It seems clear that how science has approached living organisms - life - in the 20th century - has been key to the kind of thinking we encounter regarding humankind as machines, as computer-like beings programmed and encoded. Consider the words we have used in biology and other disciplines - genetic
coding, educational
programs, etc. It's like (materialist) science gave
permission to the average person to think along certain lines because of the terminology that was used.
From Mechanistic to Organismal Biology
LINK:
http://www.natureinstitute.org/pub/ic/ic30/russell-on-holism.pdf
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The Process of Abstraction
"If we consider the various ways in which, for the purposes of science, abstraction is made from the living reality of the organism,
we shall see how the different theories of development have arisen, and how their character has been determined by the mode of abstraction they adopt.
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Biology occupies a unique and privileged position among the sciences in that its object, the living organism, is known to us not only objectively through sensory perception, but also in one case directly, as the subject of immediate experience. It is therefore possible, in this special case of one’s own personal life, to take an inside view of a living organism.
"When we conceptualize this living experience, we arrive at a definition of organism which, though it is abstract and schematic as compared with the experienced reality, is yet rich in content as compared with the still more schematic representations commonly employed in biology.
The concept of organism which we derive from a study of direct experience is that of a continuing psycho-physical unity or individuality, which acts as a whole in relation to its environment.
"The first stage of abstraction from the concrete reality of organism as experienced is the concept of organism as a psycho-physical unity or individuality.
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The second step along the path of abstraction—namely, the elimination of the psychical—is one which nowadays is almost universally taken as a matter of course. It is a step of immense importance, for it introduces at once a dualism of matter and mind, and creates between them a dividing line which can never be crossed. To reintroduce mind into living things, to reconstitute the living unity, it is necessary to have recourse to such lame expedients as psycho-physical parallelism or psycho-physical interaction, or to adopt some form of dualistic vitalism.
With the psychical aspect eliminated, the organism becomes a material system, similar in nature to, though more complex in structure than, other material bodies.
"The complexity and variety of organization naturally provoke investigation, and give rise on the one hand to the science of organic form, in which types of structure are distinguished and their variants classified (morphology), and on the other hand to the study of the functioning of the different types (physiology).
Morphology tends to remain a formal and abstract science, until it is revivified by the study of function; physiology develops very soon the concept of the organism as a complicated mechanism. Here two somewhat diverse points of view emerge—the teleological and the dynamical.
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A machine is definitely a teleological construction, and the working of its parts can be fully understood only if their relation to one another and to the action of the whole be realized and grasped. The same view can be applied to the organism, which may be regarded as a teleological mechanism or machine, albeit of extreme complexity.
The teleological point of view has undoubtedly great heuristic value in biology, and is in fact much used.
"But
the progress of physico-chemical study applied to the living thing has shown that the organism cannot be separated from its environment, with which it maintains the closest relations of interchange of matter and energy. Hence the conception arises of the organism as a physico-chemical system, standing in closest connexion with its physico-chemical environment.
The simple concept of the organism as a formed machine is then replaced by the more general concept of it as a dynamical system. From this to the application to the organism of the general philosophical concept of material determinism there is only a step, and
the organism tends then to become merged in, and hardly distinguishable from, the general flux of material events.
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Abstraction from the living reality of organism reaches of course its highest degree in the mathematical or statistical treatment of living things. Here the organism is regarded merely as a numerical value—a number, a weight, a dimension. Mathematical laws of growth, for instance, may be worked out, in which the organism is treated simply as a quantity which increases in accordance with a certain formula. Clearly such formulation gives only the most general and abstract account of the process, highly useful though it may be within strict limits.
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To recapitulate the main stages of abstraction from the organism as a whole—we get from the living reality as experienced, which is our ultimate standard, first, the primary abstraction or conceptualization as psycho-physical unity or individuality, from which may be developed the organismal theory of living things, and second, by abstraction from this of the psychical aspect, the ordinary ‘scientific’ conception of the organism as a machine, or more generally a physico- chemical system.
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Of Wholes and Parts
"The use of analysis is characteristic of science generally. Given a complex body, the chemist proceeds immediately to resolve it into its elements, to determine their relative proportions, and in some cases their architectonic arrangement. The same tendency is shown very clearly in biology. Given an organism, the morphologist’s first thought is to discover its structure in minutest detail, to resolve it into its constituent organs and cells and their arrangement. The same process of analysis is applied to what appears to be the ultimate vital unit, the cell; [...]
"Now this analytic method, employed both in the study of form and in the study of function, is quite indispensable in biological research, and has yielded extremely valuable results. It is essential also for organismal biology. But we must note that it necessarily entails abstraction. The initial step which leads to abstractness of treatment is of course the isolation and definition of parts and part-processes as such. To define is to separate, and to separate is to ignore or to disregard in some measure the relations with other parts and with the whole. In the living thing there are in actuality no separate parts, no separate processes, for no part can be adequately characterized save in terms of its relations to the whole.
"By the process of morphological analysis we can, for instance, resolve the organism into its component cells, but the cells so distinguished are abstract morphological units, characterized statically, in terms of structure.
Actually the living tissue-cell is indissolubly linked up, by reason of its functional activity, with the neighboring cells, and, through the milieu interne and the nervous system, with the general activities which the whole organism is pursuing. The tissue-cell takes part in the activity of the whole, and it is dependent for its own continued existence as a living part upon its manifold functional relations with the whole. If we distinguish it as an independent unit or component we necessarily abstract from its full reality; we disregard its functional connexions or relations with the whole, and form a simplified and static conception of it.
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In the living thing there are no completely separable or independent parts; if we distinguish separate units or components it is at the cost of artificially simplifying our definition of them by abstracting from their continuing relations with the activity of the organism as a whole. It is primarily because the parts or constituents so distinguished are to a large extent abstract that it is impossible fully to reconstitute from them the whole from which they are themselves derived by the process of analytical abstraction. This is true even if we characterize them physiologically.
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Contrast in this respect a machine. The machine has separate parts; it can be taken to pieces and put together again; its parts can be adequately characterized in terms of their own structure, apart from their relations to the machine as a whole. This is not the case with the organism. Here the parts can be adequately characterized only in terms of their functional relations to the organism as a whole. These relations, which are manifold and subtle, involve time and process, a taking part or merging in the total activity of the continuing unity which is organism.
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The unity of the organism is accordingly not decomposable without loss, and
cannot be resynthesized in its original completeness from the abstract components distinguished by analysis. We may sum this up in the following cardinal law of biological method:
The activity of the whole cannot be fully explained in terms of the activities of the parts isolated by analysis, and it can be the less explained the more abstract are the parts distinguished.
"Since analysis is necessary for biological science we must accept the fact that our biological results will be to a certain extent abstract and schematic, and we must strive to correct this abstractness as far as possible by distinguishing only such elements as are concrete and biological, not physico-chemical and abstract, and by carrying out as complete a reconstitution or reintegration of such elements as may be possible.
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It follows from what we have said that the parts cannot be understood save in relation to the whole, and so we arrive at our second law of biological method:
No part of any living unity and no single process of any complex organic activity can be fully understood in isolation from the structure and activities of the organism as a whole. To regard any process or structure by itself without relating it to the general activity of the organism is to deal with something which is in large measure abstract and unreal. To re-invest it with some degree of concrete reality it is necessary to reintegrate it into the whole. Its isolation by analysis should be provisional only, and after analysis there should always follow reintegration. We know that the reconstitution of the original unity will be incomplete, but we must make it as complete as possible.
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Particulate Theories
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There is, however, a misuse of analytical or disintegrative method which leads to disastrous consequences. The organism is by this method resolved into cells, cells into their constituent parts, and the substance of the cell into hypothetical units, to which are attributed many of the essential vital functions. This fractionalization is a method of approach to the problems of heredity and development which has become traditional and habitual, so that nowadays any other way of looking at these problems is rarely considered, and it is of course the basal method underlying all particulate theories.
It is generally, though not invariably, coupled with the idea that some at least of these ultimate units represent and give rise to, or at the least co-operate in the formation of, particular parts or characters of the organism. This idea of representative particles is, we have seen, a very old one, dating back at least to the Greeks, and revived again by Bonnet, Darwin, and Weismann. It derives some of its force and verisimilitude from the fact that certain characters appear to behave as units in inheritance—a particular lock of white hair, for example, may recur from one generation to another.
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From facts of this kind it is easy, but illogical, to conclude that all characters of the organism are separable in inheritance, that the organism is, as it were, a bundle of separate characters, represented separately in the germ, which can be shuffled about, so that some of the offspring get one set, some another, and so on indefinitely. It may be remarked that to distinguish separate characters at all in the organism has necessarily something artificial and abstract about it. Obviously the number of characters that can be distinguished is infinite, but yet none of them is in reality separate from the rest. The lock of hair, for instance, clearly cannot arise apart from the organism which manifests it. Separate or separable characters are therefore to a very large extent abstractions.
But the idea that the organism is a composite of separate characters, each of which is represented in the germ by a separate vital unit, seems to have a perennial fascination for the human mind.
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The attempt to find an internal formative mechanism as the cause alike of heredity and development, which is characteristic of nearly all modern theories, results necessarily in this separation of agent and material, just as the attempt of the vitalists to reintroduce life into the mechanistic abstraction that stands for organism results in a dualism or opposition between the immaterial agent and the material mechanism which it in some way controls. In either case one arrives at a Deus ex machina. The nuclear organization, the germ-plasm, or the gene-complex of modern theories, is accordingly invested with semi-magical powers of control. "
There is more to the article but I will end here. The link to it is supplied above. The deconstruct of the human being and then the reconstruct - I see it like the above.
B437