Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[smcder]

Metaphor and Phenomenology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



"With correspondence, we can only assume we are in possession of the truth when our representations or ideas about the world “match up” with external states of affairs. We have already seen how Aristotle’s system of first-order predication supports correspondence, as it is enabled through the denotative ascription of predicates/categorical features of /to objects. But Nietzsche boldly suggests that we are, from the outset, already in metaphor and he works from this starting point. The concepts and judgments we use to describe reality do not flatly reflect pre-existing similarities or causal relationships between themselves and our physical intuitions about reality, they are themselves metaphorical constructions; that is, they are creative forms of differentiation emerging out of a deeper undifferentiated primordiality of being. The truth of the world is more closely reflected in the Dionysian level of pure aesthetic immersion into an “undecipherable” innermost essence of things."

 

[Soupie]

As to whether you agree with the phenomenological view of perception ... ask yourself if your view of perception supports epiphenomenalism?if perception is a physiological change in X ... Then what does consciousness have to "do"?

Thanks for your efforts, but it all remains entirely unclear to me. Ill have to do some more reading to get a better understanding of the phenomenological approach to perception. Ive tried to read MPs paper on perception, but find it equally confuddeling.

As to my own view of perception: no, its not epiphenomenal. The change that occurs in the organism [entity] just is perception; the notion that the change is a physiological change is a product of perception; while there certainly is a change taking place, we should't reify our perception of physiological change. The duality between perception and reality is not an ontologically real duality.

 

[Soupie]

May I ask why?

I think it's a very clever and brilliant answer to the question of why there is anything instead of nothing. And it likewise provides a neutral ground which neutral monism requires; an approach to the MBP which I happen to favor.

 

[smcder]

Thanks for your efforts, but it all remains entirely unclear to me. Ill have to do some more reading to get a better understanding of the phenomenological approach to perception. Ive tried to read MPs paper on perception, but find it equally confuddeling.

As to my own view of perception: no, its not epiphenomenal. The change that occurs in the organism [entity] just is perception; the notion that the change is a physiological change is a product of perception; while there certainly is a change taking place, we should't reify our perception of physiological change. The duality between perception and reality is not an ontologically real duality.

1. What would it mean to "reify our perception of physiological change"?

2. What kind of real duality is the duality between perception and reality?

 

[smcder]

I think it's a very clever and brilliant answer to the question of why there is anything instead of nothing. And it likewise provides a neutral ground which neutral monism requires; an approach to the MBP which I happen to favor.

It would take a very high IQ indeed to be simultaneously clever and brilliant!

How does it "provide" rather than simply declare (In the begining was UBT) this neutral ground?

 

[Soupie]

Thanks for your efforts, but it all remains entirely unclear to me. Ill have to do some more reading to get a better understanding of the phenomenological approach to perception. Ive tried to read MPs paper on perception, but find it equally confuddeling.

As to my own view of perception: no, its not epiphenomenal. The change that occurs in the organism [entity] just is perception; the notion that the change is a physiological change is a product of perception; while there certainly is a change taking place, we should't reify our perception of physiological change. The duality between perception and reality is not an ontologically real duality.

Recall my story of the submarine.

There definitely are icebergs floating out there. When the submarine trains its radar on the icebergs it sees red blob. There is a correspondence between the real iceberg and the red blob. However, it would be a mistake for the submarine to conclude that icebergs are red blobs.

So, the change to the entity that just is perception, appears to the entity as a physiological red blob when it trains its own perception on itself. While there is a correspondence between the real change and the perceived physiological change, it would be a mistake for the entity to conclude that perception is physiological change.

 

[Soupie]

1. What would it mean to "reify our perception of physiological change"?

To conclude that our perceptions of reality are veridically real.

2. What kind of real duality is would be the duality between perception and reality?

Note that i changed the question a bit.

It would be a real duality if perceptions and reality consisted of ontologically different stuff.

 

[smcder]

Recall my story of the submarine.

There definitely are icebergs floating out there. When the submarine trains its radar on the icebergs it sees red blob. There is a correspondence between the real iceberg and the red blob. However, it would be a mistake for the submarine to conclude that icebergs are red blobs.

So, the change to the entity that just is perception, appears to the entity as a physiological red blob when it trains its own perception on itself. While there is a correspondence between the real change and the perceived physiological change, it would be a mistake for the entity to conclude that perception is physiological change.

"While there is a correspondence between the real change and the perceived physiological change, ..."

What is the real change?

 

[Soupie]

It would take a very high IQ indeed to be simultaneously clever and brilliant!

How does it "provide" rather than simply declare (In the begining was UBT) this neutral ground?

youre suggesting he doesnt provide a logical argument for ubt?

 

[smcder]

To conclude that our perceptions of reality are veridically real.


Note that i changed the question a bit.

It would be a real duality if perceptions and reality consisted of ontologically different stuff.

Define "ontologically and "stuff" ... "different" I understand. ;-)

 

[Soupie]

"While there is a correspondence between the real change and the perceived physiological change, ..."

What is the real change?

In order to see how this could work, we must transition from a view of phenomenal qualities as appendages of physical properties to seeing observed physical properties as perspectival consequences of the phenomenal qualities of components of the world, whether simple or complex.

He recognizes that the fundamental property of experience is perspective, or a point-of-view on reality, and that this perspective generates the monad's specific representation of what it sees as an objective material universe, but is actually the expression of its relation to all the other monads 43 .

 

[Soupie]

Define "ontologically and "stuff" ... "different" I understand. ;-)

Dualism vs monism

 

[smcder]

Dualism vs monism

 

[smcder]

youre suggesting he doesnt provide a logical argument for ubt?

Lay it out for me.

 

[smcder]

In the meantime @Constance can you get us to shore or take us to higher ground ... a poem, another brilliant article?

 

[Soupie]

Youre asking me to write treatise on monism and dualism?

 

[smcder]

Youre asking me to write treatise on monism and dualism?

? No, lay out Langans logical argument for UBT.

 

[smcder]

https://www.quora.com/Can-Christoph...e-Universe-CTMU-prove-Gods-existence-by-logic

You have to make a decision about how to spend your time. I think there are better sources than CTMU to explore the ideas you are interested in (and why you are interested in them).

I suspect Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Russel, Husserl. Heiddeger, Wittgenstein and many contemporary philosophers could rival Langan in any measure of intelligence.

 

[Soupie]

? No, lay out Langans logical argument for UBT.

Yes, you were also asking me to define "ontologically different".

Here's a richer outline of UBT:

What exactly is UBT?

 

[smcder]

Yes, you were also asking me to define "ontologically different".

Here's a richer outline of UBT:

What exactly is UBT?

I've read quite a bit about CTMU ... I'm asking for your words on it.