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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

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This paper is one of many delivered in an interdisciplinary conference on the subject of 'endophysics' held in January 2005 in Bielefeld, Germany . Around that time I read the abstracts of the main conference papers on the internet, and these have since been published in a book described and sampled at amazon. This link will take you to the table of contents:

Endophysics, Time, Quantum And the Subjective: Proceedings of the ZIF Interdisciplinary Research Workshop, 17-22 January 2005, Bielefeld, Germany: Zif Interdisciplinary Research Workshop, R. Buccheri, Avshalom C. Elitzur, Metod Saniga: 9789812565099: Amazon.com: Books

One would probably need to read all of these papers to appreciate the significance of the endophysical approach, but you can get a general idea of the significance of the approach from reading the title of the collection, the table of contents and the text sample from the introductory paper/chapter at amazon, linked below. Amazon quotes the introduction briefly in its description of the book:

"Endophysics, Time, Quantum and the Subjective is the first systematic cross- and trans-disciplinary appraisal of the endophysical paradigm and its possible role in our understanding of Nature. Focusing on three of the most pressing issues of contemporary science, the interpretation of quantum theory, the nature of time, and the problem of consciousness, it provides the reader with some forefront research, concepts and ideas in these areas, such as incessant Big Bang, geometrizing of "mental space-times," and a contextual view of quantum mechanics and/or a view of the Universe as a self-evolving quantum automaton. Although primarily aimed at academics this engaging volume can be read by anyone interested in modern physics, philosophy, psychology and cognitive sciences."

At the time I read the abstracts online, and one or two whole presentations/papers also available online, I copied the abstracts into Word. If that Word doc is still extant in my Word files I'll c&p it for you here.

Here's something else of relevance: https://k0a1a.net/meme20/world-as-interface.pdf

I resonate with this statement in particular: " In endophysics, reality is attributed to the interface between an observer and the rest of the world. This unique reality is comparable with the Kantian "fake
reality" and/or psychoanalysis, but was able to be characterized in more scientific way by Rossler: namely, as an objective reality of a subjective type."

I've been referring to reality as either objective or subject, but endophysics emphasizes the point that because both types exist, both are also objectively real in a third person context. It makes perfect sense to me. But what we have to be careful about here is some of the suggestions I've seen that subjective reality directly influences objective reality, as in the quantum woo we've run across in the past, most notably the misinterpretation of the observer effect.
 
I want to see and read this book too. You've seen the video clips of these beach animal constructions on the internet? Magnificent.
 
It's not too bad. This story, at least, is written as if it were an inevitability, which may be the point. It seems to have all the limits of genre writing, which is why I don't read much sci-fi. It's a de-equationing - beautiful ideas may need a compact telling, its compactibility may be the beauty of an idea - though not all ideas are subject to this short-hand. Probably not most great ones.

But if they are, a narrative seems (art)ifice. In literature it may be the other way around, conveying those truths the most compact form of which is narrative.

Amazon provides a generous Kindle sample of "Story of your Life," the index link I followed, and I find it amazing and wonderful. I typed out a few extracts to reproduce here to interest others in reading it, either the long sample, or the whole thing if they purchase the book. I'm going to tonight.

"The physicists were ultimately able to prove the equivalence of heptapod mathematics and human mathematics; even though their approaches were almost the reverse of one another, both were systems of describing the same physical universe."

"I tried following some of the equations that the physicists were coming up with, but it was no use. I couldn’t really grasp the significance of physical attributes like ‘action’; I couldn’t, with any confidence, ponder the significance of treating such an attribute as fundamental. Still, I tried to ponder questions formulated in terms more familiar to me: what kind of worldview did the heptapods have, that they would consider Fermat’s principle the simplest explanation of light refraction? What kind of perception made a minimum or maximum readily apparent to them?”

“As I grew more fluent, semagraphic designs would appear fully formed, articulating even complex ideas all at once. My thought processes weren’t moving any faster as a result, though. Instead of racing forward, my mind hung balanced on the symmetry underlying the semagrams. The semagrams seemed to be something more than language; they were almost like mandalas. I found myself in a meditative state, contemplating the way in which premises and conclusions were interchangeable. There was no direction inherent in the way propositions were connected, no ‘train of thought’ moving along a particular route; all the components in an act of reasoning were equally powerful, all having identical precedence.”

“When the ancestors of humans and heptapods first acquired the spark of consciousness, they both perceived the same physical world, but they parsed their perceptions differently; the worldviews that ultimately arose were the end result of that divergence. Humans had developed a sequential mode of awareness, while heptapods had developed a simultaneous mode of awareness. We experienced events in an order, and perceived their relationships as cause and effect. They experienced all events at once, and perceived a purpose underlying them all. A minimizing, maximizing purpose.”

“For the heptapods, all language was performative. Instead of using language to inform, they used language to actualize. Sure, heptapods already knew what would be said in any conversation; but in order for their knowledge to be true, the conversation would have to take place.”


“Usually, Heptapod B affects just my memory: my consciousness crawls along as it did before, a glowing sliver crawling forward in time, the difference being that the ash of memory lies ahead as well as behind: there is no real combustion. But occasionally I have glimpses when Heptapod B truly reigns, and I experience past and future all at once; my consciousness becomes a half-century-long ember burning outside time. I perceive—during those glimpses—that entire epoch as a simultaneity. It’s a period encompassing the rest of my life, and the entirety of yours.”


Can't wait to read all of this text and the others included in the book. And must also see the film, which I hope is able to express all of the ramifications expressed in this text. So glad you brought this book here, Steve.
 
Observer effect (physics) - Wikipedia

footnotes (1)(2)(3) though ... all require consciousness to set up an act of measurement ... and Feynman's statement about nature not caring if we look at her ... is also predicated on human consciousness:

"Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not."

How do we know that? As soon as we look ...

That't the humor @Soupie was pointing to above ... this also ties in with a recent analysis of the classic "free will" experiments, that the decision to participate in (much less to set up the experiment in the first place) - is always outside the scope and even the context of the experiment, that we always stand outside these scopes, I think, is essential to Existenitialism. Any measurement, then, of free will, comes after the decision to make any such measurement.
 
I finished the Principle of Intentionality. Its a quick read and is mostly speculative, but i found thr paper valuable for the way the author approached the problem in a true scientific fashion.

He also articulated the HP in a new way, kind of. ( @smcder )

Imagine the following:

"Mike runs downstairs. He has a baseball game. An american tradition. His grandfather had played in the big leagues. Mike hoped to play in the big leagues some day as well. He was dedicated to the sport and approached it with vigor and dedication. He also loved it. His family loved it too, and especially loved watching him play. They often took time off work to travel to his games. Just before running out the door, mike remembered he had left his lucky batting glove on his bed. He turned around and ran back up the stairs. He was so happy he remebered it; it had been his grnadfathers and was his good luck charm. He went out the door and jumped in his parents car. They left for the game. A very special game. The last of his high school career."

So whats so special about that story? The only model that mainstream science has to explain the above is the principle of causation; according to it, the above story was nothing but trillions of billiard balls bouncing into one another.

Yes, people actually believe the principle of causation mirrors reality. However, the principle of causation cannot explain meaning or value. Meaning and value are invisible to it. (exactly like consciousness being invisible to materialist models.)

Now, people like @ufology might claim that consciousness, meaning, and value fit into the principle of causation and materialism, but they dont. No, they dont.

So you either believe the above story some how results from trillions of billiard balls bouncing into each other, or you consider the fact that the principle of causation is indeed a principle.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5295140/pdf/fpsyg-08-00137.pdf

"One powerful approach to theorizing about how things go in the world is by model-building. A model is a representation of something real, and includes hypothetical entities such as influences, constructs, and relations. The model predicts how things will go in some aspect of reality, and provides one explanation of it. There is not necessarily any assertion that its hypothetical entities mirror real entities. Model-building in the area of folk psychology is discussed in Maibom (2003) and Godfrey-Smith (2005).

Any scientific explanation of change is likely to invoke non-physical entities such as forces and causal relations. Although they might seem manifest, they are in some sense inferred, and thus hypothetical. In that sense, virtually all scientific explanation of change occurs in the form of models. Prediction, too, is largely model-based, although scientific observation such as Tycho Brahe’s records of astronomical movement allows prediction in the absence of any model.

In some scientific explanation, hypothetical entities are believed to mirror actual entities. A particularly obvious example is that space-time is non-physical, but is taken to be an aspect of reality. Still, there is value in the notion that even space-time is a hypothetical entity, subject to being modified or replaced as understanding grows. Famously, Einstein transformed scientific beliefs about space and time. And Kant suggested that space and time were simply a priori categories of the understanding, rather than aspects of ultimate (noumenal) reality. Even when there is substantial reason to believe that a certain hypothetical structure precisely mirrors how things actually are (as with the relation E = mc2), hypothetical structures are invented models1, and the evidence that confirms their power in prediction and explanation draws broadly from other, often implicit hypothetical entities, such as the principle of causality.

The science of psychology can especially benefit by treating influences on change as mere hypothetical entities that are model- dependent. The mind is intuitively modeled as an intentional system, whereas the brain is modeled as a causal system. These might both be valid models, even if intentionality is inconsistent with the principle of causality. And allowing intentional models to stand on their own might open the door to there being various human sciences that revolve around models that are inconsistent with the wholly causal models of the physical sciences.

All mainstream scientific models seem to be causal models, treating any consistencies in physical events as somehow conforming to the principle of causality.2 Roughly, there is a causal relation wherever, apart from randomness, physical event B always immediately follows a spatially and temporally contiguous physical event A, such that event B will not occur if event A is blocked. The principle of causality asserts that, apart from randomness, every physical event can be traced to one or more causes, and thus through causal chains into the past (quickly muddied by randomness). There is enormous value in finding ways to model all physical change as consistent with the principle of causality. For example, when quantum events turned out not to follow the principle of causality, a small adaptation of the principle solved the problem. By treating event A as a large number of repetitions of a certain cause, the reliable effect is a fixed statistical distribution that can be treated as event B. Said differently, each single event A causes a certain wave function as event B. Quantum physics conflicts slightly with the principle of causality in other ways. Bell’s theorem describes causal relationships that violate the requirement of contiguity, and there are theoretical approaches in which a quantum effect occurs slightly prior to its cause. As with any hypothetical entity, the principle of causality is subject to modification with new evidence of these sorts.3 ...

The third approach assumes that the structure of reality is more complex than can be represented in any wholly causal model. Think of ultimate reality as having two interconnected dimensions, one causal and the other intentional. The intentional relation is real, where the intentions of an agent actually influence physical events, and where the agent is free to change her mind. But, by hypothesis, there might be no way to confirm this direct influence experimentally, because the intentional and causal dimensions are inextricably connected and fully in harmony. Neural processes and external influences that can be traced in causal chains into the past are integral in the formation of intentions, such that, in principle, a wholly causal model could powerfully predict what the agent will intend. The agent’s intentions directly influence physical events, but there is an epiphenomenal causal link alongside that influence, so that there is no scientific basis for choosing between the two explanations. It is, of course, conceivable that there will eventually be some experimental means that we cannot yet imagine for sorting out whether it is actually the intention that is efficacious. A two- dimensioned universe of this sort is independent of the dualistic claim that conscious experiences (qualia) are real but non- physical. A dualist cites the evidence of subjective experience to justify the reality of qualia. But a proponent of the two- dimensioned universe might, instead, cite the utter inadequacy of any wholly causal model for making sense of anything about minds and mattering. And it might further be argued, consistent with the dualist argument, that the experience of free will and things mattering is more primitive and certain than any causal model of the environment."
 
I finished the Principle of Intentionality. Its a quick read and is mostly speculative, but i found thr paper valuable for the way the author approached the problem in a true scientific fashion.

He also articulated the HP in a new way, kind of. ( @smcder )

Imagine the following:

"Mike runs downstairs. He has a baseball game. An american tradition. His grandfather had played in the big leagues. Mike hoped to play in the big leagues some day as well. He was dedicated to the sport and approached it with vigor and dedication. He also loved it. His family loved it too, and especially loved watching him play. They often took time off work to travel to his games. Just before running out the door, mike remembered he had left his lucky batting glove on his bed. He turned around and ran back up the stairs. He was so happy he remebered it; it had been his grnadfathers and was his good luck charm. He went out the door and jumped in his parents car. They left for the game. A very special game. The last of his high school career."

So whats so special about that story? The only model that mainstream science has to explain the above is the principle of causation; according to it, the above story was nothing but trillions of billiard balls bouncing into one another.

Yes, people actually believe the principle of causation mirrors reality. However, the principle of causation cannot explain meaning or value. Meaning and value are invisible to it. (exactly like consciousness being invisible to materialist models.)

Now, people like @ufology might claim that consciousness, meaning, and value fit into the principle of causation and materialism, but they dont. No, they dont.

So you either believe the above story some how results from trillions of billiard balls bouncing into each other, or you consider the fact that the principle of causation is indeed a principle.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5295140/pdf/fpsyg-08-00137.pdf

"One powerful approach to theorizing about how things go in the world is by model-building. A model is a representation of something real, and includes hypothetical entities such as influences, constructs, and relations. The model predicts how things will go in some aspect of reality, and provides one explanation of it. There is not necessarily any assertion that its hypothetical entities mirror real entities. Model-building in the area of folk psychology is discussed in Maibom (2003) and Godfrey-Smith (2005).

Any scientific explanation of change is likely to invoke non-physical entities such as forces and causal relations. Although they might seem manifest, they are in some sense inferred, and thus hypothetical. In that sense, virtually all scientific explanation of change occurs in the form of models. Prediction, too, is largely model-based, although scientific observation such as Tycho Brahe’s records of astronomical movement allows prediction in the absence of any model.

In some scientific explanation, hypothetical entities are believed to mirror actual entities. A particularly obvious example is that space-time is non-physical, but is taken to be an aspect of reality. Still, there is value in the notion that even space-time is a hypothetical entity, subject to being modified or replaced as understanding grows. Famously, Einstein transformed scientific beliefs about space and time. And Kant suggested that space and time were simply a priori categories of the understanding, rather than aspects of ultimate (noumenal) reality. Even when there is substantial reason to believe that a certain hypothetical structure precisely mirrors how things actually are (as with the relation E = mc2), hypothetical structures are invented models1, and the evidence that confirms their power in prediction and explanation draws broadly from other, often implicit hypothetical entities, such as the principle of causality.

The science of psychology can especially benefit by treating influences on change as mere hypothetical entities that are model- dependent. The mind is intuitively modeled as an intentional system, whereas the brain is modeled as a causal system. These might both be valid models, even if intentionality is inconsistent with the principle of causality. And allowing intentional models to stand on their own might open the door to there being various human sciences that revolve around models that are inconsistent with the wholly causal models of the physical sciences.

All mainstream scientific models seem to be causal models, treating any consistencies in physical events as somehow conforming to the principle of causality.2 Roughly, there is a causal relation wherever, apart from randomness, physical event B always immediately follows a spatially and temporally contiguous physical event A, such that event B will not occur if event A is blocked. The principle of causality asserts that, apart from randomness, every physical event can be traced to one or more causes, and thus through causal chains into the past (quickly muddied by randomness). There is enormous value in finding ways to model all physical change as consistent with the principle of causality. For example, when quantum events turned out not to follow the principle of causality, a small adaptation of the principle solved the problem. By treating event A as a large number of repetitions of a certain cause, the reliable effect is a fixed statistical distribution that can be treated as event B. Said differently, each single event A causes a certain wave function as event B. Quantum physics conflicts slightly with the principle of causality in other ways. Bell’s theorem describes causal relationships that violate the requirement of contiguity, and there are theoretical approaches in which a quantum effect occurs slightly prior to its cause. As with any hypothetical entity, the principle of causality is subject to modification with new evidence of these sorts.3 ...

The third approach assumes that the structure of reality is more complex than can be represented in any wholly causal model. Think of ultimate reality as having two interconnected dimensions, one causal and the other intentional. The intentional relation is real, where the intentions of an agent actually influence physical events, and where the agent is free to change her mind. But, by hypothesis, there might be no way to confirm this direct influence experimentally, because the intentional and causal dimensions are inextricably connected and fully in harmony. Neural processes and external influences that can be traced in causal chains into the past are integral in the formation of intentions, such that, in principle, a wholly causal model could powerfully predict what the agent will intend. The agent’s intentions directly influence physical events, but there is an epiphenomenal causal link alongside that influence, so that there is no scientific basis for choosing between the two explanations. It is, of course, conceivable that there will eventually be some experimental means that we cannot yet imagine for sorting out whether it is actually the intention that is efficacious. A two- dimensioned universe of this sort is independent of the dualistic claim that conscious experiences (qualia) are real but non- physical. A dualist cites the evidence of subjective experience to justify the reality of qualia. But a proponent of the two- dimensioned universe might, instead, cite the utter inadequacy of any wholly causal model for making sense of anything about minds and mattering. And it might further be argued, consistent with the dualist argument, that the experience of free will and things mattering is more primitive and certain than any causal model of the environment."

Sounds Buddhish ...

Or maddishly Monadist ...

And in Magic, the results are always fully expected to be explicable in terms of a chain of causality ... just ask Poor Macbeth, confident that no man born of woman can harm him ... and we won't even talk of walking trees?

There are, I think, further paradoxes in the interdictatorial nature of causality and intentionality, but in the end I find compatabilists a cold lot, sitting on their fence - I'd rather be drinking wine with the determinists or saving souls with the true believers. Is your story better with the Tiger, or without it?
 
matt dillon.jpg

Matt Dillon That's right Festus ... Deepok Chopra ... he's wanted for purveying all the way from Dry Gulch to Carson City.

Festus Purveyin?? Now, that sounds about as wrong as a kitten down a well, Marshall! We got to protect our women and the feeble-minded!

Matt Dillon And the children, Festus, don't forget the children.

Festus (awestruck) I plum forgot about the children Marshall ...
 
villagers.jpg

All manner of strange rumors the villagers tolerated about the goings on at Castle Frankenstein ... blasphemous roars of strange machinery and cries deep in the night ... tales of many worlds and many minds and then, much much darker matters told of only in whisper ... but when it was voiced that he was purveying Quatum Woo ... why, the villagers could no more be mere observers!
 
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Sounds Buddhish ...

Or maddishly Monadist ...

And in Magic, the results are always fully expected to be explicable in terms of a chain of causality ... just ask Poor Macbeth, confident that no man born of woman can harm him ... and we won't even talk of walking trees?

There are, I think, further paradoxes in the interdictatorial nature of causality and intentionality, but in the end I find compatabilists a cold lot, sitting on their fence - I'd rather be drinking wine with the determinists or saving souls with the true believers. Is your story better with the Tiger, or without it?
I'm completely in over my head here of course.

I'm still stuck on the question I posed at the end of the last thread. If we can't achieve absolute knowledge of the absolute, can we account for the order/structure we experience?

In other words, if the principle of causation and the principle of intentionality are both incomplete models, neither of which fully explain the order/structure we experience, what next?

Are there other principles of order/structure? Im not asking whether we endorse them, but just curios what else is out there. How about the simulation theory? The idea that the order we experience is due to the fact that we exist within a computation; a principle of computation?

I posted awhile back about the ways in which quantum physics seems to mirror computation. (Note I'm not arguing for this approach, just noting it.)

Did Kant truly destroy metaphysics? Enter McGinn? The end?
 
I'm completely in over my head here of course.

I'm still stuck on the question I posed at the end of the last thread. If we can't achieve absolute knowledge of the absolute, can we account for the order/structure we experience?

In other words, if the principle of causation and the principle of intentionality are both incomplete models, neither of which fully explain the order/structure we experience, what next?

Are there other principles of order/structure? Im not asking whether we endorse them, but just curios what else is out there. How about the simulation theory? The idea that the order we experience is due to the fact that we exist within a computation; a principle of computation?

I posted awhile back about the ways in which quantum physics seems to mirror computation. (Note I'm not arguing for this approach, just noting it.)

Did Kant truly destroy metaphysics? Enter McGinn? The end?

I'll let you in on a little secret ... NO ONE KNOWS. Only those who lie to themselves (big lies and little lies) are insistent that they do.
 
I'm completely in over my head here of course.

I'm still stuck on the question I posed at the end of the last thread. If we can't achieve absolute knowledge of the absolute, can we account for the order/structure we experience?

In other words, if the principle of causation and the principle of intentionality are both incomplete models, neither of which fully explain the order/structure we experience, what next?

Are there other principles of order/structure? Im not asking whether we endorse them, but just curios what else is out there. How about the simulation theory? The idea that the order we experience is due to the fact that we exist within a computation; a principle of computation?

I posted awhile back about the ways in which quantum physics seems to mirror computation. (Note I'm not arguing for this approach, just noting it.)

Did Kant truly destroy metaphysics? Enter McGinn? The end?

if it's a simulation, are the simulators living in a real world? -> here there be Tygers (and madness)

The Millican lectures I linked above are short and deal clearly with the basics of "Knowledge" and what to say to the skeptics. The true skeptic, of course, would not claim we can know nothing, because that presupposes a whole framework in which it makes sense to say "we know nothing" and so this pseudo-skeptic lives in the same world as everyone else.

No, the true skeptic says "gazornenplat" and makes an end of it.
 
My submission to the FQXi Essay Contest has been approved. The essay is now available for download and discussion on this FQXi forum page:
Newtonian bodies and consciousness - Hierarchical Construct Theory by Mark Pharoah
Other essays can be found at:
FQXi - Foundational Questions Institute
The theme of the competition is: "Wandering Towards a Goal"
Comments welcome...

@Pharoah, your paper at FQXi is excellent. It's clear, informative. and persuasive. I finally now understand HCT, and I find it a very persuasive theory indeed.

ps, I had no idea you were a concert violinist and have interacted with Prigogine. :)

pps, if you send a copy to Chalmers, let us know how he responds.
 
So we seem to have several things going on at once, I've not been able to keep up lately ... can someone summarize where we are?

I think we're still operating in multiple directions at once, as we've been doing during most of the two+ years of this conversation, and as indeed our subject seems to require. I received in my email today a link to the fifth part of a series of conversations concerning consciousness in the New York Review of Books and tracked back to find the first in the series. I'll link both the fifth and the first of these below (and then a page providing further links) which might be useful for us as an overview of where we've been so far (and maybe some places we haven't yet gone).

http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/22/consciousness-am-i-the-apple/

http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/11/21/challenge-of-defining-consciousness/

http://www.nybooks.com/topics/on-consciousness/
 
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New York Review of Books
Is Consciousness an Illusion?

Thomas Nagel
MARCH 9, 2017 ISSUE

From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds
ir

by Daniel C. Dennett
Norton, 476 pp., $28.95

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/201...sletter&utm_term=Is Consciousness an Illusion
 
@Pharoah, your paper at FQXi is excellent. It's clear, informative. and persuasive. I finally now understand HCT, and I find it a very persuasive theory indeed.
I too found this to be the clearest presentation of HCT. Unfortunately I still do not find it persuasive.

The issues for me remain your explanation of how (lived) experience emerges from non-lived experience. Relatedly, I think you still have not addressed the problem of overdetermination. (The section on Active Consciousness.)

I think HCT elequently addresses the so-called easy problems of consciousness:
  • the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
  • the integration of information by a cognitive system;
  • the reportability of mental states;
  • the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
  • the focus of attention;
  • the deliberate control of behavior;
  • the difference between wakefulness and sleep.
However, HCT does not answer the Hard Problem of consciousness:

"Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory [lived] experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion?"

I find it interesting that you quote heavily from Kant, but don't seem to incorporate his distinction between noumena and phenomena, and how this can keep us from falling into the trap of Naive Realism.

I know you reject Conscious Realism (by way of rejecting Panpyschism), but I wish you would consider incorporating Kant's insight and Conscious Realism into HCT, because they inform us that Emergentism is DOA.
 
Hopefully Danny gives Donny some credit haha. Wow.

'Nor do we have to understand the mechanisms that underlie those competencies. In an illuminating metaphor, Dennett asserts that the manifest image that depicts the world in which we live our everyday lives is composed of a set of user-illusions,

like the ingenious user-illusion of click-and-drag icons, little tan folders into which files may be dropped, and the rest of the ever more familiar items on your computer’s desktop. What is actually going on behind the desktop is mind-numbingly complicated, but users don’t need to know about it, so intelligent interface designers have simplified the affordances, making them particularly salient for human eyes, and adding sound effects to help direct attention. Nothing compact and salient inside the computer corresponds to that little tan file-folder on the desktop screen.

He says that the manifest image of each species is “a user-illusion brilliantly designed by evolution to fit the needs of its users.”'
 
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