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Consciousness and the Paranormal

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We have to keep continually reminding ourselves that the whole "mental/physical" division of reality is a set of labels we apply to the world to distinguish our own awareness of ourselves from our awareness of other things that are not ourselves. But this border is seemingly enforced by something we cannot control -- for instance, breathing: is it voluntary or involuntary? When its involuntary, is it a happening or are you doing it? Other divisive terms like "conscious" and "unconscious" accomplish the same feat of confusion. We seem to think that we know what we're talking about when we talk about "mind," "consciousness" or "awareness," when the reality is that regardless of the label, all of these formations of reality are seemingly dependent on something we can never be mentally connected to.

There's an interesting inverse relationship between two polarized states of existence:

(1) Complete theoretical omniscience destroying consciousness
(2) Complete omniscience and awareness in a limited finite domain requires a domain of not knowing.


I've probably stated this in other ways in earlier posts and discussion. The very fact that we can live in a world and be comfortable with "knowing" and "doing" things and yet stand outside this framework as if it were utterly incomprehensible and alien means that some how, in some manner, our existence somehow thrives on mystery. Weird that it may be, mystery, incomprehensibility, and confusion may lie as the fundamental bedrock for all sensual experience. The wavering line between breathing as voluntary and as involuntary is a division forced on us.

Conscious experience wouldn't exist without the curious human ability to think we know what we are talking about without actually knowing anything at all.

This is quite a challenging and ramifying post and, like Steve and Soupie, I hope you'll expand and clarify what you're claiming (or perhaps hypothesizing). In the last sentence of the post, do you mean we don't know anything at all about consciousness? or about its relationship with the physical world? or about how it comes into existence in a physical world? or about the physical world as such? In the first sentence of the post do you mean that, if consciousnesses/minds were not present to devise the 'labels' "physical/mental", the properties Chalmers refers to as protoconscious and protophenomenal would not exist in the informational exchanges at the quantum and higher levels of physical systems currently discussed in physics?

Of most interest to me is the last sentence of your first paragraph:

We seem to think that we know what we're talking about when we talk about "mind," "consciousness" or "awareness," when the reality is that regardless of the label, all of these formations of reality are seemingly dependent on something we can never be mentally connected to.

What is that "something we can never be mentally connected to" (or are there several such somethings in your view)? And would you say that we are unable to observe, describe, and make sense of our first-person experiences of consciousness in and of the world we exist in because we can "never be mentally connected to" that which they are "dependent on"? What is this something that consciousness is dependent on in your view?

Like Steve, I'm also curious what you mean in the statement I've highlighted in teal above.

Thank you for your post and for raising all these interesting questions.
 
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@Constance wrote:
More importantly, qualia are not alone in identifying subjective experience, i.e., consciousness. Consciousness includes not just the sensed qualities [qualia] of our experiences in the world but our sense of the world as actual, of our perceptions as of actual things in the world visible in their phenomenal appearances before us, of our reflections on what we see and the way in which we see it, and our thinking based on our experiences and what they signify about reality -- i.e., mind.

Constance may have a response here - but I wanted to take a shot at what I think she means in saying: "but our sense of the world as actual" as I am learning about Phenomenology and want to test my understanding:

So consciousness is more than qualia - the basic unit of experience - it also is being "in tension" with the actual world - (intentionality is a technical term in phenomenology and hopefully I am using it correctly, it is a word-play on "in tension" - consciousness in tension with its object - and means that consciousness is always conciousness of something) ... we seem to have this model that we take in the world into our brain, we perceive it and then construct a model, a "virtual reality" and that's how we perceive the world - but phenomenology seeks to eliminate this duality and says conciousness is the actual world - if we jab our finger with a pin, the pain is in the finger, not "in" our brain - phenomenology starts with watching this experience, watching how things come into our consciousness ... that's as far as I can get with it - but it's a fascinating area of philosophy that I just don't know much about yet.

I think Chalmers discusses 'intensionality' somewhere, and that might be where you're coming from. The term is also, and otherwise, significant in semantics and language-based philosophy, but its meaning is very different from what Husserl meant by 'intentionality' -- i.e., that consciousness is always conscious of something. {Husserl wrote: "No things but in ideas. No ideas but in things."} I've never had a sense in phenomenology of consciousness being in 'tension' with things; rather, consciousness is drawn out toward the world in its recognition of things {in their phenomenal appearances} standing out against a background (the Gestalt insight that inspired some of Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy). Seeing a thing as it separates itself/is separated from the background, consciousness in its primordial state moves from the prereflective level of consciousness toward the reflective level, not only questioning the relationship of things and itself in the environment but also beginning to recognize the 'depth' of the actual world of its existence receding toward a horizon of the visible and beginning to sense the invisible sides and aspects of things behind the phenomena it encounters from its current perspective. Ultimately, this core set of relationships and the partial perspectives available at any moment to any single consciousness becomes the core of the existential ontology developed by MP, Heidegger, and other phenomenologists.
 
I think Chalmers discusses 'intensionality' somewhere, and that might be where you're coming from. The term is also, and otherwise, significant in semantics and language-based philosophy, but its meaning is very different from what Husserl meant by 'intentionality' -- i.e., that consciousness is always conscious of something. {Husserl wrote: "No things but in ideas. No ideas but in things."} I've never had a sense in phenomenology of consciousness being in 'tension' with things; rather, consciousness is drawn out toward the world in its recognition of things {in their phenomenal appearances} standing out against a background (the Gestalt insight that inspired some of Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy). Seeing a thing as it separates itself/is separated from the background, consciousness in its primordial state moves from the prereflective level of consciousness toward the reflective level, not only questioning the relationship of things and itself in the environment but also beginning to recognize the 'depth' of the actual world of its existence receding toward a horizon of the visible and beginning to sense the invisible sides and aspects of things behind the phenomena it encounters from its current perspective. Ultimately, this core set of relationships and the partial perspectives available at any moment to any single consciousness becomes the core of the existential ontology developed by MP, Heidegger, and other phenomenologists.

I'm not sure where I saw the definition of intentionality but I found this on Wikipedia - let me check SEP too
Phenomenology (philosophy) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Intentionality
Intentionality refers to the notion that consciousness is always the consciousnessof something. The word itself should not be confused with the "ordinary" use of the word intentional, but should rather be taken as playing on the etymological roots of the word. Originally, intention referred to a "stretching out" ("in tension," lat. intendere[3][4]), and in this context it refers to consciousness "stretching out" towards its object (although one should be careful with this image, seeing as there is not some consciousness first that, subsequently, stretches out to its object. Rather, consciousness occurs as the simultaneity of a conscious act and its object.) Intentionality is often summed up as "aboutness."
 
I think Chalmers discusses 'intensionality' somewhere, and that might be where you're coming from. The term is also, and otherwise, significant in semantics and language-based philosophy, but its meaning is very different from what Husserl meant by 'intentionality' -- i.e., that consciousness is always conscious of something. {Husserl wrote: "No things but in ideas. No ideas but in things."} I've never had a sense in phenomenology of consciousness being in 'tension' with things; rather, consciousness is drawn out toward the world in its recognition of things {in their phenomenal appearances} standing out against a background (the Gestalt insight that inspired some of Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy). Seeing a thing as it separates itself/is separated from the background, consciousness in its primordial state moves from the prereflective level of consciousness toward the reflective level, not only questioning the relationship of things and itself in the environment but also beginning to recognize the 'depth' of the actual world of its existence receding toward a horizon of the visible and beginning to sense the invisible sides and aspects of things behind the phenomena it encounters from its current perspective. Ultimately, this core set of relationships and the partial perspectives available at any moment to any single consciousness becomes the core of the existential ontology developed by MP, Heidegger, and other phenomenologists.

Found the entry on intentionality at SEP, much more information here - very challenging, but starting to make sense to me . . . (slowly)

Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

"Contemporary discussions of the nature of intentionality were launched and many of them were anticipated by Franz Brentano (1874, 88-89) in his book, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, from which I quote two famous paragraphs:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves."
...

Replete as they are with complex, abstract and controversial ideas, these two short paragraphs have set the agenda for all subsequent philosophical discussions of intentionality in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century. There has been some discussion over the meaning of Brentano's expression ‘intentional inexistence.’ Did Brentano mean that the objects onto which the mind is directed are internal to the mind itself (in-exist in the mind)? Or did he mean that the mind can be directed onto non-existent objects? Or did he mean both? (See Crane, 1998 for further discussion.)

...

Now, the full acceptance of Brentano's first two theses raises a fundamental ontological question in philosophical logic. The question is: are there such intentional objects? Does due recognition of intentionality force us to postulate the ontological category of intentional objects? This question has given rise to a major division within analytic philosophy. The prevailing (or orthodox) response has been a resounding ‘No.’ But an important minority of philosophers, whom I shall call ‘the intentional-object’theorists, have argued for a positive response to the question. Since intentional objects need not exist, according to intentional-object theorists, there are things that do not exist. According to their critics, there are no such things. (For further discussion see section 7)."
 
Good idea to link the whole of the article on Intentionality in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Steve. It provides us not only with a detailed history of the concept in the field of philosophy but an introduction to many of the key philosophers in consciousness studies today.




 
Good idea to link the whole of the article on Intentionality in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Steve. It provides us not only with a detailed history of the concept in the field of philosophy but an introduction to many of the key philosophers in consciousness studies today.

I had to start somewhere . . . ;-) I've actually been trying out many of the resources you've suggested and other links - piecing it together, this really puts the idea of intentionality as central to phenomenology, so it seemed a good place to dig in.
 
Thanks. I didn't mean to imply that I couldn't find this myself; it's just a matter of finding time to watch.

If I recall correctly, he made a list of the ways AI+ will come about, and he felt via evolutionary simulations would be the most likely to work seeing as how "dumb" evolution had already succeeded at creating intelligence. He then talked about attempting to make this simulation leak proof.

If I recall correctly, he made a list of the ways AI+ will come about, and he felt via evolutionary simulations would be the most likely to work seeing as how "dumb" evolution had already succeeded at creating intelligence. He then talked about attempting to make this simulation leak proof.

That's right and it occur(r)ed to me that one difference in evolutionary simulations and in augmenting human intelligence wetware+dryware is that evolutionary "advantage" - (see #2 and #3 of the "rainy-day" thoughts below) . . . what is the natural history of human augmentation? Once the technology is in hand to augment our cognition - will we be "smart" about that first step? We have to reach human+ successfully, then it reduces to the AI+ case . . .

We have already have Ritalin and other cognitive enhancers, some Universities are considering (or may already have) policies re: scholarships and grades earned while on "performance enhancing" drugs just as they do with athletes ...

Cognition-Enhancing Drugs

and/or

. . . is this like the hips/head size thing? Are we actually just as smart as we can stand to be? Any smarter and so many of us would suffer "existential depression"

The Sad Socrates Effect | Opinion | The Harvard Crimson

So if there were hominids that were smarter, maybe they didn't make it because they were smarter or because of how they were smarter . . . it wasn't an evolutionary advantage (or we or someone else was just meaner or . . . insert your favorite survival trait here)

The Inheritors: William Golding: 9780548439852: Amazon.com: Books)

Also, on evolution, see Dreyfuss (a very smart man who always seems rather cheerful) talks about how the relatively slow processing brain manages to eke out consciousness when powerful computers cannot:


Some rainy-day thoughts on the AI++ thing ...
unless another equally powerful and intelligent entity intervened - which by definition happens very soon after AI+ and almost immediately after AI++
1. AI(+) emerges and it's really ticked b/c it's creator put it in a virtual box
2. AI(+) emerges and shoots itself in the head, b/c look at the level of discomfort so many humans seem to experience with consciousness at our level of intelligence
3. AI(+) emerges and demotes itself to AI (for reason #2) and just works on getting along with us
4. AI(+) emerges enlightened - cyber-Boddhisatva and solves all our problems then leaves the planet (or maybe stays here b/c hey the view isn't bad from some places) and settles in to a state of nirvana (literally "no wind")
5. ?
 
If we go forward in the discussion of consciouenss, I think the problems of emergence deserve a closer look.
I agree with this, even if doing so will scare anyone left standing in this thread completely away, haha. (I hope not.)

The SEP has a great entry on emergence of course. I just read through it tonight, and will do so again before commenting. My views seem to line up best with Alexander's.

2. AI(+) emerges and shoots itself in the head, b/c look at the level of discomfort so many humans seem to experience with consciousness at our level of intelligence.
I wonder if some or all of that "discomfort" would be relieved with (1) the ability to live forever (keeping in mind that one could choose not to live forever); in other words, there would be no worrying about an impending death and separation from loved ones, etc., and (2) the ability to more fully realize our imaginations and fantasies.

But, yeah, lets face it, even super-intelligent quasi-transhumanist AI++ will find a way to be miserable. I can just picture it now: the first AI+++ selfie! Ugh.
 
I agree with this, even if doing so will scare anyone left standing in this thread completely away, haha. (I hope not.)

The SEP has a great entry on emergence of course. I just read through it tonight, and will do so again before commenting. My views seem to line up best with Alexander's.

I wonder if some or all of that "discomfort" would be relieved with (1) the ability to live forever (keeping in mind that one could choose not to live forever); in other words, there would be no worrying about an impending death and separation from loved ones, etc., and (2) the ability to more fully realize our imaginations and fantasies.

But, yeah, lets face it, even super-intelligent quasi-transhumanist AI++ will find a way to be miserable. I can just picture it now: the first AI+++ selfie! Ugh.

Oh, I think once folks see we are going to be discussing the very hot topic of ... emergence ... they will come in droves to participate!
 
I want to share an analogy that illustrates my conception of sentience. Any and all feedback is very welcome.

I define sentience as feeling, perceiving, or experiencing.

I am purposefully not using the related term consciousness. I define consciousness, in part, as meta-sentience; that is, consciousness is feeling, perceiving, experiencing, or thinking about one’s sentience.

(We’ve talked about emergence and reduction, properties and substances, as well as dualism and monism, including different versions of each. My understanding of each of those concepts is incomplete, and thus, I’m not sure how they apply to my conception of sentience.)

On with the analogy:

The brain, environment, and sentience are related to one another similarly to the way in which musical instruments, instrumentalists, and a symphony are related to one another.

Like a brain, an orchestra is a complex system. An orchestra is composed of string, woodwind, brass, and percussion instrument sections, just as a brain is composed of many sections.

However, the instruments cannot produce the symphony without being played by instrumentalists. (In this case, let’s suppose the instrumentalists were mechanical and automated gears, levers, and blowers. Once set into motion they would strum harps, bang on drums, and blow on horns and flutes.)

Thus, the mechanical instrumentalists would interact with the instrument sections and this interaction would produce a stream of music. We would label this stream of music a symphony. (I call this interaction an exchange of information.)

Likewise, the environment interacts with a brain and this interaction produces a stream of sentience. We might label this stream of sentience a mind.

A stream of music is not one-and-the-same as sections of instruments being played by instrumentalist, just as a stream of experience is not one-and-the-same as a brain interacting with the environment.

And I think the analogy goes deeper.

A stream of music, aka a symphony, can be reduced to the notes (pitched sounds) which combine to make up the stream of music.

That is to say, the stream of music would be altered if individual instruments were removed; it would be altered even more severely if entire instrument sections were removed such as woodwind, percussion, string, etc.

Furthermore, a stream of music composed of just one instrument interacting with an instrumentalist would be quite primitive compared to a stream of music resulting from the interaction of a full orchestra of instruments with instrumentalists.

I think likewise with a stream of sentience, aka a mind. I think a mind can be reduced to the X which combine to make up the stream of sentience. In this case, I don’t know what X is or how to define/describe it. (Earlier, I described X as a unit of mental.)

But, I do think that a stream of mind is altered when parts of the brain are damaged and/or removed.

Furthermore, I think streams of sentience resulting from “simple” brains (or brain-like systems) interacting with the environment are primitive compared to streams of sentience resulting from the interaction of a human brain and the environment. The point, though, is that these streams exist no matter how primitive.

Finally, a stream of music is the symphony. And neither the instruments nor the mechanical instrumentalists experience the symphony.

The symphony is a thing unto itself.

Likewise, a stream of sentience is the mind. That is to say that a stream of sentience isn't experienced by the brain or the environment. Said again: The brain does not experience.

Rather, a stream of experience is a thing unto itself.
 
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I want to share an analogy that illustrates my conception of sentience. Any and all feedback is very welcome.

I define sentience as feeling, perceiving, or experiencing.

I am purposefully not using the related term consciousness. I define consciousness, in part, as meta-sentience; that is, consciousness is feeling, perceiving, experiencing, or thinking about one’s sentience.

(We’ve talked about emergence and reduction, properties and substances, as well as dualism and monism, including different versions of each. My understanding of each of those concepts is incomplete, and thus, I’m not sure how they apply to my conception of sentience.)

On with the analogy:

The brain, environment, and sentience are related to one another similarly to the way in which musical instruments, instrumentalists, and a symphony are related to one another.

Like a brain, an orchestra is a complex system. An orchestra is composed of string, woodwind, brass, and percussion instrument sections, just as a brain is composed of many sections.

However, the instruments cannot produce the symphony without being played by instrumentalists. (In this case, let’s suppose the instrumentalists were mechanical and automated gears, levers, and blowers. Once set into motion they would strum harps, bang on drums, and blow on horns and flutes.)

Thus, the mechanical instrumentalists would interact with the instrument sections and this interaction would produce a stream of music. We would label this stream of music a symphony. (I call this interaction an exchange of information.)

Likewise, the environment interacts with a brain and this interaction produces a stream of sentience. We might label this stream of sentience a mind.

A stream of music is not one-and-the-same as sections of instruments being played by instrumentalist, just as a stream of experience is not one-and-the-same as a brain interacting with the environment.

And I think the analogy goes deeper.

A stream of music, aka a symphony, can be reduced to the notes (pitched sounds) which combine to make up the stream of music.

That is to say, the stream of music would be altered if individual instruments were removed; it would be altered even more severely if entire instrument sections were removed such as woodwind, percussion, string, etc.

Furthermore, a stream of music composed of just one instrument interacting with an instrumentalist would be quite primitive compared to a stream of music resulting from the interaction of a full orchestra of instruments with instrumentalists.

I think likewise with a stream of sentience, aka a mind. I think a mind can be reduced to the X which combine to make up the stream of sentience. In this case, I don’t know what X is or how to define/describe it. (Earlier, I described X as a unit of mental.)

But, I do think that a stream of mind is altered when parts of the brain are damaged and/or removed.

Furthermore, I think streams of sentience resulting from “simple” brains (or brain-like systems) interacting with the environment are primitive compared to streams of sentience resulting from the interaction of a human brain and the environment. The point, though, is that these streams exist no matter how primitive.

Finally, a stream of music is the symphony. And neither the instruments nor the mechanical instrumentalists experience the symphony.

The symphony is a thing unto itself.

Likewise, a stream of sentience is the mind. That is to say that a stream of sentience isn't experienced by the brain or the environment. Said again: The brain does not experience.

Rather, a stream of experience is a thing unto itself.




I am not a note, I am a free man!


the-prisoner-intro.jpg
 
Would it help if you were a note coming from God's personal flute? No? :drops head and shuffles slowly away:
 
Soupie, your recent post reminded me of these lines from "Esthetique du Mal" by Wallace Stevens:

"The greatest poverty is not to live
In a physical world, to feel that one's desire
Is too difficult to tell from despair."


My impression is that you're attempting to reduce the experienced world and the embodied consciousnesses that experience it to 'information', which you seem to think of in only highly abstracted and reductive terms. I think this happens because you are seeking 'reality' at its most foundational levels in or below the quantum substrate, but that's not where we live. You apparently do not want to think about consciousness in terms of our felt existence in a local palpable physical world evolved over eons out of the quantum or lower substrate. In what you've described, the connectedness between what we feel and think is severed from the environment in which feeling and thinking occur, and consciousness somehow becomes 'metaconsciousness' of feelings and ideas that are not actually felt or thought existentially out of our phenomenal experiences. So "a stream of sentience is the mind" but the mind is not "experienced by the brain {or the being that has a brain} or the environment, and "a stream of experience is a thing unto itself" that seems to take place in a 'mental unit' in but not of the physical world -- connecting directly neither with the palpable world nor with experiential being in the world. Yet you also write:

Furthermore, I think streams of sentience resulting from “simple” brains (or brain-like systems) interacting with the environment are primitive compared to streams of sentience resulting from the interaction of a human brain and the environment.

I'm confused by that reference to brains as "interacting with the environment" since you seem to allow no ground for such interaction in what you've characterized as the mutual discreteness of mind, brain, and environment, having eliminated consciousness from your theory. Please correct me if I've misunderstood or misrepresented what you've said in your post, in part or in full.


As it happens, I've just today found Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception available online for reading and download. The link is below, following a comment by Andy Clark on its importance for the understanding of consciousness and mind.

‘We live in an age of tele-presence and virtual reality.
The sciences of the mind are finally paying heed to the
centrality of body and world. Everything around us
drives home the intimacy of perception, action and
thought. In this emerging nexus, the work of Merleau-
Ponty has never been more timely, or had more to teach
us ... The Phenomenology of Perception covers all the
bases, from simple perception-action routines to the
full Monty of consciousness, reason and the elusive self.
Essential reading for anyone who cares about the
embodied mind.’
--Andy Clark, Professor of Philosophy and Director of
the Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University


https://wiki.brown.edu/confluence/d....pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1286305678000
 
Would it help if you were a note coming from God's personal flute? No? :drops head and shuffles slowly away:

I just had a minute today to read your post and I had The Prisoner up in another window . . . and it's April 1th, so . . . :-)

But no, I like the analogy and I will make a real reply to the content of your post.
 
Also, on evolution, see Dreyfuss (a very smart man who always seems rather cheerful) talks about how the relatively slow processing brain manages to eke out consciousness when powerful computers cannot:


Loved listening to the guy - he is right-on imo. I also think he's cheerful because he enjoys his work. :)
 
I want to share an analogy that illustrates my conception of sentience. Any and all feedback is very welcome.

I define sentience as feeling, perceiving, or experiencing.

I am purposefully not using the related term consciousness. I define consciousness, in part, as meta-sentience; that is, consciousness is feeling, perceiving, experiencing, or thinking about one’s sentience.

(We’ve talked about emergence and reduction, properties and substances, as well as dualism and monism, including different versions of each. My understanding of each of those concepts is incomplete, and thus, I’m not sure how they apply to my conception of sentience.)

On with the analogy:

The brain, environment, and sentience are related to one another similarly to the way in which musical instruments, instrumentalists, and a symphony are related to one another.

Like a brain, an orchestra is a complex system. An orchestra is composed of string, woodwind, brass, and percussion instrument sections, just as a brain is composed of many sections.

However, the instruments cannot produce the symphony without being played by instrumentalists. (In this case, let’s suppose the instrumentalists were mechanical and automated gears, levers, and blowers. Once set into motion they would strum harps, bang on drums, and blow on horns and flutes.)

Thus, the mechanical instrumentalists would interact with the instrument sections and this interaction would produce a stream of music. We would label this stream of music a symphony. (I call this interaction an exchange of information.)

Likewise, the environment interacts with a brain and this interaction produces a stream of sentience. We might label this stream of sentience a mind.

A stream of music is not one-and-the-same as sections of instruments being played by instrumentalist, just as a stream of experience is not one-and-the-same as a brain interacting with the environment.

And I think the analogy goes deeper.

A stream of music, aka a symphony, can be reduced to the notes (pitched sounds) which combine to make up the stream of music.

That is to say, the stream of music would be altered if individual instruments were removed; it would be altered even more severely if entire instrument sections were removed such as woodwind, percussion, string, etc.

Furthermore, a stream of music composed of just one instrument interacting with an instrumentalist would be quite primitive compared to a stream of music resulting from the interaction of a full orchestra of instruments with instrumentalists.

I think likewise with a stream of sentience, aka a mind. I think a mind can be reduced to the X which combine to make up the stream of sentience. In this case, I don’t know what X is or how to define/describe it. (Earlier, I described X as a unit of mental.)

But, I do think that a stream of mind is altered when parts of the brain are damaged and/or removed.

Furthermore, I think streams of sentience resulting from “simple” brains (or brain-like systems) interacting with the environment are primitive compared to streams of sentience resulting from the interaction of a human brain and the environment. The point, though, is that these streams exist no matter how primitive.

Finally, a stream of music is the symphony. And neither the instruments nor the mechanical instrumentalists experience the symphony.

The symphony is a thing unto itself.

Likewise, a stream of sentience is the mind. That is to say that a stream of sentience isn't experienced by the brain or the environment. Said again: The brain does not experience.

Rather, a stream of experience is a thing unto itself.


listened to this today on the drive home, coincidentally around 24 minutes in is an interesting analogy to music - the whole thing is worth a listen, but that section is only a couple minutes or so . . .
 
@Constance My impression is that you're attempting to reduce the experienced world and the embodied consciousnesses that experience it to 'information', which you seem to think of in only highly abstracted and reductive terms.

That’s correct. The reason I am doing that is because so far as I can tell, all complex things in reality seem to be made up of less complex things.

Songs are made of notes. Bodies are made of cells. Liquids are made of molecules. And on and on. I don’t see how or why “mind” should be any different.

From my perspective, referring to the experienced world as ultimately information - while maybe unromantic - is not inaccurate. For instance, it may be unromantic to refer to a gourmet meal as fuel, but at the end of the day, that’s what it is.

@Constance You apparently do not want to think about consciousness in terms of our felt existence in a local palpable physical world evolved over eons out of the quantum or lower substrate.

Oh no, I actually do. I’m quite interested in that! For instance, I think evolution explains why different organisms (IPSs) experience reality differently.

For instance, when a human and a bumblebee look at (exchange information with) a flower, they see (experience) drastically different things.

split_uv.jpg


So what is the real color of the flower?

@Constance In what you've described, the connectedness between what we feel and think is severed from the environment in which feeling and thinking occur, and consciousness somehow becomes 'metaconsciousness' of feelings and ideas that are not actually felt or thought existentially out of our phenomenal experiences.

I’ll never forget what my high school science teacher once told me. He said, when you reach out and touch something - such as a tabletop - you’re not actually touching it. What you feel is the atoms of which your fingers are composed pushing against the atoms of which the tabletop is composed. The particles of which those two things - hand and desk - are composed never actually touch.

Yes, this produces a very cold, isolating picture of reality, but that does not mean it’s false.

However, I don’t think we - on the macro scale at which we experience reality - “feel” that about reality. I’m not suggesting that what we feel is an illusion per se, but that what we feel is subjective. Again, what color is the flower?

Regarding the idea of meta-sentience: I’m not suggesting consciousness does not exist. It does of course.

What I am suggesting is that consciousness is distinct from sentience. For example, Helen Keller had sentience before she had consciousness. That is, she had a stream of experience before she had an awareness of that stream of experience.

I think there are many non-human entities that have a stream of experience such as bugs, worms, mice, etc. An entity can have a stream of experience while lacking an awareness that they are having a stream of experience.

For example:

Rock - no stream of experience (non-sentient)

Mouse - stream of experience, no awareness of stream of experience (sentient, non-self-aware)

Human - stream of experience and awareness of stream of experience (sentient and self-aware)

However, a stream of sentience and a stream of self-aware sentience both come about the same way; that is, by the physical interaction of brains (IPSs) with the surrounding environment.

@Constance So "a stream of sentience is the mind" but the mind is not "experienced by the brain {or the being that has a brain} or the environment, and "a stream of experience is a thing unto itself" that seems to take place in a 'mental unit' in but not of the physical world -- connecting directly neither with the palpable world nor with experiential being in the world.

To clarify: I’m suggesting a stream of mind doesn’t take place “in” a metal unit, but rather is composed of some type of singular, “mental” unit. For example, a stream of music (a song) is composed of notes; we wouldn’t say a song took place in a note.

@Soupie Furthermore, I think streams of sentience resulting from “simple” brains (or brain-like systems) interacting with the environment are primitive compared to streams of sentience resulting from the interaction of a human brain and the environment.

@Constance I'm confused by that reference to brains as "interacting with the environment" since you seem to allow no ground for such interaction in what you've characterized as the mutual discreteness of mind, brain, and environment, having eliminated consciousness from your theory.


Hmm, no; on the contrary, the stream of experience arises only as a result of the ongoing physical interaction of the brain/body with the environment.

Back to the music analogy: although we can say a song, instruments, and instrumentalists are discrete, they are intimately connected. Such is the relationship of the mind, body, and environment.

Also, while I do describe the mind, brain, and environment as discrete, from the perspective of reality consisting of a foam of quantum particles such discreteness doesn’t really exist. @smcder had mentioned a vortex in water. That’s a beautiful analogy!

That’s the idea of the primal substance and how this substance has differentiated into systems such as brains that interact with other differentiated things such as a gentle breeze.

Think of humans, planets, cities, cars, toothbrushes, and everything else as vortices that have differentiated - not in water - but in the sea of particles which make up our universe.

We feel, experience, and think on the macro level - the level of differentiated vortices - but just as vortices are composed of water and water composed of H2O, so too are we - both our bodies and our minds - composed of more fundamental units.
 
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So what is the real color of the flower?

I apologize if this has already been covered, and for doing another hit and run on this thread.

The answer is that things like "color" and "sound" (among others) only exist as experiences generated within the organism having them. The flower is for all intents and purposes "invisible" until we pick a spectrum and an instrument to observe them with, then and only then, is the appearance determined by the instruments operational parameters.

There is no sound unless there is a functioning auditory system translating the mechanical movement of the atmosphere into a bio-electrical event in the brain of the organism exposed to the atmospheric movement. The same can be said for vision.

We talk a lot about brains and consciousness, however I think the entire organism has to be taken into account as a functioning whole that serves as a transducer translating world events into the stuff of consciousness which of course aren't the same things in either form or substance.
 
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The answer is that things like "color" and "sound" (among others) only exist as experiences generated within the organism having them.
Exactly.

I think the entire organism has to be taken into account as a functioning whole that serves as a transducer translating world events into the stuff of consciousness...
See "music, instruments, instrumentalists" analogy above.

[T]he stream of experience arises only as a result of the ongoing physical interaction of the brain/body with the environment.
 
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Exactly.

See "music, instruments, instrumentalists" analogy above.

[T]he stream of experience arises only as a result of the ongoing physical interaction of the brain/body with the environment.

Shouldn't the "environment" be said to include the organism itself as experiences can be had without or in opposition to interaction with the external environment, such as provided by dreams, and hallucinatory experiences?

Can't consciousness be seen as essentially the organism experiencing itself, modulated if you will, by transformations in the environment to which it belongs?
 
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