When it comes to the mystery of consciousness, the nature of the subject or the "I" is one aspect that particularly fascinates me (though really, all aspects are fascinating).
I agree; all aspects of consciousness are fascinating, and they all need to be recognized as we attempt to understand what consciousness is. There is a new revised entry on Consciousness at the SEP by Robert Van Gulick, who has been developing the entry over the last ten years or so in response to developments in interdisciplinary Consciousness Studies [CS]. It is a very long article but I think one has to read it all in order to appreciate the various aspects of consciousness that have been recognized and continue to be explored in CS, which is a vast ongoing inquiry. Here is the link to that article:
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
I also agree that what you refer to as the "I" {the continuous unifying 'presence' at the core of consciousness} is a particularly fascinating and significant aspect of consciousness. In a next post I'll copy Section 4.4 of the SEP article which surveys seven principal features of consciousness that are generally recognized in CS and that we need to recognize before we form our theories about consciousness. In introducing this section, Van Gulick writes:
The What question asks us to describe and model the principal features of consciousness, but just which features are relevant will vary with the sort of consciousness we aim to capture. The main properties of access consciousness may be quite unlike those of qualitative or phenomenal consciousness, and those of reflexive consciousness or narrative consciousness may differ from both. However, by building up detailed theories of each type, we may hope to find important links between them and perhaps even to discover that they coincide in at least some key respects.
Soupie continues:
If our brain is deceiving us... then it seems that we are distinct from our brain. Is this simply semantics, or is there really a mind-body duality? Or more precisely a subject-object duality?
So if we - the subject - are distinct from our brain/body, which is "having" the experiences? Is the brain/body having the experience or is the mind (the subject) having the experience?
I think many people confuse these concepts as above. Our brain can deceive us, but it is us who is having the experiences and not the brain? Who does the "processing?" Who does the perceiving? The brain or the mind? It's all very muddled.
Yes it is. I wonder, though, why nature would evolve brains in humans that "deceive us" to significant extents -- if they do -- when, according to the dominant scientific theory of evolution, the 'intent' or 'goal' of evolution is the survival of species of life. I also think that popularized concepts of information theory and of machine-like, computational, minds that merely 'process' information within the brain have further inclined some scientists and many nonscientists to entirely disregard consciousness as embodied experience in and of the world {which seems to require ignoring, or failing to pay attention to, one's own stream of experience}.
People tend to think something like organisms > minds > experiences. That is, there are objects that have minds that have experiences.
I think this is wrong.
I think minds = experiences. Furthermore, I don't think organisms "have" macro-experiences per se. I think they "generate" macro-experiences. (Chalmers has convinced me that micro-experiences are fundamental and/or non-physical.)
Would you cite the passages/source from Chalmers where you find this most explicitly expressed so we can all get a fuller idea of what he is saying there?
Going way back to my music analogy: we wouldn't say an orchestra "has" music, but we would say an orchestra "generates" music. Music is to macro-experience, as musical notes are to micro-experience. Musical notes are to vibrating molecules as micro-experiences are to Chalmers' fundamental mental property.
Before an orchestra can perform a piece of music, a composer must first have composed it, not out of a collection of individual 'notes' or 'tones', but out of the phenomenon of harmonics and dynamics as expressed in the history of music up to his or her time (and in some cases beyond that expression). The marvel is the endless variety of human music created from a limited number of scales and harmonic relationships that our species seems attuned to, which appear to some theorists to have their sources in nature. In a way, we seem to 'sing the world' in the frequencies and diatonic ratios/relationships we receive from the physical world, the latter appearing also in our mathematics and geometry. (That may be very badly expressed; I've read only random papers and articles expressing the idea I'm referring to.) Btw, 'singing the world' is a phrase from Merleau-Ponty by which he denotes the inexhaustible way in which various lifeforms express responses to, and communicate with their fellows in, the natural mileau in which they live, the particular 'world' each creature or species connects with and responds to and thus 'worlds' (transitive verb).
]@Constance, I believe, has posted material or thinkers indicating that the subject/object divide is false.[/U] I agree. Chalmers addresses this briefly at the end of one of his papers on Panpsychism. Chalmers appears to believe that phenomenal experience must entail a subject-object pair. My conception is that phenomenal experience is an object. It just so happens that that object is us.
Not 'false' but misleading. I follow MP's philosophy, which sought an overcoming of Cartesian dualism (still influential in science and some philosophy of mind) on the basis that radical dualism could not account for consciousness in and of the world. In MP's penultimate writing {The Visible and the Invisible} he describes this relationship of consciousness and world as 'chiasmic' -- involving two poles {one 'subjective', one 'objective'} of experience in/of the phenomenal world {which is the world that we have access to, that which we encounter}. In the Chiasm MP discerned, consciousness/awareness and phenomena are 'interfused' in the worlding of the world by our species and others). Both poles of the relationship are necessary to the generation of conscious experience in/of the world. From that ground, our species thinks its way to understanding being, including nature and mind.
While agree with most of Chalmers' conclusions - which I hope to share at some freaking point - I think this subject/object issue is huge.
Indeed, the subject/object and mind/body problems are huge, and philosophy has dealt with them for centuries.
Btw, I doubt that Chalmers would agree that he has reached 'conclusions' about consciousness. I think he considers himself to be still on the way to doing so, like all of us.
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