Consciousness and the Paranormal

[smcder]

From what I could gather, Nagel was saying mind is different from matter because we can objectively describe matter but not mind, mind is subjective.

My point is that this position is a matter of perspective, the human perspective. Currently, human minds cannot access/interface with other minds, but this may not be the case for all minds.

Thus, it is conceivable that some minds may be able to know what it's like to be a bat and yet not be a bat.

So I'm arguing against his 1974 position.

1974 Nagel might not disagree with you as he is arguing for humans as they are and with what they now know. And again, the issue is about the subjective/objective:

footnote 15:

"I have not defined the term 'physical'. Obviously it does not apply just to what can be described by the concepts of contemporary physics, since we expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character—whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical. It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category."

Nagel today - in Mind and Cosmos would argue that consciousness is fundamental. Here is a very compact statement by Nagel of his position in Mind and Cosmos.

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.co...f-mind-and-cosmos/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

The most helpful part to me is this below, because it deals with the arguments against this position (you seem to hold with a?):

"This means that the scientific outlook, if it aspires to a more complete understanding of nature, must expand to include theories capable of explaining the appearance in the universe of mental phenomena and the subjective points of view in which they occur – theories of a different type from any we have seen so far.
There are two ways of resisting this conclusion, each of which has two versions. The first way is to deny that the mental is an irreducible aspect of reality, either (a) by holding that the mental can be identified with some aspect of the physical, such as patterns of behavior or patterns of neural activity, or (b) by denying that the mental is part of reality at all, being some kind of illusion (but then, illusion to whom?). The second way is to deny that the mental requires a scientific explanation through some new conception of the natural order, because either (c) we can regard it as a mere fluke or accident, an unexplained extra property of certain physical organisms – or else (d) we can believe that it has an explanation, but one that belongs not to science but to theology, in other words that mind has been added to the physical world in the course of evolution by divine intervention.
All four of these positions have their adherents. I believe the wide popularity among philosophers and scientists of (a), the outlook of psychophysical reductionism, is due not only to the great prestige of the physical sciences but to the feeling that this is the best defense against the dreaded (d), the theistic interventionist outlook. But someone who finds (a) and (b) self-evidently false and (c) completely implausible need not accept (d), because a scientific understanding of nature need not be limited to a physical theory of the objective spatio-temporal order. It makes sense to seek an expanded form of understanding that includes the mental but that is still scientific — i.e. still a theory of the immanent order of nature."

He concludes:

"That seems to me the most likely solution. Even though the theistic outlook, in some versions, is consistent with the available scientific evidence, I don’t believe it, and am drawn instead to a naturalistic, though non-materialist, alternative. Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientific orthodoxy. I would add that even some theists might find this acceptable; since they could maintain that God is ultimately responsible for such an expanded natural order, as they believe he is for the laws of physics."

 

[Soupie]

The most helpful part to me is this below, because it deals with the arguments against this position (you seem to hold with a?):

"The first way is to deny that the mental is an irreducible aspect of reality, either (a) by holding that the mental can be identified with some aspect of the physical, such as patterns of behavior or patterns of neural activity...

Honestly, I'm not sure which of these categories my beliefs would fit into. I tried to quickly figure it out, but I'm not sure. I'll take your word for it. The description of Reflexive Monism described my beliefs well, so if that is (a) above, so be it. (Edit: It doesn't appear that (a) represents my views.)

Regarding the idea of one primal element, and matter/qualia being two sides of the same coin: I really like that idea, and I've been spending a bit of time thinking about it.

One thought I've had, and I'm not sure how it applies, is that when you have something, you will always have not-something as well. In other words, there will always be dualism; again, if there is one primal element, that means there will be not-primal element.

Is that the relationship between matter and qualia? Is one the "not" of the other? Could be.

Take for instance this character:

(Okay, there was nothing there, but that's the point.)

Now, take this character for example: O

It's the letter "O," but by simply existing, something else has emerged: the center of the O has emerged and the outside of the O has emerged, i.e., not-O. (And it's actually a fairly complex something having an inside form and outside form. Are these laws that have emerged?)

This is the yin-yang I referred to earlier. In this example, the O = Matter, and not-O = Qualia, (but it could be the other way around).

Does not-O really exist? Sure. But it certainly doesn't exist unless O exists.

However, the reverse (a la Langan) - which is not intuitive - could also be the case: If nothing exists, then you must also have not-nothing, which is, of course, something.

Either way, one emerges from the other.

So, while I never viewed myself as a dualist because of this way of thinking about the emergence of mind, I now do find myself in agreement with Nagel and Chalmers that matter and qualia are fundamentally different, and not reducible to one another. However, I do think reality (what-is) reduces to one, primal element which gives rise to everything else.

I also think that qualia behave according to emergent laws, just as matter does, and I think Nagel/Chalmers suggest as well.

So, I still think the scientism approach is the most promising. However, because of the limit of our minds (currently "trapped" in an inflexible substrate) our ability to experiment with qualia is limited. But it may not always be. In the words of Nagel, we may be able to move towards a more objective understanding of qualia or at least the laws governing qualia.

Anecdote of the Jar by Wallace Stevens

I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.

The wilderness rose up to it,
And sprawled around, no longer wild.
The jar was round upon the ground
And tall and of a port in air.

It took dominion every where.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush,
Like nothing else in Tennessee.

 

[smcder]

"The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait. I give one coarse instance of what I mean. Suppose some mathematical creature from the moon were to reckon up the human body; he would at once see that the essential thing about it was that it was duplicate. A man is two men, he on the right exactly resembling him on the left. Having noted that there was an arm on the right and one on the left, a leg on the right and one on the left, he might go further and still find on each side the same number of fingers, the same number of toes, twin eyes, twin ears, twin nostrils, and even twin lobes of the brain. At last he would take it as a law; and then, where he found a heart on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the other. And just then, where he most felt he was right, he would be wrong."

- GK Chesterton

 

[Soupie]

There were those who said
we'll never know and those who felt
we should not know
what is,
And why what is. But,
there were those who looked anyway
and what they found was incredible,
And what they learned was immeasurable, but,
there were those who said
we'll never know...

 

[smcder]

There were those who said
we'll never know and those who felt
we should not know
what is,
And why what is. But,
there were those who looked anyway
and what they found was incredible,
And what they learned was immeasurable, but,
there were those who said
we'll never know...

Your original composition?

I would counter with:

"Now I am become death, destroyer of worlds."

. . . if I counted myself among those who say we'll never know. But I hope that isn't what you've gotten from my posts . . . it's certainly not, in context, the point of Chesterton's lines above.

 

[smcder]

Honestly, I'm not sure which of these categories my beliefs would fit into. I tried to quickly figure it out, but I'm not sure. I'll take your word for it. The description of Reflexive Monism described my beliefs well, so if that is (a) above, so be it. (Edit: It doesn't appear that (a) represents my views.)

Regarding the idea of one primal element, and matter/qualia being two sides of the same coin: I really like that idea, and I've been spending a bit of time thinking about it.

One thought I've had, and I'm not sure how it applies, is that when you have something, you will always have not-something as well. In other words, there will always be dualism; again, if there is one primal element, that means there will be not-primal element.

Is that the relationship between matter and qualia? Is one the "not" of the other? Could be.

Take for instance this character:

(Okay, there was nothing there, but that's the point.)

Now, take this character for example: O

It's the letter "O," but by simply existing, something else has emerged: the center of the O has emerged and the outside of the O has emerged, i.e., not-O. (And it's actually a fairly complex something having an inside form and outside form. Are these laws that have emerged?)

This is the yin-yang I referred to earlier. In this example, the O = Matter, and not-O = Qualia, (but it could be the other way around).

Does not-O really exist? Sure. But it certainly doesn't exist unless O exists.

However, the reverse (a la Langan) - which is not intuitive - could also be the case: If nothing exists, then you must also have not-nothing, which is, of course, something.

Either way, one emerges from the other.

So, while I never viewed myself as a dualist because of this way of thinking about the emergence of mind, I now do find myself in agreement with Nagel and Chalmers that matter and qualia are fundamentally different, and not reducible to one another. However, I do think reality (what-is) reduces to one, primal element which gives rise to everything else.

I also think that qualia behave according to emergent laws, just as matter does, and I think Nagel/Chalmers suggest as well.

So, I still think the scientism approach is the most promising. However, because of the limit of our minds (currently "trapped" in an inflexible substrate) our ability to experiment with qualia is limited. But it may not always be. In the words of Nagel, we may be able to move towards a more objective understanding of qualia or at least the laws governing qualia.

I'm a terrible poetry person, I wish I weren't but I am!

The way I've used "scientism" in posts above is for a "religious" belief in science - so is that the way you use it here:

So, I still think the scientism approach is the most promising.

. . . or do you just mean the scientific approach is the most promising?

Remember that's where Nagel was in 1974, today he argues that consciousness is a fundamental property - but I don't know to what extent his views overlap with those of Chalmers.

In terms of understanding qualia, Chalmers responds to an argument by Colin McGinn:

*[[McGinn (1991) can be read as advocating a type-F view, while denying that we can know the nature of the protophenomenal properties. His arguments rests on the claim that these properties cannot be known either through perception of through introspection. But this does not rule out the possibility that they might be known through some sort of inference to the best explanation of (introspected) phenomenology, subject to the additional constraints of (perceived) physical structure.]]
I don't have much knowledge of phenomenology, Constance has done many posts on it in this thread and I'm interested and I'm reading up on it - but it's a very interesting idea that Chalmers proposes here on how to gain a more complete knowledge of reality.

Emergence and reduction seem to be the two ideas that have come up the most in recent posts . . . or maybe I notice them because I'm interested in both . . . I can write more later, but what interests me is that they seem for many people to be intuitions about the way the world is, at least they are taken as being obvious - but I'm not sure if they are when you look closer at reduction and emergence . . . and that comes from something you posted discussing two world views, two "conceptions of the natural order" as Nagel would put it (to tie it in with the next post):

1. things move (emerge) from the simple (ultimately one primal element) to the complex - which is a modern world view
2. things move from the complex to the simple - this is the traditional world view or Great Chain of Being - the traditional language I think would be moves from greater to lesser

So, if the modern world view exactly inverts the traditional world-view . . . where do our intuitions lie? Or do our intuitions simply lie?

 

[smcder]

Honestly, I'm not sure which of these categories my beliefs would fit into. I tried to quickly figure it out, but I'm not sure. I'll take your word for it. The description of Reflexive Monism described my beliefs well, so if that is (a) above, so be it. (Edit: It doesn't appear that (a) represents my views.)

Regarding the idea of one primal element, and matter/qualia being two sides of the same coin: I really like that idea, and I've been spending a bit of time thinking about it.

One thought I've had, and I'm not sure how it applies, is that when you have something, you will always have not-something as well. In other words, there will always be dualism; again, if there is one primal element, that means there will be not-primal element.

Is that the relationship between matter and qualia? Is one the "not" of the other? Could be.

Take for instance this character:

(Okay, there was nothing there, but that's the point.)

Now, take this character for example: O

It's the letter "O," but by simply existing, something else has emerged: the center of the O has emerged and the outside of the O has emerged, i.e., not-O. (And it's actually a fairly complex something having an inside form and outside form. Are these laws that have emerged?)

This is the yin-yang I referred to earlier. In this example, the O = Matter, and not-O = Qualia, (but it could be the other way around).

Does not-O really exist? Sure. But it certainly doesn't exist unless O exists.

However, the reverse (a la Langan) - which is not intuitive - could also be the case: If nothing exists, then you must also have not-nothing, which is, of course, something.

Either way, one emerges from the other.

So, while I never viewed myself as a dualist because of this way of thinking about the emergence of mind, I now do find myself in agreement with Nagel and Chalmers that matter and qualia are fundamentally different, and not reducible to one another. However, I do think reality (what-is) reduces to one, primal element which gives rise to everything else.

I also think that qualia behave according to emergent laws, just as matter does, and I think Nagel/Chalmers suggest as well.

So, I still think the scientism approach is the most promising. However, because of the limit of our minds (currently "trapped" in an inflexible substrate) our ability to experiment with qualia is limited. But it may not always be. In the words of Nagel, we may be able to move towards a more objective understanding of qualia or at least the laws governing qualia.

Honestly, I'm not sure which of these categories my beliefs would fit into. I tried to quickly figure it out, but I'm not sure. I'll take your word for it. The description of Reflexive Monism described my beliefs well, so if that is (a) above, so be it. (Edit: It doesn't appear that (a) represents my views.)

Definitely don't want to force your position into a category.

I took Nagel's core argument from Mind and Cosmos as he presents it here:

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-core-of-mind-and-cosmos/

and tried to break it down a little to better understand it:

1) conscious beings (human beings) are physical organisms, part of the universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems
2) so it seems natural to think we can explain everything in terms of physics
3) but the scientific revolution depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose
4) thus the physical sciences cannot describe subjective experiences of organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view
5) so the physical sciences necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained
6) since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone
7) since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory

This means that the scientific outlook, if it aspires to a more complete understanding of nature, must expand to include theories capable of explaining the appearance in the universe of mental phenomena and the subjective points of view in which they occur – theories of a different type from any we have seen so far.

So, Nagel says the mental is an "irreducible aspect of reality" and he is calling for a "new conception of the natural order". He says if you disagree, you do so in one of two basic ways:

"There are two ways of resisting this conclusion, each of which has two versions. The first way is to deny that the mental is an irreducible aspect of reality, either (a) by holding that the mental can be identified with some aspect of the physical, such as patterns of behavior or patterns of neural activity, or (b) by denying that the mental is part of reality at all, being some kind of illusion (but then, illusion to whom?)."

So, that's (a) physicalism - the mind is the brain or (b) eliminative materialism - I think those are the proper terms for these positions . . .

"The second way is to deny that the mental requires a scientific explanation through some new conception of the natural order, because either (c) we can regard it as a mere fluke or accident, an unexplained extra property of certain physical organisms – or else (d) we can believe that it has an explanation, but one that belongs not to science but to theology, in other words that mind has been added to the physical world in the course of evolution by divine intervention."

So that's why I guessed your position as (a) physicalism - but it looks like you may now agree that the mental is an irreducible aspect of reality and that a new conception of the natural order is required?

The reason he structures the above the way he does, becomes apparent as he continues:

"All four of these positions have their adherents. I believe the wide popularity among philosophers and scientists of (a), the outlook of psychophysical reductionism, is due not only to the great prestige of the physical sciences but to the feeling that this is the best defense against the dreaded (d), the theistic interventionist outlook. But someone who finds (a) and (b) self-evidently false and (c) completely implausible need not accept (d), because a scientific understanding of nature need not be limited to a physical theory of the objective spatio-temporal order. It makes sense to seek an expanded form of understanding that includes the mental but that is still scientific — i.e. still a theory of the immanent order of nature."

To me, the key to understanding Nagel's position then is in this phrase:

". . . a scientific understanding of nature need not be limited to a physical theory of the objective spatio-temporal order."

 

[Soupie]

Emergence and reduction seem to be the two ideas that have come up the most in recent posts . . . or maybe I notice them because I'm interested in both . . . I can write more later, but what interests me is that they seem for many people to be intuitions about the way the world is, at least they are taken as being obvious - but I'm not sure if they are when you look closer at reduction and emergence . . . and that comes from something you posted discussing two world views, two "conceptions of the natural order" as Nagel would put it (to tie it in with the next post):

1. things move (emerge) from the simple (ultimately one primal element) to the complex - which is a modern world view
2. things move from the complex to the simple - this is the traditional world view or Great Chain of Being - the traditional language I think would be moves from greater to lesser

So, if the modern world view exactly inverts the traditional world-view . . . where do our intuitions lie? Or do our intuitions simply lie?

I would simply ask, which worldview and the resulting methods for gaining knowledge about the nature of what-is, has produced the most fruit?

Also, I would say that characterizing (1) above as "intuitions about the way the world is," is misleading because by most objective accounts, that really is how the world is. One thing that scientism has done is shift knowing away from intuitions about the nature of whit-is to objective, predictive, utilizable concepts about the nature of what-is. That is, reality really does to appear to be composed of simple units that interact to create complex systems.

I define scientism as: belief in the universal applicability of the scientific method and approach.

So, while qualia may not be made of matter/energy, I still think the best way to go about discovering their nature is the scientific method. Based on what I've read from Nagel and Chalmers, they agree.

I don't think you, Constance, and I are disagreeing based on what we have all written, but it's possible that the two of you hold a belief regarding qualia that I do not - and I would venture to guess Nagel and Chalmers do not as well.

Nagel says:

". . . a scientific understanding of nature need not be limited to a physical theory of the objective spatio-temporal order." ...

Even though the theistic outlook, in some versions, is consistent with the available scientific evidence, I don’t believe it, and am drawn instead to a naturalistic, though non-materialist, alternative.

Is it possible, scmder, that you and Constance believe that qualia represent the "soul," and that when you speak of qualia being irreducible, you really mean souls/personalities are irreducible?

From what I can gather from Nagel and Chalmers, they are not suggesting this: they are suggesting that quale are like atoms that make up the fabric of experiences and which obey laws, in the same way that atoms obey laws. However, it's of course possible that I've misunderstood this.

 

[smcder]

I would simply ask, which worldview and the resulting methods for gaining knowledge about the nature of what-is, has produced the most fruit?

Also, I would say that characterizing (1) above as "intuitions about the way the world is," is misleading because by most objective accounts, that really is how the world is. One thing that scientism has done is shift knowing away from intuitions about the nature of whit-is to objective, predictive, utilizable concepts about the nature of what-is. That is, reality really does to appear to be composed of simple units that interact to create complex systems.

I define scientism as: belief in the universal applicability of the scientific method and approach.

So, while qualia may not be made of matter/energy, I still think the best way to go about discovering their nature is the scientific method. Based on what I've read from Nagel and Chalmers, they agree.

I don't think you, Constance, and I are disagreeing based on what we have all written, but it's possible that the two of you hold a belief regarding qualia that I do not - and I would venture to guess Nagel and Chalmers do not as well.

Is it possible, scmder, that you and Constance believe that qualia represent the "soul," and that when you speak of qualia being irreducible, you really mean souls/personalities are irreducible?

From what I can gather from Nagel and Chalmers, they are not suggesting this: they are suggesting that quale are like atoms that make up the fabric of experiences and which obey laws, in the same way that atoms obey laws. However, it's of course possible that I've misunderstood this.

I define scientism as: belief in the universal applicability of the scientific method and approach.

The key point in that definition is the distinction between science - which is a set of methods that respond to questions posed and scientism - which is a belief system. There is or was a website titled something like "science is a method, not a position".

My thinking is about what gets packed in with this belief system in an unexamined way, as happens in almost any belief system - in terms of values and choices. This is what brings some commentators to say it is a religion and certainly for some, it is.

Science can't tell us what to do - that has to come from a value system and from what I see in popular culture, that distinction isn't generally made.

Also, I would say that characterizing (1) above as "intuitions about the way the world is," is misleading because by most objective accounts, that really is how the world is. One thing that scientism has done is shift knowing away from intuitions about the nature of whit-is to objective, predictive, utilizable concepts about the nature of what-is. That is, reality really does to appear to be composed of simple units that interact to create complex systems.

I take that as a statement of belief and one indicator of that is that it seems because I am questioning certain tenets of this belief - you seem to impute views to me that I don't believe I've expressed?

But my question is, at what points (if any), does reality appear that way due to the questions we have historically asked? If we figured out other questions, would it appear otherwise?

Remember Nagel's statement above:

". . . a scientific understanding of nature need not be limited to a physical theory of the objective spatio-temporal order."

and Chalmers' response to McGinn in terms of employing phenomenology with more traditional methods to determine reality.

These are calls to expand science - not shut it down, so I think there may still be some differences in your view and Chalmers/Nagel.

Is it possible, scmder, that you and Constance believe that qualia represent the "soul," and that when you speak of qualia being irreducible, you really mean souls/personalities are irreducible?

I can't speak for Constance. No, I don't think I am speaking of one thing and meaning another. I'm not sure I even see how those two statements could be confused?

 

[Soupie]

Soupie: I define scientism as: belief in the universal applicability of the scientific method and approach.

The key point in that definition is the distinction between science - which is a set of methods that respond to questions posed and scientism - which is a belief system. There is or was a website titled something like "science is a method, not a position".

That definition was taken from wiki. There are others definitions though. I was simply saying that is the definition I have in mind when I use the term.

My belief is that the scientific method is the best approach humans have for determining what-is and the nature of what-is.

Science can't tell us what to do - that has to come from a value system and from what I see in popular culture, that distinction isn't generally made.

I agree with this sentiment, but "deriving values from science" is not included in my definition of scientism. So hopefully this is clarifying.

I take that as a statement of belief and one indicator of that is that it seems because I am questioning certain tenets of this belief - you seem to impute views to me that I don't believe I've expressed?

Haha, I'm not imputing so much as asking/trying to figure out. Earlier, you indicated that being agnostic had cons (which of course it does), but when one expresses a non-agnostic position, you are quick to note the cons inherent there as well (which of course there are).

This led to my "poem" that saying "we can't know for sure!" is all fine and dandy, but let's not chastise those who are in the meantime "knowing" all kinds of valuable stuff - even if their way of knowing cannot lead to knowing everything.

But my question is, at what points (if any), does reality appear that way due to the questions we have historically asked? If we figured out other questions, would it appear otherwise?

I don't see where any of the views/concepts I've expressed are contradictory of these two questions.

Remember Nagel's statement above:

". . . a scientific understanding of nature need not be limited to a physical theory of the objective spatio-temporal order."

and Chalmers' response to McGinn in terms of employing phenomenology with more traditional methods to determine reality.

These are calls to expand science - not shut it down, so I think there may still be some differences in your view and Chalmers/Nagel.

Again, Nagel is arguing against materialistic monism, I don't see anything more than that. He's not arguing against scientism from what I can tell.

If Chalmers' method of "employing phenomenology" can aid the human understanding of what-is and why what-is, bravo. However, other than considering phenomenon beyond the physical, I'm still not sure this is a departure from scientism either.

No, I don't think I am speaking of one thing and meaning another. I'm not sure I even see how those two statements could be confused?

Okay. I'm just trying to determine in what ways our subjective worldviews differ, haha.

I sense that they do based on your responses to my thoughts/ideas, but I haven't been able to determine in what way.

 

[Soupie]

Haha, again Constance "likes" your post. There is an idea/worldview which you are conveying that I am not receiving. I'd like to know what it is.

But my question is, at what points (if any), does reality appear that way due to the questions we have historically asked? If we figured out other questions, would it appear otherwise?

Can you give me an example - even if by way of analogy - of an "other question" that we might ask?

 

[Constance]

Haha, again Constance "likes" your post. There is an idea/worldview which you are conveying that I am not receiving. I'd like to know what it is.

Soupie, I'm having trouble understanding why you are "not receiving" what Steve [smcder] has so clearly been expressing. May I suggest that you read this thread again and the one from which it was redirected (also the material contained in the texts and podcasts linked along the way)? We have been asking that you approach human experience and thought from a perspective apparently unfamiliar to you, but which has its own long history recently supplemented by new scientific insights into deep processes in nature and consequent changes in thinking by some scientists concerning the structure of reality. The contemporary interdisciplinary field of consciousness studies (only several decades old at this point) is the place where the issues we've been discussing are most fully developed.

 

[Soupie]

We have been asking that you approach human experience and thought from a perspective apparently unfamiliar to you...

Yes, I am frankly at a loss as to what "perspective" you're referring to.

We've discussed and agreed upon the idea that what-is - so far as we humans can discern - appears to consist of at least two elements that appear not to reduce into one another.

This doesn't appear to be the perspective you(s) are referring to however. Scmder has mentioned his skepticism (I believe) in the concept of reduction, at least as far as a universal concept. (I'm assuming he does think at least some of what-is can be reduced.)

I took this perceived skepticism in the idea of reduction to mean that he (and possibly you) feel that some complex - what I would call - systems are irreducible. Thus, the question about souls.

So I apologize if you (and Smcder) feel that you've made a strong case for your (mutual?) perspective, but I'm not getting it.

 

[Constance]

Yes, it seems you're not getting it Soupie, but there's no need to apologize. I haven't responded to a number of your recent posts in this thread because I haven't been able to understand what you're saying. Steve has made better progress than I could make in continuing to clarify what he and I both see and support in the analyses of Chalmers and Nagel. Perhaps if you read more of what they've written you'll catch on. As it is, I think you've been trying to translate what they and Steve and I have written into terms in which it can't be comprehended. For example, in the above post you write:

We've discussed and agreed upon the idea that what-is - so far as we humans can discern - appears to consist of at least two elements that appear not to reduce into one another.

Consciousness, a temporal stream of qualia-laden awareness and experience lived by humans, and evidently by some other animals we've studied, can't be well-characterized as an 'element' in the scientific context in which that term is normally used. And to what physical 'element' do you think the materialist/physicalist approach has reduced the physical being of the world? Chalmers and Nagel have both referred to processes of interaction including exchanges of information now recognized to take place in physical systems and thought to be instantiated/grounded in the quantum level/substrate understood as generative of the classically described 'reality' in which we exist and see the 'world' as we see it. Your representing the interaction and exchange of information as the product of two 'elements' is confusing and I think confused. Chalmers's references to protoconsciousness and protophenomenal properties deeper in nature point the way to thinking in terms of processes in nature rather than 'things' such as elements of matter.

You continued:

This doesn't appear to be the perspective you(s) are referring to however. Scmder has mentioned his skepticism (I believe) in the concept of reduction, at least as far as a universal concept. (I'm assuming he does think at least some of what-is can be reduced.)

I took this perceived skepticism in the idea of reduction to mean that he (and possibly you) feel that some complex - what I would call - systems are irreducible. Thus, the question about souls.

My impression is that Steve is sceptical of the value and results of reductivism as a general approach to reality practiced by contemporary science (and leading to the excesses and oversimplifications of scientism). I'm not sure (and I doubt Steve is either) that consciousness as we know it has not evolved out of interactive processes and systems in physical nature that can be described as protoconscious to the extent that they involve the recognition, interpretation, and exchange of information. This approach to understanding the evolution of consciousness and mind in nature is fundamentally different from the projection of the idea of another plane or dimension of reality {a spiritual one} interacting with the one we appear to live in. I don't dispute that such a thing is possible, but you should be careful not to project such interpretations on what we have been discussing with you.

 

[Soupie]

Our disconnect may be a matter of miscommunication, simply disagreement, or both. However, I contend that it's miscommunication. I think we - especially you and I, Constance - share the same view of what-is. I'm less sure of scmder.

Consciousness, a temporal stream of qualia-laden awareness and experience lived by humans, and evidently by some other animals we've studied, can't be well-characterized as an 'element' in the scientific context in which that term is normally used.

I agree with this 100%.

And to what physical 'element' do you think the materialist/physicalist approach has reduced the physical being of the world?

For now, point particles. But I think there is an even more primal "element" or unit, if you prefer. (Not sure what the proper term is.)

Chalmers and Nagel have both referred to processes of interaction including exchanges of information now recognized to take place in physical systems and thought to be instantiated/grounded in the quantum level/substrate understood as generative of the classically described 'reality' in which we exist and see the 'world' as we see it.

I agree with this 100%.

Your representing the interaction and exchange of information as the product of two 'elements' is confusing and I think confused.

You may disagree with it, but I don't think it's confused as (1) it perfectly fits the worldview described above and (2) there is a theory/worldview known as Reflexive Monism of which many philosophers hold (other than myself).

Chalmers's references to protoconsciousness and protophenomenal properties deeper in nature point the way to thinking in terms of processes in nature rather than 'things' such as elements of matter.

Again, in 100% agreement.

I'm not sure (and I doubt Steve is either) that consciousness as we know it has not evolved out of interactive processes and systems in physical nature that can be described as protoconscious to the extent that they involve the recognition, interpretation, and exchange of information. This approach to understanding the evolution of consciousness and mind in nature is fundamentally different from the projection of the idea of another plane or dimension of reality {a spiritual one} interacting with the one we appear to live in. I don't dispute that such a thing is possible...

I 100% agree.

Again, my question regarding the soul was an effort to clarify why you seem to think we hold different worldviews when - it seems to me - we clearly do not.

 

[smcder]

...

Is it possible, scmder, that you and Constance believe that qualia represent the "soul," and that when you speak of qualia being irreducible, you really mean souls/personalities are irreducible?

...

Just thinking out loud here . . . and it's not an area I know a lot about, but we have had some discussion on this thread around survival of consciousness, reincarnation, non-local consciousness and maybe other paranormal phenomena of/around consciousness . . . @Soupie, you mentioned wanting to work the paranormal back into the conversation? - so maybe this is a way to do that - maybe we can relate it to some of the recent topics (but wouldn't have to ) . . . try to sort out whether some of these ideas would allow an explanation for such phenomena, for example . . .

 

[Constance]

That's an excellent idea, Steve, especially if we begin with some discussion of "paranormal phenomena of/around consciousness," broadly rejected by materialists/physicalists and 'scientism'. The accumulated evidence of paranormal experience and paranormal capabilities of consciousness in various kinds of phenomena raise questions about the presumed exclusively material nature of 'reality'. The general marginalization of consciousness by materialist science casts radical doubt on the reliability of consciousness to report on anomalous consciousness and more fundamentally on whether consciousness enables direct contact with 'reality' in the first place. Discussing these issues should in the long run sharpen our dialogue concerning consciousness and the nature of reality.

Soupie wrote:

Our disconnect may be a matter of miscommunication, simply disagreement, or both. However, I contend that it's miscommunication. I think we - especially you and I, Constance - share the same view of what-is. I'm less sure of scmder.

I can't speak for scmder, but I doubt that you and I share the same view of 'what-is' based on the positions you claimed to "agree with 100%" in your recent post. My impression is that you were not in agreement with some of those positions earlier in this thread.

 

[smcder]

Haha, again Constance "likes" your post. There is an idea/worldview which you are conveying that I am not receiving. I'd like to know what it is.
Can you give me an example - even if by way of analogy - of an "other question" that we might ask?

I try to click "like" whenever I respond to a post or to any post I read all the way through because it gives the poster points on the forum – I'm not sure how Constance uses it.

As to an example of "other questions" - this is saying that what we get from science is in what questions we choose to ask. Folks in Ufology and other Paranormal fields run experiments and publish them in peer-reviewed journals:

http://www.deanradin.com/evidence/evidence.htm

and yet, mainstream scientists will almost always deny (in public) that there is any evidence for Psi . . . so I would say the Psi researchers are asking lots of these “other questions”.

More broadly, my point is that deciding which questions to ask (which experiments to run) is based on all the human factors: economics, politics, personality, intuition, ambition, etc and it's based on our (Western, developed countries) philosophy of nature.

Other sciences have been based on other philosophies of nature. For example, see the video of Nasr I posted on Islam, Nature and Science.

 

[Soupie]

My impression is that you were not in agreement with some of those positions earlier in this thread.

For me, it has been more of a semantic/terminology shift than a conceptual one.

The biggest change for me is thinking of subjective experience as being composed of an element that doesn't reduce to matter/energy, that is quale.

However my prior conception of the way matter gives rise to mind hasn't changed and is precisely as you've described it.

The only difference is where I in the past would have said mind/consciousness I might now say qualia.

Likewise my conception of the nature of what-is. I'm a monist at heart and reflexive monism reflects my worldview perfectly. The term is new to me, but not the concept.

Btw, I'm not trying to get you, smcder, or anyone else to agree with me. I'm simply trying to learn.

 

[smcder]

That definition was taken from wiki. There are others definitions though. I was simply saying that is the definition I have in mind when I use the term.

My belief is that the scientific method is the best approach humans have for determining what-is and the nature of what-is.

I agree with this sentiment, but "deriving values from science" is not included in my definition of scientism. So hopefully this is clarifying.

Haha, I'm not imputing so much as asking/trying to figure out. Earlier, you indicated that being agnostic had cons (which of course it does), but when one expresses a non-agnostic position, you are quick to note the cons inherent there as well (which of course there are).

This led to my "poem" that saying "we can't know for sure!" is all fine and dandy, but let's not chastise those who are in the meantime "knowing" all kinds of valuable stuff - even if their way of knowing cannot lead to knowing everything.

I don't see where any of the views/concepts I've expressed are contradictory of these two questions.

Again, Nagel is arguing against materialistic monism, I don't see anything more than that. He's not arguing against scientism from what I can tell.

If Chalmers' method of "employing phenomenology" can aid the human understanding of what-is and why what-is, bravo. However, other than considering phenomenon beyond the physical, I'm still not sure this is a departure from scientism either.

Okay. I'm just trying to determine in what ways our subjective worldviews differ, haha.

I sense that they do based on your responses to my thoughts/ideas, but I haven't been able to determine in what way.

My belief is that the scientific method is the best approach humans have for determining what-is and the nature of what-is.

I agree - if we define what-is and the nature of what-is as scientific questions, if you can frame them in such a way that you can use scientific methods - then, by definition the scientific method is the best approach to answering scientific questions. So when we ask about the physical nature of things we ask science. But if we ask what somethings means - then we ask philosophy or religion or politics or our grandparents . . .

So, Scientism is a belief system and it provides the answers to the questions that science can't. A paradigm example is Sheldon Cooper in The Big Bang Theory.

Scientism I think is the dominant world view in developed countries but it's a largely unconscious embrace and it's assumptions (like a belief in unlimited progress) are largely unexamined.

So my own viewpoint is to Render Unto Science the things that are Science's.