Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

[smcder]

The one I posted is recent and I think likely contains the same arguments that he presented in a videotaped lecture following Zahavi's. I haven't listened to that Moran lecture but you'd be best able to tell if he changed his viewpoint at that point. I think I'll listen to his lecture now just to see what he said in response to Zahavi.

ETA: I've been reading some additional papers concerning the project of naturalizing phenomenology and will post links and extracts tonight.

My first thought is that Moran takes a stronger stance even than Zahavi. Will dig into your readings below!

 

[smcder]

Excellent, especially Bitbol's identification of "the very blindspot of science" that precludes its investigation of the grounds of all experience, including its own experience in pursuing solely objective descriptions of nature in the modern period. I want to post the whole of what Bitbol writes in that statement you linked:


On the primary nature of consciousness (a short statement)
Michel Bitbol
CNRS / Ecole Normale SupŽrieure (Archives Husserl), Paris
Published as an insert in F. Capra & P.-L. Luisi,
The Systems View of Life,
Cambridge UniversityPress, 2014, p. 266-268

Nobody can deny that complex features of consciousness, such as reflexivity (the awareness that there is awareness of something), or self-consciousness (the awareness of one's own identity) are late outcomes of a process of biological adaptation. But what about pure non-reflexive experience ? What about the mere 'feel' of sensing and being, irrespective of any second-order awareness of this feel ? There are good reasons to think that pure experience, or elementary consciousness, or phenomenal consciousness, is no secondary feature of an objective item but plainly here, primary in the strongest sense of the word.

We start with this plain fact : the world as we found it (to borrow Wittgenstein's expression) is no collection of objects ; it is indissolubly a perceptive-experience-of-objects, or an imaginative experience of these objects qua being out of reach of perceptive experience. In other terms, conscious experience is self-evidently pervasive and existentially primary. Moreover, any scientific undertaking presupposes one's own experience and the others' experiences as well. In history and on a day-to-day basis, the objective descriptions which are characteristic of science arise as an invariant structural focus for subjects endowed with conscious experience. In this sense, scientific findings, including results of neurophysiology and evolution theory, are methodologically secondary to experience. Experience, o elementary consciousness, can then be said to be methodologically primary for science. Consequently, the claim of primariness of elementary consciousness is no scientific statement: it just expresses a most basic prerequisite of science.

But conversely, this means that the objective science of nature has no real bearing on the pure experience that tacitly underpins it. The latter allegation sounds hard to swallow in view of so many momentous successes of neurosciences. Yet, if one thinks a little harder, any sense of paradox vanishes. Actually, it is in virtue of the very efficience of neurosciences that they can have no grip on phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, as soon as this efficience is fully put to use, nothing prevents one from offering a purely neurophysiological account of the chain of causes operating from a sensory input received by an organism to the elaborate behaviour of this organism. At no point does one need to invoke the circumstance
that this organism is perceiving and acting consciously (in the most elementary sense of 'having a feel'. In a mature cognitive neuroscience, the fact of phenomenal
consciousness is bound to appear as irrelevant or incidental.

As a result, any attempt at providing a scientific account of phenomenal consciousness, by way of neurological or evolutionary theories, is doomed to failure (not because of any deficiency of these sciences, but precisely as a side effect of their most fruitful methodological option). Modern neurological theories, such as global workspace theory or integrated information theory, have been remarkably successful in accounting for major features of higher levels of consciousness, such as the capacity of unifying the field of awareness and of elaborating self-mapping. They have also turned out to be excellent predictors of subject's behavioral wakefulness and ability/inability of [to] provide
reports in clinical situations such as coma and epileptic seizure. But they have provided absolutely no clue about the origin of phenomenal consciousness. They have explained the
functions of consciousness, but not the circumstance that there is something it is like
to be an organism performing these functions. The same is true of evolutionist arguments. Evolution can select some useful functions ascribed to consciousness (such as behavioral emotivity of the organism, integrated action planning, or self-monitoring), but not the mere fact that there is something it is like to implement these functions. Indeed, only the functions have adaptative value, not their being experienced.

Even the ability of neurophysiological inquiry to identify correlates of phenomenal consciousness can be challenged on that basis. After all, identifying such correlates rely [relies] heavily on the subject's ability to discriminate, to memorize, and to report , which is used as the ultimate experimental criterion of consciousness. Can we preclude the possibility that the large-scale synchronization of complex neural activity of the brain cortex often deemed indispensible for consciousness, is in fact only required for interconnecting a number of cognitive functions including those needed for memorizing, self-reflecting and reporting? Conversely, extrapolating Semir Zeki's suggestion, can we preclude that any (large or small) area of the brain or even of the body is associated to some sort of fleeting pure experience, although no report can be obtained from it?

Data from general anaesthesia feed this doubt. When the doses of certain classes of anaesthetic drugs are increased and coherent EEG frequency is decreased, mental abilities are lost step by step, one after another. At first, subjects lose some of their appreciation of pain, but can still have dialogue with doctors and remember every event. Then, they lose
their ability of recalling long-term explicit memories of what is going on, but they are still able to react and answer demands on a momentary basis. With higher doses of drugs, patients lose ability to respond to requests, in addition to losing their explicit memory; but they still have 'implicit memories' of the situation. To recapitulate, faculties that are usually taken together as necessary to consciousness are in fact dissociable from one another. And pure, instantaneous, unmemorized, non-reflective experience might well be the last item left. This looks like a scientific hint as to the ubiquity and primariness of phenomenal consciousness. Of course, a scientific hint does not mean a scientific proof (at any rate, claiming that there exists a scientific proof of the primariness of elementary consciousness would badly contradict our initial acknowledgment that objective science can have no real grip on pure experience). The former scientific hint is only an indirect indication coming from the very blindspot of science: the pure passing experience it presupposes, and of which it retains only a stabilized and intersubjectively shared structural residue.

Should we content ourselves with these negative remarks ?As Francisco Varela has shown, one can overcome them by proposing a broadened definition of science. Instead of remaining stuck within the third-person attitude, the new science should include a 'dance' of mutual definition taking place between first-person and third-person accounts, mediated by the second person level of social exchange. As soon as this momentous turn is taken,
elementary consciousness is no longer a mystery for a truncated science, but an aknowledged datum from which a fuller kind of science can unfold.

Bibliography
Bitbol M., 'Science as if situation mattered',
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science, 1, 181-224, 2002

Bitbol, M., 'Is Consciousness Primary?',
NeuroQuantology, 6, 53-71, 2008

Bitbol, M. & Luisi, P.-L., 'Science and the self-referentiality of consciousness',
Journal of Cosmology, 14, 4728-4743, 2011

Varela, F.V., 'Neurophenomenology : a methodological remedy for the hard problem', in: Shear J (ed.) Explaining consciousness, the hard problem, MIT Press, 1998

Wittgenstein, L., 'Notes for lectures on private experience and sense data', Philosophical Review, 77, 275-320,1968

Zeki, S., 'The disunity of consciousness', in R. Banerjee & B.K. Chakrabarti (Eds.),
Progress in Brain Research, Vol. 168, Elsevier, 2008

On the primary nature of consciousness (a short statement)

This stood out for me:

1) that it's due to the "efficience"of neurosciences that they can have no grip on phenomenal consciousness ... that phenomenal consciousness will always appear irrelevant to cognitive neuroscience

2) the challenge to neurophysiological correlates ... i.e. finding them depends on the ability to discriminate, to memorize, and to report ... this dependency means we can't assume that what has been assumed indispensable is only the interconnection of the functions needed for establishing the experimental criteria themselves. And that means we can't assume any area of the brain/body isn't associated to experience!

 

[smcder]

I like this too. Following this project is I think the best way to become clear about the core insight of phenomenological philosophy as a whole -- why it constitutes a 'turn' in philosophy that presents a critique of objectivist science that scientists [ETA: and philosophers] must come to terms with. It also leads us to an understanding of how phenomenology itself underwrites a new ontology as expressed in Merleau-Ponty's last works. I'm reading Mauro Carbone's The Thinking of The Sensible: Merleau-Ponty's A-Philosophy, and hoping to find it reproduced somewhere online so that we can discuss it together. It's a short but dense book and critically important since it does present a full confluence and integration of phenomenology and naturalism.

We have an efficient inter-library loan system at work, I can request Carbone's book if we don't find something on line.

 

[smcder]

This quote from your post above:

“External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish.” - Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses HUA XI 3.5

... is for me a good example of when there is just no better way to say something. We've all seen the humor where great literature is summarized TV Guide style:

Moby Dick - angry man chases whale that bit off his leg
Hamlet - man can't make up his mind, about anything
Don Quixote - maddened by trashy books, old man fights windmills and falls in love

In these cases the essence and the gist is often the least important aspect of a work, the work is its own best essence and summary. We can't do this for everything, but I think it may be important to have a relationship of this kind with at least one author or body of work.

 

[smcder]

This is referenced in your post above:

Sym-Phenomenologizing: Talking Shop

... how fun would this be?? Also, the 2017 SPEP is in Memphis, which is just down the road from me, this summer - I may just have to pop round!

 

[Constance]

This stood out for me:

1) that it's due to the "efficience"of neurosciences that they can have no grip on phenomenal consciousness ... that phenomenal consciousness will always appear irrelevant to cognitive neuroscience

Yes, that non-English word stood out for me as well. It must be meant to be a cognate for a French term. Would be good to nail down that French word and its definition.

2) the challenge to neurophysiological correlates ... i.e. finding them depends on the ability to discriminate, to memorize, and to report ... this dependency means we can't assume that what has been assumed indispensable is only the interconnection of the functions needed for establishing the experimental criteria themselves. And that means we can't assume any area of the brain/body isn't associated to experience!

Yes, this is a fundamentally significant insight in phenomenological philosophy, brought forward by Bitbol and some other phenomenologists who have been examining the issue of what neurological and neurophysiological correlates signify and fail to signify about consciousness.

 

[Constance]

We have an efficient inter-library loan system at work, I can request Carbone's book if we don't find something on line.

Good; then we can discuss some parts of it with better comprehension. I'll also link the
Google Books page concerning it (there doubtless is one) for the benefit of those who do not have the whole text in hand.

 

[Constance]

This is referenced in your post above:

Sym-Phenomenologizing: Talking Shop

... how fun would this be?? Also, the 2017 SPEP is in Memphis, which is just down the road from me, this summer - I may just have to pop round!

That's great. I might try to attend that conference too. We can listen to some experts and talk to each other face to face.

 

[Constance]

This quote from your post above:

“External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish.” - Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses HUA XI 3.5

... is for me a good example of when there is just no better way to say something. We've all seen the humor where great literature is summarized TV Guide style:

Moby Dick - angry man chases whale that bit off his leg
Hamlet - man can't make up his mind, about anything
Don Quixote - maddened by trashy books, old man fights windmills and falls in love

In these cases the essence and the gist is often the least important aspect of a work, the work is its own best essence and summary. We can't do this for everything, but I think it may be important to have a relationship of this kind with at least one author or body of work.

I remember when you summarized a half-dozen famous texts with that inimitable wit of yours. I posted it on my facebook page at the time but probably can't find it again.

 

[smcder]

To no one in particular: What are the differences (if any) between naturalism, physicalism, and materialism?

physicalism and naturalism

Let's Look At It Objectively
https://philpapers.org/archive/MORLLA.pdf
-Dermot Moran

Moran says that Naturalism, for Husserl, means that the only way to truth is through the natural sciences and that the natural sciences provide an accurate account of "the furniture of the world". So there is nothing but nature and "first and foremost" physical nature.

(This discussion begins on page 96
4. Husserl’s Critique of Psychologism and Naturalism)

For Husserl, Naturalism entails a commitment to Physicalism and Physicalism is the view that the best account of the world is given by the natural sciences and especially physics.

Moran discusses Husserl's idea that the "natural attitude"* has been transformed into the "naturalistic attitude". The "naturalistic attitude" is scientism, the idea that "nature is construed according to the framework" of the sciences.

Moran writes: "This subtle shift in the nature of the natural attitude in complex modern societies is responsible for the complete inability to understand the life of consciousness."

As for Materialism, the way I think of it is that it means everything is ultimately made up of Matter ... whatever that is ...

 

[smcder]

To no one in particular: What are the differences (if any) between naturalism, physicalism, and materialism?

Analogy problems, using the Miller's Analogies format ":" "::"

1. Naturalism:Supernaturalism :: Physicalism:?
read: "Naturalism is to Supernaturalism AS Physicalism is to what?"

2. Naturalism:Supernaturalism :: Materialism:?

 

[smcder]

To no one in particular: What are the differences (if any) between naturalism, physicalism, and materialism?

There is also the related -ism of Positivism

• a philosophical system that holds that every rationally justifiable assertion can be scientifically verified or is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and that therefore rejects metaphysics and theism.

• Positivism is a philosophical theory stating that positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties and relations. Thus, information derived from sensory experience, interpreted through reason and logic, forms the exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge.

Logical Positivism - the only meaningful philosophical problems are those that can be solved logically. This is philosophy for those who can't get over the Tractatus.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - Wikipedia

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

Strawson on MNP

Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk

 

[Constance]

Yes, that non-English word stood out for me as well. It must be meant to be a cognate for a French term. Would be good to nail down that French word and its definition.
2) the challenge to neurophysiological correlates ... i.e. finding them depends on the ability to discriminate, to memorize, and to report ... this dependency means we can't assume that what has been assumed indispensable is only the interconnection of the functions needed for establishing the experimental criteria themselves. And that means we can't assume any area of the brain/body isn't associated to experience!

Yes, this is a fundamentally significant insight in phenomenological philosophy, brought forward by Bitbol and some other phenomenologists who have been examining the issue of what neurological and neurophysiological correlates signify and fail to signify about consciousness. [/QUOTE]

I've sent a note to a French friend of mine asking for clarification of what Bitbol meant by 'efficience'. I'll post the answer when I get it.

 

[Constance]

@Soupie

Strawson on MNP

Really appreciate your linking this lecture by Strawson. Here are some notes I made while listening to the lecture, which I offer to start off discussion:

S. refers to “relational structures instantiated in concrete reality.” At 15:45 'physics can't tell us anything about whether/how ? the structure of physical being is related to its nature/Nature'. By comparison, given our intimate knowledge of our own consciousnesses, we can know more about the 'nature' of consciousness than we can about the 'nature' of physical reality. But it's clear for S. that 'the physical and the mental share a common ground,' i.e., a structural ground {as in Kafatos's theory}.

{Question: Recent attempts have been made to represent conscious experience in mathematical equations. How successful are these attempts? How successful could they be?}

This seems to be the core of Strawson’s ‘physicalist naturalism': 'the physical and the mental share a common ground.' i.e., a structural ground, and this could not be understood without the existence and activities of consciousness as experiential, as experienced.

S states that "We know that physical reality has some experiential character." {Yes, phenomenologically we know this in terms of our contacts and interactions with the physical objects we encounter in our local environments, and we know this even prereflectively. The prereflective 'sense of reality' is preconscious knowledge that the reality, the mileau, in which we exist is in part 'objective' [presents 'things' beyond ourselves] yet is not exhausted by objects since our awareness presents a surplus beyond the visibility and tangibility of what we experience -- i.e., our experiencing of them, our presence to them, and it is this 'preconscous knowledge' that opens the way into reflective consciousness and thought -- both disciplined thought and imaginative thought, both being projections of the possibilities of how things might be from the basis of how we experience them.}

S. says that "we have no reason to believe that anything exists that is nonexperiential," but also that we have no reason to believe that something might exist that is nonexperiential. Russell quote: at 36:32.

This additional videotaped lecture by Strawson on Perception might help us further to grasp his thought:

 

[Randall]

You're still not doing what Steve first asked you to do, and which I've also asked you to do -- i.e., to elaborate on what you meant by reducing the differences between Kantian and phenomenological philosophy to matters of 'attitude'. In other words, to put some flesh on the bone of your simple, reductive, statement.

I made no "simple, reductive statement". If by now you're still claiming you don't see that, and that you don't want to discuss it, and instead have me write some sort of essay on it, then I'll just assume you actually get what I meant in the first place, and therefore don't need me to explain it. The alternative would be to assume you haven't got any idea what I meant, which would imply you're the one who needs t review the material ( not me ).

It's time to fish or cut bait rather than repeatedly verbalizing what you consider to be excuses for not doing so.

Excuses? When I ask you to discuss something in your own words, from your perspective, you hand wave, refuse, ignore the request, or post walls of text by other people, and you just did it again. A few words that represent the author's own thoughts reveals far more about where they're at than posting walls of text by others. Besides that, if you two understand what is meant by the philosophical attitudes I alluded to, then I shouldn't have write anything.

 

[smcder]

"Haltung nicht Eignung bestimmt Höhe." - I. Kant

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

Strawson on MNP

Sent from my LGLS991 using Tapatalk

@Soupie - The first couple of minutes he gives pretty clear definitions for materialism, naturalism and physicalism.

 

[smcder]

Really appreciate your linking this lecture by Strawson. Here are some notes I made while listening to the lecture, which I offer to start off discussion:

S. refers to “relational structures instantiated in concrete reality.” At 15:45 'physics can't tell us anything about whether/how ? the structure of physical being is related to its nature/Nature'. By comparison, given our intimate knowledge of our own consciousnesses, we can know more about the 'nature' of consciousness than we can about the 'nature' of physical reality. But it's clear for S. that 'the physical and the mental share a common ground,' i.e., a structural ground {as in Kafatos's theory}.

{Question: Recent attempts have been made to represent conscious experience in mathematical equations. How successful are these attempts? How successful could they be?}

This seems to be the core of Strawson’s ‘physicalist naturalism': 'the physical and the mental share a common ground.' i.e., a structural ground, and this could not be understood without the existence and activities of consciousness as experiential, as experienced.

S states that "We know that physical reality has some experiential character." {Yes, phenomenologically we know this in terms of our contacts and interactions with the physical objects we encounter in our local environments, and we know this even prereflectively. The prereflective 'sense of reality' is preconscious knowledge that the reality, the mileau, in which we exist is in part 'objective' [presents 'things' beyond ourselves] yet is not exhausted by objects since our awareness presents a surplus beyond the visibility and tangibility of what we experience -- i.e., our experiencing of them, our presence to them, and it is this 'preconscous knowledge' that opens the way into reflective consciousness and thought -- both disciplined thought and imaginative thought, both being projections of the possibilities of how things might be from the basis of how we experience them.}

S. says that "we have no reason to believe that anything exists that is nonexperiential," but also that we have no reason to believe that something might exist that is nonexperiential. Russell quote: at 36:32.

This additional videotaped lecture by Strawson on Perception might help us further to grasp his thought:

@Constance wrote

{Question: Recent attempts have been made to represent conscious experience in mathematical equations. How successful are these attempts? How successful could they be?}

Google kafatos mathematics equation

returned at least 3 Kafatos papers on this subject:

Exploring Consciousness Through the Qualitative Content of Equations
Mathematical Frameworks for Consciosness
Fundamental Mathematics of Consciousness

 

[Soupie]

Can you say more about what a "predictive model" is or would do? Predictive of ... ?

In the case of subjectivity/consciousness, this would be unique, because it couldnt be predictive in the typical, objective, observational manner. It would need to be predictive on an individual, reflective level. So any predictive model of subjectivity could never be confirmed in the standard scientific manner.

So, a Conscious Realism predictive model of consciousness would be able to make statements such as: if person is in conscious state X, then there is probability Y they will conscious state Z next.

Or something along those lines. And the model will also explain why various objective observables/measurables are correlated with these states but will not seek causitive relations per se due to the nature of our relation to the objective pole of releality. (that is, we cant access objective reality objectively via subjectivity.)

The best our models might be able to capture about the objective pole of reality is via probability statements, just as we currently use in QM.

Heres the way i'm currently conceptualizing this (neutral monism):

Fundamental reality: neither objective nor subjective. Non-determined. Open. Unbound potential.

Subjectivity-Objectivity: when fundamental reality (what-is) can be said to be in a state or in various local states, ie systems

As soon as FR has a "symmetry break" subjectivity amd objectivity immediately emerge. As soon as FR breaks uniformity, the object-subject relationship manifests.

Thus, subjectivity (consciousness/experience) and objectivity (physicalism) are dual aspects that emerge whenever fundamental reality breaks uniformity.

Perhaps this is captured by the metaphor of the Big Bang? When the uniform singularity experienced a symmetry break, subjectivity (consciousness) and objectivity (physicalness) instantaneously manifested.

At the same time, when i speak of objectivity/physicalness i keep Naive Realism in mind. So while i recognize that there exists a real, objective pole of reality, i also recognize that its true nature is not captured by my perceptions.

We can conceive of the "true" nature of objective reality to consist of "atoms" a la the Materialist model, but that doesn't seem to be the case.

Im not sure we can conceptualize the true nature of objective reality, we can only conceptualize it via metaphors. We perceive it to be material, but to claim that it really is material is to fall into naive realism. We have to recognize that any and all feels, smells, tastes, sounds, etc. are on the subjective side and not the objective side.

But i think we can use math to capture the forms, relationships, amd evolutions of objective reality.

At the same time, objectivity and subjectivity are fundamentally intertwined, so viewing them as fundamentally, ontologically distinct is problematic too.

Although @ufology would protest, i think quantum physicists are recognizing that subjectivity (the observer) needs to be accounted for in any model of reality; ie a fully objective theory of everything can never be achieved because the nature or objective reality is fundmentally intertwined with subjective reality.

What are your thoughts?

Roughly, i think:

Materialism: all of reality is composed of fundamental spheres that have at least 3D extension and possibly other equally fundamental properties.

Physicalism: reality may not be fundamentally material, but all of reality is observable/measurable.

Naturalism: The state of reality is guided be non-intelligent, mechanistic processes