I finally had a nice, quiet moment to read this essay. Thanks for introducing it to me!
Re: the H2O analogy
I don't think that Nagel was implying that mind couldn't emerge from the interaction of the brain and the environment; rather, I think he was saying that both H2O and water can be described objectively, whereas both the brain and mind/experience cannot.
At the beginning of the essay, he presents the "zombies/computers have no experiences" concept, but thankfully in the notes explains that we can't really know this, and that it's possible (as I believe) that all information processing systems regardless of substrate have experiences no matter how primitive.
He does a good job of describing the problem/difference between objective knowing and subjective knowing. But he once again thankfully points out that true objectivity may be unattainable. To me, what we're dealing with is observer influence (I don't know what the technical term might be). Because the mind is created via the interaction of the body and the environment, the mind can never truly, objectively know reality. And while, as Nagel says, we as a collective of minds can move toward objectivity,
we can never achieve it.
However, I think the "we" part is the key here. For the sake of simplicity, let's keep it "I." That is, I may never be able to ascertain objective reality (what-is) but that does not mean an objective reality - at any given planck time unit - does not exist.
As I once wrote in a paper long ago, only a mind outside of our reality can objectively view it. But the problem of subjectivity would still remain, right? This mind outside of our reality, still couldn't "view" the subjective minds/experiences of information processing systems (IPS).
So then I ask: Does reality
itself know what it's like to be a bat? I think so. As Watts and Sagan put it, humans (and other self-aware systems) are a way for the universe [reality] to observe itself. Reality is itself and ourselves at the same time. It experiences itself and us at the same time. Objectivity - while inaccessible to us - is preserved. (See: Langan and hundreds of theologians.)
Some other thoughts:
It is theoretically possible that an advanced technology would allow one IPS to clone another IPS atom for atom. (For the sake of argument, just suppose the IPSs were humans.) These perfectly identical humans could be carefully maintain in atomically identical rooms and presented with perfectly identical stimuli. Their bodies would need to be held perfectly still so that they received stimuli exactly the same.
Would they have the same experiences? If we bar the possibility that quantum randomness would cause them to process the stimuli differently, then yes, I say - everything being atomically equal - they would have identical experiences: same brain, same stimuli, same experience . (However, in reality, I think quantum randomness would cause them to have
non-identical experiences. If we could control that, they would have identical experience.)
However, this
still wouldn't allow non-identical stimuli-experiencing minds to
share or
observe their subjective experience.
However, I think there would be a way to get what I would call an "ant farm" effect. It's a similar idea to the reality-human IPS relationship. Ants typically make their colonies underground where they can't be seen. Some scientists have taken to
filling colonies with cement to get a look at the structure of the colony. This is analogous to "observer influence" problem that creeps up when one IPS tries to observe surrounding reality, including the minds of other IPS.
However, if an IPS (IPS A) were able to merge/overlay its substrate with the substrate of another IPS (IPS B), whereas IPS B would not be changed in any way and whereas IPS A were able to maintain an overlapping but distinct mind, it would be possible, I believe, for IPS A to know
what it is like to be IPS B.
This would be analogous to a glass ant farm in which the glass has a
dual function as both wall and window.
Another basic analogy of the concept:
IPS A = slovenly
IPS B = love
Merged = s
lovenly
To me, this suggests that the subjective experiences of information processing systems may be unknowable to us humans, but only because of the nature of our current substrate/medium. Were our minds to emerge from a more
flexible substrate, perhaps we'd more freely be able to experience reality, including the
subjective experiences of other IPS.
One final thought regards
Siamese twins connected at the brain; they are two minds who are able to have a shared (objective, subjective?) experience. Here we have two IPS with overlapping substrate having shared mind/experience.
Again, to me, this suggests a problem of observer interference and substrate inflexibility, rather than irreducible subjectivity. When viewed from the perspective of reality itself, subjectivity evaporates.
*Of course, this all assumes that mind emerges from the interaction of brains and environmental stimuli.
**Why am I in the mood for an IPA?
***How about the idea of demon possession? Or even an omniscient God? These are not new concepts.
Boy, does that description not do the commercial justice! Ha!
