Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

[Soupie]

Sorry to drop in like this. I thought someone here might be able to help me out with something to do with special relativity:
It is often said that a twin at sea level ages slower than its twin on a mountain because of the gravity difference. This ageing is in relation to solar time ie. the days have been counted and twin A 'looks' older than twin B when they reunite after a certain number of 'counted days'.

So the ageing difference is referring to molecular activity differences in the two twins ie the physiology of one twin has moved on from the other because molecular activity differs in each—to the number of counted days.

Am I right to assume that the assumption is that each twin perceives time as a function of this molecular activity which is slightly slower in one than the other? If so, would the sea level twin perceive the passage of observed days more slowly and feel that the days were longer in duration or, perceive just as much as his ageing would indicate and thereby believe the duration of the days to be quicker? In other words, does the ageing process align with the perceived duration of time?

Am I right to gather that by ageing we are talking about molecular activity in terms of electrons doing their thing more, rather than nuclear activity as a timeframe of any other related to subatomic particle activity?

If I were to travel toward the centre of the earth, my atomic processes slow in relation to the observed solar cycle. Does this slowing of atomic processes relative to solar activity have a cooling effect over solar time, and does gravity then have to take up that energy differential and expel it in some form?

Doesn't the certainty of something correspond to a certain time fix? And does not that thereby depend on the nature of that reference? If you get the right reference, the uncertainty is no longer there.

When perceived duration becomes altered substantially is some form of expulsion necessary?

The following articles might be helpful:

Understanding gravity—warps and ripples in space and time

GPS and Relativity

 

[Soupie]

And this paper approaches the problem of general relativity from the perspective of QST or Superfluid Vacuum. I often find that models which attempt to explain phenomena in non-mainstream ways articulate the problem to be solved in ways that help me get a better grip on the problem. As mainstream approaches take some elements of the problem for granted whereas non-mainstream models do not.

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.119.7475&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

[smcder]

@Constance - is there a good biography of Merleau-Ponty? I've come across some sketches ... his relationship to the church is interesting to me.

" But apparently before his death a reconciliation had occurred, since he was buried with the solemn rites of the Church."

 

[Soupie]

Substrate independence for phenomenal consciousness too (or is that implied in your list)? Would a program run on a computer have all of these properties? Would it have p-consciousness?

I take phenomenal consciousness (what-it's-like) to be synonymous with subjectivity. (Lower case s not upper case S.)

Thus, as soon as what-is undergoes a symmetry break, subject-object interaction(s)emerge; said another way, once reality divides in subjects and objects, it can be said to possess consciousness (subjectivity) and physicalness (objectivity).

On this view, all objects would also be subjects, and all subjects would also be objects. Thus, perceived "duality" is a result of framing oneself as a subject or an object, and supposing that one is more primary than the other.

Thus, dualistic thinking, the MBP, and the Hard Problem follow from such framing.

So what I'm saying is that all physical systems are also (phenomenally) conscious systems, but not all systems are self-aware systems.

>> Would a program running on a computer have these properties?

I would say in that case that it wouldn't be the program that was self-aware, it would be the computer running the program that would be self-aware.

 

[Constance]

thinking out loud

Atomizing consciousness, saying that consciousness is fundamental, awareness is, then visualizing it particularly ... vs etherealizing matter? Is there any difference? @Soupie asked why does consciousness hang out where it does?And also something about I think consciousness in the elbow ... which the above quote would question, right?

If we reject the evidence for non-local mentality, then are we only left with a particulate view of awareness running through our fingers? How then do we answer the ethereal materialists?

But if we think of something more than minimal awareness, more than a basic unit of consciousness: a consciouton , say ... in fact we stop thinking in terms of basic units, then mind and intention are also basic ... and pervasive. But if that's the case, can you catch lightning in a bottle? That's the AI question. If you build it, will consciousness come? If mind is fundamental, then it might not be so easily fooled. The program that starts with Aristotle's slaves without souls and the Golem ... but if we are what's being steered, if we're the Golem ... that's like the Rabbi catching the Golem shaping a bit of clay in his image. Maybe that's not allowed (aloud).

But if mind, awareness, intention are pervasive and basic, then we just come back to the front door of God. So often I think philosophy is mostly generated by what we are not allowed to think about. A truly free thinker wouldn't philosophy-ize.

thinking out loud

So what I'm saying is that all physical systems are also (phenomenally) conscious systems, but not all systems are self-aware systems.

1. the universe is phenomenally conscious, there is something it is like to be the universe, just as there is something that it is like to be any given part of the universe, because both the universe and any arbitrary part of the universe, is a physical system, is that correct? is there any difference in these two "what it is like?"s. Is there any difference in what it is like to be an atom and what it is like to be the whole universe? As self-aware systems, do we also have a part in the "what it is like to be the universe"? To our gain, the universe's ... or both?

2. there is something it is like for a tree to fall in the forest

thinking out loud

if we think any given physical system has a phenomenal feel, there it is something it is like to be a quark, a saw or silly string ... but only some systems are self-aware, then the something it is like to be the universe, the overall complexity has to be measured in some other way - we can't be part of the universe and be more complicated than the universe? something in structure or complexity isn't met if the universe isn't self aware, this goes back to earlier discussions ... similarly, is the country of China self-aware? it's more complex than any given Chinese person ... but not organized in the right way?

The Splintered Mind: Group Consciousness

Could the United States of America pass the Turing test?

Excellent questions and speculations, Steve, to at least some of which I hope to respond.

 

[smcder]

Excellent questions and speculations, Steve, to at least some of which I hope to respond.

Really just clearing my head. Sometimes I need to put something down ... and just putting it on paper or a Word Doc doesn't work, something about putting it down for someone to see, or not see, but just putting it "out there" psychologically works for me. Probably a lot of blather. But I'm thinking if consciousness is truly fundamental, should we look at it as being any where in particular? which doesn't prevent it from "hanging out" here ... but it might also be doing more than that ... and it would make it a lot easier if we did accept some of the evidence for non-local mind.

 

[Soupie]

smcder Would a program running on a computer have these properties?

I would say in that case that it wouldn't be the program that was self-aware, it would be the computer running the program that would be self-aware.

So for you, this means self-awareness is computable?

thinking out loud

If we built the computer out of tinker-toys:

View attachment 6228

(this one was built to play tic-tac-toe but any program, anything computable, could be run on a computer made of tinker toys)

Would the self-awareness be in the tinker toys?

I think of this in terms of autopoeisis. Theise and Evans actually had a brief discussion about this at a conference in which they both presented their ideas. I posted and commented on their exchange several threads/posts ago.

Evans was arguing that autopoeisis could explain how sensing/perceiving could emerge with the emergence of autopoeitic cells.

Theise argued that the principles of autopoeisis could be scaled all the way down to electrons.

Theise and Kafatos illustrate how things/objects are scale dependemt and scale depends on the framing of an observer.

From the article about Theise Kafatos i recently posted:

"The universe only looks like structures organizing themselves when viewed through the outward-facing sensitivities of a compatible structure. I think that the more ‘fundamental’ context of the universe is trans-structural. No structure experiences itself as a self-organizing object in its own native frame of reference. We experience our ‘selves’ as both a current set of feelings, sensations, and thoughts, as well as a boundaryless ocean of memories and imagination which has neither a relevant geometry nor a holarchic kind of nesting. Our interiority doesn’t become more scale nested like molecules>cells>bodies, it remains a single fugue of experience."

As Ringland said, the universe can be conceived of as one evolving system or as an evolving system of systems. But to conceive of it as a system of systems requires a conceiver.

>> Is the self-awareness in the tinker toys.

It wouldn't be "in" the tinker toys; neither in the Naive Realist sense (tinker toys are "merely" our perception of objective reality) nor in the conscious realism sense. The "tinker toys"—that is, the objectice system—would be consciousness, consciousness would not be "in" the sustem.

>> Is self-awareness computable?

I dont know. I honestly dont know enough about computation and how it relates to other physical processes.

What I would say is that "self-awareness" seems to fall into the "easy" problems outlined by Chalmers. Does he think the easy problems are computable? Im not sure.

thinking out loud

Chalmers discusses consciousness in terms of structural invariance and organizational coherence.

Can we build a brain out of any given material? Is is enough just to mimic the functions? If we replicated the brain on a computer, with a program ... ? Like they say, the computer doesn't get wet when you run KIDNEY.exe.

you could say that everything is made of the same thing, atoms, but what I mean is - if you built a replica of the brain, it has certain physical properties required to replicate tha
t . . . if you just substitute silicone for carbon ... people talk about that but silicon and carbon have different numbers of bonds, etc and a different way of bonding to water ... what about proteins, DNA? I have no idea except that I don't think you could just make one thing out of another ... so some people argue that consciousness comes from the material that a silicon brain might not be conscious, only a carbon one. Some people.

On the other hand, if consciousness doesn't arise from the brain, but the brain does something with it - like organize it or respond to it or allow us to feel it or talk about it - then we still have to look at whether what it is made of ... is important. That's what I had in mind about consciousness being something that matter could respond to ... the way muscles respond to gravity.

Finally, there is the quote above in which we can't rule out or in any given part of the body and phenomenal feel!

On the Primary Nature of Consciousness
Bitbol

"Even the ability of neurophysiological inquiry to identify correlates of phenomenal consciousness can be challenged on that basis. After all, identifying such correlates rely [relies] heavily on the subject's ability to discriminate, to memorize, and to report , which is used as the ultimate experimental criterion of consciousness. Can we preclude the possibility that the large-scale synchronization of complex neural activity of the brain cortex often deemed indispensible for consciousness, is in fact only required for interconnecting a number of cognitive functions including those needed for memorizing, self-reflecting and reporting? Conversely, extrapolating Semir Zeki's suggestion, can we preclude that any (large or small) area of the brain or even of the body is associated to some sort of fleeting pure experience, although no report can be obtained from it?"

I repeat:

!

I think artificial intelligence, self-awareness, memory, percepts, concepts, and affective states are possible. However, whether these artificial varients would "feel like" human versions is doubtful other than in a very broad sense. But they don't have too.

thinking out loud

When we talk about consciousness is fundamental ... do we think of it as pervasive? If we think about it as attached to bits of matter, then we run into the problems above ... the computer program, where is it? Where is the consciousness in the tinker toys? But that's still thinking of consciousness in physical terms: i.e. where? and then we could attach it (and become attached to it) ... as my consciousness ... but if it's truly fundamental ... then even the Heraclitean river is a bad analogy because you then think of waves and energy or worse, something like The Force ... (or magnetic fields, heaven forbid!) even our term underlie uses a metaphor of orientation whereas to be fundamental means even more than to be everywhere ... so that to me makes sense in the "mind blowing" aspect above when they say:

"We are not all agents having experiences, we are experiences of agency within larger experiences which transcend it.""

So the experience isn't here nor is it not here neither is it (here AND not here) nor, finally, is it (here or NOT here).

thinking out loud

Atomizing consciousness, saying that consciousness is fundamental, awareness is, then visualizing it particularly ... vs etherealizing matter? Is there any difference? @Soupie asked why does consciousness hang out where it does?And also something about I think consciousness in the elbow ... which the above quote would question, right?

If we reject the evidence for non-local mentality, then are we only left with a particulate view of awareness running through our fingers? How then do we answer the ethereal materialists?

But if we think of something more than minimal awareness, more than a basic unit of consciousness: a consciouton , say ... in fact we stop thinking in terms of basic units, then mind and intention are also basic ... and pervasive. But if that's the case, can you catch lightning in a bottle? That's the AI question. If you build it, will consciousness come? If mind is fundamental, then it might not be so easily fooled. The program that starts with Aristotle's slaves without souls and the Golem ... but if we are what's being steered, if we're the Golem ... that's like the Rabbi catching the Golem shaping a bit of clay in his image. Maybe that's not allowed (aloud).

But if mind, awareness, intention are pervasive and basic, then we just come back to the front door of God. So often I think philosophy is mostly generated by what we are not allowed to think about. A truly free thinker wouldn't philosophy-ize.

I think there is evidence that minds are not basic and pervasive. Im not sure what you mean re intention being basic.

All aspects of minds—save for phenomenal consciousness—appear conceptually to be "easy" problems.

thinking out loud

So what I'm saying is that all physical systems are also (phenomenally) conscious systems, but not all systems are self-aware systems.

1. the universe is phenomenally conscious, there is something it is like to be the universe, just as there is something that it is like to be any given part of the universe, because both the universe and any arbitrary part of the universe, is a physical system, is that correct? is there any difference in these two "what it is like?"s. Is there any difference in what it is like to be an atom and what it is like to be the whole universe? As self-aware systems, do we also have a part in the "what it is like to be the universe"? To our gain, the universe's ... or both?

2. there is something it is like for a tree to fall in the forest

This is a question ive been spending a great deal of thought on. And this question is addressed in the quote above.

If the psychophysical systems within the Super System of What-is are arbitrary, then not only are objects/things arbitrary, then minds are arbitrary as well.

If the boundary between the physical self and other is arbitrary, then doesnt it follow from CR that the boundary between mental self and other is arbitrary as well?

I think so.

But whereas the boundary between the physical self and other is observer dependent, on what does the boundary between the mental self and other depend?

thinking out loud

if we think any given physical system has a phenomenal feel, there it is something it is like to be a quark, a saw or silly string ... but only some systems are self-aware, then the something it is like to be the universe, the overall complexity has to be measured in some other way - we can't be part of the universe and be more complicated than the universe? something in structure or complexity isn't met if the universe isn't self aware, this goes back to earlier discussions ... similarly, is the country of China self-aware? it's more complex than any given Chinese person ... but not organized in the right way?

The Splintered Mind: Group Consciousness

Could the United States of America pass the Turing test?

Yes, the mental boundary issue is a question. I think its related to the combination problem.

The problem is that objective reality isnt the material reality that we perceive it to be, a la naive realism. So we cant think of the combination problem in terms of matter/atoms, because that's not the Real objective nature of reality.

Its the questions of how what-is can differentiate at all if it is not atomized. If what-is does not differentiate via atomization, how else might it do so?

 

[Soupie]

The organism as reality or as fiction: Buffon and beyond. - PubMed - NCBI

The organism as reality or as fiction: Buffon and beyond.

Demarest B, et al. Hist Philos Life Sci. 2017.
Show full citation

Abstract

In this paper, we reflect on the connection between the notions of organism and organisation, with a specific interest in how this bears upon the issue of the reality of the organism (or in contrast the status of these notions as constructs, whether heuristic or otherwise scientifically useful). We do this by presenting the case of Buffon, who developed complex views about the relation between the notions of "organised" and "organic" matter. We argue that, contrary to what some interpreters have suggested, these notions are not orthogonal in his thought. Also, we argue that Buffon has a view in which organisation is not just ubiquitous, but basic and fundamental in nature, and hence also fully natural. We suggest that he can hold this view because of his anti-mathematicism. Buffon's case is interesting, in our view, because he can regard organisation, and organisms, as perfectly natural, and can admit their reality without invoking problematic supernaturalist views, and because he allows organisation and the organismal to come in kinds and degrees. Thus, his view tries to do justice to two cautionary notes for the debate on the reality of the organism: the need for a commitment to a broadly naturalist perspective, and the need to acknowledge the interesting features of organisms through which we make sense of them.

 

[smcder]

.

 

[smcder]

I think of this in terms of autopoeisis. Theise and Evans actually had a brief discussion about this at a conference in which they both presented their ideas. I posted and commented on their exchange several threads/posts ago.

Evans was arguing that autopoeisis could explain how sensing/perceiving could emerge with the emergence of autopoeitic cells.

Theise argued that the principles of autopoeisis could be scaled all the way down to electrons.

Theise and Kafatos illustrate how things/objects are scale dependemt and scale depends on the framing of an observer.

From the article about Theise Kafatos i recently posted:

"The universe only looks like structures organizing themselves when viewed through the outward-facing sensitivities of a compatible structure. I think that the more ‘fundamental’ context of the universe is trans-structural. No structure experiences itself as a self-organizing object in its own native frame of reference. We experience our ‘selves’ as both a current set of feelings, sensations, and thoughts, as well as a boundaryless ocean of memories and imagination which has neither a relevant geometry nor a holarchic kind of nesting. Our interiority doesn’t become more scale nested like molecules>cells>bodies, it remains a single fugue of experience."

As Ringland said, the universe can be conceived of as one evolving system or as an evolving system of systems. But to conceive of it as a system of systems requires a conceiver.

>> Is the self-awareness in the tinker toys.

It wouldn't be "in" the tinker toys; neither in the Naive Realist sense (tinker toys are "merely" our perception of objective reality) nor in the conscious realism sense. The "tinker toys"—that is, the objectice system—would be consciousness, consciousness would not be "in" the sustem.

>> Is self-awareness computable?

I dont know. I honestly dont know enough about computation and how it relates to other physical processes.

What I would say is that "self-awareness" seems to fall into the "easy" problems outlined by Chalmers. Does he think the easy problems are computable? Im not sure.


I think artificial intelligence, self-awareness, memory, percepts, concepts, and affective states are possible. However, whether these artificial varients would "feel like" human versions is doubtful other than in a very broad sense. But they don't have too.




I think there is evidence that minds are not basic and pervasive. Im not sure what you mean re intention being basic.

All aspects of minds—save for phenomenal consciousness—appear conceptually to be "easy" problems.


This is a question ive been spending a great deal of thought on. And this question is addressed in the quote above.

If the psychophysical systems within the Super System of What-is are arbitrary, then not only are objects/things arbitrary, then minds are arbitrary as well.

If the boundary between the physical self and other is arbitrary, then doesnt it follow from CR that the boundary between mental self and other is arbitrary as well?

I think so.

But whereas the boundary between the physical self and other is observer dependent, on what does the boundary between the mental self and other depend?


Yes, the mental boundary issue is a question. I think its related to the combination problem.

The problem is that objective reality isnt the material reality that we perceive it to be, a la naive realism. So we cant think of the combination problem in terms of matter/atoms, because that's not the Real objective nature of reality.

Its the questions of how what-is can differentiate at all if it is not atomized. If what-is does not differentiate via atomization, how else might it do so?

1) Is it better to say that Mindedness and intentionality are basic/fundamental than to say minds and intention is basic/fundamental? Is that better?

2) The boundary problem and minds being arbitrary ... what I am saying is that if we admit evidence that mind is non-local then the question is no longer "why do I only have my thoughts and sensations?"

• If what-is does not differentiate via atomization, how else might it do so?

Is the question: "how does the undifferentiated differentiate?" If it is, could you apply the tetralemma:

not sure I've worded this completely right, so here's the reference:

Tetralemma - Wikipedia

(affirmation)
¬X

(negation)
X¬X

(both) equiv.
¬X¬X

(neither)

• What-is is not undifferentiated
• What-is is not differentiated
• BOTH What-is is not (undifferentiated AND differentiated)
• NEITHER What-is is neither (undifferentiated OR differentiated)

What's left is the "ineffable" and an argument for putting the ineffable on logical grounds is laid out here:

The Fifth Corner of Four | University of Oxford Podcasts - Audio and Video Lectures

 

[smcder]

>> Is self-awareness computable?

@Soupie says I dont know. I honestly dont know enough about computation and how it relates to other physical processes.

Wikipedia (I'm pretty much SUMMARIZING Wikipedia in what follows) says computability is "the ability to solve a problem in an effective manner". It is the formalization of the idea of an algorithm ... so that a function is computable if there is an algorithm that can do the job of the function an algorithm that can do the job of the function.

Computability can be discussed apart from any given model of computation (like Turing model).

Another way to talk about computable functions is "effectively calculable".

So ... what isn't computable?

Well, I'm glad you asked, Johnny! SUMMARIZING (a lot) from here:

Non-computable numbers

• Any program is a series of "1"s and "0"s
• this means any program is a binary number.
• In fact any program is a binary integer

• that means that the set of ALL programs is the same as the set of (binary) integers
• integers are enumerable (you can count them ... like this 1, 2, 3 ... etc)
• so the set of ALL programs can be counter
• If I count from 1 to 2^N ... I get the set of ALL the programs that can be stored in N bits ... I get a lot of programs that don't do anything of course but I also get say Deep Blue the chess program, if N is just set large enough

Now

• set N to infiNity ... it's still enumerable and that's important because ... and you'll see this coming ... the number of irrational numbers is NOT enumerable ... (you can't count the set of irrational numbers ... go on and try it, I'll wait here) ... so there are more irrational numbers than there are integers which means that there are more irrational numbers than there are programs ... which means that if each number has a program that computes that number and displays it ... then you can compute the integers and the rationals but you can't compute the irrationals!
• That's because there are more irrational number than there are programs (remember there are 1 to 2^N programs) ... so most irrational numbers don't have programs that compute them.

I'll quote from here to the finish:

Well if you think about it a program is a shortish regular sort of construct and if it generates an irrational number then some how the information in that number must be about the same as the information in the program that generates it.

*That is computable numbers are regular in some complex sense but a non-computable number is so irregular that you can't compress its structure into a program.

This leads on to the study of algorithmic information theory which is another interesting area of computer science full of strange ideas and even strange conclusions.

FINE ... you say, but what does this have to do with consciousness and ... hey, who peed on my keyboard? yuck

 

[smcder]

OK ... now back to Merleau-Ponty.

 

[Soupie]

1) Is it better to say that Mindedness and intentionality are basic/fundamental than to say minds and intention is basic/fundamental? Is that better?

2) The boundary problem and minds being arbitrary ... what I am saying is that if we admit evidence that mind is non-local then the question is no longer "why do I only have my thoughts and sensations?"

• If what-is does not differentiate via atomization, how else might it do so?

Is the question: "how does the undifferentiated differentiate?" If it is, could you apply the tetralemma:

not sure I've worded this completely right, so here's the reference:

Tetralemma - Wikipedia

(affirmation)
¬X

(negation)
X¬X

(both) equiv.
¬X¬X

(neither)

• What-is is not undifferentiated
• What-is is not differentiated
• BOTH What-is is not (undifferentiated AND differentiated)
• NEITHER What-is is neither (undifferentiated OR differentiated)

What's left is the "ineffable" and an argument for putting the ineffable on logical grounds is laid out here:

The Fifth Corner of Four | University of Oxford Podcasts - Audio and Video Lectures

When you use the term "intentionality" do you mean it in the sense of "desire/will" or in the sense of "aboutness?" Or both?

If you mean the former, I don't see how that could be fundamental, other than by brute isness. I.e. Willful agents just are fundamental. Deal with it.

If you mean it in the sense of "aboutness," I can follow you there. If we imagine that a non differentiated ground breaks into a differentiated ground of subjects-objects, then I could grant that the interactions involved intentiality. Or object A becomes Subject A when it interacts with Object B, which becomes Subject B when it interacts with Object A.

Subject A is "about" Object B, and Subject B is "about" Object A.

Do you follow that, haha?

Regarding mind, the term "mind" to me involves differentiation/variety, heterogeneity. How something so diverse as a mind could be fundamental is hard for me to see.

However, if by mind you mean POV, then I'm with you again. As soon a second a unified, homogenous ground differentiates, POV(s) could be said to emerge.

 

[Soupie]

>> Is self-awareness computable?

@Soupie says I dont know. I honestly dont know enough about computation and how it relates to other physical processes.

Wikipedia (I'm pretty much SUMMARIZING Wikipedia in what follows) says computability is "the ability to solve a problem in an effective manner". It is the formalization of the idea of an algorithm ... so that a function is computable if there is an algorithm that can do the job of the function an algorithm that can do the job of the function.

Computability can be discussed apart from any given model of computation (like Turing model).

Another way to talk about computable functions is "effectively calculable".

So ... what isn't computable?

Well, I'm glad you asked, Johnny! SUMMARIZING (a lot) from here:

Non-computable numbers

• Any program is a series of "1"s and "0"s
• this means any program is a binary number.
• In fact any program is a binary integer

• that means that the set of ALL programs is the same as the set of (binary) integers
• integers are enumerable (you can count them ... like this 1, 2, 3 ... etc)
• so the set of ALL programs can be counter
• If I count from 1 to 2^N ... I get the set of ALL the programs that can be stored in N bits ... I get a lot of programs that don't do anything of course but I also get say Deep Blue the chess program, if N is just set large enough

Now

• set N to infiNity ... it's still enumerable and that's important because ... and you'll see this coming ... the number of irrational numbers is NOT enumerable ... (you can't count the set of irrational numbers ... go on and try it, I'll wait here) ... so there are more irrational numbers than there are integers which means that there are more irrational numbers than there are programs ... which means that if each number has a program that computes that number and displays it ... then you can compute the integers and the rationals but you can't compute the irrationals!
• That's because there are more irrational number than there are programs (remember there are 1 to 2^N programs) ... so most irrational numbers don't have programs that compute them.

I'll quote from here to the finish:

Well if you think about it a program is a shortish regular sort of construct and if it generates an irrational number then some how the information in that number must be about the same as the information in the program that generates it.

*That is computable numbers are regular in some complex sense but a non-computable number is so irregular that you can't compress its structure into a program.

This leads on to the study of algorithmic information theory which is another interesting area of computer science full of strange ideas and even strange conclusions.

FINE ... you say, but what does this have to do with consciousness and ... hey, who peed on my keyboard? yuck

So the question follows: does all self-awareness involve irrational numbers? Indeed, does any?

Again, I'm not suggesting man can artificially create minds as broad, deep, and rich as human minds. I'm not even suggesting we can create minds that are like ours in any narrow sense.

But can we create minds that have intelligence, self-awareness, memory, perceptions, and conceptions? (Given p consciousness as fundamental.)

It may turn out that all of these things are fundamental, although I don't think so.

It may turn out that these things can only emerge from organic, human brains for some reason. But I don't know that reason.

Or it may turn out that these things are substrate independent and can arise within computational systems, albeit on a primativevlevel compared to the human brain.

As noted, some AI researchers are arguing that artificial systems have already achieved some of these things.

But until we gives these systems of a voice, they can't report their inner experiences. If indeed they have them.

Of course we'll never know for certain.

 

[smcder]

So the question follows: does all self-awareness involve irrational numbers? Indeed, does any?

Again, I'm not suggesting man can artificially create minds as broad, deep, and rich as human minds. I'm not even suggesting we can create minds that are like ours in any narrow sense.

But can we create minds that have intelligence, self-awareness, memory, perceptions, and conceptions? (Given p consciousness as fundamental.)

It may turn out that all of these things are fundamental, although I don't think so.

It may turn out that these things can only emerge from organic, human brains for some reason. But I don't know that reason.

Or it may turn out that these things are substrate independent and can arise within computational systems, albeit on a primativevlevel compared to the human brain.

As noted, some AI researchers are arguing that artificial systems have already achieved some of these things.

But until we gives these systems of a voice, they can't report their inner experiences. If indeed they have them.

Of course we'll never know for certain.

"... irrational numbers ... substrate independence?! ... haven't they heard of bananas??"

 

[Soupie]

View attachment 6229

Hm, unable to compute the reason for the faceplam, even after accessing my memory banks.

I didn't mean to imply that you were suggesting self-awareness involved irrational numbers.

The point I was making is that while there may indeed be things that are non-computable, self-awareness may not be one of them.

I don't think that's obviously wrong. It may turn out to be wrong however.

 

[smcder]

Hm, unable to compute the reason for the faceplam, even after accessing my memory banks.

I didn't mean to imply that you were suggesting self-awareness involved irrational numbers.

The point I was making is that while there may indeed be things that are non-computable, self-awareness may not be one of them.

I don't think that's obviously wrong. It may turn out to be wrong however.

I posted the wrong thinker image. I want to start drawing my own.

Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk

 

[Constance]

Regarding mind, the term "mind" to me involves differentiation/variety, heterogeneity. How something so diverse as a mind could be fundamental is hard for me to see.

I agree. But to your list of characteristics of mind we would also have to add reflection on lived experience and the integrations of thought in 'making sense' of phenomenal experience. Those capabilities evolve out of prereflective awareness, which Panksepp refers to as simply 'awareness' that enables 'affectivity' even in primordial organisms. Over the eons of the evolution of species those capacities develop into what we can call protoconsciousness [of how many degrees and types?] which involve animals' more marked sense of being- situated in proximity to things and other animals, with emotions developing beyond simple 'affectivity'. It seems to me that we cannot speak of 'consciousness' or 'mind' as being present [realized] in the early evolution of the universe.

However, if by mind you mean POV, then I'm with you again. As soon as[?] second a unified, homogeneous ground differentiates, POV(s) could be said to emerge.

Yes, but in a sense more abstract than we can imagine for q particles and fields and the interacting core forces and fields described by classical physics. I think the most we can glean from Kafatos's theory is that 'incipient awareness' must exist in the early universe and is awakened/becomes active [but not necessarily 'felt'] within the interactions taking place from the q substrate up. Something new happens with life, and something beyond that with consciousness and mind as we experience them, imo.

 

[Constance]

I posted the wrong thinker image. I want to start drawing my own.

I posted here some time ago a thinker still embedded in a stone block, only his head, arms, and lower legs emerging from the stone's boundaries. Wish I could find it again.

Here is an interesting example of an early thinker image:

Background here: Israeli scientists unearth extraordinary ‘thinker’ figurine from the Middle Bronze Age

 

[smcder]

I posted here some time ago a thinker still embedded in a stone block, only his head, arms, and lower legs emerging from the stone's boundaries. Wish I could find it again.

Here is an interesting example of an early thinker image:

Background here: Israeli scientists unearth extraordinary ‘thinker’ figurine from the Middle Bronze Age

I thought it would be easy to find ... But I cant find it either. I can picture it. An extraordinary variety of such images though ... Will have to sketch a few. @Soupie it was the difference in "head in hands" search terms.

Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk