the object' through mental representation.

To think we can do so is to reify consciousness as capable of separating itself from the physical world of objects and others, counter to the world phenomenologically understood to be constituted mutually by -- 'worlded by' -- subjects and objects existing in chiasmic relationships with one another, as fully expressed in MP's later philosophy.

... What do you make of his concluding remarks from


The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment

"The odds against such a net being able to generalize as we do, and so learn to classify situations and affordances as we do, to distinguish the relevant and irrelevant, to pick up on what is obvious to us etc., are overwhelming. In our world the cards are stacked to enable entities that share our embodied form of life to learn to cope in a way we find intelligent, while leaving all other creatures behind as, to us, hopelessly stupid.


The moral is that the way brains acquire skills from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours. So it seems that we must supplement Merleau-Ponty’s account of the "I can" and the tendency towards maximum grip by an account of those aspects of our body-structure that lead us to respond to certain inputs as similar if we are finally to understand how human beings are able to project a shared world around themselves in what Merleau-Ponty calls an intentional arc."

?
 
SEP has an article entitled "Consciousness and Intentionality" that is comprehensively helpful in examining the ways in which these terms are variously used in Consciousness Studies.

Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Very helpful in showing me how muddled my idea of "intentionality is ...

section 2: interpretation of intentionality
  • confusing and contentious usage
  • not the same as every day use
defined: that aspect of mental states or events that consists in their being of or about things
  • Franz Brentano et al: intentionality conceived as "directedness"
  • distinguishing these senses of about, of, directed from everyday usage ...
  • distinguishing the way thought refers from the way names and descriptions do
  • ... and how this applies to the senses; does the mind refer to what we see or touch
  • unifying the notion of intentionality
etc.



 
SEP has an article entitled "Consciousness and Intentionality" that is comprehensively helpful in examining the ways in which these terms are variously used in Consciousness Studies.

Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

10 Things Wrong With Environmental Thinking: Merleau-Ponty and a Critique of Science

That Merleau-Ponty, among the continental philosophers, was uniquely hospitable to science is a commonplace observation in commentary on his work.
...
Although the lecture notes on Nature complicates a claim that the mature Merleau-Ponty had, in his later career, tempered his regard for scientific resources, nevertheless in his final published essay Eye and Mind starts with a succinct and forceful critique of science.

"Science manipulates things and gives up living in them. It makes it own limited models of things; operating upon these indices or variables to effect whatever transformations are permitted by their definition, it comes face to face with the real world only at rare intervals. Science is and always has been that admirably active, ingenious, and bold way of thinking whose fundamental bias is to treat everything as though it were an object-in-general – as though it meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for our use." - Merleau Ponty
 
What is the 'unobtainable dinner' you've been hoping for?

From urology's post of Nov 21 in p. 7 of this thread:

"The question of what consciousness is in terms of how it is defined and what it's physical makeup might be has reached the point where further advancement on those specific points doesn't seem possible. What does seem possible is to clarify one of the issues @Constance raised, which is the issue of correlation. It has some relevance to her recent positinghere. Virtually everything we experience is correlative, which makes the point purely academic. So invoking correlation as an objection serves no practical purpose.

More specifically, the nature of correlation ultimately leads to the question of the fundamental existence all things, and consequently, on that level, consciousness is no more possible to figure out than anything else. It just leaves us scratching at the unsolvable problem of getting our unreachable dinner. What we cando however is map the correlations of consciousness to the physical environment where consciousness is in the picture, and from there create experiments that might lead to practical applications, like for medicine and AI.

How this relates to the paranormal suggests, to the point of qualifying as proof for many, that paranormal subject matter such as OOBEs, afterlives, reincarnation, and remote viewing, are not the result of non-local consciousness or continuity of personhood beyond the death of the body, but the result of experiences that have taken place wholly within living experiencers whose minds are correlated to their functioning brains. The confusion seems to arise when the content of the local experience is correlated to some place other than the location of the living person."
 
... What do you make of his concluding remarks from


The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment

"The odds against such a net being able to generalize as we do, and so learn to classify situations and affordances as we do, to distinguish the relevant and irrelevant, to pick up on what is obvious to us etc., are overwhelming. In our world the cards are stacked to enable entities that share our embodied form of life to learn to cope in a way we find intelligent, while leaving all other creatures behind as, to us, hopelessly stupid.


The moral is that the way brains acquire skills from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours. So it seems that we must supplement Merleau-Ponty’s account of the "I can" and the tendency towards maximum grip by an account of those aspects of our body-structure that lead us to respond to certain inputs as similar if we are finally to understand how human beings are able to project a shared world around themselves in what Merleau-Ponty calls an intentional arc."

?

"The moral is that the way brains acquire skills from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours."

I haven't read as much of Dreyfus as you have but, if that statement expresses his ultimate claim and the core of his interest in writing about phenomenology, I have to say that he misses most of what phenomenology has to offer in its description and analysis of the stages of developing consciousness of world and self. I too have thought that AI could not come remotely close to human and animal consciousness if it were not 'embodied', but I think that would have to mean embodied in the organic way in which animals and humans are -- as natural organisms evolved out of nature and therefore open to the sensed character of the naturally environing world.

In other words, to develop the capacities of natural consciousness for connections with and interactions with natural beings, an AI would have to be 'born' organically into the world in some way and nurtured caringly by its human sponsors. How long does it take, how many meaningful interactions are needed over 20-26 years, for a human infant to develop capable and insightful consciousness of the meaning of its own existence and the existence of other living beings, and to care about the conditions and survival of life itself as most adult humans do? AI engineers might find ways supplement the capacities of this AI's developing consciousness and resulting mind, but I think they would have to begin with the senses and affordances provided by nature to living beings before they could expect consciousness and mind to emerge.
 
"The moral is that the way brains acquire skills from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours."

I haven't read as much of Dreyfus as you have but, if that statement expresses his ultimate claim and the core of his interest in writing about phenomenology, I have to say that he misses most of what phenomenology has to offer in its description and analysis of the stages of developing consciousness of world and self. I too have thought that AI could not come remotely close to human and animal consciousness if it were not 'embodied', but I think that would have to mean embodied in the organic way in which animals and humans are -- as natural organisms evolved out of nature and therefore open to the sensed character of the naturally environing world.

In other words, to develop the capacities of natural consciousness for connections with and interactions with natural beings, an AI would have to be 'born' organically into the world in some way and nurtured caringly by its human sponsors. How long does it take, how many meaningful interactions are needed over 20-26 years, for a human infant to develop capable and insightful consciousness of the meaning of its own existence and the existence of other living beings, and to care about the conditions and survival of life itself as most adult humans do? AI engineers might find ways supplement the capacities of this AI's developing consciousness and resulting mind, but I think they would have to begin with the senses and affordances provided by nature to living beings before they could expect consciousness and mind to emerge.

I'm very interested in MPs critique of science and in his late thinking ... And if anyone has carried on the later ideas? Todes?
 
Very helpful in showing me how muddled my idea of "intentionality is ...

section 2: interpretation of intentionality
  • confusing and contentious usage
  • not the same as every day use
defined: that aspect of mental states or events that consists in their being of or about things
  • Franz Brentano et al: intentionality conceived as "directedness"
  • distinguishing these senses of about, of, directed from everyday usage ...
  • distinguishing the way thought refers from the way names and descriptions do
  • ... and how this applies to the senses; does the mind refer to what we see or touch
  • unifying the notion of intentionality
etc.

I think that in order to understand 'intentionality' as an evolving characteristic of living animals and humans possessing/possessed of consciousness we need to look to biological and evolutionary theorists such as Jacob von Uexkull and Jaak Panksepp, both of whom we have cited in earlier parts of this thread.

We also need to examine and compare all of the various interpretations of 'intentionality' described in that SEP article if we are to come closer to understanding the motivations, the desire, of various living beings to comprehend the nature of the given natural worlds/niches in which they live -- in Stevens's words "the shape of things as they are" as they emerge differently given the affordances of perception in different biological species and in individual beings. We see things as we see them, phenomenally, based in the sensual affordances that enable us to find our way in the world/our distinct worlds and, farther along in evolution, enable us to reflect on and think about our actual situation in being and Being, thus enabling our sciences, philosophies, and arts to further explore the structures of nature and of embodied consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, all living creatures "sing the world" in their own ways.
 
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I think that in order to understand 'intentionality' as an evolving characteristic of living animals and humans possessing/possessed of consciousness we need to look to biological and evolutionary theorists such as Jacob von Uexkull and Jaak Panksepp, both of whom we have cited in earlier parts of this thread.

We also need to examine and compare all of the various interpretations of 'intentionality' described in that SEP article if we are to come closer to understanding the motivations, the desire, of various living beings to comprehend the nature of the given natural worlds/niches in which they live -- in Stevens's words "the shape of things as they are" as they emerge differently given the affordances of perception in different biological species and in individual beings. We see things as we see them, phenomenally, based in the sensual affordances that enable us to find our way in the world/our distinct worlds and, farther along in evolution, enable us to reflect on and think about our actual situation in being and Being, thus enabling our sciences, philosophies, and arts to further explore the structures of nature and of embodied consciousness. For Merleau-Ponty, all living creatures "sing the world" in their own ways.

"Uexküll's ideas about how organisms create their own concept of time are described inPeter Høeg's novel Borderliners, and contrasted with Isaac Newton's view of time as something that exists independent of life."
 
"Uexküll's ideas about how organisms create their own concept of time are described inPeter Høeg's novel Borderliners, and contrasted with Isaac Newton's view of time as something that exists independent of life."

This poem by Auden is most apt to describe our current situation:


SEPTEMBER 1, 1939
by W.H. Auden

I sit in one of the dives
On Fifty-second Street
Uncertain and afraid
As the clever hopes expire
Of a low dishonest decade:
Waves of anger and fear
Circulate over the bright
And darkened lands of the earth,
Obsessing our private lives;
The unmentionable odour of death
Offends the September night.

Accurate scholarship can
Unearth the whole offence
From Luther until now
That has driven a culture mad,
Find what occurred at Linz,
What huge imago made
A psychopathic god:
I and the public know
What all schoolchildren learn,
Those to whom evil is done
Do evil in return.

Exiled Thucydides knew
All that a speech can say
About Democracy,
And what dictators do,
The elderly rubbish they talk
To an apathetic grave;
Analysed all in his book,
The enlightenment driven away,
The habit-forming pain,
Mismanagement and grief:
We must suffer them all again.

Into this neutral air
Where blind skyscrapers use
Their full height to proclaim
The strength of Collective Man,
Each language pours its vain
Competitive excuse:
But who can live for long
In an euphoric dream;
Out of the mirror they stare,
Imperialism's face
And the international wrong.

Faces along the bar
Cling to their average day:
The lights must never go out,
The music must always play,
All the conventions conspire
To make this fort assume
The furniture of home;
Lest we should see where we are,
Lost in a haunted wood,
Children afraid of the night
Who have never been happy or good.

The windiest militant trash
Important Persons shout
Is not so crude as our wish:
What mad Nijinsky wrote
About Diaghilev
Is true of the normal heart;
For the error bred in the bone
Of each woman and each man
Craves what it cannot have,
Not universal love
But to be loved alone.

From the conservative dark
Into the ethical life
The dense commuters come,
Repeating their morning vow;
'I will be true to the wife,
I'll concentrate more on my work,'
And helpless governors wake
To resume their compulsory game:
Who can release them now,
Who can reach the dead,
Who can speak for the dumb?

All I have is a voice
To undo the folded lie,
The romantic lie in the brain
Of the sensual man-in-the-street
And the lie of Authority
Whose buildings grope the sky:
There is no such thing as the State
And no one exists alone;
Hunger allows no choice
To the citizen or the police;
We must love one another or die.

Defenseless under the night
Our world in stupor lies;
Yet, dotted everywhere,
Ironic points of light
Flash out wherever the Just
Exchange their messages:
May I, composed like them
Of Eros and of dust,
Beleaguered by the same
Negation and despair,
Show an affirming flame.
 
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