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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

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"The moral is that the way brains acquire skills from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours."

I haven't read as much of Dreyfus as you have but, if that statement expresses his ultimate claim and the core of his interest in writing about phenomenology, I have to say that he misses most of what phenomenology has to offer in its description and analysis of the stages of developing consciousness of world and self. I too have thought that AI could not come remotely close to human and animal consciousness if it were not 'embodied', but I think that would have to mean embodied in the organic way in which animals and humans are -- as natural organisms evolved out of nature and therefore open to the sensed character of the naturally environing world.

In other words, to develop the capacities of natural consciousness for connections with and interactions with natural beings, an AI would have to be 'born' organically into the world in some way and nurtured caringly by its human sponsors. How long does it take, how many meaningful interactions are needed over 20-26 years, for a human infant to develop capable and insightful consciousness of the meaning of its own existence and the existence of other living beings, and to care about the conditions and survival of life itself as most adult humans do? AI engineers might find ways supplement the capacities of this AI's developing consciousness and resulting mind, but I think they would have to begin with the senses and affordances provided by nature to living beings before they could expect consciousness and mind to emerge.

AI engineers create things...things have a habit of creating themselves. We are already proof that things are "willing" (and have done so already) to create "selves" out of things that do not have a "will"... this is the only step that mystifies "creators"...as though they were needed in the first place.
 
What is the 'unobtainable dinner' you've been hoping for?
The "unobtainable dinner" analogy goes back to our discussion here, in particular a reference to attempting to explain "the nature of the Being of all that is", including consciousness, which, depending on how one frames that question, is an impossible task. We cannot know from firsthand experience if anything or anyone other than ourselves is conscious and we cannot know how existence itself came into being. Yet some people continue to scratch at these problems like the cats in the intelligence test I had alluded to, where unlike dogs, they do not seem to comprehend that their dinner cannot be obtained.
 
Perhaps you would be more amenable to Kafatos's theory. Have you read the Kafatos and Thiese papers linked recently in this thread? You'll find them if you track back about a week or so.
Maybe, but I am not as well read up on this subject as you all are...I am a spectator/troll who throws in half-baked ideas from time to time :)
 
What I really think...
Humans need an explanation for existence and the totality that it deems as "reality" (i.e. the entire framework which allows their own dasein to make "sense" of the same). The weakness in our approach may lie in the very nature of our own questioning and "care" of the same...finding a fundamental "ground" of being that supports dasein and yet is NOT dasein may be impossible when we assume that the framework provided required de-sign. For us, to design something is fundamentally negation of the objects existence (a re-purposing of matter for tools that sustain our existence directly or indirectly). De-sign...the word is an accidental pun on what we do to the inert objects to convert them to a purpose for our own effort. Whatever "sign" or purpose for the matter prior was decommissioned and brought into service for us--the act simultaneously removes its original accidental cause-effect relations with the world and put it squarely into our own (i.e. iron > steel > structures > buildngs) ...that same matter which was a waste product from stars dying (see "stellar nucleosynthesis") is something vital to our collective human world of existence (at least today). Consciousness will always question the ground of its existence and find nothing to support it...primarily because the actual framework of the questioning was a de-signation of the world (and itself) to begin with. To ask the question of purpose requires a foundation for the questioning itself: but that foundation cannot exist in the world of things "accepted" by the same consciousness. The foundation of consciousness must find itself in the same "things" repulsive to its nature--i.e. in the very unquestionables that accidentally ascended to the level of simple questioning.
 
The "unobtainable dinner" analogy goes back to our discussion here, in particular a reference to attempting to explain "the nature of the Being of all that is", including consciousness, which, depending on how one frames that question, is an impossible task. We cannot know from firsthand experience if anything or anyone other than ourselves is conscious and we cannot know how existence itself came into being. Yet some people continue to scratch at these problems like the cats in the intelligence test I had alluded to, where unlike dogs, they do not seem to comprehend that their dinner cannot be obtained.

You must never have lived with cats (or at least not attentively) to reach your conclusions about the difference you assert between their levels of intelligence and understanding.

Similarly, you haven't lived with (i.e., attentively read) phenomenological philosophy, or you wouldn't continue to misunderstand it so drastically. Anticipating your next question, my answer is 'no, I cannot and will not provide you with a Cliff's Notes for phenomenological philosophy'.
 
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You must never have lived with cats (or at least not attentively) to reach your conclusions about the difference you assert between their levels of intelligence and understanding.

Similarly, you haven't lived with (i.e., attentively read) phenomenological philosophy, or you wouldn't continue to misunderstand it so drastically. Anticipating your next question, my answer is 'no, I cannot and will not provide you with a Cliff's Notes for phenomenological philosophy.
Well...tell him that we may actually comprehend the answer to the question by disposing of the structures implied by the question--once the foundation of questioning is laid bare the answers sought become obvious (or null).
 
The weakness in our approach may lie in the very nature of our own questioning and "care" of the same...finding a fundamental "ground" of being that supports dasein and yet is NOT dasein may be impossible when we assume that the framework provided required de-sign.

I think you should read Kafatos-Theise's papers linked here recently. They do not claim that intelligent design was required to produce the increasing complexity we recognize in natural forces, fields, and systems or in living beings evolving in complexity toward consciousness and mind in our biological history. Kafatos in particular is at pains to simply describe what has happened since the 'Big Bang' in the production of the universe/cosmos we exist in to the extent we are presently capable of comprehending its history. Try it; you might like it.
 
You must never have lived with cats (or at least not attentively) to reach your conclusions about the difference you assert between their levels of intelligence and understanding.
The study I alluded to was independent and therefore bias either way isn't a factor. I suppose you could dispute the results of the experiment that I alluded to, but I'm not the one to take that up with. I just referred to it in order to illustrate the point that some animals don't appear to be smart enough to realize that a problem is beyond their ability to solve. BTW I have lived with both cats and dogs. I love them both.
Similarly, you haven't lived with (i.e., attentively read) phenomenological philosophy, or you wouldn't continue to misunderstand it so drastically. Anticipating your next question, my answer is 'no, I cannot and will not provide you with a Cliff's Notes for phenomenological philosophy.
Your claim that I drastically misunderstand phenomenology is not substantiated by references to any specific errors or anything else. It seems to be entirely an assumption, like that I've never lived with cats. So rather than making unfounded assumptions to validate personal opinions, perhaps in this discussion, applying some critical thinking to specific issues as they are stated would be more advantageous.
 
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"The moral is that the way brains acquire skills from input-output pairings can be simulated by neural-networks, but such nets will not be able to acquire our skills until they have been put into robots with a body structure like ours."

I haven't read as much of Dreyfus as you have but, if that statement expresses his ultimate claim and the core of his interest in writing about phenomenology, I have to say that he misses most of what phenomenology has to offer in its description and analysis of the stages of developing consciousness of world and self. I too have thought that AI could not come remotely close to human and animal consciousness if it were not 'embodied', but I think that would have to mean embodied in the organic way in which animals and humans are -- as natural organisms evolved out of nature and therefore open to the sensed character of the naturally environing world.

In other words, to develop the capacities of natural consciousness for connections with and interactions with natural beings, an AI would have to be 'born' organically into the world in some way and nurtured caringly by its human sponsors. How long does it take, how many meaningful interactions are needed over 20-26 years, for a human infant to develop capable and insightful consciousness of the meaning of its own existence and the existence of other living beings, and to care about the conditions and survival of life itself as most adult humans do? AI engineers might find ways supplement the capacities of this AI's developing consciousness and resulting mind, but I think they would have to begin with the senses and affordances provided by nature to living beings before they could expect consciousness and mind to emerge.

I think of the ethics of bringing an AI consciousness into the world. The comment by Pearl about consciousness giving a cognitive advantage so that robots could be better soccer players ...
 
Well...tell him that we may actually comprehend the answer to the question by disposing of the structures implied by the question--once the foundation of questioning is laid bare the answers sought become obvious (or null).
Without seeing the specific question, there is no way to know what structures you're talking about. So I'm left to assume that you are alluding to what is described in general as the phenomenological attitude.
For example: http://lindafinlay.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-phenomenological-attitude.pdf
Good guess?
 
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Well...tell him that we may actually comprehend the answer to the question by disposing of the structures implied by the question--once the foundation of questioning is laid bare the answers sought become obvious (or null).

I sense that that is the idea, the formulation, by which your thinking of your existence, your being, is constrained. Perhaps poetry works for you, especially useful if you appreciate ideas turned and turned in the dialogue about reality, either with yourself or someone else. In case poetry works for you better than philosophy, I offer you Part 1 of Wallace Stevens's Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, dedicated at the outset to a friend of Stevens's with whom he could explore his interrogations of what is real. The poem consists of three cantos, each ten stanzas long. I'll post the first canto (and later the second and third if anyone here desires to read it all).


Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction

To Henry Church

And for what, except for you, do I feel love?
Do I press the extremest book of the wisest man
Close to me, hidden in me day and night?
In the uncertain light of single, certain truth,
Equal in living changingness to the light
In which I meet you, in which we sit at rest,
For a moment in the central of our being,
The vivid transparence that you bring is peace.


"It Must Be Abstract


I

Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea
Of this invention, this invented world,
The inconceivable idea of the sun.

You must become an ignorant man again
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye
And see it clearly in the idea of it.

Never suppose an inventing mind as source
Of this idea nor for that mind compose
A voluminous master folded in his fire.

How clean the sun when seen in its idea,
Washed in the remotest cleanliness of a heaven
That has expelled us and our images . . .

The death of one god is the death of all.
Let purple Phoebus lie in umber harvest,
Let Phoebus slumber and die in autumn umber,

Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was
A name for something that never could be named.
There was a project for the sun and is.

There is a project for the sun. The sun
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be
In the difficulty of what it is to be.

II

It is the celestial ennui of apartments
That sends us back to the first idea, the quick
Of this invention; and yet so poisonous

Are the ravishments of truth, so fatal to
The truth itself, the first idea becomes
The hermit in a poet’s metaphors,

Who comes and goes and comes and goes all day.
May there be an ennui of the first idea?
What else, prodigious scholar, should there be?

The monastic man is an artist. The philosopher
Appoints man’s place in music, say, today.
But the priest desires. The philosopher desires.

And not to have is the beginning of desire.
To have what is not is its ancient cycle.
It is desire at the end of winter, when

It observes the effortless weather turning blue
And sees the myosotis on its bush.
Being virile, it hears the calendar hymn.

It knows that what it has is what is not
And throws it away like a thing of another time,
As morning throws off stale moonlight and shabby sleep.


III

The poem refreshes life so that we share,
For a moment, the first idea . . . It satisfies
Belief in an immaculate beginning

And sends us, winged by an unconscious will,
To an immaculate end. We move between these points:
From that ever-early candor to its late plural

And the candor of them is the strong exhilaration
Of what we feel from what we think, of thought
Beating in the heart, as if blood newly came,

An elixir, an excitation, a pure power.
The poem, through candor, brings back a power again
That gives a candid kind to everything.

We say: At night an Arabian in my room,
With his damned hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how,
Inscribes a primitive astronomy

Across the unscrawled fores the future casts
And throws his stars around the floor. By day
The wood-dove used to chant his hoobla-hoo

And still the grossest iridescence of ocean
Howls hoo and rises and howls hoo and falls.
Life’s nonsense pierces us with strange relation.


IV

The first idea was not our own. Adam
In Eden was the father of Descartes
And Eve made air the mirror of herself,

Of her sons and of her daughters. They found themselves
In heaven as in a glass; a second earth;
And in the earth itself they found a green—

The inhabitants of a very varnished green.
But the first idea was not to shape the clouds
In imitation. The clouds preceded us.

There was a muddy centre before we breathed.
There was a myth before the myth began,
Venerable and articulate and complete.

From this the poem springs: that we live in a place
That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days.

We are the mimics. Clouds are pedagogues.
The air is not a mirror but bare board,
Coulisse bright-dark, tragic chiaroscuro

And comic color of the rose, in which
Abysmal instruments make sounds like pips
Of the sweeping meanings that we add to them.


V

The lion roars at the enraging desert,
Reddens the sand with his red-colored noise,
Defies red emptiness to evolve his match,

Master by foot and jaws and by the mane,
Most supple challenger. The elephant
Breaches the darkness of Ceylon with blares,

The glitter-goes on surfaces of tanks,
Shattering velvetest far-away. The bear,
The ponderous cinnamon, snarls in his mountain

At summer thunder and sleeps through winter snow.
But you, ephebe, look from your attic window,
Your mansard with a rented piano. You lie

In silence upon your bed. You clutch the corner
Of the pillow in your hand. You writhe and press
A bitter utterance from your writhing, dumb,

Yet voluble of dumb violence. You look
Across the roofs as sigil and as ward
And in your centre mark them and are cowed . . .

These are the heroic children whom time breeds
Against the first idea—to lash the lion,
Caparison elephants, teach bears to juggle.


VI

Not to be realized because not to
Be seen, not to be loved nor hated because
Not to be realized. Weather by Franz Hals,

Brushed up by brushy winds in brushy clouds,
Wetted by blue, colder for white. Not to
Be spoken to, without a roof, without

First fruits, without the virginal of birds,
The dark-blown ceinture loosened, not relinquished.
Gay is, gay was, the gay forsythia

And yellow, yellow thins the Northern blue.
Without a name and nothing to be desired,
If only imagined but imagined well.

My house has changed a little in the sun.
The fragrance of the magnolias come close,
False flick, false form, but falseness close to kin.

It must be visible or invisible,
Invisible or visible or both:
A seeing and unseeing in the eye.

The weather and the giant of the weather,
Say the weather, the mere weather, the mere air:
An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought.


VII

It feels good as it is without the giant,
A thinker of the first idea. Perhaps
The truth depends on a walk around a lake,

A composing as the body tires, a stop
To see hepatica, a stop to watch
A definition growing certain and

A wait within that certainty, a rest
In the swags of pine-trees bordering the lake.
Perhaps there are times of inherent excellence,

As when the cock crows on the left and all
Is well, incalculable balances,
At which a kind of Swiss perfection comes

And a familiar music of the machine
Sets up its Schwarmerei, not balances
That we achieve but balances that happen,

As a man and woman meet and love forthwith.
Perhaps there are moments of awakening,
Extreme, fortuitous, personal, in which

We more than awaken, sit on the edge of sleep,
As on an elevation, and behold
The academies like structures in a mist.


VIII

Can we compose a castle-fortress-home,
Even with the help of Viollet-le-Duc,
And see the MacCullough there as major man?

The first idea is an imagined thing.
The pensive giant prone in violet space
May be the MacCullough, an expedient,

Logos and logic, crystal hypothesis,
Incipit and a form to speak the word
And every latent double in the word,

Beau linguist. But the MacCullough is MacCullough.
It does not follow that major man is man.
If MacCullough himself lay lounging by the sea,

Drowned in its washes, reading in the sound,
About the thinker of the first idea,
He might take habit, whether from wave or phrase,

Or power of the wave, or deepened speech,
Or a leaner being, moving in on him,
Of greater aptitude and apprehension,

As if the waves at last were never broken,
As if the language suddenly, with ease,
Said things it had laboriously spoken.


IX

The romantic intoning, the declaimed clairvoyance
Are parts of apotheosis, appropriate
And of its nature, the idiom thereof.

They differ from reason’s click-clack, its applied
Enflashings. But apotheosis is not
The origin of the major man. He comes,

Compact in invincible foils, from reason,
Lighted at midnight by the studious eye,
Swaddled in revery, the object of

The hum of thoughts evaded in the mind,
Hidden from other thoughts, he that reposes
On a breast forever precious for that touch,

For whom the good of April falls tenderly,
Falls down, the cock-birds calling at the time.
My dame, sing for this person accurate songs.

He is and may be but oh! He is, he is,
This foundling of the infected past, so bright,
So moving in the manner of his hand.

Yet look not at his colored eyes. Give him
No names. Dismiss him from your images.
The hot of him is purest in the heart.


X

The major abstraction is the idea of man
And major man is its exponent, abler
In the abstract than in his singular,

More fecund as principle than particle,
Happy fecundity, flor-abundant force,
In being more than an exception, part,

Though an heroic part, of the commonal.
The major abstraction is the commonal,
The inanimate, difficult visage. Who is it?

What rabbi, grown furious with human wish,
What chieftain, walking by himself, crying
Most miserable, most victorious,

Does not see these separate figures one by one,
And yet see only one, in his old coat,
His slouching pantaloons, beyond the town,

Looking for what was, where it used to be?
Cloudless the morning. It is he. The man
In that old coat, those sagging pantaloons,

It is of him, ephebe, to make, to confect
The final elegance, not to console
Nor sanctify, but plainly to propound.
 
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The "unobtainable dinner" analogy goes back to our discussion here, in particular a reference to attempting to explain "the nature of the Being of all that is", including consciousness, which, depending on how one frames that question, is an impossible task. We cannot know from firsthand experience if anything or anyone other than ourselves is conscious and we cannot know how existence itself came into being. Yet some people continue to scratch at these problems like the cats in the intelligence test I had alluded to, where unlike dogs, they do not seem to comprehend that their dinner cannot be obtained.
Referring back to the original cat/dog post and the distinction between consciousness and the nature of being. You are on the money Usual suspect ... two separate issues. Explaining one does not explore the other, and exploring one does not explain the other. They are unrelated.
Concerning the point made here, if the food was attainable both to the cat and the dog neither would pretend the food was unattainable: Those of us who are not skeptics assume that the problems worth pursuing are those that have not been answered. More to the point, we find little fun in the chase where the mouse is already dead
 
Overview
Body and World is the definitive edition of a book that should now take its place as a major contribution to contemporary existential phenomenology. Samuel Todes goes beyond Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his description of how independent physical nature and experience are united in our bodily action. His account allows him to preserve the authority of experience while avoiding the tendency towards idealism that threatens both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.Todes emphasizes the complex structure of the human body; front/back asymmetry, the need to balance in a gravitational field, and so forth; and the role that structure plays in producing the spatiotemporal field of experience and in making possible objective knowledge of the objects in it. He shows that perception involves nonconceptual, but nonetheless objective forms of judgment. One can think of Body and World as fleshing out Merleau-Ponty's project while presciently relating it to the current interest in embodiment, not only in philosophy but also in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Todes's work opens new ways of thinking about problems such as the relation of perception to thought and the possibility of knowing an independent reality; problems that have occupied philosophers since Kant and still concern analytic and continental philosophy.
 
I sense that that is the idea, the formulation, by which your thinking of your existence, your being, is constrained. Perhaps poetry works for you, especially useful if you appreciate ideas turned and turned in the dialogue about reality, either with yourself or someone else. In case poetry works for you better than philosophy, I offer you Part 1 of Wallace Stevens's Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, dedicated at the outset to a friend of Stevens's with whom he could explore his interrogations of what is real. The poem consists of three cantos, each ten stanzas long. I'll post the first canto (and later the second and third if anyone here desires to read it all).

Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction

To Henry Church

And for what, except for you, do I feel love?
Do I press the extremest book of the wisest man
Close to me, hidden in me day and night?
In the uncertain light of single, certain truth,
Equal in living changingness to the light
In which I meet you, in which we sit at rest,
For a moment in the central of our being,
The vivid transparence that you bring is peace.

...


It is of him, ephebe, to make, to confect
The final elegance, not to console
Nor sanctify, but plainly to propound.

Wallace Stevens' Voice Was "Life-Saving"

When I first heard Wallace Stevens’ voice it was by chance: a friend wanted to listen to the recording he had made for the Harvard Vocarium Series. In a listening room in the Harvard Library, the quiet authority of his voice entered my mind like a life-saving transfusion: “Sister and mother and diviner love. . . .” In my younger days, I had been insusceptible to the idea that there were thirteen ways of looking at a blackbird; Stevens’ sophistications were beyond me then. Hearing him read many poems aloud naturalized me in his world.


“Notes toward a Supreme Fiction” was the first of Stevens’ sequences that I struggled with. I was, as a graduate student, enrolled in a seminar on Pope’s poetry, but my whole mind was on Stevens. I asked my teacher, Reuben Brower, whether I could write my final paper on didactic poetry, taking as my examples “An Essay on Criticism” and “Notes toward a Supreme Fiction.” He indulgently allowed this bizarre intrusion of Stevens into the eighteenth century, and I am still grateful to him; the paper became the core of my eventual book on Stevens’ longer poems.

Part III of “Notes”—“It Must Give Pleasure”—was recorded by the Y during Stevens’ reading there on November 6, 1954. Now, listening to him enter upon this strange and difficult poem, I am surprised that he expected it to be understood by his audience—or perhaps he didn’t. When one of his colleagues (according to the oral biography) complained to Stevens that he didn’t understand his poetry, Stevens answered (as I recall): “That doesn’t matter; what matters is whether I understand it.” And he was of course right: over time, poems clarify themselves, and sophomores read “The Waste Land.”

....

...PennSound: C.K. Wallace Stevens
 
...infants ... and animals ... and experts ... oh my!

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/pdf/Dreyfus APA Address 10.22.05 .pdf

"McDowell has taught us a lot about what is special about human experience and he has raised the crucial question
  • as to how perception grounds knowledge.

But he has left aside how the nonconceptual perceptual and coping skills we share with animals and infants open us to a reality more basic than knowledge. Given the availability of rich descriptions of perceptual affordances and of everyday know-how, however, couldn’t analytic philosophers profit from pursuing the question of how these nonconceptual capacities are converted into conceptual ones — how minds grow out of being-in-the-world — rather than denying the existence of the nonconceptual?

  • Conversely, phenomenology needs help from the analysts.
Phenomenologists lack a detailed and convincing account of how rationality and language grow out of non-conceptual and nonlinguistic coping. Heidegger made a start and Todes sharpened the question and made important suggestions, but he didn’t live to work out the details.

The lack of any worked out step-by-step genesis of the conceptual categories that structure the space of reasons from the perceptual ones that structure the space of motivations might well encourage all philosophers to contribute to the task, but so far it seems to have encouraged analytic philosophers to continue their work on the upper stories of the edifice of knowledge, perfecting their rigorous, fascinating, and detailed accounts of the linguistic, conceptual, and inferential capacities that are uniquely human, while leaving the ground floor -- the nonlinguistic, non-conceptual discriminations of everyday perceivers and copers such as infants, animals, and experts -- to the phenomenologists.

The time is ripe to follow McDowell and others in putting aside the outmoded opposition between analytic and continental philosophy, and to begin the challenging collaborative task of showing how our conceptual capacities grow out of our nonconceptual ones — how the ground floor of pure perception and receptive coping supports the conceptual upper stories of the edifice of knowledge. Why not work together to understand our grasp of reality from the ground up? Surely, that way we are more likely to succeed than trying to build from the top down."
 
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