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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

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But only if one is willing to grant consciousness (feeling or "what it's like") as fundamental. Which most physicalists are not willing to do, wanting instead for consciousness to be something that emerges from neural processes.

Once one considers that feeling may be one-and-the-same as being, then one can flip back and forth.

However if one insists that feeling emerges from being, then one is faced with the HP.

Consider away - but how would you show anything like that to be the case? This is why Hoffman's theory is one of conscious agents - there has to be something that can be modelled- but as soon as he does that, he is going to run into problem #2 below, I suspect, because I think you can model the world on any sufficiently complex structure - the structure just has to be complex enough to account for our experiences.


fpsyg-05-00577-g001.jpg


Drop all the words under the letters in this model and anything with this set of relationships can be modelled - I wish I could say this more clearly.

1. Hoffman's theory is a theory of conscious agents, not consciousness, not pure being ... not even phenomenal consciousness, I don't find any light shed on phenomenal consciousness in this model - the hard problem still hangs out there in the form of how do we get "what it is like" from Conscious Agents?

I haven't found anyone that has commented on the mathematics ... but what I think could be happening is that it's really not at all surprising that:

2. We show that one particular object, the quantum free particle, has a wave function that is identical in form to the harmonic functions that characterize the asymptotic dynamics of conscious agents; particles are vibrations not of strings but of interacting conscious agents.

Because Hoffman/Prakesh defined Conscious Agents to begin with - it's not like comparing two independent phenomena in nature and finding some surprising underlying mathematics.
 
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Hoffman's theory is a theory of conscious agents, not consciousness, not pure being ... not even phenomenal consciousness, I don't find any light shed on phenomenal consciousness in this model - the hard problem still hangs out there in the form of how do we get "what it is like" from Conscious Agents?
I disagree. As I've noted in the past, Hoffman's Conscious Agents imo are no different conceptually than panpsychism, defined as the idea that, say, electrons are conscious.

In other words, the conscious agents just are what it's like, also known as "feeling" or consciousness.

And following that, Hoffman says that everything else can be explained via networks of conscious agents.

In other, other words, we can in principle explain everything as networks of conscious agents except for a conscious agent (pure feeling) itself.

Thus Hoffman's CR starts with phenomenal consciousness and builds everything else from it.
 
I disagree. As I've noted in the past, Hoffman's Conscious Agents imo are no different conceptually than panpsychism, defined as the idea that, say, electrons are conscious.

In other words, the conscious agents just are what it's like, also known as "feeling" or consciousness.

And following that, Hoffman says that everything else can be explained via networks of conscious agents.

In other, other words, we can in principle explain everything as networks of conscious agents except for a conscious agent (pure feeling) itself.

Thus Hoffman's CR starts with phenomenal consciousness and builds everything else from it.

"Conscious realism is not panpsychism nor does it entail panpsychism.
Panpsychism claims that all objects, from tables and chairs to the sun
and moon, are themselves conscious (Hartshorne 1937/1968, Whitehead
1929/1979), or that many objects, such as trees and atoms, but perhaps
not tables and chairs, are conscious (Griffin 1998). Conscious realism,
together with MUI theory, claims that tables and chairs are icons in the
MUIs of conscious agents, and thus that they are conscious experiences of
those agents. It does not claim, nor entail, that tables and chairs are con-
scious or conscious agents."
 
"Conscious realism is not panpsychism nor does it entail panpsychism.
Panpsychism claims that all objects, from tables and chairs to the sun
and moon, are themselves conscious (Hartshorne 1937/1968, Whitehead
1929/1979), or that many objects, such as trees and atoms, but perhaps
not tables and chairs, are conscious (Griffin 1998). Conscious realism,
together with MUI theory, claims that tables and chairs are icons in the
MUIs of conscious agents, and thus that they are conscious experiences of
those agents. It does not claim, nor entail, that tables and chairs are con-
scious or conscious agents."
Not different conceptually than panpsychism.
 
I disagree. As I've noted in the past, Hoffman's Conscious Agents imo are no different conceptually than panpsychism, defined as the idea that, say, electrons are conscious.

In other words, the conscious agents just are what it's like, also known as "feeling" or consciousness.

And following that, Hoffman says that everything else can be explained via networks of conscious agents.

In other, other words, we can in principle explain everything as networks of conscious agents except for a conscious agent (pure feeling) itself.

Thus Hoffman's CR starts with phenomenal consciousness and builds everything else from it.

experience is something a conscious agent can have

fpsyg-05-00577-g001.jpg
 
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I disagree. As I've noted in the past, Hoffman's Conscious Agents imo are no different conceptually than panpsychism, defined as the idea that, say, electrons are conscious.

In other words, the conscious agents just are what it's like, also known as "feeling" or consciousness.

And following that, Hoffman says that everything else can be explained via networks of conscious agents.

In other, other words, we can in principle explain everything as networks of conscious agents except for a conscious agent (pure feeling) itself.

Thus Hoffman's CR starts with phenomenal consciousness and builds everything else from it.

the conscious agents just are what it's like, also known as "feeling" or consciousness

Thus Hoffman's CR starts with phenomenal consciousness and builds everything from it.

Again, experience is part of the definition of Conscious Agent -

"Conscious realism, together with MUI theory, claims that tables and chairs are icons in the MUIs of conscious agents, and thus that they are conscious experiences of those agents. It does not claim, nor entail, that tables and chairs are con-scious or conscious agents."

conscious experiences is something that Conscious Agents can have.
 
There is actually not that much said about phenomenal consciousness by Hoffman - the phrase "what it is like" hasn't come up in searches against Hoffman's name - so far - much of his discussion seems to be more about access consciousness ... and Conscious Agents are discussed more in terms of a theory of subjects than subjectivity.
 
definition of access consciousness from Wikipedia:

access consciousness consists of that information globally available in the cognitive system for the purposes of reasoning, speech and high-level action control.

"So, each time a conscious agent interacts with the world and, in consequence, has a conscious experience, we can think of this interaction as a message being passed from the world to the conscious agent over a channel. Similarly, each time the conscious agent has a conscious experience and, in consequence, decides on an action to take, we can think of this decision as a message being passed over a channel within the conscious agent itself."

access vs phenomenal consciousness I guess is still controversial? I'm not sure you can have one without the other and Hoffman does speak above about "conscious experience" but there isn't much about what role phenomenal consciousness as "what it is like" would play in the above ... certainly not anything that necissitates it ... ? So even under conscious agents, the phenomenal, what it is like - could simply accompany the working of a conscious agent -

you could even postulate an alternate world of "Zombie Conscious Agents" identical to Conscious Agents, except for one thing - in that world, there is nothing it is like to be a conscious agent ... ;-)
 
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Lisa Barrett: Facing Down Ekman’s Universal Emotions | Neuroanthropology

Panksepp is only mentioned in a comment

Gary Siegel
July 30, 2013 at 2:07 pm


In thinking about the basic emotion concept, I think one cannot overlook the Jaak Panksepp contribution to this material. His recent book, with Lucy Bivin
The Anthropology of Emotion, summarizes a vast amount of experimental material on the study of emotion, much of it in animals and suggests that there are distinct emotional networks in the brain, that have a lot of experimental data gathered and a fair amount of confirmation.

He would probably differ with Eckman considerably, but he would make a strong argument for basic emotional networks in the brain, and would also make the point that in real life, especially in primates these networks rarely create pure single emotion expressions, rather they are mixes and blends of various layers of emotional response from brainstem level responses to complex cortical ones.

Many people aren’t aware of his work, perhaps because so much of it is in the animal research realm. Again, I think it would be a key piece to consider when addressing this question.
 
"That, Barrett told me, is what the mind does with emotions. Just as that first picture of the bee actually wasn’t a picture of a bee for me until I taught myself that it was, my emotions aren’t actually emotions until I’ve taught myself to think of them that way. Without that, I have only a meaningless mishmash of information about what I’m feeling. In other words, as Barrett put it to me, emotion isn’t a simple reflex or a bodily state that’s hard-wired into our DNA, and it’s certainly not universally expressed. It’s a contingent act of perception that makes sense of the information coming in from the world around you, how your body is feeling in the moment, and everything you’ve ever been taught to understand as emotion. Culture to culture, person to person even, it’s never quite the same.

  • What’s felt as sadness in one person might as easily be felt as weariness in another, or frustration in someone else.

So there’s no such thing as a basic emotion? It sounds crazy. But this is where all sorts of brain science is headed. Researchers once assumed that the brain stored specific memories, but now they’ve realized that there is no such stash to be found. Memories, the new science suggests, are actually reconstructed anew every time we access them, and appear to us a little differently each time, depending on what’s happened since. Vision works in a similar way. The brain, it turns out, doesn’t consciously process every single piece of information that comes its way. Think of how impossibly distracting the regular act of blinking would be if it did. Instead, it pays attention to what you need to pay attention to, then raids your memory stores to fill in the blanks.


THAT versus

And for the other side, here is a recent Ekman review:

Paul Ekman and Daniel Cordaro (2010), What Is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review.

Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
 
Consider away - but how would you show anything like that to be the case? This is why Hoffman's theory is one of conscious agents - there has to be something that can be modelled- but as soon as he does that, he is going to run into problem #2 below, I suspect, because I think you can model the world on any sufficiently complex structure - the structure just has to be complex enough to account for our experiences.


fpsyg-05-00577-g001.jpg


Drop all the words under the letters in this model and anything with this set of relationships can be modelled - I wish I could say this more clearly.

1. Hoffman's theory is a theory of conscious agents, not consciousness, not pure being ... not even phenomenal consciousness, I don't find any light shed on phenomenal consciousness in this model - the hard problem still hangs out there in the form of how do we get "what it is like" from Conscious Agents?

I haven't found anyone that has commented on the mathematics ... but what I think could be happening is that it's really not at all surprising that:

2. We show that one particular object, the quantum free particle, has a wave function that is identical in form to the harmonic functions that characterize the asymptotic dynamics of conscious agents; particles are vibrations not of strings but of interacting conscious agents.

Because Hoffman/Prakesh defined Conscious Agents to begin with - it's not like comparing two independent phenomena in nature and finding some surprising underlying mathematics.

Seconded.


The problem of overdetermination is a problem for dualists as well. If all behavior can be explained via physical processes, why and how is there a non-physical mind which seems to play a role in guiding behavior?

The answer that both physicalists and dualists might consider is that the body is "merely" how the mind appears to itself when it is perceived via the senses. (Note that this is distinct from introspection.)

You with Hoffman jump from a) 'conscious agents' assumed to be present in q particles and/or waves {and note that waves deeply complicate the question of 'conscious agents'} t0 b) 'minds' without blinking. 'Mind' is not a synonym for consciousness. Or do you think it is? If you think these terms/concepts are synonyms, on what basis do you think so, either scientifically or philosophically. Does Hoffman use these terms/concepts interchangeably? Does anyone else among all the consciousness researchers we've read over the last two+ years?

The hypothesis you assert [Hoffman's hypothesis or yours?] that
"the body is "merely" how the mind appears to itself when it is perceived via the senses" is one of the most curious statements I've ever read. I can't make sense of it. Do you mean to say that in your view the 'mind' {conceptual apparatus}of a conscious being appears to that being through the pathways of the being's bodily senses but that this body is not real/actual? That it is an illusion projected from the 'mind' as informed by bodily senses that are no more real or actual than the bodily illusion as a whole, an illusion that we exist as physical, biologically evolved, bodies possessing senses and an evolved capability to think about what we sense in our existence? Please clarify what you are claiming. Thanks.


There is actually not that much said about phenomenal consciousness by Hoffman - the phrase "what it is like" hasn't come up in searches against Hoffman's name - so far - much of his discussion seems to be more about access consciousness ... and Conscious Agents are discussed more in terms of a theory of subjects than subjectivity.

Seconded.

I want to add that 'what it is like' has become an unfortunately vague stand-in term in Consciousness Studies, coined by Chalmers (or was it Nagel?), to refer to the experiential base of subjectivity in humans and many other animals. Strawson's paper "Cognitive Phenomenology" and several recent books on this topic recognize, as phenomenological philosophers have long recognized and clarified, the ways in which preconscious experience -- aka "prereflective consciousness" -- constitutes the ground for the evolution of reflective consciousness and ultimately the development of what we call 'mind' in our own species. We need to explore preconscious and protoconscious experience, as Panksepp and Heidegger have done, as the means by which living beings begin to become consciously aware of their situated existences --> i.e., their lived actualities. In both of those thinkers it is emotions, valenced moods, that begin to awaken consciousness as subjective/objective presence to self and world. 'What it is like to be' begins in what it feels like to be. And, to the best of our knowledge, feeling begins in the living body.
 
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quoting "my emotions aren’t actually emotions until I’ve taught myself to think of them that way."

If that's what Barrett thinks, she's dead wrong.

Here is another essential paper by Panksepp:

The Power of the Word May Reside in the Power of Affect
Jaak Panksepp

Abstract: This commentary on Dan Shanahan’s, A New View of Language, Emotion and the Brain, basically agrees with an emotion-based view of the evolutionary and developmental basis of language acquisition. It provides a supplementary neuroscience perspective that is more deeply affective and epigenetic in the sense that all claims about neocortically-based language modules need to be tempered by the existing genetic evidence as well as the robust neuroscience evidence that the cortex resembles random-access-memory space, a tabula rasa upon which epigenetic and learning processes create functional networks. The transition from non-linguistic creatures to linguistic ones may have required the conjunction of social-affective brain mechanisms, morphological changes in the articulatory apparatus, an abundance of cross-modal cortical processing ability, and the initial urge to communicate in coordinate prosodic gestural and vocal ways, which may have been more poetic and musical than current propositional language. There may be no language instinct that is independent of these evolutionary pre-adaptations.

Keywords Emotions . Language . Music . Gesture . Affect . Epigenesis . Neocortical functions . Modules

http://library.allanschore.com/docs/Panksepp08.pdf

.
 
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The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing (anoetic) and knowing (noetic) consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures

Marie Vandekerckhove, Jaak Panksepp

Keywords: Semantic and episodic memory, Anoetic consciousness, Noetic consciousness, Autonoetic consciousness, Self, Identity, Brain Development

Abstract: In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving (1985, 2004, 2005), Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009) we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing (anoetic) consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing (noetic and autonoetic) and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher ‘knowing consciousness’.

1. Consciousness as a continuum of stages

Within consciousness studies and the experimental analysis of subjective experience, the relationship between the self, human memory and awareness has been considered in depth by many philosophers and theoreticians. Theories of higher forms of consciousness and awareness, along with actual studies in cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and neurophilosophy have set the stage. We will focus on the theorizing of Tulving (1985, 2002, 2004, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009), on higher levels of awareness as ‘‘noetic” and ‘‘autonoetic” consciousness based on semantic and episodic memory systems and lower levels of primary-process experience, which can be conceptualized as ‘‘anoetic” consciousness relying on implicit procedural, sensory and affective memory and on the conceptualization and empirical foundation of raw affective consciousness of Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005, 2007), and primal perceptual consciousness (Merker, 2007) at the very lowest neuro-evolutionary levels.

We will concentrate in particular on anoetic consciousness which presumably preceded higher levels consciousness in brain–mind evolution. Such evolutionary viewpoints bring us closer to the understanding of the cross-species foundations of the self, intertwined with the development of different stages of consciousness in newborn humans, as developing brains begin to make sense of the world in the progression toward psychological maturation (Northoff &Panksepp, 2008; Reddy, 2008; Trevarten & Reddy, 2007; Trevarthen, Aitken, Vandekerckhove, Delafield-Butt, & Nagy, 2006; Vandekerckhove, 2009).

Developmentally, such integrative views help us understand how an enormous number of conscious experiences emerge from the flow of ancient mind–brain dynamics. It is now clear that young animals and humans deprived essentially of all neocortex are still conscious creatures, with primitive affective and sensory, perceptual capacities (Merker, 2007; Panksepp, 2008; Shewmon, Holmes, & Byrne, 1999). William James recognized this penumbra, the ‘‘psychic overtone” or ‘‘fringe” to higher awareness in his Chapter XI on Consciousness of his Principles of Psychology (1890):

‘‘The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even where the pails and the pots are actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead.”


This type of anoetic consciousness may include aspects of the ‘‘fringe consciousness” that has been extensively discussed by Mangan (2001) along with the accompanying dozen commentaries. In our view, this ‘‘free water of consciousness”, that has been underestimated empirically, is largely affective (Panksepp, 2003), based on ancient systems that encode basic (primary-process) emotional and motivational survival values, that are encapsulated within the concept of raw affective consciousness (Panksepp, 2008).

In our estimation, this anoetic form of consciousness, has not yet received the attention it deserves in this era of resurgence of work on subtle mind issues that is the focus of this article. We hypothesize that this anoetic-affective foundation may be the primal stuff from which higher forms of noetic and autonoetic consciousness emerged in Mind–Brain evolution (Mind–Brain and Brain–Mind will be used here without hyphenation to reflect that we are discussing a fully unified concept with no residue of dualism).

Since this is a radical idea, to be explored from many distinct but converging perspectives, we will use a recursive style where some key arguments are reformulated in slightly different contexts and along many different trajectories of seemingly infinitely complex layers of Brain–Mind processing. In as complex and hierarchical, developmental, mental landscape as we will try to depict, one needs to view the same concept from many different, albeit harmonious, perspectives.

Based on this foundational view, as children undergo a continuous flow of developmental stages, they emerge from a state of unreflective, here and now anoetic consciousness to increasingly complex forms of self-awareness (Reddy, 2008). We envision these developmental stages to progress from a state of embryonic unconsciousness1 , to a global infantile biological adaptive state of unknowing, pure affective-sensorial and perceptual consciousness—two seemingly distinct forms of ‘‘anoetic” consciousness (affective-sensory and perceptual) toward higher forms of self-consciousness and intersubjective engagements. These higher forms of consciousness continue to rely on increasingly differentiated affective states along with increasingly complex implicit procedural memories that are gradually transformed into enduring forms of knowing consciousness.

Using a terminology developed by Tulving, primal ‘‘anoetic”—purely experiential and unreflective—consciousness, serves as a foundation for the emergence of knowing forms of consciousness that involve first noetic (knowledge-based), then autonoetic (self-awareness based) consciousness imbued with semantic and episodic memories, respectively.

We believe that the anoetic level of non-reflective, primary-process consciousness has been vastly neglected in consciousness studies, and our main aim here is to clarify, conceptually, how this level of analysis may be essential for understanding the higher levels of knowing and awareness—noetic and autonoetic consciousness. Since anoetic consciousness has probably received the least attention in consciousness studies compared to knowing forms of consciousness, our argument about evolutionary progressions and linkages is, by necessity, premised more on issues of conceptual coherence rather than on a rich storehouse of empirical information. The vision we wish to share is one which may help integrate many diverse lines of thought in consciousness studies, and provide a conceptual infrastructure for future studies of anoetic consciousness. Thus, we will here focus on the importance of a proper conceptualization of a primal form of pre-reflexive here-and-now ‘self-experience’ or unreflective core-self-consciousness apparent at an anoetic level.

In the beginning, human infants do not remember events in time and contexts nor do they appear to reflect on the origin of their own knowledge and their experience of themselves as living organisms. They are presumably still living just in the ‘‘free flowing water” of consciousness, as William James put it, while increasingly being captivated by implicit experiential information about themselves and the world. With a growing sense of a personal self and unique identity, harvested from a continuous stream of being and acting, which begins a long and sustained trajectory as children are able to retrieve events and actions in ever longer and ever increasing time lines. All this is critically dependent on the maturation and developmental-epigenetic maturation of the neocortex. However, prior to this, at a time when children are not yet capable of retrieving from memory specific personal events in explicit forms, they do possess affective, sensory and perceptual states of being (Merker, 2007; Panksepp, 1998a), as well as intersubjective abilities (Reddy, 2008), and procedural information on an implicit level, much of it directly dependent on ancient subcortical functions. This cauldron of fundamental brain–mind processes is, as far as we know, the source of primary-process anoetic consciousness.

In order to understand conceptually the evolution of higher forms of consciousness that can reflect on idiographic personal aspects of self and identity, and the extended flow of events in the world, and eventually related states of others, (i.e., the emergence of ‘‘mental time travel”) we must first consider the antecedent forms of mind. Thus, we must first start with the nature of unconsciousness, which we suggest, serves as the foundation for the emergence first of an affective form of anoetic consciousness, followed soon or perhaps coincidentally with a more perceptual anoetic consciousness. Accordingly, any comprehensive approach to the problem of consciousness must not only consider the problem of different evolutionary and developmental stages of consciousness, but also the nature of mental unconsciousness.

As William James put it: ‘‘Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the flimsiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded” (James, 1902, p. 388).

2. From unconsciousness and unknowing consciousness towards knowing consciousness . . . . ."

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/95b1/87b876eb74b8e9cc9a8bc468bd9845ee3a71.pdf
 
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Charlie Haden &Kenny Barron ...
Has anyone ever told you you have fabulous taste in music? I hit the play button, sit back with a cup of tea, read through your posts, and it becomes a whole other experience.

Something I'm wondering, if you might feel like commenting, with respect to the NDE episode from CBC's Ideas that I posted for you. There's the interpretation that the experience represents some sort of perceptual experience that is independent of the person's material brain, to the extent that it doesn't need a brain at all to have the experience. There's no explanation for how that is possible, but setting that aside for the moment, and assuming that is the case, why do you think that normally we are unable to have that experience at will?

It seems to me that if disembodied consciousness is our default, that embodied consciousness would be unnecessary and pointless, just a long sequence of material needs and physical and mental suffering that most of us would want to avoid.

Is there some sort of mechanism that locks us into this embodied state that can be unlocked with psychedelics or Persinger's God Helmet? Is the hallucination the reality? Or what is going on when people have these same kinds of experiences while healthy and alive? Are they literally seeing into this other realm? How might we know?
 
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But you didn't like the guilty dog video ? :D

I didn't see it at the time you posted it but followed the link and watched it just now. No, I don't like it. I don't think that dogs and other domesticated animals can be made to feel guilt, but they can easily be made to feel very bad by their people, as we see with these two dogs. I think that kind of human behavior toward animals is inexcusable.
 
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